Can We Still Win the War?

by Emanuel Shilo, Editor of Besheva, translated by Hillel Fendel.

There is no way to achieve the declared goals of destroying Hamas and freeing the hostages without occupying the entire Gaza Strip and establishing a military government. The Israeli public that sacrificed so much should demand from the weakened military and political leadership the victory they promised.

1. It appears, from the interview Prime Minister Netanyahu granted Israel's Channel 14 last week – his first public interview in months – that it will not be more than a few weeks at most before the IDF announces that it has all but completed its mission in Gaza. Our forces will then remain on the Philadelphi route in Rafah and in other strategic locations in Gaza, from where it will occasionally set out to attack specific Hamas targets.

If this is in fact the case, most unfortunately, the war will have essentially ended without the achievement of its goals. Hamas will not have been destroyed; it is already on its way to rejuvenation, at least partially. If Hamas continues to rule in Gaza, it is doubtful whether the exiled Jews of the Gaza Envelope will agree to return to their kibbutzim and communities, even if they are physically rebuilt.

In addition, the hostages – those who are alive – will continue to suffer in captivity, if they survive. Though the IDF might be able to rescue a few more of them here and there, we can assume that Hamas will not agree to any comprehensive release deal, because the hostages serve an important purpose for Hamas: They protect, physically and otherwise, the Hamas leaders from Israeli strikes. The only way Hamas will agree to release them is if Israel withdraws all its forces from Gaza, with international guarantees that the IDF will not attack again. This would be a pure victory for Yahye Sinwar and Hamas, dealing a death blow to Israel's deterrence capabilities vis-à-vis Hizbullah and others. The present government will not agree to such a scenario – but it is not presenting an alternative strategy leading to victory.

2. The alternative that even some on the left-wing agree to is simply this: We must conquer the entire Gaza Strip, pursue every single terrorist, confiscate every weapon and piece of ammunition, and destroy every tunnel and weapons-manufacturing plant. We must not conquer and leave and conquer and leave, but conquer and remain.

Hamas will continue to rule in Gaza unless it is totally dismantled, and this cannot happen if we encourage local militias to take its place. The only body that can neutralize Hamas from the very foundations is an Israeli military government. It will also help Israel in terms of our intelligence gathering. We will be able to receive information from the local populace that will help us locate Hamas leaders, as well as the hostages. When Sinwar realizes that our forces are closing in on him and that his organization is on the verge of total eradication, it is more likely that he will finally agree to release our hostages in a deal that Israel can live with – just as he did in November, when more than 100 hostages were freed.

3. This approach certainly has its shortcomings. However, it is the only way to achieve our war objectives and the victory we so sorely need to rehabilitate our deterrence capabilities. Sadly, there are those amongst us who have despaired of achieving this victory. For instance, the IDF Spokesman actually told the world, in an apparent reflection of the opinion of the Chief of Staff and other top military figures, that Hamas is an "idea that cannot be defeated." Even if it is true that an idea cannot be defeated, certainly the number of its believers can be reduced and its implementation can be prevented. Communism and Nazism might still exist as ideas, but are nowhere near a position to bring about the terrible calamities they did in the past. It is very regrettable that the impression left by the Spokesman's remark is that our General Staff, which is responsible for the Oct. 7th travesty, has simply given up in despair.

4. This defeatist spirit must be opposed on and from all levels, and the movement of opposition must begin at the bottom: The soldiers and their families, those who have been paying the highest price of this war in every sphere, must publicly demand the victory that the government and army promised us, and for which we sacrificed so very much. In the face of the despair and helplessness, the voice demanding victory and the full achievement of our objectives must be heard strongly - from the political echelons, from the public, from the media, and from the battalions, brigades and divisions. 

The government leaders must then demand this from themselves and from the IDF, and internalize that the only path available to us is the complete occupation of the Gaza Strip and the establishment of a military government there.

After all, what is the point of the survival of this government if it doesn't lead us to victory? True, every other possible governmental constellation – other than a unity government – would be much worse. This does not mean, however, that we can accept a right-wing, nationalist government that cannot win the war! If Defense Minister Gallant continues to dream of local Gazan forces that will replace Hamas, he must either be re-educated, or replaced. Binyamin Netanyahu, Yisrael Katz, Yariv Levine, Betzalel Smotrich, Itamar Ben-Gvir, Orit Strook, Yuli Edelstein – it's up to you!!

And it's also up to Avigdor Lieberman and Gideon Saar – two opposition party leaders who understand the importance of fighting the war to it successful conclusion. Instead of providing fuel to the fires of the protestors who continue to demand, at almost literally all costs, the toppling of the present government – which will almost certainly lead to a premature end to the war – they must show responsibility and join the government. 

A unity government is the call of the hour, and will show our enemies that we are still united and still believe in "Together We Will Win."

Netanyahu and the Submarines: A View From His Side

by Yoni Rotenberg, Besheva, translated by Hillel Fendel.

Every once in a while, ever since it first burst into the public consciousness in 2017, the story of the "purchase of the German submarines" returns to the headlines. The general impression appears to be that, though important security figures always have what to say about it on the news programs – just enough to fill the allotted air-time – the public doesn't really know what all the fuss is about, or what it has to do with our everyday lives. 

But this time, when the rumors and suspicions abruptly became official "warning letters" to Prime Minister Netanyahu and others, it appears that the drapes of apathy have been drawn open. The feeling is that there must be fire under the smoke. 

