The PA and the Lion King

 by Amotz Miller, Yisrael HaYom newspaper, translated by Hillel Fendel.

Instead of self-flagellation, we must unite behind our immediate common goal: The PA-PLO must not be allowed a foot in the door of Gaza rule.

Those of us who grew up in the mid-90's not only remember, but can still feel, their pain and even fury at the Lion King scene when cruel Scar - who had just dropped his brother the king off a cliff to his death - persuades his nephew, little crown-prince Simba, that he was actually to blame for his father's death. 

Scar despicably offers his "generous" help in rectifying the situation, and Simba falls gratefully into his arms. Scar proposes that the newly-orphaned Simba run far, far away, and never return, and that he, Scar, would take upon himself the yoke of royalty. 

The children of the 90's also bear other scenes of hurt and fury, but these are not taken from Disney movies. They remember buses that turned into giant balls of fire and restaurants that became death traps – a nightmare wrapped in pink cellophane, tied with a ribbon, and adorned with the festively-written words: "Peace Process."

The cruel implosion of the "peace process" surprised many – but not those who listened with even half an ear to the jihadist declarations of the bridegroom of the festivities: arch-terrorist Yasser Arafat, may his name be blotted out.

Yigal Carmon, a former senior Israeli Intelligence official and an expert advisor on anti-terrorism warfare, listened to and recorded the unsuspecting speeches of Arafat. He heard Arafat say clearly, shortly before the signing of the Oslo Accords in 1993, that the agreement with Israel was not a recognition of the Jewish state's right to exist, but rather simply a tactical move in the ongoing war of extermination against the Zionist entity. 

Carmon tried to warn the public of the dangerous fraud being perpetrated upon Israel. He took his information to top journalist Nachum Barnea, who did nothing with it. Barnea later said he did not sufficiently understand the material; Carmon said he purposely covered it up in order not to sabotage the peace process. [Six months later, Arafat delivered his famous Johannesburg address, in which he called on the "Islamic nation" to "come and fight and start the Jihad to liberate Jerusalem," and in which he likened the Oslo process to a historical ceasefire agreement between Muhammad and the Quraysh tribe, which was meant to be only temporary.]

Home internet was just beginning, and social media were just a dream, such that the press was a closed clique, marketing Oslo almost unanimously as the "new Middle East."

Three Decades Later

Thirty years have passed, and the murderous PLO-Fatah-Hamas enemy, which never laid down its sword, pulled off the Oct. 7th massacre against unsuspecting civilians and unprotected soldiers in and around Israel's western Negev communities. The attack caught Israeli society in a period of extreme disunity, and actually led to a burst of brotherhood and cooperation. All parts of the society chipped in, whether in the reserves or in volunteering; whether presenting Israel's case to the world or giving of their money or time; whether praying or crying out.

However, the war has dragged on – prevented from reaching a successful conclusion by our many friends in the international community. While our hostages debilitate in the tunnels of Gaza and IDF soldiers endanger their lives in combat, cracks of disunity have become to emerge. One bitter feature thereof is the blame game, where accusations against everyone from the Prime Minister and his government, down through the military and intelligence establishments, and then to various sectors of society for their role, are furiously censured and denunciated. 

And thus, the despairing and sad nation, bewildered by events and its Simba-like self-flagellation, searching for stability and hope, falls like ripe fruit into the blood-stained hands of the Palestinian Authority – which has so generously volunteered, with American encouragement, to take over the yoke of governing Gaza when the war ends. 

But we are no longer in the 90's, and we are no longer blind to reality.

Israel's Regavim Association, which works to prevent illegal Arab use of state lands, very recently released a chilling report about top figures in the Palestinian Authority. The names, ranks, and official positions of bona-fide terrorists in the PA's security apparatus are listed. The report leaves no room for mistakes:  The official leaders of the PA have nothing but praise for its shahid workers taking part in the violent struggle against Israel and its citizens. 

And of course, its "pay for slay" policy – monthly salaries or pensions to terrorists and/or their families – is well-known to everyone in the West, which continues to pretend it doesn't know. 

