Hamas Wants an Israeli Surrender, Not a Deal

by Prof. Eyal Zisser, Vice Rector of Tel Aviv University and the holder of The Yona and Dina Ettinger Chair in Contemporary History of the Middle East, translated by Hillel Fendel.

Now that the same scene has repeated itself, wherein Israel sends teams to negotiate the release of our hostages, hopes are raised, and then Hamas refuses, it is very clear:Hamas Wants an Israeli Surrender, Not a Deal.

The negotiations Israel is waging with Hamas regarding the release of the 134 live and dead hostages are making no progress, to the great sorrow and frustration not only of their families, but of the entire nation.

The U.S., Egypt, and Qatar, who took upon themselves the role of mediators, keep coming up with new formulas and improved outlines, hoping to appease Hamas. Israel, too, is actually showing willingness to soften its stance and make comprises and concessions – but Hamas simply hardens its own stance with each cycle, not reducing its demands and showing no inclination to compromise. Basically, it seems clear that Hamas has no inclination to make a deal at all.

The Hamas representatives - leaders of the terrorist organization who live outside Gaza in luxury hotels made available to them by Qatar - come readily to the talks with the mediators, whether in Qatar or in Egypt. Perhaps they do so to please the Qataris, who finance and host them, but their main reason is that they know that the very existence of the talks is their life insurance policy against Israel's attempt to eliminate them.

But it is now six months after the war began – and it is clear to all that this traveling Hamas circus making the rounds from one luxury hotel to another in Qatar, then Egypt, and then back again, has no significance or importance whatsoever. For it's not these wined-and-dined reps making the decisions, but rather Yihye Sinwar – still hiding deep in some bunker somewhere in the southern Gaza Strip, frightened to death that the IDF will soon find him. Communication with Sinwar is sketchy, and frequently breaks up, making it quite difficult to wage substantial talks, and in fact dragging them out. 

But the truth is that the main problem is not a technical one, but rather one of substance.

It doesn't bother Sinwar at all that negotiations are taking place, for in his view, they serve to tighten the pressure on Israel both abroad and domestically. It doesn't bother him, but what does he want? The truth appears to be that he doesn't really want the talks to end with an actual deal, but simply with an Israeli surrender to all his demands: an end to the war, an IDF withdrawal from the Gaza Strip, the return of Gaza refugees to their homes, a massive release of Palestinian terrorists from Israeli prisons, and – the icing on the cake – guarantees that he and his men will not be killed or captured by Israel when the battles die down.

Sinwar, after all, couldn't care less about the residents of Gaza. For him, they are just "grease on the wheels of the revolution," who can easily be sacrificed for the good of his cause. What interests him is not how many of his men will yet die, but how history will remember this war that he initiated, and how it will contribute in the long-term to the Palestinian struggle against Israel. 

If Hamas manages to survive this war as a governmental and military force still able to stand on its two legs – this will be a great victory for Sinwar and Hamas that will only encourage him to continue along the same path.

Sinwar apparently believes that any deal with Israel that doesn't absolutely guarantee an end to the war is really just "on the ice." For he knows that as soon as he gives away his winning card – i.e., the hostages – Israel will immediately pursue him, and this time with no fear of accidentally hurting the hostages in the process. 

This gap between a.) the Hamas desire to buy more time, and b.) Israel's determination to continue the war to destroy, or at least neutralize, Hamas – can simply not be bridged. Therefore, the most that can be achieved now is a limited, partial release of some of the hostages [with no guarantee as to what will be with the remainder…], in exchange for a limited, temporary cessation of hostilities, similar to the several-part deal made a few weeks after the war began. 

However, in truth, Israel does have more wiggle-room than what we generally assume. This is because Gaza is in near-total ruins, and Hamas was severely stricken and damaged. The question is therefore not necessarily whether Israeli offensives will continue until the last of the Hamas battalions in Rafah is defeated. It is rather this: What will happen in Gaza on the day after the war ends?

The answer to this question is not only a military matter, but also a diplomatic issue – and this grants Israel extra room for maneuvering.

What is clear is that Israel has a moral obligation to turn over every stone in seeking to return the hostages home. Israel abandoned them on Oct. 7th, and their return will be a victory for Israel and for the Israeli spirit, and an important part of the defeat that we will yet deal Hamas.

