Iran's Revenge: Another Angle

by Haggai Huberman, Arab Affairs Correspondent, translated by Hillel Fendel.

It took 14 years for Israel to respond to Iran last time. How long will it take this time? 

The general security situation in Israel - the Gaza front, Lebanon/Hizbullah, and the rockets from Iran - overshadowed a very important piece of news published this weekend: The Federal Criminal Court in Argentina ruled on Friday that Iran and Hizbullah were behind the murderous attacks on the Israeli Embassy and the Jewish community building in Buenos Aires in 1992 and 1994, respectively.

The court further ruled that the two attacks are to be considered crimes against humanity, meaning, inter alia, that they are not bound by statutes of limitations.  

The 12th day of Adar Bet, three weeks ago, marked 32 years since the attack on the embassy. On that day in 1992, a car bomb driven by a suicide terrorist exploded at the gate to the four-story building, causing its collapse and the death of 29 people, including four Israelis and four Argentinian Jewish women. Over 220 people were hurt.

The bombing was a revenge attack by Iran, via Hizbullah, for the liquidation of Hizbullah's then-leader Abbas Musawi a month earlier. Musawi was killed in an air strike in Lebanon, and Israel claimed immediate responsibility. His death led to the ascendance of an unknown terrorist named Hassan Nasrallah to the helm of Hizbullah.

Two years later, in the summer of 1994, Iran carried out yet a second revenge attack, bombing the AMIA Jewish Community Center building in Buenos Aires. A Lebanese terrorist detonated another car bomb, this time murdering 85 people and wounding 330 – apparently the worst terrorist attack in Argentina ever.

Following Israel's killing last month of major Iranian military leaders in Syria, the Israeli public was in nervous suspense as to how Iran would avenge itself this time. It was feared that either an Israeli embassy abroad would be hit, or Israel itself would be the target. As is now known, Iran chose to hit Israel directly, for the first time in history. It did not even use one of its proxies such as Hizbullah or the Houthis of Yemen. The Iranians assumed that their more than 300 drones and missiles would deal Israel a strong and significant blow. Among these were 110 ballistic missiles directed towards an important IDF base in the Negev, Nevatim. However, the results for Iran were quite paltry: A Bedouin girl was hurt by shrapnel, and only light damage was caused to the army base. 

Tactically and operatively, Israel registered a tremendous achievement: Our coordinated defense system stopped nearly 100% of the rockets and drones used in what was probably the largest offensive of its type in history. Israel also scored a great diplomatic success in that the U.S., other Western nations, and even Middle East neighbors such as Jordan all took part in bolstering Israel's defenses, rendering it multi-layered and all the more effective.

On the one hand, then, it was a dizzying success – but at the same time it represented a total loss of both Israeli and American deterrence. The Ayatollahs proved during this attack how much they were not scared off by Biden's one-word warning to Iran six months ago: "Don't." It appears that the only ones scared off by the American Don't were Israeli leaders, especially by the Don't directed at them in recent weeks.

Now the question is if, and how, Israel will respond to Iran's failed, but very provocative, attack. Thirty years ago, Israel did not respond to the two attacks in Argentina. In fact, it waited 14 years to do so, eliminating (according to foreign sources, of course) Hizbullah's second-in-command Imad Mureina in Damascus. Mureina was responsible for planning the Argentinian attacks. This was such a strong blow to Hizbullah that it was unable, or unwilling, to avenge his death, for no one there was equal to the task of planning attacks on the scale of Mureina. 

As of this writing, the State of Israel stands before one of the biggest dilemmas it has ever faced: whether and how to respond to the Iranian onslaught. If we show restraint, ostensibly because the attack did not cause substantial damage, our deterrence power will be eroded even further. 

In this vein, let us recall that the erosion of our deterrence increased precisely in light of the successes of the Iron Dome anti-rocket defense system. Iron Dome certainly prevented many casualties from Hamas rockets, and allowed Israel to "contain" this incessant fire. But it was also our biggest curse. For years it enabled our great suppression, and even ignoring, of the Gaza threat – until it smashed into our kibbutzim and bases on the morning of Simchat Torah (Oct. 7th).