Let us therefore disperse some of the smoke so that we can see how our leaders, some of whom are still in positions of major influence, behaved regarding the security of the State of Israel. 

The commission of inquiry that sent the letters was decided upon by the short-lived Bennett-Lapid government. Its mandate was to look exclusively into how the decision to purchase the submarines was made; the accusations of bribery against Netanyahu have long been debunked. The most interesting of the five recipients of the warnings are by far Netanyahu and his then-Defense Minister, and now his bitter rival, Moshe Bugi Yaalon. 

If the average citizen of Israel, one who knows even just a bit about the news, would read the warning letter to the Prime Minister and the clauses of which he is "accused," he would probably respond with four words: "Of course, that's Netanyahu!" That is, Netanyahu is described in the letter as acting in his classic style, just as he has throughout his political career, for better or for worse. He is described as having "made decisions bearing great ramifications in a non-regulated manner," as having "come to conclusions… while bypassing the government," and even having "turned the National Security Committee into an executive committee of the Prime Minister." These are all classic Netanyahu! The are just like the "War Cabinet" that he invented during the current war, by which he surrounds himself with those he trusts and keeps others out of the decision-making process. Nothing new here. 

Though we have gotten used to it, it is of course unacceptable. The opinions of Cabinet ministers must be sought and seriously considered, as must be those of professionals in the field. Netanyahu is not justified in believing that only he can be trusted with the security of the State of Israel. However, even though the criticism of his modus-operandi is justified, it must come with an asterisk: When we talk of the "professionals" whom Netanyahu bypassed when he decided to purchase the submarines, we are referring to none other than Israel's security establishment, and primarily the IDF – and there's the rub.

As we have known for many years, and as was empirically proven over the past nine months, the security establishment suffers from dogmatic and narrow thinking, a sense of self-importance, complacency, and too many intrigues and ego-considerations. It is expected of Netanyahu, as the Prime minister, to use his own personal judgement when dealing with this network. (This should also be kept in mind by the anti-Netanyahu protestors who on the one hand marched with giant balloon submarines to protest his independent thinking, yet now demand that he take responsibility for all the mistakes made by the army and security apparatus before and after October 7th!)

It is very hard to disagree with the security establishment. These are not easygoing people, they see their opinions as absolute truth, and have little interest in bowing before the elected leadership. This is evident today as well. This is why Netanyahu built himself the National Security Council – a body that existed before him, but without great influence – as a professional security body that will provide recommendations that do not necessarily conform with those of the army and defense establishment and that are more in line with his own conceptions. Yes, this deviates from the accepted practice of how decisions are made, but it could be that in some cases it is necessary. 

The Two Sides

Let us boil down the dispute between Netanyahu and the establishment so that we can understand what it is about, and not simply reject one side or the other out of hand. In a nutshell, Netanyahu wants to enhance our naval power even if it costs more, and the security establishment feels that this is wasteful and unnecessary. The Prime Minister's position is not surprising at all. He is in general an alarmist-type, and specifically regarding Iran and what he feels is the existential threat it presents for the State of Israel. This, and the need to guarantee Israel's gas reserves, are the two main issues for Netanyahu, and it is only natural that he wishes to ensure that they are budgeted generously. 

The security establishment also recognizes the Iranian threat, of course. It acknowledges that Israel must have submarines that can carry nuclear bombs (according to foreign reports) for second-strike capabilities that form deterrence and a balance of power. However, they feel that a fleet of five such ships, so that one can be on constant alert at any given moment, is sufficient. Netanyahu, however, sees the worst-calamity scenario in which Iran takes out two of the subs and heaves an atomic bomb on Israel. He therefore says, "Let's go not for the minimum, but for the maximum." 

Faced with the official objections, Netanyahu has no choice but to make decisions in a less-than-acceptable manner, and "turn the National Security Council into his own executive branch."

*** Translator's note: The author notes that though there is much more to write regarding this complex issue, he can only elaborate on a few points. Let us sum them up:

1. The operative assumption of the commission is that the security establishment is the epitome of professionalism, and that Netanyahu's deviation from its recommendations actually "harms national security." However, this is not necessarily true, as can be seen from the small example of Netanyahu's desire to privatize the job of maintaining Israel's existing submarines. The idea was scrapped so that there should not appear to be a conflict of interest, but even the "professional" IDF itself did not succeed in carrying out its own plan to privatize the maintenance, and was criticized by the State Comptroller for this back in 2022.
2. Then-Defense Minister Yaalon's version of the events seeks to portray Netanyahu as having been motivated by personal considerations. Keep in mind that ever since Yaalon was fired by Netanyahu in 2016, he has barely missed a chance to bitterly criticize Netanyahu. But in fact, in several ways, his version actually bolsters Netanyahu's case.
3. Netanyahu felt that it was important at the time to augment the navy's submarine fleet, and wished to take advantage of Germany's offer to sell advanced submarines even if they would not be ready for years. Let's consider: If Israel, in the current state of international affairs in which it finds itself, would now try to make the same deal with Germany from scratch, would Germany agree? And if so, what would Biden have said? And even if the deal would pass, what about in a year or two from now, given a possible major war with Lebanon and clashes with Iran – would the West also then be interested in our acquisition of submarines that could aid us in an apparently-nearing nuclear war? When looked at from this angle, Netanyahu's efforts to spend money for German submarines take on a very different color.