The truth is out in the open: The Palestinian Authority is no different than Hamas. We do not need exploding buses or another version of Oct. 7th to tell us the true murderous intentions of the PA, or to foresee the blood that will be shed if we allow it any part in the future government of Gaza.

What the Goyim Say

 by Yoni Rotenberg, Besheva, translated by Hillel Fendel.

The Israeli media seems to be trying to play down the IDF's achievements in Gaza, but top security experts in the United States, not necessarily lovers of Zion, admit that the IDF's fighting in Gaza is nothing less than a remarkable and unprecedented achievement.

On October 20, two weeks after the horrific massacre, while Israeli planes were bombarding Gaza from the air and our ground forces were still waiting to enter, the Virginia-based Military Times magazine published an article entitled, "The Fight in Gaza Will be Hell." Combat experts with urban combat experience in countries around the world were sure that a ground entry into Gaza would turn into an Israeli bloodbath.

The article stated: "Estimates from Mosul, Iraq alone [referring to the nine-month Battle of Mosul in 2016-2017] — a likely comparison for what may happen in Gaza, according to multiple experts — suggest that more than 1,000 coalition forces died… If the tolls of dead, wounded and widespread destruction from other urban battles is any kind of indicator, a prolonged ground operation in Gaza likely is to produce as much or more carnage, experts said."

U.S. Lt.-Gen. James Gallin met at the time with Israeli government cabinet members and the IDF Chief of Staff. He told them decisively that a ground offensive was hopeless and would lead to an average daily toll of 20 dead Israeli soldiers. Articles and speeches by our own security experts agreed in principle and warned against getting involved in the "mud of Gaza."

 

More than four months have passed, sufficient time to examine these evaluations. In Israel, strangely enough, we don't receive an optimistic picture – but listen to what generals and warfare experts from abroad have to say!

According to military research institutes and experts in the U.S. and elsewhere, the IDF has done the impossible, showing the world very impressive combat capabilities in more difficult conditions than have ever been seen. Yes, we Israelis are used to six-day victories, or at most, three weeks. But just like the battlefield has changed, so too our thinking about war must change: The victory of our brave soldiers is achieved from one tunnel-shaft to the next, and from one building to another – and it is a shining victory nonetheless. 

Sample quotes from the experts: 

John Spencer, head of the Modern War Institute at West Point, speaking to Israeli TV Channel 14: 

"The IDF is advancing in a historic manner. I was very surprised by the pace of its progress. There is no other army that I know of, ever since World War II and maybe even forever, that had to fight a terrorist organization like Hamas that seeks to cause maximum casualties, even among civilians. If you would have asked me beforehand, I would have thought that the IDF would suffer many more casualties, and would not be able to attain control over such a large area."

Dr. Eliot A. Cohen of the Center for Strategic and International Studies: 

"Israel entered a densely-populated urban area that turned out to be even more fortified than it thought at first. This is a type of war of attrition. Still, militarily speaking, it is doing excellent work there…

"Even if we accept the reports of the Palestinian Health Ministry - and I'm not sure that their numbers are accurate - and the IDF estimates of the amount of terrorists among them, the number of civilian casualties is relatively low."

Cohen is full of criticism of Israel's general policies, but he was forced to admit, with noticeable difficulty, that the IDF is fulfilling international combat laws. He also said that the Israelis are exhibiting creativity, as well as technological and tactical abilities. 

To recap: Some experts expected 1,000 dead Israeli soldiers, and Gen. Gallin thought we could have reached 3,000 by now – and this when the actual dimensions of the Hamas tunnel network were under-estimated. The true numbers stand only at 240 IDF casualties in Gaza, with all the sorrow that we suffered at the loss of even one. 

The above-mentioned John Spencer: 

"What the IDF forces learned during the course of their combat in Gaza is worth more than developed technology. Their ability to close in on and destroy the enemy under the most difficult conditions should frighten Hizbullah. [Hizbullah should know that if] there was ever a time not to start up with Israel, that time is now…

"The IDF's ability to integrate between the ground forces and those in the air is a unique strength of Israel, involving even the commanders in the field."