On the other hand, let no one have any illusions: An Israeli military response involving a direct attack on Iran means nothing less than war with Iran. That is, no more exchanges of fire with Iran's proxies – Hizbullah, Syria, or the Yemenite Houthis – but with Iran itself. The first problem with this is whether the U.S. will give us a green light, or even any form of coordination – either of which is necessary for our success. This appears doubtful, given the election-season difficulties Biden faces. On the other hand, there are indications that America has already given tacit approval to a form of Israeli retribution. All in all, an unclear situation. 

But one thing that is known is that a war with Iran will have to involve the destruction, or at least something close to it, of Iran's nuclear facilities. If not, the war will be pointless. The US, of course, could carry out this destruction more effectively than Israel can – but this does not appear very likely under a Biden presidency. 

Does Israel have the power to do it alone? Every Israeli government forum or cabinet that has to make this terrifically difficult decision will have to, first of all, take that question into account. Only afterwards will it be able to consider other variables, such as the international community's positions, and make a final decision on this critical issue. 

It should be just a matter of days before we know the answer.

Time to Strike Iran!

by Kobi Eliraz and Dr. Chanan Shai Arutz-7 commentators, translated by Hillel Fendel.

Kobi Eliraz, former Settlement Affairs Advisor to several Defense Ministers: "Israel's attack must include an Iranian nuclear installation, or at least one of its oil refineries."

Most unfortunately, even after the great achievement and miracles of this past Saturday night, and despite the fact that the Iranian missile barrage is a casus belli of the first degree, calls are being sounded even from the right-wing to "show restraint" in our military response on Iranian territory. This is wrong! Restraint is not strength, and deterrence is not a good enough defense. To think otherwise is a total mistake, in my opinion. Iran must be made to pay for the attack it carried out against the State of Israel, in cash, for all to see – right now. 

Yes, there are many geopolitical considerations to be taken into account: the US elections, our relations with China and Russia, oil from Saudi Arabia and Iran, and more – but still and all, Israel must exact a painful price from Iran. Israel has dealt successfully in the past with American objections and vetoes, starting with the establishment of the State and in many wars since then – and many times, American ended up justifying our decisions. Strong Israeli responses of this type have cemented Israel's status as a regional power that knows how to look out for itself. "We are not a banana republic," Menachem Begin told the US Ambassador to Israel in 1982. 

The appropriate Israeli response must mean the destruction of at least one Iranian nuclear installation. This will not spell the end of the Islamic revolution, nor will it be a mortal blow to the Ayatollahs' regime – but it will strike hard at Iran's nuclear ambitions and will postpone an Iranian nuclear bomb for an unknown amount of time.

Alternatively – and this could possibly be the best we can hope for under the circumstances – Israel must attack one of Iran's oil refineries. This will significantly damage the Iranian economy and will impede Iran's ability to fund Hizbullah, the Houthis, and the militias in Syria and Iraq. It will also be in the oil-selling interests of both Russia and China.

Dr. Chanan Shai, IDF lieutenant-colonel in the reserves and an expert in military and political strategic thinking and planning: "The Israel Air Force's brilliant operation against the Iranian offensive must be turned into a catalyst to overthrow Khomeinism." 

War is not won via defense alone. The right time must be found to carry out an offensive – and that "right time" is now: Israel is receiving broad praise and support from world leaders and even the media. To take strong advantage of these accomplishments, it would be best now to hold off on the planned Gaza offensive in Rafah, and to aim even higher. 

Now that Israel has brought a great achievement to the U.S., its status vis-à-vis the superpower has changed radically – and the dialogue between the two countries must change accordingly. 

In accordance with the overall objective of Israel and the democratic West – which is the overthrow of Khomeinism and radical Islam (which took the place of Communism as the active enemy of the West), and in keeping with the formative principle of von Clausewitz regarding the essence of defense and the importance of momentum, Israel must strike while the iron is hot, as quickly as possible, in one or more of the following ways: 

1. Destroying Iran's nuclear capabilities

2. A decisive, paralyzing blow at Iran's war-making capacity

3. Uprooting Iran's stronghold in Israel's vicinity

One thing Israel must not do is to strike out at the symbols of the regime simply to humiliate the leadership. This would be a childish vengeance with no real advantage in weakening Iran's physical strength. 

