Freeing the Captives in Gaza: Where to Put the Pressure

by Rabbi Dr. Yoel Bin-Nun, Yeshivat Har Etzion, translated by Hillel Fendel.

What is needed now is not pressure upon Israel, but upon Qatar and the UN

For some strange reason, the main pressure exerted by Israelis regarding the hostages and their safety is directed not towards Hamas, not upon the UN, and not at the international community – but the Israeli government. This was definitely the Hamas plan when they decided to kidnap as many Israelis as they could this past Simchat Torah – and it is also the only success that they can show for themselves in this war.

The evil leaders of Hamas well know the nature of public pressure in Israel in these matters, and that it stems from instinctive Jewish brotherhood and solidarity. They also know that it thus works to the terrorists' benefit. This they learned from previous kidnappings, especially from Israel's release in 2011 of over 1,000 terrorists in exchange for one single solidarity IDF soldier (Gilad Shalit). Let us also note that Israel freed 1,150 terrorists back in 1985 in exchange for three soldiers.

Yes, several Israeli governments have already caved in to such pressures in the past, ignoring the lives of future captives [and future victims of the freed terrorists] – in favor of the lives of those captives who happen to be held now by the evil Hamas terrorists. They are certain that if they just succeed in holding them in such a way that an Israeli attempt to free them with force will endanger their lives, as well as the lives our soldiers in the liberating force – Israel will surely surrender. In such a case, Hamas will be able to present the only "victory photo" that it can achieve.

[Only] a few of those struggling for the cause of freeing the hostages have understood that their pressure must be directed against Hamas and its patrons, in every possible front around the world. But they, and we, must comprehend the situation correctly, so that their/our efforts will be effective. 

Let us picture the following situations and what could be their welcome results: 

• Pressure could be exerted, for instance, on the International Court of Justice in The Hague to hear petitions or suits against Qatar's funding of Hamas. Countries that support Israel must be encouraged to file these suits. Similarly, the court could consider the legality of Egypt's turning a blind eye to the smuggling of weapons from its territory to Gaza via Rafah.
• Or, picture what would happen if the United Nations would convene to consider the very fact that the holding of captives with no supervision by international judicial organizations, without medicines, without elementary steps being taken to safeguard their lives and health, is completely illegal under international law.
• What would be if Turkey and other Hamas-supporting countries would be sued for violation of international law in funding Hamas while it illegally holds captives? How about if pressure is exerted to get the international community to demand that the captives be immediately transferred to Egypt, which would then be required do release them to Israel?
• How about if we demand that the international community condition all further humanitarian aid to Gaza on the immediate release of all captives, including the bodies of those who were murdered?

All the protest marches and demonstrations in favor of the hostages must be held not in Israel or outside Israeli government offices, but outside the consulates and embassies of countries that support Hamas. It must be made clear to all that the Israeli captives are not regular prisoners of war, but rather hostages in the full sense of the world - people who have been stolen from their homes - in full violation of the most basic of all international laws.

Qatar, specifically, must be held accountable. If, under sharp international pressure, Qatar would inform the Hamas leadership that it will no longer support them financially, and that it will expel its leaders from its territory, if the hostages are not returned home – families all over Israel will joyfully be reunited without delay. [The Wall St. Journal reported that Qatar has in fact threatened to expel Hamas officials from their base in Doha should they fail to persuade the group’s Gaza-based leaders to agree to a deal.]

And/but if Israel agrees to some sort of compensation to Hamas for a Qatari ultimatum of this sort, I pray and hope that the price will not endanger Israelis in the near and far future.

In short, the pressure must be placed not where it will cause Israel to relax its demands on Hamas, but where it will cause Hamas to realize that its interests lie in releasing the hostages.

Good Intentions, Catastrophic Deeds

by Minister Orit Strook, Religious Zionist Party, translated by Hillel Fendel.

