Wednesday, June 10, 2026

Confusing the Ally for the Enemy

by Michael Puah, Director-General of the Jewish Leadership movement, translated by Hillel Fendel.




The massacre of Oct. 7th should have taught us a basic lesson: Our enemy is not the settlers, those who work the land, or those building small new Jewish farms in Judea and Samaria (Yesha). The actual enemy is Palestinian terrorism, the goal of which is to banish Jews from their land – not just parts of it, but all of it, including Tel Aviv and elsewhere – and to destabilize the very existence of the State of Israel.

But it seems that despite the so-heavy price that we paid then, some members of our security apparatus are still caught in the old and dangerous conceptions. Instead of seeing those who build the farms as a pioneering force that buttresses the Israeli hold on our only homeland and strengthens our security, they all too frequently treat them as if they were the enemy. Large IDF and police forces are deployed to evacuate the outposts, clash with young Jewish pioneers, and destroy their structures, while not far away our real enemies are engaged in terrorist activity, agricultural theft, illegal takeovers of lands, and violent riots.

The message that this gives over to the Palestinians is destructive. When they see the IDF investing such efforts against the Jewish settlement enterprise, it fills them with motivation. They feel that the State of Israel itself is unsure about Jewish rights to live in and settle their land. Instead of deterring their terrorism, this policy encourages the Arabs to believe that their pressure and violence and hatred are working!

It's not only unfair to the settlers, it is also a very grave security miscalculation. The farms and outposts in Yesha have proven time and again their importance in the campaign to safeguard state lands, to prevent hostile take-overs, and to create an Israeli presence in strategic areas. Many of those involved in building the outposts and farms serve in the IDF reserves, in stints of weeks and months at a time. When they are treated as if they don't have basic human rights, let alone civilian rights, this impairs not only their dignity, but also the basic trust between the public they represent and the state institutions.

Whoever reads the news know that this also brings to the fore a basic contradiction: For long months we have been hearing from the IDF and the media of the grave shortage of IDF manpower, and that all the hareidim must be drafted in order to ease the load on the reservists – yet behold, when there is a "need" to destroy a farm or settlers' hilltop shacks, we suddenly see that dozens and sometimes even hundreds of fighters and Border Guardsmen and women are recruited for the mission.

If there really is a manpower shortage in the army, these forces should be deployed not to destroy Jewish settlement points, but to protect the roads from rock-throwers and worse, thwart terrorism, confiscate arms, and arrest hostile elements busy building more and more illegal Arab houses. The answer must be demanded: Is there a manpower shortage, or not?

The problem is not only operational, but also conceptual. For years, the settlers and Yesha residents have warned of the erosion of anti-terrorism deterrence. But instead of listening to them, the opposite was done: extensive efforts were invested in monitoring, restricting, and arresting them. The Simchat Torah slaughter showed in the most brutal way what happens when those who identify dangers and warn against them are treated as the enemies themselves.

The responsibility is not only upon the commanders in the field, for they are instruments of the policies and instructions they receive from above. The responsibility lies, first and foremost, with the top IDF echelons, which determine the order of priorities. They have clearly decided that the pioneer settlers are not acting in consonance with the conceptions in which many of our civil and military leadership is trapped.

The destruction of settlement points is very reminiscent of what happened prior to Oct. 7th, when the radio equipment that was used to learn of and transmit reports of Hamas movements was confiscated. It can also be likened to when civilian patrol and defense units in the Gaza envelope were dismantled.

But even above this level of command stands our government. Defense Minister Yisrael Katz may not simply suffice with receiving reports retroactively. He must constantly examine whether the policies applied "on the ground" serve Israel's security needs – or harm them. When IDF troops are allocated to face off against Jewish pioneers instead of to fight terrorism, it is his duty to intervene and demand a change.

This is the clear responsibility of the Israeli government, led by Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu. The nationalist public voted for a government that pledged to strengthen and secure the 550,000-strong Jewish population in Yesha, and change failed military policies – and not to target those who work tirelessly to support them and enhance their growth.

The State of Israel has to wake up and clearly distinguish between its enemies and those who love and support it. The IDF must concentrate its efforts on fighting terrorism, protecting Israeli citizens, and supporting our grasp on the Land. The Prime Minister and Defense Minister must make absolutely sure that the policies being carried out match the lessons learned so dearly since October '23.

