The Sharp Strategic U-Turn in Our Consciousness

by Kobi Eliraz, former advisor on settlement affairs to four Defense Ministers, translated by Hillel Fendel.

Israel's current war, not only in Gaza, is not the result of a particular or individual failure. It was not just an isolated military mistake that brought about Oct. 7th, nor a temporary or even long-term intelligence failure.

It was rather brought upon us by a failed understanding – the notorious "misconception" that everyone talks about – that became entrenched in the popular thinking of many in power, and not in power, in the State of Israel. It was the dangerous illusion that concessions, appeasement, and restraint would bring about quiet and stability.

This terrible failure that brought us to where we are does not belong to just one particular government, or to one Chief of Staff or another. It is a very deeply ensconced misunderstanding of Middle East reality that developed over the course of decades of naively mistaken policy.

It was manifest in a long series of false slogans that were disseminated and became principles of our public policy. For instance:

·         "The new Middle East" popularized by Shimon Peres [and echoed, in the context of an anticipated peace deal with Saudi Arabia, by Prime Minister Netanyahu in the United Nations just two weeks (!) before Oct. 7^th]

·         "Peace is made with enemies" – forgetting that this does not include enemies who will use the "peace" to find new ways to destroy you; and

·         "There is no military solution" – leading to a situation in which the enemy continually fortifies himself, in the knowledge that our response will be limited.

Instead of reading the reality as it truly is, we became addicted to the illusion that concessions will lead to calm. At the same time, the enemy took advantage of our weakness to build himself up with a powerful military apparatus and prepare for his next offensive.

Between the Oslo Accords of 1993-95 and the Disengagement/expulsion of 2005, Israel repeatedly retreated, while the terrorists kept on growing stronger. The thought that our withdrawals would decrease Palestinian violence was proven to be downright wrong: Our departure from Gush Katif and Gaza did not turn it into the "Singapore of the Middle East," but rather into the capital of international terrorism.

Every round of fighting in Gaza over the past three decades ended with an "arrangement" – but not with a decisive defeat of Hamas. This in itself strengthened Hamas, giving it not only confidence, but also the ability to rearm, regroup, and rebuild. Our restraint in the face of Hamas rockets, tunnel-building, and terrorist attacks sent Hamas a clear message: "Israel will not fight you forcefully and you have little to lose by continuing to attack us."

This ongoing mistake of believing that we can simply "manage" the dispute instead of "winning" it has nothing to do with the lack of intelligence at any given time. It does, however, explain why whatever intelligence was received was woefully misinterpreted.

When commissions of inquiry are ultimately established to investigate what happened on and before Oct. 7^th, they must not be allowed to suffice with attempts to figure out who is most to blame for the military and intelligence blunders. The critical question that must be answered is rather: How did Israel allow this situation to develop in the first place?

The officers who went to sleep early Simchat Torah morning in the belief that the signs of an imminent attack were not substantial made a local mistake. Those who waved off the warnings of the female lookout soldiers made a worse mistake. They must all pay for them. But most culpable of all are those who led the State of Israel into deceptive "peace" agreements and who tried to sell the public false dreams of "peace for land" and insisted that there "is no military solution." These include many in academia, the media, the security establishment, and in the broad public. They helped form a reality in which Israel was perceived as weak – which invited our enemies to act against us in every way they could.

The current war must lead not only to a change in our military, but to a change in how we think. We can no longer strategize in terms of how to manage the conflict, but rather how to win and end it; no more ceasefire, but only total destruction of the enemy's military capabilities; no more unilateral concessions, but only steps that strengthen our grasp on the Land and our deterrence capabilities.

For Israel to return to strategic security, there must be a total change in our thinking, and on the ground. We must not return to the same cycle of weakness, false illusions, and baseless hopes. The time has come, once and for all, to stop hoping that everything will work out on its own – and to start shaping it the way we want with force, strength, and strategic clarity.

Time is Running Out for Israel to Attack Iran

by Kobi Eliraz, former Settlement Affairs advisor to various Israeli defense ministers, translated by Hillel Fendel.

Only just over six weeks remain for Israel to make a brave strategic decision.

[Translator's note: This past April, Iran attacked Israel with hundreds of missiles and drones, and Israel retaliated a week later. On October 1, Iran missile-attacked Israel once again, followed on Oct. 19 by a drone fired by Iran's proxies in Lebanon at Netanyahu's home in Caesaria. Israel's retaliation later that month included the destruction of an active nuclear weapons research facility – but security officials said then that this did not include Israel's response to the drone strike against Netanyahu's home. Though they indicated that further action could be expected, this has not yet happened.]