With only a few days left before the start of the Muslim month of Ramadan, Israel still has a chance to rectify its preparations. Israeli government minister Orit Strook says the goal must be to reduce – not enhance – the ability of the terrorists to attack us. This is an adaptation of her article, which first appeared in Besheva.

All eyes are now peeled towards the holy Muslim month of Ramadan and the terrorist attacks if often brings. US President Biden has said he is hoping for a deal to stop the fighting in Gaza before Ramadan, Defense Minister Galant is warning of a "Ramadan drift" [apparently referring to an upswing in terrorism], and the general public is fretfully weary of what the month might have in store.

For very long, Ramadan has been a time of tribulations, pogroms and Jewish bloodshed. Its dangers have kept many of our security strategists awake at nights – but for some reason their preparations for the month have often, including this year, been the opposite of what simple logic would dictate.

Every year, this crazy cycle seems to repeat itself. The IDF, Shabak and police all know that every year, Ramadan is a month of terrorist attacks. So what do they do in response? Set up more checkpoints? Arrest and detain known agitators? Not quite. Would-be terrorists held as administrative detainees are actually being released, and as it stands now, Arabs from the PA-controlled areas will be allowed to enter Jerusalem and pray at the Temple Mount.

Probably worst of all is that throughout Judea and Samaria, checkpoints that generally help prevent terrorist attacks are now being taken down – as "Ramadan gestures" to the Muslim population. As if it weren't crystal clear that these gestures will be taken advantage of to attempt to carry out attacks…

This very message is written in blood all over the highways of Judea and Samaria - yet still the security bodies insist on holding this same ceremony of removing the checkpoints every year. And then, when serious attacks resume, right on cue, the restrictions that had been removed are put right back in place. The announcement is usually made as families, friends and neighbors make their way to the victims' funerals. This has been, more or less, the same script for the past number of years; though to be fair, not every single year were restrictions eased, and even when there were, not every year were they then canceled. Over the past decade, restrictions were eased, then reinstalled, or nearly so, three times in the past decade – much too many times.

Great pressures were exerted on the Cabinet ministers to allow Arab workers from Judea and Samaria to enter pre-'67 Israel. But to their credit, they withstood and did not cave to the bullying.  Even the dangerous "pilot" program to this effect was not carried out, in the merit of the strong stance of the Cabinet members, and their sincere and responsible concern for the citizens of Israel.

But within Judea and Samaria – there the story is different. No one asks the Cabinet whether to enable free travel to Arabs of all stripes, without checks, on our traffic routes, adjacent to our communities, into our gas stations [in one of which, two Israelis were murdered last week]. These areas are apparently over and beyond, somewhere in the mountains of darkness, a type of no-man's-land where - even though more than a half-million Jews live there and another half-million travel there each day – only the "security bodies" determine how to get ready for Ramadan. And the way it decides is the way it has decided for years: in accordance with the "conception." [This refers to the preconceived and unchallenged notions that Israel "owned" Hamas, that Hamas was "deterred," and that infinite periodic rounds of limited battle with Hamas would keep the terrorists at bay with no need to ever make the hard decision to go to all-out war.]

But, as we see, it seems that even taking the "conception" route can reach new heights. And so it happened that last week – even as we were in the midst of mourning our two latest terrorism victims, shocked at the intolerable ease with the terrorist murderer was able to arrive by car carrying a lethal weapon to his chosen spot for his attack - and while we had still barely absorbed the significance of the fact that he was a PA "policeman" previously imprisoned for terrorist activity – as if all this was not enough, we suddenly hear of something even more ludicrous and incomprehensible: that dozens of terrorists, or would-be terrorists, not yet charged with crimes but held administratively, will actually be freed from their cells and sent home to their towns and villages throughout Judea and Samaria, to celebrate the "get out of jail" festivities that await them there.  

