Not as Innocent as They Seem

by Nadav Shragai, Israeli author and journalist, Yisrael Hayom newspaper, translated by Hillel Fendel. 

With all the media talk of the suffering of "innocent Palestinians in Gaza," it is important to know that many or most of them are not all that innocent. Hamas and the general populace of Gaza are one and the same - in the elections that Hamas won handily, in their hearts, and in actually keeping secret and helping out in the preparations for the mass attack.

The media coverage of what is happening in Gaza invariably mentions that the Gazans currently under attack are mostly the "non-involved" – i.e., not involved in the horrific attack on Jewish families two weeks ago. Let us take a look how "non-involved" they actually were.

Twenty thousand of them used to leave Gaza every day, before the massacre, to work in Israel. They worked in the Jewish villages near the border, as well as in larger towns such as Sderot and Ofakim, in the fields and elsewhere. Some of them had an extra assignment as well – assigned by Hamas: They wrote down details of their Jewish employers, such as number and locations of houses in a village, the locations of the living rooms and safe rooms, how many people live in each house, whether they have a dog, where they park their cars, and more. Everything was documented, and everything was handed over to Hamas. This was part of the infrastructure of the barbaric atrocity – the contribution of the "un-involved."

Many thousands of "non-involved" held "demonstrations" in the days before the massacre alongside the fence, where they apparently planted explosive devices and marked its weak points. They took active part in the great camouflage operation that succeeded for Hamas beyond all its expectations.

Salah Arouri, a top Hamas leader who generally hides out in Gaza, attempted to speak up for his fighters and say that it wasn't they who carried out the massacre, but rather the residents of Gaza. He said that many of the latter entered through the border fence and fought with Jewish settlers, and "as a result, people were killed." 

In addition, myriads of "non-involved" – the IDF says it was "hundreds of thousands" – have participated over the years in the "Marches of Return" along the fence. Over the course of these events, they threw explosives and Molotov cocktails over to our side, sent explosive balloons, and burned our fields. With their hearts filled with hatred, they know only their dreams of taking our place in Ashkelon, Lod, Acco and Ashdod.  How do we know this? Because they say it outright – just like, incidentally, their brothers in Judea and Samaria and even some of them in Israel. Hopefully, many of us now will take them seriously and actually believe them. 

It's true that our true friend in the White House, President Biden, is not yet convinced, but this will come as well – for the Palestinians have creative ways to explain themselves.

What else can we say about the "non-involved?" They danced with wild joy around the vans holding the kidnapped children, elderly, women and young boys. They chanted "Death to the Jews!" and helped Hamas hide them. They also helped Hamas move their rockets to hiding places. "Non-involved" mothers declared how proud they were to send their children to the campaign so that they would become martyrs, and "non-involved" teachers taught Gazan children that it is a religious duty to kill Jews.

In many funerals over the years of arch-terrorists that Israel managed to liquidate, hundreds of thousands of "non-involved" took part. For those who want to know exactly what happened there, Google and important tracking organizations such as MEMRI and Palestinian Media Watch can supply the precise wording of the horrific chants heard at those funerals, which received hate-filled roars of approval from the masses.

And who voted Hamas into power in the first place? Hundreds of thousands of Gazans voted in 2006 for Hamas, the organization whose charter calls openly for the destruction of Israel and the Jews. Hamas thus received 18 out of the 24 seats on the legislative council in Gaza. While Fatah received only 33% of the vote at the time, Hamas received 43%. It also won in eastern Jerusalem, and did well in Shechem (Nablus), Hevron, and elsewhere. Uncommonly for the PA, these were actually democratic elections, run according to law; the 250 EU observers who were on hand confirmed this. Thus, the results mirrored precisely the preferences of the Arabs of Judea, Samaria and Gaza. Today, 17 years later, all indications are that support for Hamas has grown, not weakened.

In short: Hamas and Gazan residents are one – in elections, in heart, and in deed. Many of them knew of the preparations for the massacre, helped facilitate it, and certainly did not reveal it. The IDF is a moral army and does not purposely target civilians – but in case civilians are hurt, we need to know who they are and what they stand for.

Held Captive in Wrong Conceptions

by Dr. Chaim Misgav, translated by Hillel Findel

With nightmarish photos all over, and with our blood boiling, it could be that now is not the right time – but I can't help bringing up some points that may have been forgotten.