The Wall St. Journal, in a February op-ed entitled "Israel’s Untold Gaza Progress," cited Spencer's comparison of the IDF's advancement in Khan Yunis to the Americans' victory in Mosul: 

“Mosul was one battle, in one city against 3 to 5k militants with limited defenses. Israel is fighting multiple battles in 7 cities against 30k militants with military grade underground cities built under civilian areas.” "Israel needs time to achieve victory," the article stated, "and Hamas is counting on Western powers to deny it that time." 

David H. Petraeus, former Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, referring to the complexities of combat in Gaza:

"These are the most difficult military conditions that exist – much more complex than the battles in Ramadi, Fallujah and Bakuba [cities in Iraq where the Americans fought]. Gaza is a larger area, with a larger population and taller buildings, and in addition, hundreds of kilometers of tunnels and underground infrastructures beneath public and civilian installations such as hospitals, schools, and mosques. It is very, very challenging – but I believe that it must be done."

Col. Richard Kemp, a retired British Army officer who commanded Operation Fingal in Afghanistan: 

"I invite all the colonels, generals, experts, and computer war-game players to email me within 48 hours a detailed attack plan for Israel…"

A month ago, in a more serious vein, he said:
"The war is progressing more quickly, with more losses to Hamas, than the Israeli leadership thought at first. This doesn't mean that it will end quickly, because this is the most complex war battlefield ever in history. Urban combat is the most complicated, and Hamas invested years in preparing the ground and the underground for this war. Yes, there have been battle sites with tunnels in the past, but not to this extent and on this level. The IDF was forced to deal with a situation that has never been seen before. And in addition to all this, there is also the matter of the hostages that must be taken into account… I spoke to people in the IDF and I reviewed their activity, and I was very impressed. They are working and advancing in a very effective manner." 

In a perfect world, our faith in the justness of our cause and in the Creator of the world, together with the stories we hear from the front and from the IDF Spokesman, would buttress us with the knowledge that "we are winning." But unfortunately, Israeli media often filters out the military items based on whether they are "pro Bibi" or "anti Bibi." We are given a distorted and cynical picture of lack of progress in Gaza. 

It is therefore good to hear from the experts abroad that we are in fact making mincemeat out of the cruel Gazan enemy, and with G-d's help we will continue to do so.

Freeing the Captives in Gaza: Where to Put the Pressure

by Rabbi Dr. Yoel Bin-Nun, Yeshivat Har Etzion, translated by Hillel Fendel.

What is needed now is not pressure upon Israel, but upon Qatar and the UN

For some strange reason, the main pressure exerted by Israelis regarding the hostages and their safety is directed not towards Hamas, not upon the UN, and not at the international community – but the Israeli government. This was definitely the Hamas plan when they decided to kidnap as many Israelis as they could this past Simchat Torah – and it is also the only success that they can show for themselves in this war.

The evil leaders of Hamas well know the nature of public pressure in Israel in these matters, and that it stems from instinctive Jewish brotherhood and solidarity. They also know that it thus works to the terrorists' benefit. This they learned from previous kidnappings, especially from Israel's release in 2011 of over 1,000 terrorists in exchange for one single solidarity IDF soldier (Gilad Shalit). Let us also note that Israel freed 1,150 terrorists back in 1985 in exchange for three soldiers.

Yes, several Israeli governments have already caved in to such pressures in the past, ignoring the lives of future captives [and future victims of the freed terrorists] – in favor of the lives of those captives who happen to be held now by the evil Hamas terrorists. They are certain that if they just succeed in holding them in such a way that an Israeli attempt to free them with force will endanger their lives, as well as the lives our soldiers in the liberating force – Israel will surely surrender. In such a case, Hamas will be able to present the only "victory photo" that it can achieve.

[Only] a few of those struggling for the cause of freeing the hostages have understood that their pressure must be directed against Hamas and its patrons, in every possible front around the world. But they, and we, must comprehend the situation correctly, so that their/our efforts will be effective. 

