by Hillel Fendel
A gas agreement between Lebanon and Israel is apparently about to be signed, and so we must ask: How bad or good is it for Israel? Middle East expert Dr. Guy Bechor weighs in with an exclusive analysis of the deal governing hydrocarbon deposits in the waters claimed by each of the two countries. His widely-accepted conclusions show that Israel has made some very dangerous concessions, to say the least.
The agreement is four pages long, plus a letter deposited with the UN Secretary-General by each party.
Bechor prefaces his study by asking a series of questions, which he tellingly calls "the many dangers" to Israel in the agreement. These include: Is there truly a recognition of Israel's "buoys line?" What type of maritime border will it be – economic, or also territorial? Will the Lebanese be permitted to operate within Israel's territorial waters? Will Israel officially cede its claims? Will there be a change in Israel's territorial waters? (If so, this requires full Knesset approval and even a national referendum [Fendel's note: though some legal opinions disagree]). And, what are Hizbullah's responsibilities and commitments in this agreement?
Let us begin with Dr. Bechor's first conclusion:
1. There is in fact no de jure recognition of the "buoys line" despite the media deception in Israel. Rather, there is only a de facto recognition – and even this is only temporary.
What is the "buoys line?" It is a 6-kilometer long border-line that Israel drew west of Rosh HaNikra, Israel's coastal border point with Lebanon. It actually is the beginning of Line 1, which Israel presented to the United Nations in 2011 as its border, but is now being asked to repudiate. Though the putative agreement states multiple times that each party will retain its respective legal claims regarding this line, the agreement itself later actually contradicts this point regarding Israel's claims.
The agreement states that the area demarcated by the buoys will remain as is, i.e., not under Israeli control, until a future date when negotiations will be held regarding the ground borders (specifically regarding a small adjustment of a few meters demanded by Israel north of Rosh HaNikra). "The parties agree that the status quo will remain in force, notwithstanding [their] differing legal positions in this area, which remains undelimited."
That is, the Israel demand for UN and Lebanese recognition of the legality of the "buoys line" and the border adjustment at Rosh HaNikra is not happening. The only thing that Israel is receiving is a recognition of the existing situation (de facto), leaving Israel in technical violation of the international maritime border, in accordance with the claims of Lebanon and the UN. As such, what does this agreement give us, other than a continuation of the existing situation? Even worse, it turns an all-but-forgotten issue into a burning and dynamic issue for the future.
In its letter deposited with UN Secretary-General, Lebanon does not even relate to this matter – for from its standpoint, the agreement relates to its legal claims and views the area as Lebanon's.
Even worse: The "buoys line" is a remnant of the Israeli line from 2011 – but in the agreement's Clause D1, Israel agrees to ignore the Line 1 claim it made to the UN, such that the "buoys line" loses even this legal basis, remaining totally virtual and in the air.
And in fact, in Israel's to the Secretary–General, Israel agrees to ignore Line 1, thus leading to the logical conclusion that its "buoys line" claim is also null and void.
This point is the heart of the agreement, and Israel must not agree to it! To put it succinctly: The agreement strengthens Lebanon's legal claim regarding the all-important "buoys line," while liquidating Israel's – and at the same time, retains the status quo, without legal basis, until further announcement. It is clear that after Lebanon receives what it wants in this agreement, it will initiate an international-legal campaign against Israel's position.
The agreement anchors Lebanon's gains for the next several decades, and possibly forever. Israel is too worried about what will happen in the coming days, while signing an international agreement that is slated to last forever. Does Israel not realize that the de-jure is more important the de-facto??
This unfortunately brings to mind the "peace" agreement with Jordan, in which Israel was allowed to lease for 25 years some disputed territories that Israel had controlled ever since the Six Day War. However, at the end of the 25 years, Jordan "surprised" Israel by refusing to renew the lease for another 25 years, against Israel's expectations. An indication of the Israel naivety in this respect was expressed by Yossi Beilin, one of those responsible for the agreement from the Israeli side, who said, "Who would ever have believed that 25 years would pass so quickly?"
In short, the claim that this agreement will put an end to Lebanese claims on our waters, once and for all, is simply untrue.
2. In defense of the agreement, it has been stated that it does not relate at all to Israel's territorial waters, but only to its economic waters.
Patently false. A joint letter to the Secretary-General – a legal document in every sense, and one that establishes norms of the agreement – includes a clear Israeli and Lebanese recognition of the fact that the agreement relates to the territorial water borders. The wording is as follows:
• A line of delimitation of the territorial sea,
• A line of delimitation of the exclusive economic zone
Incidentally, the Lebanese letter includes references to clauses in the UN Charter on international maritime borders, while Israel's letter does not. This is a clear indication that the Lebanese are already preparing their next stage in the legal battle over its maritime borders with Israel.
It is important to note that the Israeli government's opposition in the Knesset, led by the Likud, demands that the agreement not be ratified only by the government, but by the entire Knesset, since it apparently calls for a contraction of Israel's borders.