We call for an end to confusion: Targeting and destroying the new farms and farmers encourages the hopes of those who wish to throw us out of our Land!

Thursday, June 4, 2026

The Ceasefires Are Too Dangerous!

by Omer ben-Hamu, Deputy Director of the "Victory Generation Reservists Movement", translated by Hillel Fendel.




The situation in southern Lebanon cannot be allowed to continue. The last several weeks of explosive drones killing a soldier or two every week are intolerable. Ceasefires are agreed upon between Tehran and Washington, instead of in Jerusalem, and northern Israel is paralyzed and bleeding.

How did we reach this situation, and what can be done now?

Over a year ago, the IDF initiated an offensive, in the wake of the successful beeper operation against Hizbullah in September 2024. The offensive saw the practically-crippled terrorist organization running for its life, leaving behind equipment and installations worth tens of millions of dollars; IDF troops uncovered valuable military stockpiles in every abandoned village they reached.

This should have marked an unquestionable Israeli victory. We eliminated Hizbullah's charismatic leader Nasrallah and nearly all of its entire leadership, the large majority of its field military commanders were wounded from the beeper operation, and the entire population of southern Lebanon – strong Hizbullah supporters, based on what our soldiers found in their homes – had left on its own for the north.

But instead, as has happened so often in the past, we did not take advantage of the military momentum, and our government decided on a "stalemate" devoid of both logic and self-respect.

Israel signed an agreement that everyone knew in real-time was worthless. Our forces were to withdraw from all the territory (except for a small area with five military bases) we had captured, at a great cost in lives; the Lebanese citizens were to be allowed to return; and the Lebanese government committed to disarm Hizbullah – even though there was no dispute that it had neither the will nor the capability of doing so.

The breathing-room that this fake agreement gave Hizbullah enabled the terrorists not only to avoid being disarmed, but also to renew its stockpiles and armaments, rehabilitate its chain of command, and acquire hundreds of fiber-optic-guided FPV's (First-Person View, i.e., an operator can see a video of exactly what the drone "sees"). Because these can carry several kilometers of extremely thin optical fiber that connect them back to their base, they are not easily jammed or stopped, as in the past.

When Hizbullah later attacked us following the campaign against Iran, we responded again with many of the same mistakes: Instead of setting up for a short but powerful offensive, with full-scale recruitment and utilization of the element of surprise to capture southern Lebanon, the IDF – which admittedly was focused mainly on Iran – crawled around from village to village. And when the ceasefires in Iran and Lebanon were forced upon us, we found ourselves far from the Litani River (except in the east), not protected naturally by the river but rather by an imaginary "yellow" line that was easily infiltrated by terrorists.

In addition, our "consent" to the ceasefire meant that our forces were stuck mostly inside buildings, tracked and observed by Hizbullah. The terrorists had time to recover, stopped retreating, and began attacking our vulnerable soldiers with their new drones.

Contrary to what many talking-heads say, the great failure was not that we weren't prepared for the drone threat. The Russians, Ukrainians, and even the Americans were also not ready for it, even though their bases were attacked dozens of times. Rather, the problem was that we didn't finish the job when we had the chance; we weakly accepted these ceasefires that enabled the enemy time and again to regroup and start over.

The situation is creating considerable frustration among our forces. Not only are the campaigns prolonged, thereby creating manpower crises, but the ground forces are not clear on what their missions are. Are they supposed to advance and occupy territory up to the Litani? Are they supposed to destroy Hizbullah? Are they supposed to defend the Yellow Line? Are they supposed to wait and see what Trump decides?

Soldiers must know what their mission is, and reservists' families need to understand the goals of the fighting for which their loved ones are once again leaving home for the unknown.

Of course, not all is lost.
Israel is still the strongest and most dominant player in the Middle East. But what has to be done now is, firstly, to make sure not to repeat past mistakes. We relied too heavily on the Iron Dome anti-rocket system and underground tunnel-blocking methods; we cannot now rely once again just on our technological genius to come up with an anti-drone system. The drones are not our enemy, and neither were the tunnels in Gaza; the enemy is Hamas and Hizbullah. We didn't seem to realize this in Gaza, and at this rate, neither have we grasped this in Lebanon.