Let us picture the following situations and what could be their welcome results: 

• Pressure could be exerted, for instance, on the International Court of Justice in The Hague to hear petitions or suits against Qatar's funding of Hamas. Countries that support Israel must be encouraged to file these suits. Similarly, the court could consider the legality of Egypt's turning a blind eye to the smuggling of weapons from its territory to Gaza via Rafah.
• Or, picture what would happen if the United Nations would convene to consider the very fact that the holding of captives with no supervision by international judicial organizations, without medicines, without elementary steps being taken to safeguard their lives and health, is completely illegal under international law.
• What would be if Turkey and other Hamas-supporting countries would be sued for violation of international law in funding Hamas while it illegally holds captives? How about if pressure is exerted to get the international community to demand that the captives be immediately transferred to Egypt, which would then be required do release them to Israel?
• How about if we demand that the international community condition all further humanitarian aid to Gaza on the immediate release of all captives, including the bodies of those who were murdered?

All the protest marches and demonstrations in favor of the hostages must be held not in Israel or outside Israeli government offices, but outside the consulates and embassies of countries that support Hamas. It must be made clear to all that the Israeli captives are not regular prisoners of war, but rather hostages in the full sense of the world - people who have been stolen from their homes - in full violation of the most basic of all international laws.

Qatar, specifically, must be held accountable. If, under sharp international pressure, Qatar would inform the Hamas leadership that it will no longer support them financially, and that it will expel its leaders from its territory, if the hostages are not returned home – families all over Israel will joyfully be reunited without delay. [The Wall St. Journal reported that Qatar has in fact threatened to expel Hamas officials from their base in Doha should they fail to persuade the group’s Gaza-based leaders to agree to a deal.]

And/but if Israel agrees to some sort of compensation to Hamas for a Qatari ultimatum of this sort, I pray and hope that the price will not endanger Israelis in the near and far future.

In short, the pressure must be placed not where it will cause Israel to relax its demands on Hamas, but where it will cause Hamas to realize that its interests lie in releasing the hostages.

Good Intentions, Catastrophic Deeds

by Minister Orit Strook, Religious Zionist Party, translated by Hillel Fendel.

With only a few days left before the start of the Muslim month of Ramadan, Israel still has a chance to rectify its preparations. Israeli government minister Orit Strook says the goal must be to reduce – not enhance – the ability of the terrorists to attack us. This is an adaptation of her article, which first appeared in Besheva.

All eyes are now peeled towards the holy Muslim month of Ramadan and the terrorist attacks if often brings. US President Biden has said he is hoping for a deal to stop the fighting in Gaza before Ramadan, Defense Minister Galant is warning of a "Ramadan drift" [apparently referring to an upswing in terrorism], and the general public is fretfully weary of what the month might have in store.

For very long, Ramadan has been a time of tribulations, pogroms and Jewish bloodshed. Its dangers have kept many of our security strategists awake at nights – but for some reason their preparations for the month have often, including this year, been the opposite of what simple logic would dictate.

Every year, this crazy cycle seems to repeat itself. The IDF, Shabak and police all know that every year, Ramadan is a month of terrorist attacks. So what do they do in response? Set up more checkpoints? Arrest and detain known agitators? Not quite. Would-be terrorists held as administrative detainees are actually being released, and as it stands now, Arabs from the PA-controlled areas will be allowed to enter Jerusalem and pray at the Temple Mount.

Probably worst of all is that throughout Judea and Samaria, checkpoints that generally help prevent terrorist attacks are now being taken down – as "Ramadan gestures" to the Muslim population. As if it weren't crystal clear that these gestures will be taken advantage of to attempt to carry out attacks…

This very message is written in blood all over the highways of Judea and Samaria - yet still the security bodies insist on holding this same ceremony of removing the checkpoints every year. And then, when serious attacks resume, right on cue, the restrictions that had been removed are put right back in place. The announcement is usually made as families, friends and neighbors make their way to the victims' funerals. This has been, more or less, the same script for the past number of years; though to be fair, not every single year were restrictions eased, and even when there were, not every year were they then canceled. Over the past decade, restrictions were eased, then reinstalled, or nearly so, three times in the past decade – much too many times.

