Wednesday, March 18, 2026

Reports of the Demise of American-Israeli Alliance are "Highly Exaggerated"

by Zev Kam, public news commentator and reporter, translated by Hillel Fendel.




It took only a bit more than a week for the media onset of the usual nonsense about "cracks" in the cooperation between the U.S. and Israel in the war against Iran. This is precisely as it's been for years now in the Israeli media: In the first days of a war, we see almost total unity behind the army, government, and war objectives. But as the days go by, all sorts of hints of weariness and impatience begin to pop up, and even doubts regarding the "justness of our cause" – as if protecting ourselves against Iran needs justification. Then come the reports of "gaps" and disagreements and even tension between Israel and the U.S. This is how it happened in the war with Hamas, then regarding the battles in Lebanon, and even now in this unprecedented war with no-longer-nuclear Iran.

There are some who simply can't find it in their hearts to enjoy all this goodness. Either they're impatient, or they forgot the threat that Iran possessed, or their political agenda simply doesn't allow them to do anything other than try to bring down or even just criticize the government. So they look for any possible hint of disagreement between us and America, and if they find some minor Administration official who can say a half-sentence that shows less than total infatuation with Israel, they'll be happy to spread far and wide "news" of the end of the American-Israeli honeymoon.

The same thing is happening with alleged American criticism of Israel's bombing of Iran's gas reserves. The fact is that the coordination between Israel and the U.S. has remained as tight as it was two weeks ago. The Americans are still determined to go all the way, in contrast with the fake reports of "erosion" in their resolve. Trump 2026, in the Iranian context, is the same Trump as in his first term, when he quit Obama's nuclear agreement with Iran and successfully targeted the head of Iran's Revolutionary Guard (IRGC). He's also the same Trump who was nearly assassinated by Iranians. He knows precisely what Iran is and the extent of the threat it represents.

If anything, his appetite is getting stronger. If last June Trump gave us 12 days to wage a short war against Iran, this time he was predicted to give a full two weeks - and the clock is still running now, nearly three weeks later. The great early successes seem to have whetted his appetite, and he has therefore decided he wants more.

In this regard, we must clarify the respective goals of the two allies. Back at the end of last year, before the Iranian protests started, the goals defined by the Americans were very clear and precise: No nukes or intercontinental ballistic missiles, degraded IRGC and proxies, no regional aggression, and an end to Iranian missile development.

But during January, when toppling the Iranian regime began to seem possible, the Americans started to consider making this a war objective. This looked realistic especially when Trump announced to the Iranian public, "Help is on the way!" But we must remember that, in fact, absolute, official regime change has never been an American war objective. No matter how many Iranian government officials are killed and how many targets are bombed, in the end it's up to the Iranian people: If they don't take down their government themselves, it won't be done.

As of now, therefore, both Trump and Netanyahu will be happy if their original objectives are carried out.

If there is any fear of tension between the U.S. and Israel, it has to do with "the day after." It could be that precisely on the backdrop of the full bilateral cooperation at present, the Americans might come and tell us, "We were with you in Iran, now it's your turn to show us that you're with us regarding the Palestinian issues and the Saudi demands." Just like we were all sadly surprised when Trump announced his objections to Israeli sovereignty in Judea and Samaria, it's not out of the question that something similar will happen again.

On the other hand, that is far from the only scenario. It could very well be the opposite - that the Arab nations around us will realize that their own existential interests overshadow the Palestinians, and that they would be smart to continue their cooperation with the U.S. It would not be surprising at all if after the war, we see a quick rejuvenation of the Abraham Accords, at the expense of Abu Mazen and the Palestinian Authority. 

On the one hand, if the Iranian threat is neutralized, Saudi Arabia may feel it no longer needs us; after all, why should they pay a price in domestic public opinion by aligning with the Zionists? This is actually what happened after the war of last June: The Saudis thought we had removed the Iranian threat hanging over them as well as over us, and they therefore quickly distanced themselves from us.

Now, however, a fascinating partnership of fate has unwittingly emerged, wherein both they and we, along with other Gulf states, are being attacked by the same country. At the same time, the Saudis have discovered that the alliance they forged with Turkey and Pakistan is nothing but a broken reed, an alliance only on paper – for the Turks did not stand by the United States in this war, choosing rather the side of the “bad guys,” and the Pakistanis mainly looked for a way to avoid any involvement.

What Time Will it be Over? 

Back home in Israel, many are asking how it is that it appears that the Iranian missiles keep coming? Didn't we destroy them already?