Zionism in Exchange for Peace

by Haggai Huberman, Land of Israel specialist, translated by Hillel Fendel.

When the Arabs speak of "land for peace," they really mean "Zionism for peace." Their objective is to defeat Zionism

This past Sabbath, the 27th of Adar, marked 45 years since the signing of Israel's first peace agreement, namely, the accord with Egypt in 1979. Menachem Begin and Anwar Sadat signed the treaty in a festive ceremony on the White House lawn, under the sponsorship of President Jimmy Carter.

For the past 45 years, Egypt has carefully observed Sadat's promise in the Knesset: "No more war!" But practically speaking, it has also made sure to fulfill the opposite theme: "No more peace!" These two contradictory statements have no problem guiding the Egyptian leadership at one and the same time.

The great excitement aroused by the peace treaty with Egypt was so widespread that only few noticed the trap it contained for the State of Israel. In essence, it set the stage for Arab recognition of the State of Israel – on condition that Israel give up its unique Jewish-Zionist character. The real motto that Sadat brought with him to Jerusalem was not "[Israeli-liberated] territories for peace," as was mistakenly thought, but rather, "Zionism for peace."

Though the late Shimon Peres made famous the phrase "new Middle East," and even wrote a book by that name in 1994, he was far from the first one to speak about it. Nearly 20 years before him, and two years before Sadat visited Jerusalem, a very famous Egyptian thinker named Muhammed Sayad Ahmed publicized his own book, "When the Cannons are Silenced." It discussed a possible future peace agreement with Israel, leading to fruitful economic cooperation between the two countries. But the author did not hide his true motive: diverting Israel from being the mechanism by which the Zionist dream is fulfilled for Jews the world over, to becoming a factor in Arab development in the Middle East. Israel would never be able to fulfill both these contradictory challenges, Ahmed believed, and with the arrival of "peace," would eventually be swallowed up into the Arab world around it. Israel would then become, in Ahmed's vision, nothing more than a large Jewish Heritage Center. "This would bring about the extinction of the Zionist enterprise precisely as its population would be busy celebrating the apparent fulfillment of its goal, that of making peace.

Boutros Boutros-Ghali, the former UN Secretary-General who served as Egypt's Foreign Minister when the peace agreement was signed, once wrote in an Egyptian newspaper (before he became Foreign Minister) about Egypt's goals: They are "not necessarily to liquidate the State of Israel, but rather to win over the souls of its residents – extricating Jews from Zionist rule and melting them down in the crucible of Arab nationalism." And this is precisely what Egypt tried to do by signing the peace agreement with Israel. Anwar Sadat, like most Arab leaders, understood that Zionism rests on two main pillars: Aliyah and settlement. The Egyptians therefore fought us precisely in these two areas, and their agreement with Israel was primarily intended to harm us in these two topics. He first struck a harsh blow at the settlement enterprise, successfully demanding during the Camp David talks the destruction of the blossoming settlement zone in Yamit and environs.

More than a decade later, the Oslo Accords were similarly designed to destroy the large-scale Jewish settlement enterprise in Judea, Samaria and Gaza – and if Syrian dictator Assad had simply agreed to waive his demand for 200 meters on the eastern shore of the Sea of Galilee [or if Israel had agreed to his demand], he would have received the destruction of every Jewish community in the Golan Heights.

PA Chairman Abu Mazen takes the same approach when he refuses to give up his demand for the "right of return" for millions of Arabs whose great-grandparents may have lived here for a couple of years. Such an influx into Israel, of course, would totally destabilize Israel's demography - which is precisely one of the main Arab strategies to collapse the State of Israel.

When US President Biden, seemingly one of the more gullible presidents the US has ever had, speaks of the two-state solution, he doesn't seem to realize, or care, that when the PA and other Arab countries speak of two states, they envision one of them as totally Arab and the other as temporarily Jewish, with the goal of turning it soon into another Arab state.