The eye reads these reports, the ear hears them, but the brain refuses to believe that they can possibly be true. After all, just three months ago we convened – the entire government – for an all-night meeting to debate whether to accept a deal of a very similar nature: the release of low-grade terrorists in exchange for the return of our women and children being held in cruel Hamas captivity. Some voted in favor, some voted against, but the deliberations were sincere and intense, and all understood that there was no getting around the fact that such a release, even if it would achieve the goal of returning [some of] the hostages, would surely mean a supportive backwind for further terrorism. And then, behold, just a short time later, the "security establishment" makes such decisions all by itself, and releases dozens of terrorists – on the eve of Ramadan, to boot.

And while we try to rub our eyes in disbelief, they tell us that the terrorists are only under administrative detention and that they were about to be released within a month in any event, and that the planned release has nothing to do with any Ramadan gesture. Then why are they doing it? Because, they say, of overcrowding in the prisons. Let's say that this is true. But – first of all, if so, how about releasing the Jewish administrative detainees? [A District Court is about to hear a suit demanding just that, in light of the planned release of Palestinian terrorists.]

Secondly, if there's no room in the jails, is there room in our cemeteries for the victims of the attacks? And in our hospitals, for the wounded?  Let the terrorists crowd themselves in a bit, and leave a little room in our cemeteries. Yes, I know that the Supreme Court has ruled on a minimum amount of space per prisoner – but there's a war going on, and there is terrorism, and there is Ramadan, in which every step we take that encourages terrorism has an exponential factor, and it costs us in blood.

It is very important for me to clarify: Not one of the decision makers is indifferent in any way to our security. Very much the opposite: These are people with values, with courage, who love the Jewish People, who are super-dedicated to our security, and are willing to sacrifice their lives for us, work day and night for the cause, and cry no less than we do over our dead and wounded.

But what? They are captive to the "conception" of Ramadan, whose mistaken operating instructions continue to direct their actions and decisions, and don't allow the facts to confuse them. And so they take the exact opposite course of what is required, endangering the nation they love and are convinced they are doing the best for.

During the Sin of the Golden Calf, about which we read in our weekly Torah portion this past week, Aharon the High Priest most certainly had the best of intentions when he unwittingly facilitated the fashioning of the giant idol. Rashi explains that he was simply trying to stall until his brother Moshe would descend from the mountain. He figured that when he would ask the women for their gold and silver, they would not rush to give… and all sorts of other calculations, all of which were for the sake of Heaven, in order to prevent idol-worship. But despite his best intentions, we know what happened in the end: A golden calf around which the people danced and worshiped.

Today, as then: All their best intentions are truly good and from loving and concerned hearts – but their decisions will be made based on the mistaken and so-dangerous "conception." There are just a few days left for them to fix their errors, and to truly and properly prepare for Ramadan, based on the catastrophic statistics of the past few years that showed more terrorist attacks and more dead Jews. The idea is to reduce the terrorists' abilities to get to us, not to expand them. This is our obligation, this is our responsibility, and this is what we must do.

Ramadan this year falls in the month of Purim, and therefore we must ensure the fulfillment of the verse, "contrary to what was decreed, the Jews ruled over their enemies."

Together, we will win!

Who Will De-contain Containment, Once and For All?

by Emanuel Shilo, editor of the Besheva weekly, translated by Hillel Fendel.

1. I first heard the word "containment" in a military-strategic context some 20 years ago. I took part in a tour organized for the religious media in the IDF's Gaza Division sector, whose headquarters in those days was near Gush Katif in the Gaza Strip.

Those were the days after the IDF's successful Operation Defensive Shield (March-April 2002), under the auspices of Prime Minister Ariel Sharon. It came in response to the soaring rate of terrorist murders that had reached well over 100 in the first four weeks of March alone. During the offensive, our forces captured the six large PA cities, including Ramallah and Shechem, and regained the intelligence capabilities it had lost since the signing of the Oslo Accords. 