Here it is, exactly 50 years later [after the Yom Kippur War], and it's happening to us yet again: Arrogance and overconfidence. Getting stuck in our misconceptions. Generals who talk and talk. Similar things happened then along the Suez Canal - and yet the lessons were not learned.

It appears that each and every mistake is being repeated in turn. The idiotic Bar-Lev line (a chain of Israeli fortifications along the eastern bank of the Suez Canal, designed to delay an Egyptian invasion by at least 24 hours; in the event, however, the Egyptians overran it in under two hours when they initiated the Yom Kippur War) collapsed almost as easily as the Gaza border fence was broken through ten days ago. The cries of despair of the soldiers who were captured in the Sinai outposts 50 years ago were very similar to the recent desperate pleas of our citizens – women and children, this time – in their emergency shelters, waiting, often in vain, for the arrival of the IDF rescue forces. The over 200 captives and 1,300 dead, and their families, paid and are paying the price of the conceptual blindness of those who were supposed to protect us.

The reason I'm bringing up that accursed war – which, it must be remembered, we ultimately won – is only because of the plague of "getting stuck in our misconceptions" that keeps on striking at us and dragging the State of Israel to the edge of the abyss. When Yasser Arafat, for instance, put on his "peacemaker" mask back in 1993 to sign the Oslo Accords, Israel's security establishment relied upon a totally hollow "conception." For some reason, our security leaders built up this idea in their heads that terrorist-mastermind Arafat had actually suddenly become a man of peace, and was willing to give up his dream of destroying Israel in exchange for a few slivers of land (large slivers, actually). But even when the streets of Israel were awash with the blood of the "sacrifices of peace" in the ensuing intifada, and another illusory conception collapsed, no one of its supporters apologized. Not then, and not since then. 

And when "Gaza First" was implemented, and cities there were given over to PA control, and Gaza then became a nest of murderers – again, no one woke up. The security zone in southern Lebanon, the one that supposedly promised peace and security to the Israeli citizens living near the Lebanese border – was abruptly and wildly abandoned by the IDF, in the hope that our enemies would appreciate our generosity. But the consequences were too bitter to bear. The Hizbullah terrorist organization, which until then had been a mouse, became a lion of monstrous proportions. The shameful Israeli withdrawal that left our southern Lebanese allies helpless and vulnerable returned upon us like a boomerang. It seemed to be very difficult for Israel to learn this lesson: In the Middle East, those who give up on land are not viewed as very strong or threatening.

Not long afterwards, when the Disengagement from Gush Katif in Gaza was being considered by Ariel Sharon and his government, generals sat sternly in the TV studios and explained how the expulsion of thousands of families would strengthen our security. The PR agents of this move – politicians, journalists, academics, and many more – cast aspersions on anyone who dared raise the possibility that a retreat from Gush Katif might strengthen the Hamas terrorists running around in Gaza. Craziness seemed to be the name of the game. 

Of course, there were many on the left who still continued, and continue, to believe that a similar withdrawal from Judea and Samaria was a good idea. Peace is just around the corner, they explained to us, if we just give in a little bit more... 

And I haven't yet even mentioned the "gas agreement" with Lebanon of last year; the affidavits submitted to the Supreme Court tell the whole story.

The horrific events since the Simchat Torah holiday are truly blood-curdling, and our bitterness, confusion, fright and anger – all together – know no bounds. It could be that I am a bit too quick to bring up these points. But I felt that I had no choice. If we do not look directly and clearly at our situation, we will once again suffer the consequences. It is very sad to realize that even now, there are those in our midst who feel that the current circumstances are a good opportunity to renew the concept of a Palestinian state in the heart of our homeland. 

I did mention the idea of "trapped in a misconception," did I not?

The Gaza Fence is Just an Excuse

by Ahikam Himmelfarb, originally published in Hebrew in B'sheva magazine, translated by Hillel Fendel

The Hamas Arab riots against Israel at the Gaza border fence have started up again. Many interests are at play there, beginning with internal Gazan politics and all the way up to regional and national scheming involving even Qatar. Israel's largely passive containment policy is liable to lead to a worsening of the situation, including possibly a major military offensive.