If for some reason, the first two goals are unattainable, Israel must act immediately to uproot Iran's influence in the countries around us. This means to liquidate the Hizbullah "kingdom," which is the top Iranian proxy strategically close to Israel. 

The challenge in fighting Hizbullah is to make sure that a long war of attrition does not develop, which would be against Israel's interests and therefore a victory for Hizbullah. 

Hizbullah's strategy will be to take advantage of the mountainous and hilly terrain in southern Lebanon to make it hard for the Israeli forces to advance in their campaign to silence the constant shooting attacks on Israel's civilian northern front. If the residents' return to their homes in northern Israel is delayed, this will cause terrible hardship and damage to Israel, and may even lead to international intervention that will force a ceasefire upon Israel in very adverse conditions.

The IDF's challenge in the war against Hizbullah is, therefore, to neutralize the source of its strength – namely, its control over the influential factor known as 'time'. To this end, a clever and tricky operative plan is required that will take the campaign's 'time' and duration out of Hizbullah's hands and transfer it to the IDF. Unfortunately, the IDF replaced its doctrine of "winning" with one of "deterrence." This is precisely why Israel has not won several recent wars and campaigns.

And it is precisely this IDF weakness that Hizbullah is depending on for the victory it hopes to attain. The IDF must therefore rectify this weakness – it's definitely possible – and come up with a new brilliant plan that will enable us to defeat Hizbullah in the time-frame that we determine.

For Israel to be stuck in two simultaneous wars of attrition would be disastrous. If the IDF plans to defeat Hizbullah as it did/is doing with Hamas, via "painful strikes," deterrent damage, and "chewing up" tunnels and their openings one at a time, instead of directly and quickly seeking actual victory, it would be better to give up this "right moment" that has been created by our success this past weekend.

Hamas Wants an Israeli Surrender, Not a Deal

by Prof. Eyal Zisser, Vice Rector of Tel Aviv University and the holder of The Yona and Dina Ettinger Chair in Contemporary History of the Middle East, translated by Hillel Fendel.

Now that the same scene has repeated itself, wherein Israel sends teams to negotiate the release of our hostages, hopes are raised, and then Hamas refuses, it is very clear:Hamas Wants an Israeli Surrender, Not a Deal.

The negotiations Israel is waging with Hamas regarding the release of the 134 live and dead hostages are making no progress, to the great sorrow and frustration not only of their families, but of the entire nation.

The U.S., Egypt, and Qatar, who took upon themselves the role of mediators, keep coming up with new formulas and improved outlines, hoping to appease Hamas. Israel, too, is actually showing willingness to soften its stance and make comprises and concessions – but Hamas simply hardens its own stance with each cycle, not reducing its demands and showing no inclination to compromise. Basically, it seems clear that Hamas has no inclination to make a deal at all.

The Hamas representatives - leaders of the terrorist organization who live outside Gaza in luxury hotels made available to them by Qatar - come readily to the talks with the mediators, whether in Qatar or in Egypt. Perhaps they do so to please the Qataris, who finance and host them, but their main reason is that they know that the very existence of the talks is their life insurance policy against Israel's attempt to eliminate them.

But it is now six months after the war began – and it is clear to all that this traveling Hamas circus making the rounds from one luxury hotel to another in Qatar, then Egypt, and then back again, has no significance or importance whatsoever. For it's not these wined-and-dined reps making the decisions, but rather Yihye Sinwar – still hiding deep in some bunker somewhere in the southern Gaza Strip, frightened to death that the IDF will soon find him. Communication with Sinwar is sketchy, and frequently breaks up, making it quite difficult to wage substantial talks, and in fact dragging them out. 

But the truth is that the main problem is not a technical one, but rather one of substance.

It doesn't bother Sinwar at all that negotiations are taking place, for in his view, they serve to tighten the pressure on Israel both abroad and domestically. It doesn't bother him, but what does he want? The truth appears to be that he doesn't really want the talks to end with an actual deal, but simply with an Israeli surrender to all his demands: an end to the war, an IDF withdrawal from the Gaza Strip, the return of Gaza refugees to their homes, a massive release of Palestinian terrorists from Israeli prisons, and – the icing on the cake – guarantees that he and his men will not be killed or captured by Israel when the battles die down.