The answer is that, numerically, Iran has in fact been firing fewer and fewer missiles in each attack, even though the number of bomb sirens has not decreased. This is actually the main challenge facing the IDF now: how to destroy the most missiles and launchers. One explanation is the cloudy weather in Iran in recent days, which has made it difficult to locate the launchers. In addition, it must be remembered that the more launchers are destroyed, the harder it is to find the rest of them. It will take a bit more time, but the IAF has expressed its confidence to the government that it will happen. When we reach, with G-d's help, a level of just one Iranian rocket per day, as it was with the Houthis for a long while, the entire economy will be opened, including schools and airports, and we will be in a different place.

Politically, what's going on with the elections scheduled for this October? It is now clear that this year's annual budget will be passed by the Knesset – an achievement that can be chalked up to Finance Minister Betzalel Smotrich's credit. The following sentence has not been spoken or written in Israel for over 30 years: It looks like the elections will be held on time, and will not be advanced because of some political crisis or another. All the talk about Bibi calling snap elections to take advantage of the war gains seem to be just that – talk – assuming that the work in Iran will be completed successfully.

And how did it come about that the hareidi parties agreed to support the budget and not topple the government even without the lenient hareidi recruitment bill they have been hoping for? It's complex, but the short answer is that in exchange for other political benefits, they convinced their rabbinical leaders that the charge of the hour now is to be united in the war and put aside matters in dispute.

And now, for desert, an encouraging true story: On Monday I happened to be in the Shivtei Yisrael synagogue in Givatayim for evening prayers, when all of a sudden we heard the familiar bomb siren. We all went down to the shelter, and within seconds, more people joined us as well: locals without a safe room at home, passersby who chanced to be there, etc. So there we were: one of us reciting aloud a chapter of Psalms, others with their knitted yarmulkes, older secular neighbors, young couples, and more than one with a dog. Children played and yelled enthusiastically around and about the adults – and all in great harmony of the most Jewish type. Different folks, brothers sharing troubles, brothers in Redemption.

Tuesday, March 17, 2026

Israel’s Demographic Momentum: A Growing Gap Between Jewish and Arab Trends

Based on "2026 Israel’s Demography Repudiates Conventional Wisdom" by Ambassador (ret.) Yoram Ettinger

For years, conventional wisdom warned of a looming demographic balance between Jews and Arabs in Israel because Arab fertility was far higher than Jewish fertility. But recent data suggests a different reality is unfolding—one marked by diverging trends in birth rates, fertility, and population growth.

A Widening Gap in Births

According to Israel’s Israel Central Bureau of Statistics, the number of Jewish births has risen sharply over the past three decades:

  • 1995: about 80,400 Jewish births

  • 2025: about 139,676 Jewish births

This represents a 74% increase.

By contrast, Arab births grew much more modestly:

  • 1995: about 36,500

  • 2025: about 44,000

That’s roughly a 21% increase.

As a result, Jewish births now make up about 76% of all births in Israel, compared to 69% in 1995. The gap is not just persisting—it’s widening.

Fertility Rates: A Historic Reversal

One of the most significant changes is in fertility rates.

For decades, Arab fertility was far higher than Jewish fertility. But that gap has closed—and in some cases reversed:

  • Jewish fertility: about 3.0 children per woman

  • Muslim fertility: about 2.5 children per woman

Around 2015, the two rates converged. Since then, Jewish fertility has often edged ahead.

This is a dramatic shift from the past, when Arab families were significantly larger on average.

Why Arab Fertility Is Declining

The decline in Arab fertility reflects broader social and economic changes:

  • Increased urbanization

  • Higher levels of education

  • Greater participation of women in the workforce

  • Later average age of marriage

  • Expanded use of contraception

These trends mirror patterns seen across much of the developing world as societies modernize.

Jewish Fertility: Unusual for a Developed Country

At the same time, Jewish fertility in Israel remains unusually high—especially compared to other developed nations.

Among countries in the OECD, most have fertility rates well below replacement level. Israel stands out as a rare exception.

What makes this even more notable is that:

  • Higher education and income in Israel do not necessarily lead to fewer children

  • Fertility is supported across multiple segments of society

While the Haredi Jews continue to have the highest birth rates, growth is also coming from secular and traditional populations.

Younger vs. Older Populations

Another emerging difference is in age structure:

  • The Jewish population remains relatively young, supported by higher birth rates

  • The Arab population, with declining fertility, is beginning to age gradually

Over time, this affects everything from workforce size to economic growth and social services.

Why This Gap Matters

These diverging trends are not just statistical—they have real-world implications:

  • Population balance: A growing Jewish share of births strengthens long-term majority trends

  • Economy: A larger, younger population supports workforce growth

  • National planning: Education, housing, and infrastructure needs shift accordingly

The Bottom Line

Israel’s demographic picture is no longer defined by convergence, but by divergence.

  • Jewish birth rates are rising

  • Arab birth rates are growing more slowly

  • Fertility trends have shifted in favor of the Jewish population

Together, these changes suggest that the demographic balance within Israel is evolving in ways that challenge long-held assumptions—and may shape the country’s future for decades to come.