Between 2018 and 2021, the Hamas leadership that controls the Gaza Strip was behind the violent riots at the border fence. Thousands of Gazan Arabs took part in those events, demanding to return to the villages they abandoned in 1948. The riots were often violent, and included the hurling of explosive charges and Molotov cocktails at IDF soldiers; hundreds of Arab attackers were killed or injured in response. The protests originally broke out in protest of the move by US President Trump of the embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem, and against the blockade imposed by both Egypt and Israel on the Gaza Strip. Now in 2023, with the aim of blackmailing Israel and attaining achievements that will be detailed below, the Hamas leadership is trying to reenact those demonstrations.

The first to initiate the 2018 protests were grassroots groups in Gaza, and not Hamas. As the protests gathered support, however, the Hamas leadership began to fear that the residents' anger would soon be turned against Hamas itself, in light of their long-standing criticism of Hamas. This was a time when the Badna Naish (We Want to Live) movement was gaining steam on social media, protesting against the generally poor living conditions in Gaza. Hamas thus decided, "If you can't beat 'em, join 'em – and better yet, lead 'em." And so Hamas, together with other extremist groups, spread its sponsorship over the fence events. The violence intensified, and on one day in May 2018, 62 Arabs were killed when they made a full-blown attempt, with weapons and gunfire, to break through the fence and swarm into Israel. 

After a two-year hiatus, near-riots have now started up again, though currently on a much lower scale than the previous ones. 

Prof. Kobi Michael, a senior researcher at the National Security Research Institute, says that Hamas often begins to incite hatred against Israel whenever it begins to feel internal opposition intensifying. But beyond that, he says, "there are another four primary reasons for [the Hamas-motivated protests and riots against Israel]. One of them is that they serve as a lever by which to pressure Israel for additional economic benefits, such as an increase in permits for work in Israel, more gas, or more raw materials allowed to be brought in to Gaza. In general this system works for them: By allowing this to happen, we pave the way for them to seemingly legitimately challenge us again and again - and each time more gravely."

"Another reason for Hamas to support the protests is that they also put pressure on Qatar. The Qataris are very angry at the Hamas leadership, and especially the Gaza leadership, because of its increasingly close relations with Syria, a great enemy of Syria. Qatar is one of the few Arab nations that did not renew its diplomatic ties with Syria. Qatar is interested, like Israel and Egypt, in retaining calm and peace, of which these border protests are the antithesis." That is, in a sense, Hamas is seeking to blackmail the Qataris into renewing their monthly cash handouts, by causing trouble and instability on the border. 

The third reason, according to Prof. Michael, is to prove to the Palestinian Arabs in Judea and Samaria that the Gazans are also contributing to the effort against Israel – even though a full-scale conflict with Israel is not a Hamas interest at this point. And the fourth reason that Hamas is organizing the violence on the Gaza border, such as by clearing areas in which to riot and organizing buses to the "front," has to do with conflicts within the Hamas leadership itself. Although the official leader is Yichye Sinwar, Salah al-Aghrouri is a very dominant figure there, and his interests lie with Iran, Hizbullah, and the Islamic Jihad, all of which seek to increase violence against Israel on all fronts. 

The number of participants in the protests is relatively small, something like a few hundred. However, the quality of the weapons and explosives used is high, and Prof. Michael assumes that either Iranian equipment or knowhow, or both, have made their way into Gaza. 

"Hamas can feel quite comfortable with the current situation," he says, "because it estimates that Israel will simply contain it and not respond more sharply than with an occasional attack on empty Hamas positions along the border. Hamas assumes that Israel, together with its current internal crisis, is addicted to the relative quiet in Gaza and is willing to absorb the occasional hostilities without reacting too strongly."

"Over the years, Israel has formed for Hamas a comfort zone in which it can act freely and challenge Israel a bit more each time. So Israel closes the Erez Crossing and doesn't allow workers to cross over, thus causing more economic pressure and incentivizing Hamas to increase its fence violence. As long as Hamas' operative assumption is that Israel will contain these events, Hamas will continue to challenge us at the fence. This will lead either to an event that spirals out of control into a much broader battle, or to a decision by Israel that the time has come to change the rules and respond much more strongly."