Sinwar, after all, couldn't care less about the residents of Gaza. For him, they are just "grease on the wheels of the revolution," who can easily be sacrificed for the good of his cause. What interests him is not how many of his men will yet die, but how history will remember this war that he initiated, and how it will contribute in the long-term to the Palestinian struggle against Israel. 

If Hamas manages to survive this war as a governmental and military force still able to stand on its two legs – this will be a great victory for Sinwar and Hamas that will only encourage him to continue along the same path.

Sinwar apparently believes that any deal with Israel that doesn't absolutely guarantee an end to the war is really just "on the ice." For he knows that as soon as he gives away his winning card – i.e., the hostages – Israel will immediately pursue him, and this time with no fear of accidentally hurting the hostages in the process. 

This gap between a.) the Hamas desire to buy more time, and b.) Israel's determination to continue the war to destroy, or at least neutralize, Hamas – can simply not be bridged. Therefore, the most that can be achieved now is a limited, partial release of some of the hostages [with no guarantee as to what will be with the remainder…], in exchange for a limited, temporary cessation of hostilities, similar to the several-part deal made a few weeks after the war began. 

However, in truth, Israel does have more wiggle-room than what we generally assume. This is because Gaza is in near-total ruins, and Hamas was severely stricken and damaged. The question is therefore not necessarily whether Israeli offensives will continue until the last of the Hamas battalions in Rafah is defeated. It is rather this: What will happen in Gaza on the day after the war ends?

The answer to this question is not only a military matter, but also a diplomatic issue – and this grants Israel extra room for maneuvering.

What is clear is that Israel has a moral obligation to turn over every stone in seeking to return the hostages home. Israel abandoned them on Oct. 7th, and their return will be a victory for Israel and for the Israeli spirit, and an important part of the defeat that we will yet deal Hamas.

Zionism in Exchange for Peace

by Haggai Huberman, Land of Israel specialist, translated by Hillel Fendel.

When the Arabs speak of "land for peace," they really mean "Zionism for peace." Their objective is to defeat Zionism

This past Sabbath, the 27th of Adar, marked 45 years since the signing of Israel's first peace agreement, namely, the accord with Egypt in 1979. Menachem Begin and Anwar Sadat signed the treaty in a festive ceremony on the White House lawn, under the sponsorship of President Jimmy Carter.

For the past 45 years, Egypt has carefully observed Sadat's promise in the Knesset: "No more war!" But practically speaking, it has also made sure to fulfill the opposite theme: "No more peace!" These two contradictory statements have no problem guiding the Egyptian leadership at one and the same time.

The great excitement aroused by the peace treaty with Egypt was so widespread that only few noticed the trap it contained for the State of Israel. In essence, it set the stage for Arab recognition of the State of Israel – on condition that Israel give up its unique Jewish-Zionist character. The real motto that Sadat brought with him to Jerusalem was not "[Israeli-liberated] territories for peace," as was mistakenly thought, but rather, "Zionism for peace."

Though the late Shimon Peres made famous the phrase "new Middle East," and even wrote a book by that name in 1994, he was far from the first one to speak about it. Nearly 20 years before him, and two years before Sadat visited Jerusalem, a very famous Egyptian thinker named Muhammed Sayad Ahmed publicized his own book, "When the Cannons are Silenced." It discussed a possible future peace agreement with Israel, leading to fruitful economic cooperation between the two countries. But the author did not hide his true motive: diverting Israel from being the mechanism by which the Zionist dream is fulfilled for Jews the world over, to becoming a factor in Arab development in the Middle East. Israel would never be able to fulfill both these contradictory challenges, Ahmed believed, and with the arrival of "peace," would eventually be swallowed up into the Arab world around it. Israel would then become, in Ahmed's vision, nothing more than a large Jewish Heritage Center. "This would bring about the extinction of the Zionist enterprise precisely as its population would be busy celebrating the apparent fulfillment of its goal, that of making peace.