Great pressures were exerted on the Cabinet ministers to allow Arab workers from Judea and Samaria to enter pre-'67 Israel. But to their credit, they withstood and did not cave to the bullying.  Even the dangerous "pilot" program to this effect was not carried out, in the merit of the strong stance of the Cabinet members, and their sincere and responsible concern for the citizens of Israel.

But within Judea and Samaria – there the story is different. No one asks the Cabinet whether to enable free travel to Arabs of all stripes, without checks, on our traffic routes, adjacent to our communities, into our gas stations [in one of which, two Israelis were murdered last week]. These areas are apparently over and beyond, somewhere in the mountains of darkness, a type of no-man's-land where - even though more than a half-million Jews live there and another half-million travel there each day – only the "security bodies" determine how to get ready for Ramadan. And the way it decides is the way it has decided for years: in accordance with the "conception." [This refers to the preconceived and unchallenged notions that Israel "owned" Hamas, that Hamas was "deterred," and that infinite periodic rounds of limited battle with Hamas would keep the terrorists at bay with no need to ever make the hard decision to go to all-out war.]

But, as we see, it seems that even taking the "conception" route can reach new heights. And so it happened that last week – even as we were in the midst of mourning our two latest terrorism victims, shocked at the intolerable ease with the terrorist murderer was able to arrive by car carrying a lethal weapon to his chosen spot for his attack - and while we had still barely absorbed the significance of the fact that he was a PA "policeman" previously imprisoned for terrorist activity – as if all this was not enough, we suddenly hear of something even more ludicrous and incomprehensible: that dozens of terrorists, or would-be terrorists, not yet charged with crimes but held administratively, will actually be freed from their cells and sent home to their towns and villages throughout Judea and Samaria, to celebrate the "get out of jail" festivities that await them there.  

The eye reads these reports, the ear hears them, but the brain refuses to believe that they can possibly be true. After all, just three months ago we convened – the entire government – for an all-night meeting to debate whether to accept a deal of a very similar nature: the release of low-grade terrorists in exchange for the return of our women and children being held in cruel Hamas captivity. Some voted in favor, some voted against, but the deliberations were sincere and intense, and all understood that there was no getting around the fact that such a release, even if it would achieve the goal of returning [some of] the hostages, would surely mean a supportive backwind for further terrorism. And then, behold, just a short time later, the "security establishment" makes such decisions all by itself, and releases dozens of terrorists – on the eve of Ramadan, to boot.

And while we try to rub our eyes in disbelief, they tell us that the terrorists are only under administrative detention and that they were about to be released within a month in any event, and that the planned release has nothing to do with any Ramadan gesture. Then why are they doing it? Because, they say, of overcrowding in the prisons. Let's say that this is true. But – first of all, if so, how about releasing the Jewish administrative detainees? [A District Court is about to hear a suit demanding just that, in light of the planned release of Palestinian terrorists.]

Secondly, if there's no room in the jails, is there room in our cemeteries for the victims of the attacks? And in our hospitals, for the wounded?  Let the terrorists crowd themselves in a bit, and leave a little room in our cemeteries. Yes, I know that the Supreme Court has ruled on a minimum amount of space per prisoner – but there's a war going on, and there is terrorism, and there is Ramadan, in which every step we take that encourages terrorism has an exponential factor, and it costs us in blood.

It is very important for me to clarify: Not one of the decision makers is indifferent in any way to our security. Very much the opposite: These are people with values, with courage, who love the Jewish People, who are super-dedicated to our security, and are willing to sacrifice their lives for us, work day and night for the cause, and cry no less than we do over our dead and wounded.

But what? They are captive to the "conception" of Ramadan, whose mistaken operating instructions continue to direct their actions and decisions, and don't allow the facts to confuse them. And so they take the exact opposite course of what is required, endangering the nation they love and are convinced they are doing the best for.

During the Sin of the Golden Calf, about which we read in our weekly Torah portion this past week, Aharon the High Priest most certainly had the best of intentions when he unwittingly facilitated the fashioning of the giant idol. Rashi explains that he was simply trying to stall until his brother Moshe would descend from the mountain. He figured that when he would ask the women for their gold and silver, they would not rush to give… and all sorts of other calculations, all of which were for the sake of Heaven, in order to prevent idol-worship. But despite his best intentions, we know what happened in the end: A golden calf around which the people danced and worshiped.

