Tuesday, April 9, 2024

Hamas Wants an Israeli Surrender, Not a Deal

by Prof. Eyal Zisser, Vice Rector of Tel Aviv University and the holder of The Yona and Dina Ettinger Chair in Contemporary History of the Middle East, translated by Hillel Fendel.

Now that the same scene has repeated itself, wherein Israel sends teams to negotiate the release of our hostages, hopes are raised, and then Hamas refuses, it is very clear:Hamas Wants an Israeli Surrender, Not a Deal.




The negotiations Israel is waging with Hamas regarding the release of the 134 live and dead hostages are making no progress, to the great sorrow and frustration not only of their families, but of the entire nation.

The U.S., Egypt, and Qatar, who took upon themselves the role of mediators, keep coming up with new formulas and improved outlines, hoping to appease Hamas. Israel, too, is actually showing willingness to soften its stance and make comprises and concessions – but Hamas simply hardens its own stance with each cycle, not reducing its demands and showing no inclination to compromise. Basically, it seems clear that Hamas has no inclination to make a deal at all.

The Hamas representatives - leaders of the terrorist organization who live outside Gaza in luxury hotels made available to them by Qatar - come readily to the talks with the mediators, whether in Qatar or in Egypt. Perhaps they do so to please the Qataris, who finance and host them, but their main reason is that they know that the very existence of the talks is their life insurance policy against Israel's attempt to eliminate them.

But it is now six months after the war began – and it is clear to all that this traveling Hamas circus making the rounds from one luxury hotel to another in Qatar, then Egypt, and then back again, has no significance or importance whatsoever. For it's not these wined-and-dined reps making the decisions, but rather Yihye Sinwar – still hiding deep in some bunker somewhere in the southern Gaza Strip, frightened to death that the IDF will soon find him. Communication with Sinwar is sketchy, and frequently breaks up, making it quite difficult to wage substantial talks, and in fact dragging them out. 

But the truth is that the main problem is not a technical one, but rather one of substance.

It doesn't bother Sinwar at all that negotiations are taking place, for in his view, they serve to tighten the pressure on Israel both abroad and domestically. It doesn't bother him, but what does he want? The truth appears to be that he doesn't really want the talks to end with an actual deal, but simply with an Israeli surrender to all his demands: an end to the war, an IDF withdrawal from the Gaza Strip, the return of Gaza refugees to their homes, a massive release of Palestinian terrorists from Israeli prisons, and – the icing on the cake – guarantees that he and his men will not be killed or captured by Israel when the battles die down.

Sinwar, after all, couldn't care less about the residents of Gaza. For him, they are just "grease on the wheels of the revolution," who can easily be sacrificed for the good of his cause. What interests him is not how many of his men will yet die, but how history will remember this war that he initiated, and how it will contribute in the long-term to the Palestinian struggle against Israel. 

If Hamas manages to survive this war as a governmental and military force still able to stand on its two legs – this will be a great victory for Sinwar and Hamas that will only encourage him to continue along the same path.

Sinwar apparently believes that any deal with Israel that doesn't absolutely guarantee an end to the war is really just "on the ice." For he knows that as soon as he gives away his winning card – i.e., the hostages – Israel will immediately pursue him, and this time with no fear of accidentally hurting the hostages in the process. 

This gap between a.) the Hamas desire to buy more time, and b.) Israel's determination to continue the war to destroy, or at least neutralize, Hamas – can simply not be bridged. Therefore, the most that can be achieved now is a limited, partial release of some of the hostages [with no guarantee as to what will be with the remainder…], in exchange for a limited, temporary cessation of hostilities, similar to the several-part deal made a few weeks after the war began. 

However, in truth, Israel does have more wiggle-room than what we generally assume. This is because Gaza is in near-total ruins, and Hamas was severely stricken and damaged. The question is therefore not necessarily whether Israeli offensives will continue until the last of the Hamas battalions in Rafah is defeated. It is rather this: What will happen in Gaza on the day after the war ends?

The answer to this question is not only a military matter, but also a diplomatic issue – and this grants Israel extra room for maneuvering.

What is clear is that Israel has a moral obligation to turn over every stone in seeking to return the hostages home. Israel abandoned them on Oct. 7th, and their return will be a victory for Israel and for the Israeli spirit, and an important part of the defeat that we will yet deal Hamas.