As stated, the second target for the Arab states in their wars against Israel is Aliyah. We saw, when the Soviet Union collapsed and myriads of Jews streamed into Israel, the leading protestor was Egypt. Already back in 1977 – before Sadat's visit to Israel – then-Egyptian Foreign Minister Ismail Fahmi wrote that any peace agreement with Israel must include a condition that Israel must stop all Aliyah for 50 years (!). Later, under President Mubarak, Sadat's successor, Egypt worked closely with the first Bush Administration to prevent American loan guarantees for Israel's absorption of new Russian immigrants; the stated fear was that the new Israelis would move to the settlements in Judea and Samaria.

The above approach stands in opposition to the Islamist approach, which seeks the military defeat of Israel and does not suffice with a cultural victory. The more "moderate" elements seek to embrace Israel with a cynical bear-hug that would neutralize the Jewish-Zionist character of the State. Those Jews who support the two-state vision are playing right into the hands of this latter approach, to the great danger of a secure, Jewish and democratic State of Israel.

In Conclusion:

Allow me to add here a note on unity and the left-wing protests against Netanyahu: Zalman Shoval, a former two-time Israeli ambassador to the U.S. and ex-Likud MK, wrote a book entitled "Diplomat" regarding the period following Sadat's visit to Israel in late 1977. That visit marked the beginning of long, arduous Israeli-Egyptian negotiations that ultimately led to the peace agreement. Shoval wrote, "It became clear to us that the Egyptians were trying cleverly to use the Peace Now movement for their own purposes - though apparently the Peace Now heads were not aware that they were being used."

What exactly did the Egyptians do? They carefully tracked Peace Now's activities and used the organization's own arguments and claims to strengthen their propaganda campaign against Israel. Their well-founded assumption was that the demonstrations and declarations by Peace Now against the "stubbornness and rigidity of the Israeli government" would shake Israeli cohesiveness, and would significantly affect Israeli public opinion. It was later learned that the Egyptians attributed such great importance to this strategy that the man responsible for this approach was none other than then-Prime Minister Mustafa Halil.

In the end, most sadly, peace with Egyptian was attained, at the cost of the uprooting of the entire Yamit region, together with all the Jewish communities in the area, and our retreat from all of the Sinai Peninsula. We must be very wary of similar developments taking place today.

Successful IDF Campaign in Gaza's Shefa Hospital Concludes

by Hillel Fendel, Writer & Translator for Bet El Institutions.

The ten-day IDF military operation to destroy the renewed Hamas headquarters in Shefa Hospital in northern Gaza has ended, having been declared a very successful campaign. Over 200 Hamas and other terrorists were killed, and at least 500 were arrested. The latter are being interrogated and supplying vital intelligence information regarding the hostages, Hamas leaders, and more, even as these words are being written. 

Satellite photo shows that many buildings in and around the hospital have been destroyed. At the same time, many are still standing, proving that the IDF did not wantonly bomb the complex; only those structures from which terrorists attacked or used as command posts and the like were hit. In addition, thousands of civilians were safely evacuated from Shefa, and the IDF acted to bring medical equipment into the hospital during the course of the battles. 

Built in 1946, Shefa was Gaza's primary hospital. It is/was located in the upscale neighborhood of A-Rimal in western Gaza City, where many top Hamas leaders resided until the current war. IDF and other sources have both already stated that Shefa will not be able to serve as a hospital in the near future. 

Hamas headquarters were located, up until last week, in the basement of one of the hospital buildings, to which many tunnels led. At the beginning of the current war, some of the over 200 Israeli hostages taken captive on Oct. 7th were held there. In nearly every building of the complex were found huge amounts of weapons and arms – under patients' beds, in the ceilings, and elsewhere.

It should be noted that the use of civilian infrastructures as a military/terrorist command post, as well as the use of civilians as live shields, are clearly war crimes committed by Hamas against the population it governs.

The just-ended campaign, code-named "Local Operation," was the second time the IDF acted in Shefa Hospital, after conquering it and leaving it earlier in the war. Besheva's Assaf Mishnayot noted that while last time it took the IDF several weeks to make its way into the hospital and take it over, this time it took only a few hours - an indication of the IDF's success in dismantling Hamas' military stronghold in northern Gaza.

However, this begs the question: Does this second campaign not indicate that the first conquest was not successful or effective? Mishnayot presented this question to IDF Lt.-Col (res.) Yaron Buskila, who explained: 

"Just as in Operation Defensive Shield in Judea and Samaria 20 years ago, we first acted intensively to dismantle the terrorist infrastructures and the terrorist organizations' stronghold in the area – and it then took us another five years to empty the entire region of terrorists… Of course, in the current situation, we will not be able to end this war without destroying the last Hamas brigades in Rafah [in southern Gaza, on the Egyptian border]."

