by Haggai Huberman, journalist and author, translated by Hillel Fendel.
In one of the parking
lots in the IDF's Tzrifin compound in Rishon LeTzion is parked a line of light
trucks and full-size trucks. They are painted in a variety of colors, including
some in colors of camouflage. A cursory glance reveals that some of the
vehicles are damaged and in bad shape. A deeper look shows their contents:
missile launchers, anti-aircraft guns, and more – last used in Lebanon to fire
mostly at Israeli civilian targets.
These are most of the
vehicles of the Radwan special operation forces unit of Hizbullah, whose principle mission is to infiltrate Israel's Galilee.
They were captured in southern Lebanon during the short time (most of Oct.-Nov.
2024) that the IDF was present there, before retreating under the
France/U.S.-brokered ceasefire.
Over the past two weeks,
the Israeli press has been focusing on the commissions of inquiry into the
events of Simchat Torah 5754 (Oct. 7, 2023) along Israel's border with Gaza and
points further east. But we have not heard of any similar inquiries into what
happened on the northern front, in the battles that took place, or that didn't
take place, with Hizbullah.
The reason for this,
apparently, is that the ruthless Nukhba forces of Hamas struck us a very
painful blow, inconceivable even now, while the Radwan units sufficed with
firing rockets from a distance. This caused damage to thousands of homes, to be
sure, but they did not invade Israel in their thousands, did not murder over
1,000 Israelis, and did not kidnap hundreds of Jews.
If Hizbullah had
dispatched their forces to do so simultaneously with the Hamas attack,
precisely according to the original Iranian plan and as Sinwar hoped, how
successful would they have been? We can only imagine it with dread. Would we
have known about it in advance? Probably not – but we cannot be sure, because
as far as is known, no analysis or inquiry into the northern arena is being
carried out.
Let us also recall that tens of Jewish communities and towns on Israel's
northern border were evacuated for their own safety, just as on our border with
Gaza. The difference is that in the south, most of the residents have returned
home, while in the north, most have not.
I visited last week the exhibit of the weapons we captured from
Hizbullah. We saw the Toyotas and Hyundais - the notorious pickup-trucks of the
type used in the Hamas attack - equipped with 80mm and 107mm rocket launchers, the
very ones that Hizbillah fired massively at Galilee communities over the past
year. They were captured not far from northern Israel, in the narrow strip that
the IDF occupied for eight weeks. Most of the vehicles that were confiscated
were brought to Israel, and the rest were apparently destroyed.
Looking at the Hizbullah weapons and stocks in Tzrifin, and knowing that
much more are stored elsewhere in Israel, one is shocked by the thought of what
could have happened if Radwan had infiltrated as and when Hizbullah did.
The explanations regarding what I was seeing were given by Lt.-Col. Idan
Sharon Kantar, the deputy commander of the Loot Clearance Unit. This is a
General Staff unit that travels around the area and collects the equipment and
other weapons that the enemy leaves behind, so that it can be investigated and
studied.
Officer Kantar explains that the main differences between Hamas and
Hizbullah primarily concern the way they each maintain their weapons. Both
terrorist forces prolifically use Kalashnikov rifles, for instance, known as
AK-47's. "The Kalash is the basic, daily weapon of Hamas," Lt.-Col.
Kantar explains, "and the ones that we captured were in various stages of
overuse. But in Hizbullah, they are well-kept, and we found them as new as if
they had just come from the factory. Most of the Kalash's that we found were
made in China, and looked brand new."
"But in Hamas, it's a different story," he said. "They
don't have rifles that they're saving for war time; the guns are always in use.
But with Hizbullah, some of them were still in their original packing. Most of
them had the name of the user, and where he was serving, etc. – very
organized."
"Another interesting thing we saw was the uniformity. In Hamas, you
can see how every battalion has its own equipment – different than the other
battalions. But in Hizbullah, there is a planning body that defines the same
formats for all the forces. The same stickers were on all the rifles, no matter
where we found them, and we also saw that there was a certain uniform ratio of
weapons, cartridges and bullets to each terrorist. The level of planning in Hizbullah
was much higher than with Hamas.
"Hizbullah was much more modern. Even if they manufactured their
own explosives, they didn't do it in an underground lab, like in Gaza. They had
organized laboratories, with bona-fide chemists and engineers working there.
Hizbullah was a very organized army. Most of what we found there was not
improvised, but rather originated in industrial plants, with clear instructions
for use."
Lt.-Col. Kantar continued contrasting Hizbullah with Hamas: "Most
of the RPG rockets of Hamas are made in Gaza, or put together in Gaza.
Sometimes they take pieces from existing rockets to make or improve new ones;
most of the rockets are not new. They have many that were dismantled and
rebuilt by them themselves. Hizbullah, however, has money for whatever it needs;
they buy new weapons, without having to put them together. In addition, there
is a highway from Damascus to Tehran, and a seaport in Lebanon, and an airport
of course. They were able to get whatever they needed."
OK, so now we have a much clearer picture – one that tells us how little
we knew on that infamous Simchat Torah about what was actually going on beyond
our northern border fence. What is now understood is that if Hizbullah had
acted in tandem with Hamas that day, it's hard to even imagine the horrors we
would have been tortured with.
The current inquiries are important, and help us draw the correct lessons,
both operationally and intelligence-wise. But we must conduct in-depth
investigations not only regarding the southern arena, but just as much – and perhaps
more – concerning the north as well.