The View from the Other Side

We also spoke with L., an Arab journalist living in Gaza, who requested that we not specify his name to avoid the danger of Hamas learning that he spoke with an Israeli media outlet. Asked what the general populace feels about the border fence violence, he said, "There are different approaches. Some people support them because they are truly poor, and they hope that Israel will grant them several benefits and reliefs as a result of the protests. UNRWA used to give food to [grandchildren and great-grandchildren of] refugees, but this has partially stopped of late, and some people really need it. Aside from this most indigent class, there are also public servants of the Hamas government that support the protests because the financial crisis has led to their receiving only 55% of their salaries. They, too, hope that the pressure on Israel will work and that some of the economic penalties will be withdrawn."

Q. Why are they receiving only 55% of their salaries?

A. "Qatar used to give Hamas in Gaza $30 million in cash every month, but this amount has now dropped to $10 million, leaving much less for salaries. This is a recipe for catastrophe. If until now, the average civil servant received 2,000 shekels a month, and now he's left with about 1,000, what can he live on? He has to pay for electricity, water, services, internet, and rent, and of course food for himself and his family. What remains is simply not enough. This is why many in Gaza hope that these demonstrations will bear fruit and cause Israel to relieve some tensions."    

Q. You implied that there are those who oppose the violence at the border fence.

A. "Yes, there are many who have been harmed by it. There are some 18,000 workers working in Israel, about 8,000 of whom returned home for the Jewish holidays – and now won't be allowed back in to Israel. These workers brought in $1.5 million into Gaza. The people who were counting on this money also have families to feed and bills to pay, and naturally want to avoid political tensions. Of course, they can't come and say straight out that they're against the protests, because they live in Gaza. They can only say that they want to stay away from political disputes - and even this they direct only at Israel, not to elements in Gaza."

Just two days ago, after a round of negotiations regarding a possible halt to the border violence, Hamas announced that it would either renew or not stop the protests "because of Jews visiting the Temple Mount."

Ben-Ami: The Idea of a Palestinian State Has Been Cremated

by Nitzan Keidar, translated by Hillel Fendel

Former Foreign Minister Shlomo Ben-Ami says the right-wing was right: The Palestinians never wanted a state, and won't get one.

For many years, the Israeli left pegged the Oslo Accords as the basis for the solution of a Palestinian state to be established in Judea and Samaria. Barely a voice was ever heard from the left saying otherwise. However, many who believed in this approach have recently changed their position, especially in light of the Abraham Accords that showed that normalization with Arab countries does not require a prior agreement with the Palestinians.

One of those who has been looking on for years at the large disparity between the Oslo dream and its manifestation – and in his case, with sadness – is Prof. Shlomo Ben-Ami. He is a historian and diplomat who served as Foreign Minister, among other positions, in the short-lived Ehud Barak government, and later backed the far-left Meretz party. Even more significantly, he took part in the Camp David talks in which Barak agreed to a Palestinian state on some 97% of Judea and Samaria – to which Yasser Arafat did not agree. 

Thirty years later, it is his estimation that nothing at all is left of the Oslo Accords – as he explained in his book published last year, "Prophets without Honor: The 2000 Camp David Summit and the End of the Two-State Solution."

A frequent lecturer on Israeli-Palestinian relations, Ben-Ami agreed to grant an interview to the Besheva weekly. By way of introduction, he said: "The Oslo Accords had two objectives. One was a permanent solution between us and the Palestinians, which of course was not achieved – and in fact we are now perhaps further than ever from an implementation of the two-state solution. The second goal was to form some type of Palestinian entity with which we could talk and have some stability; this was achieved only partially."

He added that the Palestinian Authority that was formed as a result of Oslo "is largely a handicapped entity – due to factors that include the culture of the Palestinian nationalist movement, the fragility of the situation, the Israeli occupation, the deep divide that exists [in Palestinian society], and of course its culture of corruption." 

Q. Some blame the failure of Oslo on the Israeli politicians involved, primarily Binyamin Netanyahu and Ehud Barak. Do you agree?

A. No, nor do I agree that "Israeli evil" is at fault. The problem is much deeper than that. There is no denying that the Palestinians are an uprooted and divided people*, a nation that never had a leadership with a vision for statehood. The idea of a Palestinian state is alien and foreign to the Palestinian national movement. Unlike the Zionist movement, which saw a state as the end-goal of the process, the [Arabs in the Land of Israel] do not see a state as the end of the process. Rather, their movement simply wanted only a return of what [they felt] was stolen from them, namely lands and refugees. It's true that in 1988, Arafat made a declaration in Algeria about Palestinian independence, but with Arafat you could never tell what he really meant. I spent a lot of hours with him, and not one word of his could be taken at face value. I really don't know what he actually wanted, and I don't think anyone did."