But Buskila's explanation does not end there: 

"This was a complex exercise that the IDF planned in advance. Israel set up a honey trap for the Hamas terrorists. We knew that they would return to some of the places they had left – and we ensured that they would return to specific places that are now easier for us to enter, and to catch them there. We knew that Shefa was a likely place for them to return to, because they would never guess, after we acted already very intensively in their most important civilian infrastructure, that we would return there. When we surprised them by returning to Shefa so quickly and quietly, they were basically trapped."

Lt.-Col. Buskila explained that this strategy was largely formulated by Brig.-Gen. Itzik Cohen, Commander of Division 162: "It brought about a situation in which we closed in on the terrorists from all directions, cutting off all escape routes both below and above ground. If we hadn't left Shefa, thus enticing them to return there, we would have had to hunt them down one by one, without the successes that we registered in this campaign." 

The IDF success occurred even in the face of strong military opposition by many terrorist elements in the area, such as Islamic Jihad, the PFLP, and even ISIS, among others. These tried to attack the Israeli forces from different angles, but were repelled. 

What Next? 

With the conclusion of this operation, the IDF is continuing in the rest of the Gaza Strip: in western Khan Yunis [very close to the former site of Gush Katif's largest community, N'vei Dekalim] around the Am-Amal and Nasser hospitals; in Karara, north of Khan Yunis; south of the Netzarim corridor; and elsewhere. Long tunnels, even one 2.5 kilometers long, have been found and destroyed. 

It now appears likely that when the western Khan Yunis operation ends, the IDF will begin to deal with the camps in central Gaza – and, of course, Rafah. The IDF apparently has plans to evacuate large amounts of refugees in these areas, and is poised to act despite the concerns of both the Egyptians and Americans. It is estimated that the Israeli hostages, as well as the surviving Hamas leaders, are located in Rafah. 

The expected capture of Rafah will all but cement the victory over Hamas and the liquidation of its military leadership, as well as deal a great blow to the terrorist organization's civilian control over the Gaza Strip.

The PA and the Lion King

 by Amotz Miller, Yisrael HaYom newspaper, translated by Hillel Fendel.

Instead of self-flagellation, we must unite behind our immediate common goal: The PA-PLO must not be allowed a foot in the door of Gaza rule.

Those of us who grew up in the mid-90's not only remember, but can still feel, their pain and even fury at the Lion King scene when cruel Scar - who had just dropped his brother the king off a cliff to his death - persuades his nephew, little crown-prince Simba, that he was actually to blame for his father's death. 

Scar despicably offers his "generous" help in rectifying the situation, and Simba falls gratefully into his arms. Scar proposes that the newly-orphaned Simba run far, far away, and never return, and that he, Scar, would take upon himself the yoke of royalty. 

The children of the 90's also bear other scenes of hurt and fury, but these are not taken from Disney movies. They remember buses that turned into giant balls of fire and restaurants that became death traps – a nightmare wrapped in pink cellophane, tied with a ribbon, and adorned with the festively-written words: "Peace Process."

The cruel implosion of the "peace process" surprised many – but not those who listened with even half an ear to the jihadist declarations of the bridegroom of the festivities: arch-terrorist Yasser Arafat, may his name be blotted out.

Yigal Carmon, a former senior Israeli Intelligence official and an expert advisor on anti-terrorism warfare, listened to and recorded the unsuspecting speeches of Arafat. He heard Arafat say clearly, shortly before the signing of the Oslo Accords in 1993, that the agreement with Israel was not a recognition of the Jewish state's right to exist, but rather simply a tactical move in the ongoing war of extermination against the Zionist entity. 

Carmon tried to warn the public of the dangerous fraud being perpetrated upon Israel. He took his information to top journalist Nachum Barnea, who did nothing with it. Barnea later said he did not sufficiently understand the material; Carmon said he purposely covered it up in order not to sabotage the peace process. [Six months later, Arafat delivered his famous Johannesburg address, in which he called on the "Islamic nation" to "come and fight and start the Jihad to liberate Jerusalem," and in which he likened the Oslo process to a historical ceasefire agreement between Muhammad and the Quraysh tribe, which was meant to be only temporary.]

