Post-War Inquiries: Where's the Inquiry into the War With Hizbullah?

by Haggai Huberman, journalist and author, translated by Hillel Fendel.

In one of the parking lots in the IDF's Tzrifin compound in Rishon LeTzion is parked a line of light trucks and full-size trucks. They are painted in a variety of colors, including some in colors of camouflage. A cursory glance reveals that some of the vehicles are damaged and in bad shape. A deeper look shows their contents: missile launchers, anti-aircraft guns, and more – last used in Lebanon to fire mostly at Israeli civilian targets.

These are most of the vehicles of the Radwan special operation forces unit of Hizbullah, whose principle mission is to infiltrate Israel's Galilee. They were captured in southern Lebanon during the short time (most of Oct.-Nov. 2024) that the IDF was present there, before retreating under the France/U.S.-brokered ceasefire.

Over the past two weeks, the Israeli press has been focusing on the commissions of inquiry into the events of Simchat Torah 5754 (Oct. 7, 2023) along Israel's border with Gaza and points further east. But we have not heard of any similar inquiries into what happened on the northern front, in the battles that took place, or that didn't take place, with Hizbullah.

The reason for this, apparently, is that the ruthless Nukhba forces of Hamas struck us a very painful blow, inconceivable even now, while the Radwan units sufficed with firing rockets from a distance. This caused damage to thousands of homes, to be sure, but they did not invade Israel in their thousands, did not murder over 1,000 Israelis, and did not kidnap hundreds of Jews.

If Hizbullah had dispatched their forces to do so simultaneously with the Hamas attack, precisely according to the original Iranian plan and as Sinwar hoped, how successful would they have been? We can only imagine it with dread. Would we have known about it in advance? Probably not – but we cannot be sure, because as far as is known, no analysis or inquiry into the northern arena is being carried out.  

Let us also recall that tens of Jewish communities and towns on Israel's northern border were evacuated for their own safety, just as on our border with Gaza. The difference is that in the south, most of the residents have returned home, while in the north, most have not.

I visited last week the exhibit of the weapons we captured from Hizbullah. We saw the Toyotas and Hyundais - the notorious pickup-trucks of the type used in the Hamas attack - equipped with 80mm and 107mm rocket launchers, the very ones that Hizbillah fired massively at Galilee communities over the past year. They were captured not far from northern Israel, in the narrow strip that the IDF occupied for eight weeks. Most of the vehicles that were confiscated were brought to Israel, and the rest were apparently destroyed.

Looking at the Hizbullah weapons and stocks in Tzrifin, and knowing that much more are stored elsewhere in Israel, one is shocked by the thought of what could have happened if Radwan had infiltrated as and when Hizbullah did.

The explanations regarding what I was seeing were given by Lt.-Col. Idan Sharon Kantar, the deputy commander of the Loot Clearance Unit. This is a General Staff unit that travels around the area and collects the equipment and other weapons that the enemy leaves behind, so that it can be investigated and studied.

Officer Kantar explains that the main differences between Hamas and Hizbullah primarily concern the way they each maintain their weapons. Both terrorist forces prolifically use Kalashnikov rifles, for instance, known as AK-47's. "The Kalash is the basic, daily weapon of Hamas," Lt.-Col. Kantar explains, "and the ones that we captured were in various stages of overuse. But in Hizbullah, they are well-kept, and we found them as new as if they had just come from the factory. Most of the Kalash's that we found were made in China, and looked brand new."

"But in Hamas, it's a different story," he said. "They don't have rifles that they're saving for war time; the guns are always in use. But with Hizbullah, some of them were still in their original packing. Most of them had the name of the user, and where he was serving, etc. – very organized."

"Another interesting thing we saw was the uniformity. In Hamas, you can see how every battalion has its own equipment – different than the other battalions. But in Hizbullah, there is a planning body that defines the same formats for all the forces. The same stickers were on all the rifles, no matter where we found them, and we also saw that there was a certain uniform ratio of weapons, cartridges and bullets to each terrorist. The level of planning in Hizbullah was much higher than with Hamas.

"Hizbullah was much more modern. Even if they manufactured their own explosives, they didn't do it in an underground lab, like in Gaza. They had organized laboratories, with bona-fide chemists and engineers working there. Hizbullah was a very organized army. Most of what we found there was not improvised, but rather originated in industrial plants, with clear instructions for use."

Lt.-Col. Kantar continued contrasting Hizbullah with Hamas: "Most of the RPG rockets of Hamas are made in Gaza, or put together in Gaza. Sometimes they take pieces from existing rockets to make or improve new ones; most of the rockets are not new. They have many that were dismantled and rebuilt by them themselves. Hizbullah, however, has money for whatever it needs; they buy new weapons, without having to put them together. In addition, there is a highway from Damascus to Tehran, and a seaport in Lebanon, and an airport of course. They were able to get whatever they needed."

OK, so now we have a much clearer picture – one that tells us how little we knew on that infamous Simchat Torah about what was actually going on beyond our northern border fence. What is now understood is that if Hizbullah had acted in tandem with Hamas that day, it's hard to even imagine the horrors we would have been tortured with.

The current inquiries are important, and help us draw the correct lessons, both operationally and intelligence-wise. But we must conduct in-depth investigations not only regarding the southern arena, but just as much – and perhaps more – concerning the north as well.