Boutros Boutros-Ghali, the former UN Secretary-General who served as Egypt's Foreign Minister when the peace agreement was signed, once wrote in an Egyptian newspaper (before he became Foreign Minister) about Egypt's goals: They are "not necessarily to liquidate the State of Israel, but rather to win over the souls of its residents – extricating Jews from Zionist rule and melting them down in the crucible of Arab nationalism." And this is precisely what Egypt tried to do by signing the peace agreement with Israel. Anwar Sadat, like most Arab leaders, understood that Zionism rests on two main pillars: Aliyah and settlement. The Egyptians therefore fought us precisely in these two areas, and their agreement with Israel was primarily intended to harm us in these two topics. He first struck a harsh blow at the settlement enterprise, successfully demanding during the Camp David talks the destruction of the blossoming settlement zone in Yamit and environs.

More than a decade later, the Oslo Accords were similarly designed to destroy the large-scale Jewish settlement enterprise in Judea, Samaria and Gaza – and if Syrian dictator Assad had simply agreed to waive his demand for 200 meters on the eastern shore of the Sea of Galilee [or if Israel had agreed to his demand], he would have received the destruction of every Jewish community in the Golan Heights.

PA Chairman Abu Mazen takes the same approach when he refuses to give up his demand for the "right of return" for millions of Arabs whose great-grandparents may have lived here for a couple of years. Such an influx into Israel, of course, would totally destabilize Israel's demography - which is precisely one of the main Arab strategies to collapse the State of Israel.

When US President Biden, seemingly one of the more gullible presidents the US has ever had, speaks of the two-state solution, he doesn't seem to realize, or care, that when the PA and other Arab countries speak of two states, they envision one of them as totally Arab and the other as temporarily Jewish, with the goal of turning it soon into another Arab state.

As stated, the second target for the Arab states in their wars against Israel is Aliyah. We saw, when the Soviet Union collapsed and myriads of Jews streamed into Israel, the leading protestor was Egypt. Already back in 1977 – before Sadat's visit to Israel – then-Egyptian Foreign Minister Ismail Fahmi wrote that any peace agreement with Israel must include a condition that Israel must stop all Aliyah for 50 years (!). Later, under President Mubarak, Sadat's successor, Egypt worked closely with the first Bush Administration to prevent American loan guarantees for Israel's absorption of new Russian immigrants; the stated fear was that the new Israelis would move to the settlements in Judea and Samaria.

The above approach stands in opposition to the Islamist approach, which seeks the military defeat of Israel and does not suffice with a cultural victory. The more "moderate" elements seek to embrace Israel with a cynical bear-hug that would neutralize the Jewish-Zionist character of the State. Those Jews who support the two-state vision are playing right into the hands of this latter approach, to the great danger of a secure, Jewish and democratic State of Israel.

In Conclusion:

Allow me to add here a note on unity and the left-wing protests against Netanyahu: Zalman Shoval, a former two-time Israeli ambassador to the U.S. and ex-Likud MK, wrote a book entitled "Diplomat" regarding the period following Sadat's visit to Israel in late 1977. That visit marked the beginning of long, arduous Israeli-Egyptian negotiations that ultimately led to the peace agreement. Shoval wrote, "It became clear to us that the Egyptians were trying cleverly to use the Peace Now movement for their own purposes - though apparently the Peace Now heads were not aware that they were being used."

What exactly did the Egyptians do? They carefully tracked Peace Now's activities and used the organization's own arguments and claims to strengthen their propaganda campaign against Israel. Their well-founded assumption was that the demonstrations and declarations by Peace Now against the "stubbornness and rigidity of the Israeli government" would shake Israeli cohesiveness, and would significantly affect Israeli public opinion. It was later learned that the Egyptians attributed such great importance to this strategy that the man responsible for this approach was none other than then-Prime Minister Mustafa Halil.

In the end, most sadly, peace with Egyptian was attained, at the cost of the uprooting of the entire Yamit region, together with all the Jewish communities in the area, and our retreat from all of the Sinai Peninsula. We must be very wary of similar developments taking place today.

Successful IDF Campaign in Gaza's Shefa Hospital Concludes

by Hillel Fendel, Writer & Translator for Bet El Institutions.

The ten-day IDF military operation to destroy the renewed Hamas headquarters in Shefa Hospital in northern Gaza has ended, having been declared a very successful campaign. Over 200 Hamas and other terrorists were killed, and at least 500 were arrested. The latter are being interrogated and supplying vital intelligence information regarding the hostages, Hamas leaders, and more, even as these words are being written. 

