by Haggai Huberman, Arab Affairs Correspondent, translated by Hillel Fendel.
It took 14 years for Israel to respond to Iran last time. How long will it take this time?
The general security situation in Israel - the Gaza front, Lebanon/Hizbullah, and the rockets from Iran - overshadowed a very important piece of news published this weekend: The Federal Criminal Court in Argentina ruled on Friday that Iran and Hizbullah were behind the murderous attacks on the Israeli Embassy and the Jewish community building in Buenos Aires in 1992 and 1994, respectively.
The court further ruled that the two attacks are to be considered crimes against humanity, meaning, inter alia, that they are not bound by statutes of limitations.
The 12th day of Adar Bet, three weeks ago, marked 32 years since the attack on the embassy. On that day in 1992, a car bomb driven by a suicide terrorist exploded at the gate to the four-story building, causing its collapse and the death of 29 people, including four Israelis and four Argentinian Jewish women. Over 220 people were hurt.
The bombing was a revenge attack by Iran, via Hizbullah, for the liquidation of Hizbullah's then-leader Abbas Musawi a month earlier. Musawi was killed in an air strike in Lebanon, and Israel claimed immediate responsibility. His death led to the ascendance of an unknown terrorist named Hassan Nasrallah to the helm of Hizbullah.
Two years later, in the summer of 1994, Iran carried out yet a second revenge attack, bombing the AMIA Jewish Community Center building in Buenos Aires. A Lebanese terrorist detonated another car bomb, this time murdering 85 people and wounding 330 – apparently the worst terrorist attack in Argentina ever.
Following Israel's killing last month of major Iranian military leaders in Syria, the Israeli public was in nervous suspense as to how Iran would avenge itself this time. It was feared that either an Israeli embassy abroad would be hit, or Israel itself would be the target. As is now known, Iran chose to hit Israel directly, for the first time in history. It did not even use one of its proxies such as Hizbullah or the Houthis of Yemen. The Iranians assumed that their more than 300 drones and missiles would deal Israel a strong and significant blow. Among these were 110 ballistic missiles directed towards an important IDF base in the Negev, Nevatim. However, the results for Iran were quite paltry: A Bedouin girl was hurt by shrapnel, and only light damage was caused to the army base.
Tactically and operatively, Israel registered a tremendous achievement: Our coordinated defense system stopped nearly 100% of the rockets and drones used in what was probably the largest offensive of its type in history. Israel also scored a great diplomatic success in that the U.S., other Western nations, and even Middle East neighbors such as Jordan all took part in bolstering Israel's defenses, rendering it multi-layered and all the more effective.
On the one hand, then, it was a dizzying success – but at the same time it represented a total loss of both Israeli and American deterrence. The Ayatollahs proved during this attack how much they were not scared off by Biden's one-word warning to Iran six months ago: "Don't." It appears that the only ones scared off by the American Don't were Israeli leaders, especially by the Don't directed at them in recent weeks.
Now the question is if, and how, Israel will respond to Iran's failed, but very provocative, attack. Thirty years ago, Israel did not respond to the two attacks in Argentina. In fact, it waited 14 years to do so, eliminating (according to foreign sources, of course) Hizbullah's second-in-command Imad Mureina in Damascus. Mureina was responsible for planning the Argentinian attacks. This was such a strong blow to Hizbullah that it was unable, or unwilling, to avenge his death, for no one there was equal to the task of planning attacks on the scale of Mureina.
As of this writing, the State of Israel stands before one of the biggest dilemmas it has ever faced: whether and how to respond to the Iranian onslaught. If we show restraint, ostensibly because the attack did not cause substantial damage, our deterrence power will be eroded even further.
In this vein, let us recall that the erosion of our deterrence increased precisely in light of the successes of the Iron Dome anti-rocket defense system. Iron Dome certainly prevented many casualties from Hamas rockets, and allowed Israel to "contain" this incessant fire. But it was also our biggest curse. For years it enabled our great suppression, and even ignoring, of the Gaza threat – until it smashed into our kibbutzim and bases on the morning of Simchat Torah (Oct. 7th).
On the other hand, let no one have any illusions: An Israeli military response involving a direct attack on Iran means nothing less than war with Iran. That is, no more exchanges of fire with Iran's proxies – Hizbullah, Syria, or the Yemenite Houthis – but with Iran itself. The first problem with this is whether the U.S. will give us a green light, or even any form of coordination – either of which is necessary for our success. This appears doubtful, given the election-season difficulties Biden faces. On the other hand, there are indications that America has already given tacit approval to a form of Israeli retribution. All in all, an unclear situation.
But one thing that is known is that a war with Iran will have to involve the destruction, or at least something close to it, of Iran's nuclear facilities. If not, the war will be pointless. The US, of course, could carry out this destruction more effectively than Israel can – but this does not appear very likely under a Biden presidency.
Does Israel have the power to do it alone? Every Israeli government forum or cabinet that has to make this terrifically difficult decision will have to, first of all, take that question into account. Only afterwards will it be able to consider other variables, such as the international community's positions, and make a final decision on this critical issue.
It should be just a matter of days before we know the answer.