The failure of Oslo "is not a question of blame. It's a very complex issue that involves not only the players in the negotiations, but also the circumstances. Some say that Barak didn't offer enough – [but in fact] he offered 97% of the territory, more land outside [Judea and Samaria] to complete it to 100%, a de-facto division of Jerusalem, total Palestinian control of the Temple Mount – so how can he be blamed for not offering enough? … Then Olmert came and offered even more, things that no one ever dreamt of."

*[HF: Many, in fact, do deny that they are a people, much less that they were uprooted]

Q. There have been claims that if Rabin had not been assassinated, Oslo could have succeeded. What's your opinion?

A. "I don't think so. If Rabin would have lived to lead the negotiations, he would have gotten to the same point that we reached. The maximum that Rabin was willing to give did not meet the minimum that the Palestinians demanded."

[HF: Rabin was actually on record as saying that he would grant the Palestinians only "something less than a state." He also explained that he saw Oslo as leading to the "preservation of the unity of Jerusalem under our sovereignty; keeping the settlements intact; preserving our right and duty to ensure the security of settlements and safeguard the lives of all Israelis staying in the territories; and naturally, our responsibility for external security."] 

Ben-Ami reiterated often in the interview that it was never clear what exactly the Palestinians really wanted: "Even when Israeli leaders agreed to make great concessions on their behalf, Arafat and his negotiators never agreed to anything. They never agreed to the interim agreement… I remember I said to Arafat, 'Let's take care of the burning issues, and push off the issue of Jerusalem for two years.' He said: 'Not even two hours!' The entire idea of Oslo was that it was predicated on what Henry Kissinger called 'constructive vagueness,' in that it stated that issues such as a state, Jerusalem and refugees should be discussed, but without setting any [objective or framework]. Anyone who came afterwards to try to negotiate these points found himself in a minefield."

Q. What types of "mines" were these?

A. "Those who came to negotiate the permanent solution meant to discuss the problems of 1967 [i.e., the issues resulting from the Six Day War in 1967], but we found ourselves discussing the issues of 1948. In addition, I can't guarantee that Arafat even read the Oslo Accords. All he wanted was to be allowed back into the territories, and for this goal he was willing to sign on Oslo. Even in his car on his way to Gaza, he brought with him a terrorist about whom Rabin expressly said would not be allowed in."

"Oslo was Arafat's ticket back into the Land of Israel. He was the founder of the nationalist Palestinian movement, and this was his great historic role. He detached the PLO from the grasp of the Arab states' leaders and made it an autonomous movement. The most important event that happened after the PLO's establishment [in 1964] was the first intifada [which began in late 1987] – and he wasn't around to lead it! He desperately wanted to return to the territories so that he could supplant the local Arab leadership that he hated."

On the other hand, Ben-Ami continued, "You could never make a concrete offer to Arafat, because he was never clear about what he wanted. So then you give another bit and another bit so that maybe it would appease [him]. But Arafat didn't want to make any decisions that would give up any of his movement's nationalist principles, nor did he want to do anything that would cause an internal war. So therefore it's very hard to say that if Barak or Rabin would have done something differently, the results would have been different."

Q. Could it be that the very approach of holding direct talks between Israel and the Palestinians for the purpose of a final solution was wrong?

Ben-Ami agrees with that premise, and says that the Jordanians should have been included: "I was a member of the Israeli delegation at the Madrid Conference of 1991 when I served as Israel's Ambassador to Spain. The Palestinians were represented by a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation – and this, in my opinion, was the main strategic problem of Oslo, in that it side-stepped the Jordanians and went straight to the Palestinian nationalist movement. Kissinger has said that Israel would never be able to meet all the PLO's demands, and that's why he tried to advance the dialogue via the Jordanian-Palestinian channel. He admitted that he made a mistake during the post-Yom Kippur War talks when he did not agree to give King Hussein a foothold in the West Bank [of the Jordan River]."

When talking with the Palestinians about Judea and Samaria, Ben-Ami said, "there is no constellation in which Israel can meet their demands. The nationalist Israeli Zionist movement when led by the left, and all the more so when led by the right, simply cannot meet these demands, which have always been simply too much." 