We asked the Southern District Commanding Officer, Maj.-Gen. Dan Har'el, when would come the turn of Gaza to be "treated" to a similar operation to wipe out its burgeoning terrorist infrastructures.

Gen. Har'el said straight out: "It won't happen. Our policy in Gaza is different. It will be one of containment." 

This meant, he explained, that we don't intervene in anything that happens on the other side of the symbolic border fence between the Jewish communities of Gush Katif and the rest of Gaza, which had been given over to PA control a decade earlier. "Even if we know about, or even see, a terrorist deployment, or acquiring weapons, or training," the general told us, "we will take no action. Only if they attempt to invade our territory will we fight back."

2. We didn't have to be great military experts to sense, as I and others there did, that this approach made no sense. A policy that enables terrorist organizations to strengthen themselves seemed dangerous and disastrous to us. 

It was also far from the spirit of the Oslo Accords. These stipulated that whatever territory in Gaza, Judea and Samaria we hand over to Palestinian Authority rule would remain demilitarized, except for the weapons we agreed to provide the PA police. Hamas' acquisition of RPG's and other rockets that were launched at Gush Katif and Sderot were, of course, blatant violations of the agreement. In addition, the promise that the PLO would fight Hamas "without the [restrictions of the] Supreme Court and without [the protests of] B'Tselem," as then-Prime Minister Yitzchak Rabin promised, never happened. 

So why did the IDF initiate weeks of battle against the PLO in Ramallah and Jenin, but not in Khan Yunis and Gaza City? We didn't understand Gen. Harel's explanation, and in fact, he himself did not seem very convinced himself of the value of the "containment" policy. 

After the fact, we now know that it was that policy that ultimately led to the deterioration of security inside and outside Gaza. It also served as a justification for Ariel Sharon's decision to destroy the Jewish presence in Gaza and unilaterally withdraw the IDF from the Strip; this was what he called the infamous Disengagement and what the nationalist camp called the Expulsion. 

The ideological right-wing camp warned repeatedly that the Disengagement would turn Gaza into a greenhouse of terrorism, that the rockets on Sderot would become more powerful and frequent, and that they would soon hit Ashkelon and Tel Aviv as well. But the warnings were waved off and ignored; Israel's security establishment had fallen in love with the policy of containment, hiding behind fences, and closing eyes to Hamas' constantly increasing military capabilities.  

Our leaders explained to us that if we totally quit Gaza and return to the pre-'67 borders, we would have complete legitimacy to respond to any attacks upon us. This of course was never true, in that because we retained control over the airspace, for understandable reasons, our enemies around the world claimed that we never actually left Gaza. But Israel's security establishment was convinced that leaving Gaza was a great idea, and that we could deter Gazan terrorism simply by bombing from the air and from our side of the border. 

3. Soon, however, the failure of the conception of the Disengagement became too obvious to ignore. Just a half-year after the last IDF soldier left Gaza, the PA held parliamentary elections. Bragging that its terrorist activities and policies had gotten rid of the Jews, Hamas won a majority of seats in the PA legislature. Within a short time, Hamas and Fatah became embroiled in a cruel civil war; Hamas all but threw out Fatah, and Gaza became a political entity run by the Hamas terrorist organization and subjugated to its goals. 

For Israel, this meant constant rocket attacks against the Jewish communities just outside of Gaza, and periodic attacks against further targets such as Ashkelon and Be'er Sheva. The assumption that Hamas could be deterred just by return fire was proven to be an illusion. The IDF was forced to periodically enter Gaza, show strong force in destroying Hamas capabilities, and then withdraw with the job only partially done. 

The capture of IDF soldier Gilad Shalit from his tank on the border, and the fact that we were unable to reach and free him throughout more than five years, showed clearly how weak was our intelligence gathering capabilities in post-Disengagement Gaza.

Even when Gaza showed its prowess in firing its rockets even to Tel Aviv, Israel's government and military leaders still did not admit their error and come to the obvious conclusion: Gaza must be captured anew, cleaned of all rockets and of its terrorist government, and returned to Israeli control – if not administrative, then at least security. 