Brig.-Gen. (res.) Hezi Nehama: "Prepare for War. There Won't be a Stage II, for Three Reasons"

by Rivky Goldfinger, Besheva contributor, translated by Hillel Fendel.

Israel is at a crossroads: The ceasefire with Hamas is officially over, yet 21 live hostages (including two foreign workers) remain in Gaza, and talks are continuing. What will Israel's strategy be?

Hamas has refused Israel's offer to extend Stage I of the ceasefire-hostage-release deal. It also does not accept U.S. envoy Steve Witkoff's proposal for the release of additional hostages, in two groups, in exchange for seven weeks of ceasefire.

Israel has announced its consent to Witkoff's plan, but has made it clear that it has no plans at present to retreat from the Philadelphi route separating Egypt from Gaza. As part of its pressure on Hamas, Israel has stopped all humanitarian aid – of which several months' worth of supplies are still available in Gaza – and has also cut off electricity to Gaza. To be sure, Israel has not supplied much electricity to Gaza for nearly a year and a half, ever since the war started, but has now cut off the final supply, which powers desalination facilities there.

Israel has also made it very clear that it is preparing to resume its military campaign, and this time with the declared intention of conquering the entire Strip. Various officials have made statements to this effect, and military preparations are underway in full force, under the aggressive leadership of new IDF Chief of Staff Lt.-Gen. Eyal Zamir.

The coming days are critical to see which path Israel is to take: that of a temporary ceasefire, the freeing of some hostages, and the leaving behind of others – or war.

Brig.-Gen. (res.) Hezi Nehama, one of the leaders of the "Reserves Commanders and Fighters Forum," spoke with us just before Israel announced its absolute cut-off of electricity to Gaza. He said that what Israel is doing now is intended to exhaust the efforts to release as many hostages as possible for now, while keeping open the option of resumed warfare. "Israel is striving to achieve the two main goals of the war – both the defeat of Hamas and the completion of the return of the hostages."

Q. Even though these are basically contradictory goals?

A. "Practically speaking, the way in which Prime Minister Netanyahu has been operating over the past year and a half under all the tremendous pressures exerted upon him have led to a situation where he has both not stopped the war and also succeeded in returning most of the hostages... What is happening now is our trying to see if we can milk Stage I a little bit more, to achieve the release of as many hostages as possible."

Q. Stopping the humanitarian aid – did that even have any effect? After all, Hamas has stored up huge amounts of food, and other supplies.

A. "It's true that they have supplies for 4-5 months, at least. But when you stop the supplies for a large population, it first of all starts to cause unrest among the people and fears about what the future holds. The prices of food and goods of course will go up, and that itself creates panic among the Gazans.

"But at the same time, we certainly must stop, very soon, all water to places where we don't want Gazans to be. Water can't be stored up in Gaza. They have water in two ways: either via pipelines from Israel to Gaza, or by desalination facilities that require electricity. Israel's next move must therefore be to cut off electricity and water to Gaza."

Q. How should the next round of fighting look, from Israel's standpoint?

A. "It has to be done very differently. We will have to detach the general populace from the terrorists, and supply water only to places that Israel approves. Water must be supplied to the humanitarian camps, but not to any place where we don't want civilians. This will cause them to evacuate and enable us to fight the enemy, which will be weakened from lack of food and water.

Q. What about Israel's insistence on remaining in the Philadelphi Route?

A. We must not leave Philadelphi! If we do, Hamas will transfer hostages, live and dead, to Iran and elsewhere. Iran will put hostages at their nuclear facilities with warnings that if we attack their sites, the hostages will die. And then what – the public cries will resume that the hostages must be freed at any price and we can't bomb Iran? No, Philadelphi cannot be opened in any way whatsoever. Netanyahu insisted throughout the war on these two critical principles: the war cannot stop, and we cannot leave Philadelphi. These are of critical strategic importance, and his insistence is very correct."

Q. What do you think about the Witkoff proposal? Does it serve Israel's interests?

A. "Israel must adopt his plan and thus, first of all, to receive half of the remaining hostages. It's exactly like the question we faced regarding Stage I because of the great challenges we would face in Stage II; right now, we have to get what we can. After we do that, we can talk more about what's next. As long as we can get some hostages home, we must exhaust this option – on condition that we don't totally stop the war and don't leave Philadelphi."

Q. Is there a chance for Stage II?

A. "No, for three main reasons. One, Hamas does not have all the hostages –meaning that it literally does not know where some of the corpses are buried. Two, Hamas will never give up its insurance policy: the hostages. The terrorists will always make sure to keep some of them, dead and alive, so that it can continue playing its game and trying to remain alive. This will go on for as long as we have not totally defeated Hamas. And three, Hamas is currently not willing to cede its control in Gaza, while Israel, for its part, is not willing to allow it to have control in Gaza. This gap cannot be bridged in any form. It could be that Stage I will be extended in some way or another, but there will be no permanent agreement to end the fighting. I therefore believe that within a month, Israel will return to very strong warfare with the goal of destroying Hamas.

"We will see things in the coming battle that we should have seen before, but did not. We will see the activation of large numbers of forces at the same time – at least four divisions [each with several thousands of soldiers] – and a massive evacuation of the Gazan populace. We did see a large evacuation before, but it was not complete. There will then be a full siege on the areas in which Hamas remains, with no civilians there – and this will lead to its surrender."