Secondly, the IDF must mobilize large-scale reserves for a short, decisive campaign. It has to occupy territory in Lebanon equivalent to the length of the optical fiber that guides the drones, whether it be 30 kilometers or even twice that, well beyond the Litani River.

Next, we must make it clear to the Lebanese public that Hizbullah is destroying Lebanon and causing it to lose its land. It must be distinctly established – despite Trump's temper tantrum this week – that every Hizbullah rocket or drone launch will be met with destroyed buildings in Hizbullah headquarters in Beirut and deep damage to infrastructure.

If children in Kiryat Shmona cannot take a bus to school safely, then no one in the Dahiya district and throughout southern Lebanon will find a single functioning gas station. Infrastructure that serves both Hizbullah and the Shiite population must be struck, including electricity and water, thus that Hizbullah will be blamed and pressured to disarm.

And finally, we must declare unequivocally that what has been will no longer be. For years, our enemies have grown accustomed to the cycle wherein they attack, we respond, and then a ceasefire kicks in, leaving the map more or less as it was. It must be made clear that from now on, an attack upon us will cost them a lack of sovereignty, permanently. Israel must announce formally that it will adopt the Golan Heights approach: Just as we never withdrew from the Golan, we will never retreat from Lebanon south of the Litani. Our enemies must be made to realize that attacking Israel will cost them in territory, for generations. And just to fill out the picture, Israel must add that we will retain the area north of the Litani as well if Lebanon does not disarm Hizbullah, as it promised.

This decisive, brisk approach will not only push back the threat of fiber-optic drones, but will also finally end the "cycle of violence:" Whoever starts a war against Israel will pay, on their own land, a price they simply cannot afford.

Thursday, May 21, 2026

To-Do List About Gaza

by Adi Mintz, former Director-General of the Yesha Council of Jewish Communities in Judea and Samaria, translated by Hillel Fendel.




“You cannot build a future with armed groups running the streets, hiding in tunnels and stockpiling weapons." So declared last week Nikolay Mladenov, chairman of the “Peace Council” appointed last year by U.S. President Donald Trump. Mladenov, who repeated these remarks at the Munich Security Conference and in his meetings in Jerusalem, effectively stated unequivocally: The disarmament of Hamas is not open to negotiation.

That is, even senior figures in the American “Peace Council” understand what some among us still refuse to accept: There is no chance of dismantling the Hamas terror monster peacefully. Victory will be achieved only through force of arms.

This is not to say that Mladenov has become a Zionist. He still believes that Hamas can compete in national Palestinian elections if it disavows armed activity. But he insisted that it is "not negotiable [to have] armed factions or militias with their own military command and control systems, with their own arsenals or tunnel networks, existing alongside a transitional Palestinian authority.”

Sadly, the Knesset opposition in Israel, together with some of our popular media, engage in systematically minimizing the IDF’s achievements. The situation on the ground, however, tells a completely different story: In recent months the State of Israel carried out a series of strategic operations that has changed the face of the Gaza Strip.

First of all, a thorough and unprecedented cleansing of terrorist infrastructure was carried out in the Gaza areas under our control - from drilling and locating deep tunnels, to the systematic destruction of command compounds. 

Secondly, and most importantly, the IDF gradually and consistently expanded its territorial zone of control. The “yellow line” dividing Hamas and Israeli forces moved westward, towards the Mediterranean – and Israel now fully controls roughly 60% of the Gaza Strip. Combine this with our intelligence capability to carry out precise, surgical targeted killings - such as last week's elimination of the Sinwar brothers' successor as Hamas chieftain arch-terrorist Izz a-Din al-Haddad – and the result is a bottom line of tremendous achievements.

Despite this, opposition leaders in Israel, motivated by narrow political considerations, insist on proclaiming time and again how poorly we have fared and are faring in Gaza. They ignore our achievements there, choosing rather to create headlines about supposed "Hamas empowerment." They don't seem to mind that along the way, the combat morale of our soldiers in the field suffers. 