Instead, we continued to entered a new routine of suffering more and more rocket firings as we rocket-proofed more and more towns and buildings – a reality that no other normal country would ever accept. Instead of smashing the enemy once and for all, we built "safe rooms" in every house, scattered concrete shields throughout southwestern Israel, and developed an entire Torah of warning systems, bomb-alert sirens, and charts and graphs showing how much time every child and adult needed – depending on place of residence and distance from Gaza – to run to protected spaces. We became a technological powerhouse in developing anti-missile systems at an insane cost, with great pride in the performance of Israeli technology's 'Iron Dome' system – while agreeing to absorb the damage caused by a certain inevitable rate of its misses.

4. We attempted to deal with the constantly intensifying tunnels threat in a similar manner: We paid billions to build some kind of barrier that was supposed to defend against feared attacks by hordes of terrorists, or even just dozens, streaming into Israel via the tunnels. 

For these mistakes and lack of deterrence, we of course paid a very steep price, with great interest, 140 days ago, in the form of the worst catastrophe in the history of the State of Israel.  

5. The same thing, most unfortunately, appears to be happening on our northern border. It started with the abrupt unilateral IDF withdrawal from southern Lebanon by none other than then-Prime Minister Ehud Barak back in 2000. This time the beneficiary was Hizbullah, which proceeded to build up an incredible stockpile of missiles estimated at 150,000 (!). 

And now, instead of the buffer zone in southern Lebanon that protected Israel for 18 years, we now have a different kind of buffer zone inside northern Israel: It is the zone from which its Israeli residents have been evacuated, for fear of Hizbullah missiles. No one yet knows when they will be able to return. 

The nationalist camp earned for itself a reputation of always saying no: No to the Oslo Accords, no to the withdrawal from Lebanon, no to the Disengagement, no to the Gilad Shalit deal [which saw the freeing of over 1,000 terrorists in exchange for the soldier], and no to the conceptions that Hamas was deterred and that infinite periodic rounds of limited battle with Hamas would keep the terrorists at bay. 

Now, with the threat of national elections looming, it would be totally absurd if the recent massacre would end up leading to the replacement of a right-wing government by, of all people, former IDF Chief of Staff Benny Ganz – who was always a full partner in formulating and implementing the containment strategy. 

It is the ideological right-wing – which has proven to be correct in its analysis of the situation, and which speaks today of returning control of Gaza to our hands for the long-range, and which seeks to encourage Arab emigration from Gaza – that is clearly the most appropriate camp to navigate the correct path in the face of the security challenges that we will be forced to encounter in the coming years. 

Political Unity Now!

Adapted from an article by Emanuel Shilo, editor of the Besheva weekly, translated by Hillel Fendel.

Instead of the demand for another divisive election campaign in the middle of a war, it would be best if those who claim to seek unity and reconciliation call for a genuine unity government right now.

After the horrific Hamas massacre that befell us, there were hopes for a great domestic change. We hoped we could put aside the argumentative political discourse of the preceding years, and mainly months, for at least as long as we needed to unite around common goals vital to our future and our very survival. 

We hoped for a genuine unity government that would radiate reconciliation and stability, and would strengthen Israel from within against its enemies without. We wanted a different media discourse, one that would avoid wild accusations, push off the obsessive preoccupation with finding culprits, and discuss only what needs to be done now and in the near future.

So we hoped… 

Despite all our battlefield successes so far, including the near-destruction of Hamas, demolition of tunnels and other terrorist infrastructures, finding critical intelligence materials and millions of shekels in terrorism-funding, and killing of terrorists, we are still in a very difficult war. We are still missing 134 hostages, up to 3/4 of whom are assumed to be alive, and the residents of many towns in the south and north are still not home and cannot safely return. At such a time, we want to engage in positive and constructive dialogue – not politics and mud-slinging. 