This week, explaining why he agreed to the ceasefire arrangement in Lebanon, Netanyahu said that one of the reasons was that it "enables us to focus on Iran - and I won't elaborate on that." 

The window of opportunity for Israel to mortally, or at least very painfully, strike Iran is beginning to close. The clock is ticking, and our option for a significant blow will disappear even faster the more the international situation changes and a new United States president takes office. 

Israel stands before a critical moment in which it must make a brave strategic decision, in spite of American and international reservations about - and pressures against - this course of action. 

Even with the ongoing messaging back and forth between Jerusalem and Washington, it appears that Israel currently has a rare opportunity to act in Iran, precisely now during the changing of the guard of the U.S. Administration. 

Iran, which well understands the greatness of the hour and the "complex" situation in which it finds itself, has refrained from responding with power to Israel's latest actions, even though it has often boasted to do so. This is the hour of Israel's test; it must realize that the time has come to change the rules of the game, Churchill-style. 

Great leaders are measured during times of crisis, when a single decision can change the course of history. Winston Churchill was forced to make fateful decisions during the course of World War II – and he sometimes did so against the advice of his own advisors and international allies. He understood that the future of the British nation, and the entire free world, was dependent on his leadership.

So, too, Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu now faces a historic test of leadership. The present situation can tolerate neither hesitation nor procrastination, and this is the precise hour for him to make a daring decision. What Israel does now will affect the strategy of the Islamic-fundamentalist terrorist countries and organizations, and thus Israel's security, for many years going forward.

History does not remember kindly, if at all, the leaders who waited. It reserves an honored place only for those who took action, initiated, and led. 

Iran activates regional proxies such as Hamas, Hizbullah, Islamic Jihad, and others in Syria and Iraq. It represents a constant active threat to Israel and the stability of the entire Middle East. The Iranian proxies wait for instructions from Tehran, and Israel knows that if it precisely strikes the "head of the snake," those proxies will receive an equally precise message: "Israel is not playing just for its defense, but rather knows how to initiate and act whenever and wherever necessary."

It is likely that a unilateral Israeli strike of this nature will anger the U.S., but we must remember that there are those in the outgoing Biden Administration, and certainly in the incoming Trump Administration, who would actually support such a move. The appointees of Trump, in particular, who is known for his strong anti-Iran stance, could very well view this action as an opportunity to entrench his future policy vis-à-vis Iran. That is, an Israeli offensive will better position him regarding Iran, and against the Axis of Evil altogether. 

Strategically speaking, a successful Israeli strike will present Israel as a leading power and as an independent force in the regional arena. This will of course strengthen Israel's stature in future negotiations, and will further fortify its status as a military and diplomatic powerhouse. 

History teaches us that military initiatives, such as Operation Opera against Iraq's nuclear reactor in 1981, and Operation Outside the Box against a nuclear reactor in Syria in 2007, can effectively neutralize strategic threats. On the other hand, they also prove that refraining from such activity can be catastrophic. At the current time, a well-timed, precise, and successful strike against Iran will strengthen Israel in every possible arena, from north to south. It will even influence future moves by other countries in the region.

This is the moment when true leadership is measured. Israel must take advantage of the current Iranian sensitivity, and act with determination and wisdom. Any further delay reduces Israel's field of operations and strengthens our enemies. 

Mr. Prime Minister, you have successfully passed historic tests over the past year – and now you face perhaps the most acute one of all. Just as Churchill acted with unwavering steadfastness during the crisis moments of the Second World War, so too you must lead the State of Israel today. If you perform correctly, you will be remembered not only as a leader on the local stage, but as one who changed the balance of power in the Middle East and safeguarded Israel's security for generations to come. Iran well understands its own weaknesses at this time, and precisely for that reason, Israel must strike now while the iron is hot – and relevant.

So Far: Israel's Achievements and Failures in the Gaza War

by Kobi Eliraz, former Advisor to the Defense Minister on Settlement Affairs, translated by Hillel Fendel.

As one who has been actively involved on the front lines in the Gaza Strip for several months now, I am well aware of the gap between the IDF's actual significant achievements in this war, and the public perception that we are not truly making great progress.

While the IDF indeed failed in its mission on October 7th - the result of the mistaken conception we all lived by, some more than others – it is important to know that even that very day, our forces regrouped, recovered, and found great strengths. In reality, we have had quite a few accomplishments on the battlefield, despite the boastful declarations by Hamas and its leaders. In the following lines, I will enumerate these achievements, and also point out the goals and areas in which we need to improve.