Home internet was just beginning, and social media were just a dream, such that the press was a closed clique, marketing Oslo almost unanimously as the "new Middle East."

Three Decades Later

Thirty years have passed, and the murderous PLO-Fatah-Hamas enemy, which never laid down its sword, pulled off the Oct. 7th massacre against unsuspecting civilians and unprotected soldiers in and around Israel's western Negev communities. The attack caught Israeli society in a period of extreme disunity, and actually led to a burst of brotherhood and cooperation. All parts of the society chipped in, whether in the reserves or in volunteering; whether presenting Israel's case to the world or giving of their money or time; whether praying or crying out.

However, the war has dragged on – prevented from reaching a successful conclusion by our many friends in the international community. While our hostages debilitate in the tunnels of Gaza and IDF soldiers endanger their lives in combat, cracks of disunity have become to emerge. One bitter feature thereof is the blame game, where accusations against everyone from the Prime Minister and his government, down through the military and intelligence establishments, and then to various sectors of society for their role, are furiously censured and denunciated. 

And thus, the despairing and sad nation, bewildered by events and its Simba-like self-flagellation, searching for stability and hope, falls like ripe fruit into the blood-stained hands of the Palestinian Authority – which has so generously volunteered, with American encouragement, to take over the yoke of governing Gaza when the war ends. 

But we are no longer in the 90's, and we are no longer blind to reality.

Israel's Regavim Association, which works to prevent illegal Arab use of state lands, very recently released a chilling report about top figures in the Palestinian Authority. The names, ranks, and official positions of bona-fide terrorists in the PA's security apparatus are listed. The report leaves no room for mistakes:  The official leaders of the PA have nothing but praise for its shahid workers taking part in the violent struggle against Israel and its citizens. 

And of course, its "pay for slay" policy – monthly salaries or pensions to terrorists and/or their families – is well-known to everyone in the West, which continues to pretend it doesn't know. 

The truth is out in the open: The Palestinian Authority is no different than Hamas. We do not need exploding buses or another version of Oct. 7th to tell us the true murderous intentions of the PA, or to foresee the blood that will be shed if we allow it any part in the future government of Gaza.

What the Goyim Say

 by Yoni Rotenberg, Besheva, translated by Hillel Fendel.

The Israeli media seems to be trying to play down the IDF's achievements in Gaza, but top security experts in the United States, not necessarily lovers of Zion, admit that the IDF's fighting in Gaza is nothing less than a remarkable and unprecedented achievement.

On October 20, two weeks after the horrific massacre, while Israeli planes were bombarding Gaza from the air and our ground forces were still waiting to enter, the Virginia-based Military Times magazine published an article entitled, "The Fight in Gaza Will be Hell." Combat experts with urban combat experience in countries around the world were sure that a ground entry into Gaza would turn into an Israeli bloodbath.

The article stated: "Estimates from Mosul, Iraq alone [referring to the nine-month Battle of Mosul in 2016-2017] — a likely comparison for what may happen in Gaza, according to multiple experts — suggest that more than 1,000 coalition forces died… If the tolls of dead, wounded and widespread destruction from other urban battles is any kind of indicator, a prolonged ground operation in Gaza likely is to produce as much or more carnage, experts said."

U.S. Lt.-Gen. James Gallin met at the time with Israeli government cabinet members and the IDF Chief of Staff. He told them decisively that a ground offensive was hopeless and would lead to an average daily toll of 20 dead Israeli soldiers. Articles and speeches by our own security experts agreed in principle and warned against getting involved in the "mud of Gaza."

 

More than four months have passed, sufficient time to examine these evaluations. In Israel, strangely enough, we don't receive an optimistic picture – but listen to what generals and warfare experts from abroad have to say!

According to military research institutes and experts in the U.S. and elsewhere, the IDF has done the impossible, showing the world very impressive combat capabilities in more difficult conditions than have ever been seen. Yes, we Israelis are used to six-day victories, or at most, three weeks. But just like the battlefield has changed, so too our thinking about war must change: The victory of our brave soldiers is achieved from one tunnel-shaft to the next, and from one building to another – and it is a shining victory nonetheless. 