Today, as then: All their best intentions are truly good and from loving and concerned hearts – but their decisions will be made based on the mistaken and so-dangerous "conception." There are just a few days left for them to fix their errors, and to truly and properly prepare for Ramadan, based on the catastrophic statistics of the past few years that showed more terrorist attacks and more dead Jews. The idea is to reduce the terrorists' abilities to get to us, not to expand them. This is our obligation, this is our responsibility, and this is what we must do.

Ramadan this year falls in the month of Purim, and therefore we must ensure the fulfillment of the verse, "contrary to what was decreed, the Jews ruled over their enemies."

Together, we will win!

Who Will De-contain Containment, Once and For All?

by Emanuel Shilo, editor of the Besheva weekly, translated by Hillel Fendel.

1. I first heard the word "containment" in a military-strategic context some 20 years ago. I took part in a tour organized for the religious media in the IDF's Gaza Division sector, whose headquarters in those days was near Gush Katif in the Gaza Strip.

Those were the days after the IDF's successful Operation Defensive Shield (March-April 2002), under the auspices of Prime Minister Ariel Sharon. It came in response to the soaring rate of terrorist murders that had reached well over 100 in the first four weeks of March alone. During the offensive, our forces captured the six large PA cities, including Ramallah and Shechem, and regained the intelligence capabilities it had lost since the signing of the Oslo Accords. 

We asked the Southern District Commanding Officer, Maj.-Gen. Dan Har'el, when would come the turn of Gaza to be "treated" to a similar operation to wipe out its burgeoning terrorist infrastructures.

Gen. Har'el said straight out: "It won't happen. Our policy in Gaza is different. It will be one of containment." 

This meant, he explained, that we don't intervene in anything that happens on the other side of the symbolic border fence between the Jewish communities of Gush Katif and the rest of Gaza, which had been given over to PA control a decade earlier. "Even if we know about, or even see, a terrorist deployment, or acquiring weapons, or training," the general told us, "we will take no action. Only if they attempt to invade our territory will we fight back."

2. We didn't have to be great military experts to sense, as I and others there did, that this approach made no sense. A policy that enables terrorist organizations to strengthen themselves seemed dangerous and disastrous to us. 

It was also far from the spirit of the Oslo Accords. These stipulated that whatever territory in Gaza, Judea and Samaria we hand over to Palestinian Authority rule would remain demilitarized, except for the weapons we agreed to provide the PA police. Hamas' acquisition of RPG's and other rockets that were launched at Gush Katif and Sderot were, of course, blatant violations of the agreement. In addition, the promise that the PLO would fight Hamas "without the [restrictions of the] Supreme Court and without [the protests of] B'Tselem," as then-Prime Minister Yitzchak Rabin promised, never happened. 

So why did the IDF initiate weeks of battle against the PLO in Ramallah and Jenin, but not in Khan Yunis and Gaza City? We didn't understand Gen. Harel's explanation, and in fact, he himself did not seem very convinced himself of the value of the "containment" policy. 

After the fact, we now know that it was that policy that ultimately led to the deterioration of security inside and outside Gaza. It also served as a justification for Ariel Sharon's decision to destroy the Jewish presence in Gaza and unilaterally withdraw the IDF from the Strip; this was what he called the infamous Disengagement and what the nationalist camp called the Expulsion. 

The ideological right-wing camp warned repeatedly that the Disengagement would turn Gaza into a greenhouse of terrorism, that the rockets on Sderot would become more powerful and frequent, and that they would soon hit Ashkelon and Tel Aviv as well. But the warnings were waved off and ignored; Israel's security establishment had fallen in love with the policy of containment, hiding behind fences, and closing eyes to Hamas' constantly increasing military capabilities.  