But there are forces at play that won't let us. They believe, incredibly so, that the one thing Israel needs now is new elections. Their goal, of course, is to rid the country of Binyamin Netanyahu, no matter what the cost. They didn't wait long after the massacre to return to mud-slinging, mainly against him. 

It's true that politically, we do have an emergency unity government, and Benny Ganz and his party deserve credit for making it happen when they joined the government four days after the war was forced upon us. However, it does not signal real unity. On the contrary; Ganz gives the constant impression that he is planning to quit the first moment he can. 

The media situation is even worse. Significant parts of it returned much too quickly to the pre-Simchat Torah mode, with their central line of attack being a frontal offensive against Netanyahu. A public commission of inquiry has not yet been established, but for many in the media, Netanyahu's responsibility for everything having to do with the massacre is a given; it need not be explained, but rather repeated in different formulations as often as possible.

Though even the media largely takes the line that now is a time for reconciliation, showing respect, and judging each other favorably, there is one great exception: Binyamin Netanyahu. About him, the media permits itself to say whatever it wants: that he cares only about his own political survival, that he doesn't care if the hostages die, that he is lengthening the war for no good reason, and that everything happening now is his fault. They give him no credit at all for the quite successful war being waged in Gaza under his leadership, and deny him the same temporary immunity that they have given the IDF Chief of Staff, the Chief of Intelligence, the Southern Command General, the Defense Minister, and everyone else involved 24/7 in the war effort. 

And so, in the midst of a grinding, costly war, we are witness to a campaign, financed with huge sums, that demands new elections soon. As if we can afford to engage now in a stormy election campaign rife with mutual accusations and worse. Most unfortunately, even some of the best people in our midst, who have great achievements for our society under their belts, have fallen into this trap. By agreeing that new elections are needed quickly, they grant this call legitimacy that enables extremists and destructive protest groups – whose role in bringing us to where today must also be investigated – to continue their aggressive and divisive campaign.

At this time, then, we cannot sit on the fence, but must rather express and present our position. The alternative is a one-sided monologue that is liable to lead to terrible mistakes, such as caving in to the most extreme Hamas conditions for the release of hostages, including even calamitously stopping the war. 

Let us not be naïve. The demand for new elections in the middle of a war is based only on the poll findings that Netanyahu's Likud party will lose. This is their only goal: to depose Netanyahu – war or no war, hostages or no hostages. 

On the other hand, there is no need to be a blind follower of Netanyahu as if he was a cult leader. Even nationalists can legitimately think that he made some big mistakes, even while believing that the primary blame for the Oct. 7th catastrophe lays at the doorstep of the security establishment leaders. 

For instance: The black intelligence hole regarding everything that happened that day, and before it, must be carefully addressed. Also to be investigated is the basis of the "conception," so widely held throughout all top leadership levels, that Hamas is "deterred" and not interested in war. And what about the physical barrier – largely a tall fence with cameras, sensors, and other technological aids – that cost an estimated $3.5 billion to build and was easily broken through in dozens of places that tragic morning? And what of the late-night Zoom meeting called by the GSS head with the IDF Chief of Staff and others just hours before the Hamas invasion, in which it was decided to postpone discussion of the warnings of what might happen, without even informing the government echelons? All this is primarily the fault of the military and intelligence arms, not the government. 

Again, there were many strategic errors in which Netanyahu's large share cannot be denied. The most blatant is the Gilad Shalit deal, which gave Hamas its leader Sinwar, other top terrorists, and a tremendous motivation to pull off other such kidnappings. There is also the "containment" strategy, which enabled Hamas to build itself militarily while we deluded ourselves into thinking that we can always deter it from using its increasing strength. Going further back, there were the Oslo Agreements to which Netanyahu objected with full force, but accepted them as a done deal – and of course Ariel Sharon's Disengagement of 2005, which Netanyahu did not really fight to thwart. But in all these, Netanyahu was not alone; nearly all his political critics and rivals were party to at least some of them, if not all. 