Ever since the IDF attacked the Gaza Strip following the Hamas massacre, our forces have exacted a significant civilian toll among the residents on all battlefields – north, south and central Gaza, in both urban and rural areas – while finding much evidence of the widespread extent of their hostility and support for terrorism. 

IDF forces razed tens of thousands of buildings and numerous civilian infrastructures, primarily those used by Hamas. The immense destruction we have caused has decreased, somewhat, the motivation of the other side to attack us and to continue supporting Hamas. It also sends a crucial message to others of our Middle Eastern enemies watching from the sidelines: "Whoever attacks us, remember: the price tag will be heavy."

Thus far, most of the underground infrastructures of Hamas have been destroyed. It is true that we were taken by surprise - and still are at times - from the extent of the underground city in Gaza. The fact is, however, that we have succeeded in destroying 70% of it (according to my estimation), using various means that keep on getting better. By the end of the current offensive in Rafah, I expect that we will have demolished 80% of the infrastructures. 

On the other hand, preserving this achievement and preventing the renewal of these underground cities when Gaza is once again rebuilt are critical objectives, in which we must invest much thought and creativity.  

Another important move that we have made there is to expand the "buffer zone" perimeter to one kilometer throughout the length of the Gaza Strip, within Gaza. Our forces have destroyed every building, orchard and greenhouse in this area, leaving us with a kilometer-wide zone that in effect distances the border from us and enables us a much better defense. Maintaining this achievement also requires much work.

In the seven-plus months of fighting we have also depleted the ranks of the terrorists, killing most of the combat fighters and wounding many as well. Many Nukhba troops (elite Hamas commando units who carried out the Simchat Torah massacre) are still active, but a large part of their leadership has been killed. The remaining enemy forces continue to cause us occasional casualties, but their effectiveness has been clearly depleted. The same is true for the amount of weapons they have, compared to the colossal amounts they held at the beginning of the war.

And last but not at all least: our soldiers' fighting spirit. If there were any questions and doubts about Israel's Tik-Tok generation's motivation to defend their country, the war came along and not only dispelled these reservations, but has shown the opposite. The question marks have become exclamation points, providing great encouragement regarding the state of our youth and society. The fighters take the offensive, and are imbued with a spirit of combativeness, great motivation, and notable capabilities.

Of course, there is still much to improve. Topping the list is the painful matter of the hostages still being held captive in Gaza. Aside from several dozen who were released during the ceasefire, a few others who were rescued by the IDF, and a few corpses that the army was able to locate and extract (involving great effort) – over 120 hostages still remain there, dead or alive. 

Second in importance is the fact that many Hamas leaders, including the top ones, have still not been killed. They are important symbols of Hamas strength, and thereby continue to inject life into the Hamas war effort.

Another point that we must note is that a significant amount of Hamas terrorists have returned to areas that the IDF already succeeded in conquering and cleaning out. They have also begun rebuilding the terrorist infrastructures there. Similar problems have arisen regarding the Philadelphi route and the Rafah district in southern Gaza. This is something that must be dealt with immediately.

The IDF is expected to complete its mission in Rafah within a few weeks, and consideration must be given to the question of who will control the area afterwards. Both above and below ground must be secured, and ground obstacles that will prevent the prevalent smuggling of arms into Gaza must be built. The same applies to the new Netzarim route: Who will hold it, and how? Is another route needed between Rafah and Khan Yunis, and perhaps elsewhere? Despite the controversies surrounding the issue, it is becoming clear to all that the IDF must and will continue to hold the Gaza Strip in the near future, though it is not clear how this will be manifest. Clear statements from Israel's diplomatic echelon are also required here.

Israel's strategy during this war is to conquer territory, save soldiers' lives, and not cause harm to our captives. Fighting this type of war comes at the price of slow advancement of our forces, the enemy's ability to constantly reorganize, and more. In addition, the international pressure, in the form of recognition of a Palestinian state, arrest warrants for Netanyahu and Gallant, and the Hague's demand for an end to the Rafah offensive, make it quite difficult for us to achieve our defined war objectives.

It can be said that we have failed to present our case effectively in the world arena, though the international community has long been known for its hypocrisy and ignorance when it comes to the Israeli-Arab conflict. However, it is still better late than never. We must not give up on the very important issue, and we have no choice but to invest great efforts in fighting on this critical front.  

An objective examination of the seven months of fighting in Gaza reveals significant achievements in the campaign. It can cautiously be said that we are actually winning, though dozens of captives still remain concealed in Gaza. A structured and detailed plan for Israel's continued presence in Gaza for at least the coming decade is direly required.