Even the Arab countries are not interested in a Palestinian state, Ben-Ami says: "Jordan never wanted a state, but caved in to the dictates of the Arab League. Egypt, too, never wanted a state; its president, Anwar Sadat, is quoted as having told Menachem Begin in Camp David that Jordan must be involved in the Palestinian solution. Carter agreed, and even Donald Trump asked King Abdullah to get involved – but he refused." 

The Right was Right!

Ben-Ami acknowledges that the nationalist camp was more correct in its analysis of future peace prospects than the left-wing: "The concept we always worked with was that if we solve the Palestinian problem, we'll have peace with the Arab world. This is what the left-wing camp – of which I am a part, intellectually – always thought. But the right-wing felt differently. I talked with [late Likud party prime minister] Yitzchak Shamir, who told me that we must first make peace with the Arab countries and then the Palestinians will follow along – and he was right. The left-wing mocked him, but the right was right, and the paradigm was in fact changed [with the Abraham Accords]."

"We can actually say that if we come to an agreement with Saudi Arabia*, the Israeli-Arab conflict will have ended before the Israeli-Palestinian conflict." 

It was actually Menachem Begin, according to Ben-Ami, who first detoured the Palestinian issue, by making peace with Egypt while simply mentioning the Palestinian issue in the agreement.  "This made way for a different type of solution to the Palestinian issue than that which the left-wing always strove for, without success." 

*[HF: assuming that this country does not make far-reaching demands on the Palestinian issue – an uncertain assumption at present]

Q. Will an agreement with Saudi Arabia require Israeli concessions on the Palestinian front? 

A. "Most certainly. I don't think the Saudis will demand a Palestinian state, but very likely they will speak of an Israeli construction freeze [in Judea and Samaria], and more… But I don't think that Netanyahu wants a Saudi diplomatic process that will bring down his own government."  

Ben-Ami added that even if a centrist-right government is formed, in which Benny Ganz's party replaces the parties of Smotrich and Ben-Gvir, "will such a government be able to talk about a Palestinian state in [all the land liberated by Israel in] 1967? That won't happen. This solution is no longer on the table – not because it's bad, but primarily because it has been proven that it is simply unattainable, and today even more so than before."

Translator's Note: Just today, Thursday, US President Joe Biden reiterated his country's commitment to achieving "two states for two peoples." Even prior to this, reports have been streaming in that Saudi Arabia won't agree to normalization with Israel without clear progress towards a "two-state solution." Based on his words in this interview, however, Prof. Ben-Ami still believes it won't happen.

Overriding the Supreme Court the Smart and Democratic Way

by Emanuel Shilo, Editor, Besheva Newspaper, translated by Hillel Fendel

1. The weekly anti-judicial reform protests have waned considerably in recent weeks, and it's not only because of the summer heat. Nor can it be attributed solely to a mass exodus to summer vacations abroad, or to the fact that the Knesset is in recess, or to the general tiredness, both physical and ideological, that has overtaken many of the protestors. A more precise reason would be that everyone is anxiously awaiting the results of the petitions against the recently-passed judicial reform outlawing "Not Reasonable" as a reason to nullify a duly-passed Knesset law; these cases are scheduled to be heard by the entire Supreme Court in another ten days or so. 

But the most precise reason for the ebbing of the protests is that there is barely anything to protest against! From the large, far-reaching judicial reform package that Justice Minister Yariv Levine presented several months ago, barely any of it is left on the table. 

It's true that for the hard core protestors, judicial reform had nothing really to do with the protests in the first place; they wanted nothing less than the toppling of the government, with judicial reform just their excuse. These professional protestors began their demonstrations years ago outside the Balfour St. home of Prime Minister Netanyahu. The main excuse then was the indictments handed down against him. Even before the judges in the case told the prosecutors how weak their bribery case against the prime minister was, the protest leaders quickly pivoted and adopted the judicial reform as their new "main" reason for protest. If judicial reform truly drops from the public eye, a new excuse can be expected to be used – for as long as the government still stands. 