Satellite photo shows that many buildings in and around the hospital have been destroyed. At the same time, many are still standing, proving that the IDF did not wantonly bomb the complex; only those structures from which terrorists attacked or used as command posts and the like were hit. In addition, thousands of civilians were safely evacuated from Shefa, and the IDF acted to bring medical equipment into the hospital during the course of the battles. 

Built in 1946, Shefa was Gaza's primary hospital. It is/was located in the upscale neighborhood of A-Rimal in western Gaza City, where many top Hamas leaders resided until the current war. IDF and other sources have both already stated that Shefa will not be able to serve as a hospital in the near future. 

Hamas headquarters were located, up until last week, in the basement of one of the hospital buildings, to which many tunnels led. At the beginning of the current war, some of the over 200 Israeli hostages taken captive on Oct. 7th were held there. In nearly every building of the complex were found huge amounts of weapons and arms – under patients' beds, in the ceilings, and elsewhere.

It should be noted that the use of civilian infrastructures as a military/terrorist command post, as well as the use of civilians as live shields, are clearly war crimes committed by Hamas against the population it governs.

The just-ended campaign, code-named "Local Operation," was the second time the IDF acted in Shefa Hospital, after conquering it and leaving it earlier in the war. Besheva's Assaf Mishnayot noted that while last time it took the IDF several weeks to make its way into the hospital and take it over, this time it took only a few hours - an indication of the IDF's success in dismantling Hamas' military stronghold in northern Gaza.

However, this begs the question: Does this second campaign not indicate that the first conquest was not successful or effective? Mishnayot presented this question to IDF Lt.-Col (res.) Yaron Buskila, who explained: 

"Just as in Operation Defensive Shield in Judea and Samaria 20 years ago, we first acted intensively to dismantle the terrorist infrastructures and the terrorist organizations' stronghold in the area – and it then took us another five years to empty the entire region of terrorists… Of course, in the current situation, we will not be able to end this war without destroying the last Hamas brigades in Rafah [in southern Gaza, on the Egyptian border]."

But Buskila's explanation does not end there: 

"This was a complex exercise that the IDF planned in advance. Israel set up a honey trap for the Hamas terrorists. We knew that they would return to some of the places they had left – and we ensured that they would return to specific places that are now easier for us to enter, and to catch them there. We knew that Shefa was a likely place for them to return to, because they would never guess, after we acted already very intensively in their most important civilian infrastructure, that we would return there. When we surprised them by returning to Shefa so quickly and quietly, they were basically trapped."

Lt.-Col. Buskila explained that this strategy was largely formulated by Brig.-Gen. Itzik Cohen, Commander of Division 162: "It brought about a situation in which we closed in on the terrorists from all directions, cutting off all escape routes both below and above ground. If we hadn't left Shefa, thus enticing them to return there, we would have had to hunt them down one by one, without the successes that we registered in this campaign." 

The IDF success occurred even in the face of strong military opposition by many terrorist elements in the area, such as Islamic Jihad, the PFLP, and even ISIS, among others. These tried to attack the Israeli forces from different angles, but were repelled. 

What Next? 

With the conclusion of this operation, the IDF is continuing in the rest of the Gaza Strip: in western Khan Yunis [very close to the former site of Gush Katif's largest community, N'vei Dekalim] around the Am-Amal and Nasser hospitals; in Karara, north of Khan Yunis; south of the Netzarim corridor; and elsewhere. Long tunnels, even one 2.5 kilometers long, have been found and destroyed. 

It now appears likely that when the western Khan Yunis operation ends, the IDF will begin to deal with the camps in central Gaza – and, of course, Rafah. The IDF apparently has plans to evacuate large amounts of refugees in these areas, and is poised to act despite the concerns of both the Egyptians and Americans. It is estimated that the Israeli hostages, as well as the surviving Hamas leaders, are located in Rafah. 

The expected capture of Rafah will all but cement the victory over Hamas and the liquidation of its military leadership, as well as deal a great blow to the terrorist organization's civilian control over the Gaza Strip.