So let’s assume that we have new elections and Netanyahu is defeated – who will take his place? Benny Ganz or Gadi Eisencott, who were full partners to the construction of the failed Gaza border obstacle and the containment strategy and the like? 

The last thing we need now is another election campaign. Instead, if we truly want reconciliation at home and victory in war, let's establish here and now a genuine unity government in the current Knesset. This should be a government without automatic disqualifications of particular personages (such as Netanyahu). It must be one that will serve at least until peace returns to the land and the evacuated citizens are able to return home. And it must be one in which controversial issues are addressed and resolved via dialogue and a true will to reach a compromise. 

Keeping Our Eye on the Ball

by Emanuel Shilo, editor of the weekly Besheva newspaper, translated by Hillel Fendel.

Our military forces in Gaza are chalking up successes and making great progress on their way to their final objective of destroying Hamas and its organized military power. We must protect our soldiers from attempts from without and within to bind their hands, precisely as they are closing in on victory.

There are a few things that I don't pretend to understand about the current war in Gaza. For instance, I don't get why our forces' progress in capturing Gaza, and particularly Khan Yunis and Rafah, can't be quicker. Neither do I get why two IDF divisions that operated successfully in north and central Gaza were withdrawn from their locations and not redeployed to southern Gaza. 

Could it be that the combat has slowed down because of the need to protect our soldiers, or to prevent our captives from being harmed by Hamas, or from pressure by the US and other friendly countries? Has the Philadelphi Route in southern Gaza not been captured because of the need to avoid a clash with Egypt? 

Success after Success

All of the above is likely true, but the fact is that we find ourselves in the fog of war, both militarily and diplomatically. Even with this lack of clarity, however, there is nothing blocking us from seeing a simple and very gladdening fact: Our forces are chalking up success after success as they grind down the Palestinazi enemy, dismantle its brigades, cut down hundreds and thousands of its terrorist fighters, obtain more and more vital intelligence, capture objective after objective, and destroy more and more fortifications and weapons. International experts on "warfare in built-up areas" have nothing but admiration for the progress of the 98th Commando Division and its supplementary forces facing a sophisticated underground fortification system that no army in the world (!) has ever had to face.  

The IDF will apparently need at least another three months to dismantle the remaining Hamas battalions and complete the conquest of all of Gaza. If we can only manage, with G-d's help, to meet the challenges of the international and domestic efforts to tie our hands, then our number-one objective of this war – the destruction of Hamas' military ability – is within our close reach.  

At the same time, Israel must also invest more firmly in terminating Hamas' governmental apparatus. The distribution of necessary food and medical supplies must be effected by us, not by Hamas and not by Hamasniks dressed up as UNRWA officials. The population of the towns and villages that we have captured must come under Israeli military administrative control.

IDF Gov't in Gaza

Any delay in establishing an IDF military administration in Gaza, like that which governed Judea and Samaria – and Gaza – for many years after the Six Day War, plays into the hands of Hamas. It also threatens the many achievements that we have already made. Wherever a governmental vacuum remains, Hamas will enter. 

Blocking the Trucks!

Over the last two weeks, we have been seeing an increasingly popular and effective protest tool effected by families of hostages and of fallen soldiers, as well as citizens across the spectrum. They arrive daily at the Ashdod port and the Kerem Shalom crossing and physically block the passage of trucks filled with "humanitarian aid" to Gaza. For one thing, it is known that these supplies go first to Hamas and its leaders, to promote their personal, governmental, and terrorist objectives. In addition, Israel has the perfectly justified right to condition its supply of humanitarian aid on a humanitarian Hamas approach, if such a thing exists, towards the hostages. 