Furthermore: The agreed-upon border in the agreement, Line 23 in the accompanying map, not only represents a tremendous Israeli concession, but is defined in the agreement as a "maritime boundary line" in all respects – and not only as an "economic boundary." This has led Hizbullah to jump and claim that it is a full-fledged border, meaning that Israel's navy would not be permitted to cross it. This ban would prevent Israel from entering even international waters off Lebanon, and even waters that are currently, before the finalization of the agreement, Israel's territorial waters.
This is no trivial matter, and under normal circumstances, it should lead to Israel's toppling of the entire agreement. No clarification exists in the agreement emphasizing that this is only an economic border. A tremendous breach is thus left open for future border disputes that could take place even on a daily basis. It is simply inconceivable how our negotiators approved such a clause. It means that Lebanon sees the area thus demarcated as its "defense umbrella" against Israeli military maritime activity – yet refuses to allow Israel to have a much smaller such umbrella, demarcated by the "buoys line."
It should be understood most clearly: Once Lebanon receives what it wants, it will begin its international legal battle to receive even the area up to the "buoys line," and can be expected to succeed in winning UN support against Israel in this fight. This is typical of how the Lebanese managed the negotiations in this agreement, gradually biting off one bit at a time.
The transfer of Israeli territorial areas in the Mediterranean Sea to our Lebanese enemy is buried in the agreement, by referring only to naval coordinates, which are not understood by the general public.
3. Amazingly, the operator of the Lebanese maritime gas deposits will be permitted to pass through Israeli waters – but Israeli operators will not be allowed to pass through Lebanese waters.
The pink areas in the accompanying map represent potential Lebanese gas deposits. Block 9 is currently the only one that is estimated to possibly have significant deposits, in an area (red, on the map) that extends into Israeli territory. The operator of Block 9 on behalf of Lebanon will be allowed to pass through Israeli waters for operational purposes, after having given advance warning, and Israel will not be allowed to protest or refuse. The opposite scenario does not exist in the agreement – yet it is this that is critical for us, for it prevents Israel from laying a gas pipeline between Israel and Turkey, or at least makes it most difficult. Why is there no symmetry here??
The four "boundary" lines on the map, from north to south, are: Israel's proposed line, the Hof compromise, the Lebanese line of 2010, and Lebanon's "improved" lines (from its standpoint…) of 2020.
The agreement allows Israel's economic waters, and perhaps its territorial waters too, to be compromised, and Israel will have no right to object. But why should the operator for Lebanon have to pass in Israel's water in the first place? These are very dangerous precedents for the future.
4. Lebanon appears to have rights to seek out gas deposits in Israeli territory!
The agreement states: "Israel will not exercise any rights to develop hydrocarbon deposits in the Prospect [the red area of the map] and will not object to… reasonable activities in pursuit of the development of the Prospect. Israel will not exploit any accumulation or deposit of natural resources… extending across the boundary line in the Prospect."
Dr. Bechor notes that this area where Israel is not allowed to drill and Lebanon is permitted to drill is not clearly marked, and that this is very dangerous. Why? "Because the area in which Israel is not allowed to drill reaches almost up to its own Karish deposit. Perhaps the Lebanese will choose to set up additional drilling platforms in proximity to Karish from other angles, and claim them as their own? Israel will not even be allowed to object! Without a precisely marked border, disputes can arise, leading to all sorts of trouble that we wish to avoid."
5. Hizbullah: Everyone knows that Hizbullah is the power behind the throne in Lebanon, yet it is not mentioned in the agreement.
The fact that Hizbullah is not a party to the agreement means that it is not bound by it. "It can therefore serve as a tool in the hands of the Lebanese 'government,'" Bechor explains, "and can violate it at will, or act against it, thus threatening Israel – while Israel is totally bound by the agreement without any proxies that can serve its interests."
Among other problems raised by Dr. Bechor are these:
* Although the agreement prevents Iranian operators from operating in Block 9, this does not apply to Block 8. It also appears that there are several loopholes whereby Iran could, despite this clause, get its foot in the door of this agreement.
* Israel is required by the agreement to cede its claim to Line 1, while Lebanon cedes its claim to Line 29. But Lebanon is not clearly required to cede its claim to Line 23! "It is not acceptable to leave this issue open and unclear," Bechor writes, "as the Lebanese left this purposely vague. The agreement must be clarified and rectified regarding Line 29."
* Israel is to receive, from the operator, a percentage of any profits engendered by the deposits in Block 9 – but again, the critical details of this arrangement are not specified, and can therefore be a source of dispute and even international litigation.
Dr. Bechor concludes: "As a civil lawyer for 35 years, and a Middle East expert for 42 years, and a doctor of Arab-world commercial and civil law for 24 years, I would never consent to sign such an agreement under any circumstances. If it is approved, it would be a case of mali principia malus finis, 'a bad end from a bad beginning.'"