In the past, Yichye Sinwar – Hamas leader and architect of the Simchat Torah/Oct. 7th massacre – would emerge from the tunnels after an Israeli strike, sit among the ruins, and announce: "We won!" But today, most shamefully, some of our own politicians and "experts" do Sinwar's work for him, by sitting in the TV studios and declaring, "We lost!" 

I'm not suggesting that Hamas is not dangerous; the recent bitter past has taught us that all too well. But the facts are clear: During the recent Israeli-U.S. military operation "The Lion's Roar," Hamas sat paralyzed on the side. Nor did it dare to try anything, even if only to distract Israel, when the IDF was engaged (and still is) in attacking and wiping out Hizbullah capabilities. Hamas was simply too weak to do so, and Israeli deterrence is too strong. 

The Five Steps Needed for Total Victory

Now is precisely the opportunity that Israel cannot allow itself to miss. In light of the international recognition that Hamas has sorely violated the ceasefire agreements of seven months ago, the Israeli government must take the following five strategic steps in order to completely dismantle Hamas. 

  • The logistics faucet must be closed immediately: The number of trucks with "humanitarian aid" entering Gaza must be reduced to the absolute minimum. Currently, 650 (!) trucks enter each day, and many of them are stocked with luxury items or dual-use products. Reducing the daily number of trucks to 150 would ensure that there is no famine in Gaza, while also preventing Hamas from ruthlessly controlling the resources arriving there. 

  • Not a trace of Hamas sovereignty may remain. Air strikes must destroy every sign of the Hamas regime in areas that have not yet been conquered. Anyone bearing arms, every local policeman, and any semi-governmental building must be legitimate targets, in order to shake and weaken the Hamas foothold among the populace.

  • Hamas territory must be constantly eroded. The "yellow line" must keep on shifting westward, so that Israeli control will be expanded and terrorist expanses will be narrowed.

  • Intelligence capabilities must be increased: The Shabak and IDF Intelligence Wing must be more firmly and deeply emplaced in Gaza, in order to more precisely prepare for a future IDF ground-forces entry to completely dismantle the terrorist infrastructures.

  • Willful emigration from Hamas must be encouraged. Efforts to do so have been underway to one extent or another, but an official body totally dedicated to this end has not yet been formed. 

We must emphasize that there are no shortcuts to dismantling Hamas. The IDF’s attempts to cultivate “local militias” or armed clans as an alternative governing authority are a form of playing with fire. Predictably, in the long term, these weapons will inevitably be turned against us.

Defeating Hamas will not be achieved by transferring control to other gangs - but rather through decisive Israeli security control, territorial firmness, and stripping the Gaza Strip of any governing capacity and terrorist capabilities.

Editor’s Note: It is important to note the all-but-forgotten promises by President Trump to disarm Hamas. As Dr. Aaron Lerner of IMRA has noted repeatedly, President Trump told reporters last October that Hamas "said they were going to disarm - and if they don't disarm, we will disarm them. It will happen quickly and perhaps violently. But they will disarm, do you understand me?" 

Earlier this year, Trump wrote on Truth Social, "Hamas must IMMEDIATELY honor its commitments… and proceed without delay to full Demilitarization. As I have said before, they can do this the easy way, or the hard way." 

Meanwhile, BBC reported last month that Hamas rejected the latest Trump-administration disarmament proposals. Lerner notes that Trump and his team are "stone-silent regarding this development… Iran and Hezbollah, not to mention China and others, are taking notes. If President Trump willingly ignores an inconvenient reality regarding Hamas, why should they take him seriously in substantially more challenging situations?"

Thursday, May 14, 2026

Breakthrough in the Settlement Enterprise: Bet El Is Set to Become a City

After years of delays, the land reserves of the community of Bet El have finally been legally regulated — a move that opens the door for the construction of thousands of housing units.

A dramatic development has taken place in Bet El after a long and complex legal process regarding land ownership and planning was completed. The move removes longstanding restrictions that had blocked large-scale construction projects for years.

As a first stage, plans are already advancing for approximately 1,200 housing units, with the broader vision of transforming Bet El into a city. The project is expected to significantly increase the population of the area.

The expansion also includes major transportation upgrades, particularly widening the access road to the community in preparation for increased traffic and improved accessibility.