And another thing: If we of the home front do not maintain a level of unity and cohesiveness, this can only harm the spirit of the soldiers on the military front. Yes, we want instinctively to be attentive to the needs of the hostages and their families, but we cannot therefore accept absurd demands that are liable to endanger our attainment of the all-important goal of victory over Hamas.

Elections Later!

This is also not the time to engage in early national elections, which by definition is a time of divisiveness and the opposite of what is needed for a united war effort. It is legitimate to call for early elections – but they should be held after the war is over, not before. There is even room to consider whether elections should be held before the commission of inquiry (which will certainly be appointed) releases its conclusions. For how can we decide which of the politicians is worthy of our electoral trust based only on partial information and a one-sided media campaign?

Another call from certain sectors of the population can also not be agreed to, and that is that we accept nearly every Hamas demand, no matter how ridiculous, for the sake of receiving back home our fathers, brothers, sisters, and children from Hamas captivity. With all the sorrow, pain, and empathy, we must remember the heavy price we ended up paying in other blackmail deals, such as the 1,027 terrorists – including Yahye Sinwar – Israel released in exchange for Gilad Shalit, and of course the ten Israelis murdered by some of them in the years following. The current demands to release a tremendous number of terrorists, including cold-blooded murderers, makes such a deal totally insupportable. 

Even more insane is the Hamas demand that Israel give up everything it gained in this war – that has cost us nearly 250 casualties as of now – and allow the Palestinazis to continue to reign in Gaza. To accept this crazed notion is something that no other country in the world would ever do. 

The Only Way 

The way to achieve the release of our hostages is to keep on destroying Hamas until we can rescue them militarily, or until the last of the terrorists remaining alive offer a deal with a reasonable price.

Israel was dealt a shattering blow on October 7th, but now it is on the verge of a great victory; if it is achieved, its strategic value will be of inestimable value, but if we miss it, the damage will be similarly inestimable. For the sake of the future of the State of Israel, and for the sake of our children and their ability to live in a country where another Oct. 7th cannot happen again, we must make sure to resolutely reject all pressures from without and within, and keep our eye on the goal of destroying Hamas. Our forces in Khan Yunis and throughout Gaza are moving forward to this goal, day by day, step by step. Our job is to support them, with prayers to the G-d of the armies of Israel, with encouragement, and with help to the families on the home front – and certainly not to disturb and distract them with petty arguments and weakness of spirit. 

This past week, a public mini-storm arose as a result of an infuriating army drill in the Central District (Judea and Samaria). The drill involved, in part, a scenario in which IDF soldiers were to envision the Jewish residents of a pioneer community in the Shomron as "enemies" who had kidnapped an Arab from a nearby village. This, in the middle of a war in which the soldiers of these communities are paying with their lives in high numbers. 

Public ire in the entire religious-Zionist and nationalist camps was both strong and justified. Even Prime Minister Netanyahu came out publicly against this injustice done to the pioneer public. He demanded an investigation and answers from the IDF as to how this decision could have been made. As a result, both the Chief of Staff Hertzy HaLevi and O.C. Central Command Gen. Yehuda Fuchs acknowledged the mistake and publicly apologized.

Most unfortunately, this incident became a divisive political football. Benny Ganz - who acted responsibly nearly four months ago when he left the opposition to help form a unity government for the duration of the war - attacked Netanyahu's above response in a most irresponsible manner: "The Prime Minister's decision to use the incident [of the anti-settler drill] in order to harm the IDF and its cohesiveness stemmed from political motives and was unnecessary; it itself requires an investigation and an apology from him before the IDF and all the citizens of Israel." It's not at all clear what fault Ganz found in Netanyahu's correct words, especially given the apologies by HaLevy and Fuchs. It appears that Ganz was the one who harmed national unity for political motivations, not Netanyahu. 

This case shows clearly how important it is for both sides of the political spectrum to ensure that narrow political interests, even if they cannot be totally erased, do not bring them to make wrong strategic decisions or harm the "public togetherness" that is so necessary for our military victory.