Sample quotes from the experts: 

John Spencer, head of the Modern War Institute at West Point, speaking to Israeli TV Channel 14: 

"The IDF is advancing in a historic manner. I was very surprised by the pace of its progress. There is no other army that I know of, ever since World War II and maybe even forever, that had to fight a terrorist organization like Hamas that seeks to cause maximum casualties, even among civilians. If you would have asked me beforehand, I would have thought that the IDF would suffer many more casualties, and would not be able to attain control over such a large area."

Dr. Eliot A. Cohen of the Center for Strategic and International Studies: 

"Israel entered a densely-populated urban area that turned out to be even more fortified than it thought at first. This is a type of war of attrition. Still, militarily speaking, it is doing excellent work there…

"Even if we accept the reports of the Palestinian Health Ministry - and I'm not sure that their numbers are accurate - and the IDF estimates of the amount of terrorists among them, the number of civilian casualties is relatively low."

Cohen is full of criticism of Israel's general policies, but he was forced to admit, with noticeable difficulty, that the IDF is fulfilling international combat laws. He also said that the Israelis are exhibiting creativity, as well as technological and tactical abilities. 

To recap: Some experts expected 1,000 dead Israeli soldiers, and Gen. Gallin thought we could have reached 3,000 by now – and this when the actual dimensions of the Hamas tunnel network were under-estimated. The true numbers stand only at 240 IDF casualties in Gaza, with all the sorrow that we suffered at the loss of even one. 

The above-mentioned John Spencer: 

"What the IDF forces learned during the course of their combat in Gaza is worth more than developed technology. Their ability to close in on and destroy the enemy under the most difficult conditions should frighten Hizbullah. [Hizbullah should know that if] there was ever a time not to start up with Israel, that time is now…

"The IDF's ability to integrate between the ground forces and those in the air is a unique strength of Israel, involving even the commanders in the field."

The Wall St. Journal, in a February op-ed entitled "Israel’s Untold Gaza Progress," cited Spencer's comparison of the IDF's advancement in Khan Yunis to the Americans' victory in Mosul: 

“Mosul was one battle, in one city against 3 to 5k militants with limited defenses. Israel is fighting multiple battles in 7 cities against 30k militants with military grade underground cities built under civilian areas.” "Israel needs time to achieve victory," the article stated, "and Hamas is counting on Western powers to deny it that time." 

David H. Petraeus, former Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, referring to the complexities of combat in Gaza:

"These are the most difficult military conditions that exist – much more complex than the battles in Ramadi, Fallujah and Bakuba [cities in Iraq where the Americans fought]. Gaza is a larger area, with a larger population and taller buildings, and in addition, hundreds of kilometers of tunnels and underground infrastructures beneath public and civilian installations such as hospitals, schools, and mosques. It is very, very challenging – but I believe that it must be done."

Col. Richard Kemp, a retired British Army officer who commanded Operation Fingal in Afghanistan: 

"I invite all the colonels, generals, experts, and computer war-game players to email me within 48 hours a detailed attack plan for Israel…"

A month ago, in a more serious vein, he said:
"The war is progressing more quickly, with more losses to Hamas, than the Israeli leadership thought at first. This doesn't mean that it will end quickly, because this is the most complex war battlefield ever in history. Urban combat is the most complicated, and Hamas invested years in preparing the ground and the underground for this war. Yes, there have been battle sites with tunnels in the past, but not to this extent and on this level. The IDF was forced to deal with a situation that has never been seen before. And in addition to all this, there is also the matter of the hostages that must be taken into account… I spoke to people in the IDF and I reviewed their activity, and I was very impressed. They are working and advancing in a very effective manner." 

In a perfect world, our faith in the justness of our cause and in the Creator of the world, together with the stories we hear from the front and from the IDF Spokesman, would buttress us with the knowledge that "we are winning." But unfortunately, Israeli media often filters out the military items based on whether they are "pro Bibi" or "anti Bibi." We are given a distorted and cynical picture of lack of progress in Gaza. 

It is therefore good to hear from the experts abroad that we are in fact making mincemeat out of the cruel Gazan enemy, and with G-d's help we will continue to do so.