Israeli Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich welcomed the development, describing it as a “moral and national obligation” and saying the government is continuing to strengthen Jewish presence in the area through building and development.

Local council officials said the move will allow younger generations to remain in Bet El and establish their homes there, while turning the community into a major urban center in the Binyamin region over the coming years.

The Massive Egyptian Threat in Sinai: A Scary Reminder of the Six Day War Exactly 59 Years Ago

by Haggai Huberman, Israeli journalist and authortranslated by Hillel Fendel.




We are commemorating this very week 59 years since the Six Day War of 1967 – a miraculous and decisive victory in which we thankfully liberated the areas of Judea, Samaria and Binyamin; the Jordan Valley; the Golan Heights; the Sinai and Gaza Strip – and of course, most historically, the Old City of Jerusalem and the site of the two Holy Temples, the Temple Mount (Har HaBayit).

Six decades is a long time, and we might have forgotten how it all started. It began when Egypt violated the terms of the agreements reached with Israel and the United Nations following the Sinai Campaign of 1956. The Sinai, a part of Egypt, became largely demilitarized, with the UN's Emergency Force (UNEF) stationed there to keep the peace. However, after just ten years, on Israel Independence Day in 1967 (the 5th of Iyar, May 15), Egypt's President Gamal Abdul Nasser streamed his country's army into the Sinai Peninsula. 

The front page of Israel's daily Maariv newspaper blared the alarming development the next day, but added this sub-headline: "Washington is advising Israel not to take the Egyptian show of force seriously.” Three weeks later, it became quite clear how strongly advisable it would have been to take that show of force quite seriously.

Our sweeping victory in the Six Day War obscured the fact that there had actually been an intelligence failure here no less significant than that of the Yom Kippur War. That is, our intelligence leaders evaluated in the months preceding the war that, in the words of one of them, "1967 will not be a year of war." The difference is that then, Egypt's activities were so above-board, and the calls across the entire Arab world for Israel's destruction were so loud, that Israel had no choice but to launch a preemptive counterattack to save the state – but on Yom Kippur we all but ignored the abundance of evidence showing that Egypt and Syria were planning a surprise attack against us, and we did nothing. 

I recall this in light of the reports of the very significant Egyptian violations of our agreements with them going on right now. As reported on Channel 14 a few days ago, the Egyptians have no fewer than 60,000 troops (possibly now up to 70,000), as well as nearly 1,000 tanks and hundreds of artillery units in the Sinai. Very close to our border in the Negev, just 100 meters from Israel, the Egyptians are carrying out training exercises, and have also deployed air defenses.

Not much is left of the Begin-Sadat (Camp David) peace agreement of 1979, but it did have one clear advantage: the demilitarizing of the Sinai Peninsula of all Egyptian forces, except for small forces enumerated in the agreement. Even this advantage, however, has been nearly totally erased in recent years.

The "Netziv" internet site, based on open-source intelligence, reports that elite Egyptian units, advanced weapon stores, infantry and tanks have been detected between El-Arish and the Israeli border 45 kilometers (28 miles) away. Only light-weapons are allowed there, according to the agreements. Underground bunkers have been built in mountain sides, for control and missile storage, Netziv reports, and even the Sinai's airport runways in Rafid and Um-Hashiba have been widened, enabling combat aircraft activity.

The Biggest Threat: Apathy 

Israel appears to be relating to these threatening violations with apathy. The main lesson of the Six Day War, and even more so, of the Yom Kippur War and the Simchat Torah massacre (Oct. 7th), is that the enemy must be evaluated not according to his intentions, but according to his capacities and abilities. And the Egyptian abilities are quite worrisome.

Even assuming that Israel does not wish to enter into war with Egypt at present, Israel must deal with these threats and violations publicly, noisily, and internationally.

First of all, Israel must advance its own armored forces very openly to its border with Egypt. It must also insist publicly that the United States, which is a guarantor to the Camp David Agreements, demand that Egypt remove the forces that violate the accords. Israel must even threaten, in a headlines-grabbing manner, a military response to the violations. 

At present, even more worrisome than the strong Egyptian military presence in the Sinai is Israel's current passive approach.