by Avi Greentzeig, journalist and political strategist, translated by Hillel Fendel.
Clearly, last week's elections, and their results, have aroused many more questions than answers. For instance: Did Netanyahu win, in that he received the support of a majority of the Jewish electorate, or did he lose, for not being able to form a nationalist government?
Or, consider the Shas party: Aryeh Deri, founder and long-time leader of the Sephardic religious-hareidi party is considering resigning, after Shas dropped from 11 Knesset seats to 7. How did this happen, and is Deri to blame?
[The Arab parties, which received an all-time high representation in the Knesset of 19 seats – will they be able to repeat this achievement if new elections are held soon? Or will the reports of voting "irregularities" and Qatari funding obviate this result next time? Note that nearly 1,000 votes for these parties have already been disqualified.]
In my opinion, the main story is not who won, but rather who lost, and the change-of-story that has resulted.
Until now, the sector often known as "liberal secular," represented across the spectrum by Yair Golan on the left to Avigdor Lieberman on the right, has basically felt that it is the majority here. In fact, in all Israeli governments up to but not including the outgoing one, this group had representation and influence, in addition to the numerous power centers it holds, such as the judicial system, the media, academia, and large sectors of the capital market and high-tech.
In last week's election, this group mobilized the maximum possible power for its victory. It legitimized Bennett and Lieberman, both of whom were not long ago quite high on its enemies list; it flew in tens of thousands of voters from abroad; it organized itself for Election Day efficiently so as not to waste a single vote; and it invested heavily in an aggressive campaign to lure many voters who otherwise would not have been expected to support it.
Above all, it enjoyed impressive starting conditions – primarily in relation to the hot issues on the table, such as the military draft issue and the Oct. 7th commission of inquiry or lack thereof. In addition, there were not insignificant levels of right-wing disappointment and frustration with the Netanyahu government. Haredi voters were not enthusiastic about going out to vote, the Noam party made a conscious decision to burn religious-Zionist votes, and several other groups in that sector decided to switch sides for various reasons.
But all that didn't help – and for the first time in Israel's history, this group is beginning to grasp that it is actually a minority. Pre-election polls gave it close to a majority in the Knesset, or at least in the neighborhood of 56, when in fact it reached only 48. It has only three choices for a political alliance if it wants to return to power: the Arabs, the hareidi public, or the religious-Zionist public. Each of these sectors on its own would give Eisencott-Bennett-Lapid-Lieberman a working majority of the Knesset. Are any of them realistic scenarios?
Regarding the Arabs: Given that support for terrorism and a Palestinian state is a very large if not absolutely major part of their platforms, and that this not expected to change in the coming decades, no Zionist party that seeks to survive another election campaign will agree to such a partnership.
The religious-Zionist public should potentially be a good choice. This camp shares with the "Just-not-Bibi!" camp cultural closeness, as well as Zionism and nationalism in general, and even the "covenant of those who serve" [in the army]. However, the obstacle is that the Smotrich-Ben Gvir camp is not willing to settle for minor roles in the government. The days have long gone when it agreed to have control only over of the Ministry of Religious Affairs. It is simply not likely that Yair Golan will agree to Smotrich's construction and housing plans in Judea and Samaria, that Lapid will agree to gender-segregation in the army, and that Bennett will return again to the conservative views he held when he headed the Yesha Council. All this will not happen.
The least-unlikely option, then, is that the secular-liberal camp will join up with the haredim – a sector that has few demands beyond its own autonomous issues. The problem, of course, is that even this narrow space was one of the core issues of the campaign. Is it in any way possible that a coalition agreement can be drawn up that would enable the haredi sector to avoid full-scale recruitment into the IDF? This, after all, is precisely what Bennett and partners have been screaming about for months and years.
And yet, a scenario of this type appears very rational at this point. Yes, there has been talk of a national unity government, but this is not likely to happen without Eisencott first trying to form a narrow coalition.
If none of the above materialize – and keep in mind that neither the Arabs, nor the hareidim, nor the religious-Zionists have expressed particular interest in joining Eisencott and crew – new elections are likely. If this happens, my prediction is that the liberal secular camp will lose even more decisively – and will lead to even more of a "revolution" than the 1977 elections were [when the Likud first came to power]. You heard it here first!