Our leaders explained to us that if we totally quit Gaza and return to the pre-'67 borders, we would have complete legitimacy to respond to any attacks upon us. This of course was never true, in that because we retained control over the airspace, for understandable reasons, our enemies around the world claimed that we never actually left Gaza. But Israel's security establishment was convinced that leaving Gaza was a great idea, and that we could deter Gazan terrorism simply by bombing from the air and from our side of the border. 

3. Soon, however, the failure of the conception of the Disengagement became too obvious to ignore. Just a half-year after the last IDF soldier left Gaza, the PA held parliamentary elections. Bragging that its terrorist activities and policies had gotten rid of the Jews, Hamas won a majority of seats in the PA legislature. Within a short time, Hamas and Fatah became embroiled in a cruel civil war; Hamas all but threw out Fatah, and Gaza became a political entity run by the Hamas terrorist organization and subjugated to its goals. 

For Israel, this meant constant rocket attacks against the Jewish communities just outside of Gaza, and periodic attacks against further targets such as Ashkelon and Be'er Sheva. The assumption that Hamas could be deterred just by return fire was proven to be an illusion. The IDF was forced to periodically enter Gaza, show strong force in destroying Hamas capabilities, and then withdraw with the job only partially done. 

The capture of IDF soldier Gilad Shalit from his tank on the border, and the fact that we were unable to reach and free him throughout more than five years, showed clearly how weak was our intelligence gathering capabilities in post-Disengagement Gaza.

Even when Gaza showed its prowess in firing its rockets even to Tel Aviv, Israel's government and military leaders still did not admit their error and come to the obvious conclusion: Gaza must be captured anew, cleaned of all rockets and of its terrorist government, and returned to Israeli control – if not administrative, then at least security. 

Instead, we continued to entered a new routine of suffering more and more rocket firings as we rocket-proofed more and more towns and buildings – a reality that no other normal country would ever accept. Instead of smashing the enemy once and for all, we built "safe rooms" in every house, scattered concrete shields throughout southwestern Israel, and developed an entire Torah of warning systems, bomb-alert sirens, and charts and graphs showing how much time every child and adult needed – depending on place of residence and distance from Gaza – to run to protected spaces. We became a technological powerhouse in developing anti-missile systems at an insane cost, with great pride in the performance of Israeli technology's 'Iron Dome' system – while agreeing to absorb the damage caused by a certain inevitable rate of its misses.

4. We attempted to deal with the constantly intensifying tunnels threat in a similar manner: We paid billions to build some kind of barrier that was supposed to defend against feared attacks by hordes of terrorists, or even just dozens, streaming into Israel via the tunnels. 

For these mistakes and lack of deterrence, we of course paid a very steep price, with great interest, 140 days ago, in the form of the worst catastrophe in the history of the State of Israel.  

5. The same thing, most unfortunately, appears to be happening on our northern border. It started with the abrupt unilateral IDF withdrawal from southern Lebanon by none other than then-Prime Minister Ehud Barak back in 2000. This time the beneficiary was Hizbullah, which proceeded to build up an incredible stockpile of missiles estimated at 150,000 (!). 

And now, instead of the buffer zone in southern Lebanon that protected Israel for 18 years, we now have a different kind of buffer zone inside northern Israel: It is the zone from which its Israeli residents have been evacuated, for fear of Hizbullah missiles. No one yet knows when they will be able to return. 

The nationalist camp earned for itself a reputation of always saying no: No to the Oslo Accords, no to the withdrawal from Lebanon, no to the Disengagement, no to the Gilad Shalit deal [which saw the freeing of over 1,000 terrorists in exchange for the soldier], and no to the conceptions that Hamas was deterred and that infinite periodic rounds of limited battle with Hamas would keep the terrorists at bay. 

Now, with the threat of national elections looming, it would be totally absurd if the recent massacre would end up leading to the replacement of a right-wing government by, of all people, former IDF Chief of Staff Benny Ganz – who was always a full partner in formulating and implementing the containment strategy. 

It is the ideological right-wing – which has proven to be correct in its analysis of the situation, and which speaks today of returning control of Gaza to our hands for the long-range, and which seeks to encourage Arab emigration from Gaza – that is clearly the most appropriate camp to navigate the correct path in the face of the security challenges that we will be forced to encounter in the coming years.