But while the hard core can be expected to keep the protests going even for years, these will just be a nuisance, not more. To maintain a long series of genuine country-paralyzing protests, they need hundreds of thousands of people. How were these attained until now? Simple: they came out in droves only because of the lying propaganda that presented the judicial reform legislation as a bona fide drive to turn Israel into a dictatorship. No other excuse would actually get reservists in the Air Force, IDF Intelligence and the like to threaten not to serve. They are basically patriotic Israelis, after all, who agreed to weaken Israel militarily and economically only because they were lied to that Israel's government ministers and Knesset majority are preparing a revolution to overthrow Israel's democracy.  

2. There are in fact indications that the nationalist government's plans for genuine judicial reform are waning and ebbing away. For one thing, there are those on the right who see the societal crisis that has developed, and the threats of civil war, as well as the economic and security damage that has resulted – and feel that the government should unfurl a white flag and announce that further judicial reform has been placed on hold. And there are others on the right who agree with them simply because of the cold reality that a Knesset majority to pass additional such legislation is not likely to be found. Still others say there's no point in continuing since in any event the Supreme Court will do as it pleases, including abolishing any judicial changes it doesn't like. 

However, to give up now is not a good idea. For one thing, it would mean the perpetuation of the judicial system's many egregious faults and distortions, and this is a high price to pay. In addition, though it can be hoped that ending judicial reform will ensure that the protestors go home and leave us in peace, there is no guarantee that this will happen. After succeeding in thwarting a homogeneous, stable, 64-MK government, why should the coalition of leftists and elites not continue to use the same unconventional weapons to further trample the democratic majority and the government on every issue regarding which it holds a differing opinion? Since it is far from clear that this will not happen, why should we cave in now and possibly motivate them to continue their destructive and non-democratic behavior?

3. It has been reported that Netanyahu intends to pass into law only one more judicial reform: a change in the composition of the Committee for the Selection of Judges, to give the largely left-wing judges less of a decisive say in the appointment of new High Court judges. In this scenario, further changes would be made only in consensus with the opposition. 

Allow us to note that if it has been decided to suffice with only one more change, it is far from certain that the most important of the planned reforms is a change in the Committee.

As far as is currently known, the idea of giving the Committee a clear government majority, so that it could fill Supreme Court vacancies as it pleases, is no longer on the table. There are other proposals instead that would simply provide more balance. One idea, which might be the most far-reaching compromise the coalition would be willing to accept, is that the Committee would be comprised of an equal number of members from each of the coalition and the opposition, with no judges or Bar Association members. 

Certainly this idea is considerably better than the present situation, in which the government and the coalition have only three representatives out of nine. But still, it is not at all democratic, in that it gives the opposition minority equal power to that of the coalition majority. In any case, this formula is also not expected to pass without a strong fight – for why should Chief Justice Esther Hayut and her colleagues give up their place and power in the committee?  If we have to fight, then, why should we not fight for an even better proposal for the nationalist camp, such as having the judges elected in the Knesset Constitution Committee or in the Knesset itself, where the coalition always has a majority?

Another proposal, suggested by former Justice Minister Chaim Ramon, would also be a slight improvement for the right-wing – but very slight. Not for this did we make such a major effort to introduce judicial reform. If it is impossible today to make a major change in the composition of the Committee, it would perhaps be better to wait for a more favorable opportunity rather than to suffice with such a minimum achievement.

4. In any event, many years will pass before a change in the Committee for the Appointment of Judges will actually make a real difference in the High Court's decisions. Even if right now, judges with a Jewish-national outlook would be appointed, years will pass before they amass sufficient seniority to hear important cases. In fact, the composition of the Supreme Court for the coming few years does not look very good for the nationalist camp. Activist judges will control the Court for the coming years, which will continue to chip away at the authority of the government to rule and of the Knesset to legislate. It appears that the only way out is to restore these bodies their original authorities via a general, gradated "overruling clause." 

That is, it is hereby proposed as follows: The law must state that if the Supreme Court wishes to hear a case involving the possible overturning of a Knesset law, all 15 of its justices must hear the case, and may overrule the law only if at least 10 justices vote to do so. In such a case, the Knesset can then overrule the overruling with a majority vote of 61 MKs. If 13-14 justices vote to overrule the law, then a special Knesset majority of 65 would be required in order to restore it. And if all 15 High Court justices feel the law must be overturned because it violates a Basic Law, then 80 MKs would be needed to override the overruling and reinstate the Knesset law. 

It would seem that if the coalition has the power only to pass one law of judicial reform, the above would be the correct law to pass.