Tuesday, November 21, 2023

Not the PA and Not Egypt

by Emmanuel Shiloh, editor of the Besheva newspaper, translated by Hillel Fendel. 




Post-war Gaza must be under the total security control of Israel. Control over the residents must not be in the hands of unfriendly foreigners –
but the best solution is consensual immigration.

1. The entire nation is supporting our soldiers – logistically, motivationally, and in other ways – as they successfully battle in Gaza and inflict ever-increasing damage on Hamas-ISIS. The latter, for its part, is trying very hard to achieve a ceasefire while cynically and cruelly using the 240-or-so hostages as a pressure point. Most of our attention is focused on the two major goals of the campaign: the destruction of Hamas and its government organs, and the rescue of the hostages and their safe return home. There is an unshakable and welcome national consensus around these two goals, and unity of opinion and hearts is particularly important at this time. At the same time, however, we are not exempt from dealing with "the day after." Prime Minister Netanyahu and other government ministers have made some bombastic but unspecific announcements regarding what will be in Gaza when the IDF completes its missions there, and the Americans seem to have strong opinions on the matter as well. While position papers are quietly beginning to be prepared, we must not be taken by surprise. If we want to influence these plans, we must be ready and prepared. It will be a true tragedy if the ones who frame the political and security situation in newly liberated-from-Hamas Gaza come from the same school of thought and mindset that brought upon us the past years' series of catastrophes and various diplomatic and security failures. The list begins with the Oslo Accords, followed by the Disengagement, the Gilad Shalit terrorists exchange, and the conception that Hamas terrorism could be "contained" with bi-annual "rounds" of battles, the Iron Dome, and the border fence that ultimately was so tragically and easily scaled. 2. On the security front, Israel learned in the most painful way that what it has to do from now on is to prevent, at all costs, its Arab enemy from arming itself and building its military force. The Oslo Accords designers promised us that in the areas given over to PA control, the only weapons PA men would bear would be the light arms necessary for routine, or routine-plus, police work. But this concept broke down within a few years, and the security situation in Judea and Samaria – and especially in Gaza – has deteriorated severely ever since. Even the thought that we can function for years alongside a cruel enemy that wishes to destroy us and actively builds himself a military force for this purpose, has proven to be an illusion. We made a bitter mistake when we thought that we were safe and protected, that our intelligence always knows how to read the enemy's intentions, and that we would always be strong enough to deter them from realizing their dream of "itbah al-Yahud [slaughter the Jew]" that is so central to their religion and culture. We thought we learned this lesson 50 years ago after the Yom Kippur War – but no. It took another 1,200-plus dead Israelis, and some 240 abductees, to teach it to us once again. Once again, our intelligence misread the map, underestimated the enemy's capabilities and intentions, and trusted our fortified border which proved to be insufferably weak. The conclusion is clear: Our intelligence must always be improved, but even more important is to ensure that future mistakes will not have such catastrophic consequences. This can be done by ensuring that the enemy is never again able to build up his military capabilities to the point that he can harm us. This is true regarding Hamas, regarding Hizbullah – and regarding Iran as well. 3. And yet another lesson must be learned: We can never trust anyone else to do our work for us. When Peres and Rabin gave up Gaza to the control of arch-murderer Arafat, they promised that Arafat would be able to fight Hamas "without the constraints of the Supreme Court and [civil rights org] B'Tselem." But in practice, Arafat had no desire to do this, and Hamas built up its terrorist structures that not only inflicted painful losses upon us, but also led Ariel Sharon and his government to quit Gaza with our tail between our legs. The ideological right-wing and the religious-nationalist public, which fought mightily against the withdrawal from Gush Katif and expulsion of its 9,000 Jews, warned desperately that Gaza would become a center of terror targeting Ashkelon and Ashdod. But even they never really considered the eventuality of an arsenal of thousands of rockets that would reach Tel Aviv and further. Within just two years after Gaza became Jew-free, Hamas violently wrested control of the region from the PA and Fatah. The Jihadistic Hamas terrorist organization thus found itself with the resources of a small country, which it chose not to use these for its citizens' welfare, but to enrich its leaders and prepare militarily to attack Israel however possible. It increased its rocket capabilities, built thousands of launchers, dug an amazing array of underground tunnels, and developed a trained commando force. This past Simchat Torah, it succeeded beyond our worst fears, with cruelty, sadism, and military prowess that caught the IDF by total surprise. 4. It is therefore 100% clear: The Disengagement and the Oslo Accords must be nullified, at least militarily. The IDF must retain, and not just for a short period of time, the ability to act anywhere within Gaza and to nip in the bud any attempt there to build up terrorist and military capabilities. This cannot happen unless we maintain a permanent and massive military presence in various places throughout Gaza. Obviously we have to keep our American friends in mind as well. We must explain to them that it would be totally irresponsible to put our trust in Abu Mazen – PA chief Mahmoud Abbas – in this matter. Aside from the fact that he is aging and will not be around forever, he himself supports and encourages terrorism. Under his leadership, the PA has centered itself around a culture of adulation of terrorists and murderers, and educates its young children to hate Jews. The only reasons why Judea/Samaria is not a headquarters for Gaza-like rockets and terrorists are a) the IDF presence and b) the half-million Jewish "settlers." Can Egypt be considered for the task of policing Gaza? No. Egypt is not a true friend of Israel, and is liable to turn again into a bitter enemy at any time. The relative stability of our peace agreement with Egypt leans heavily on the ban on significant military forces in the vast expanses of the Sinai Desert buffer between us and them. Bringing the Egyptians to Gaza would create a new temptation for them to try to harm Israel – dangerous not only in and of itself, but also a threat to the Camp David agreements that are somehow still holding up. The idea of an international peacekeeping force is a non-starter. This is because the motivation of a hodge-podge group of soldiers to do an effective job far from their own homes, in a dangerous situation, is basically nil. We have seen this in other areas on Israeli borders and around the world. No foreign army, and certainly not a UN force, can do our work for us. 5. So who then will run the lives of the Gazans when the war ends? The most practical answer to this question might be to return to the format of an IDF Military Administration, as existed before the Oslo Accords of 1993 and 1995. Other methods have been tried, but this one seems to have been the safest and most effective not only for Israel, but also for the Arabs of Gaza. But it could be that this idea will not go over well even within the Israeli populace. Another solution, then, is to divide Gaza into separate cantons, in which representatives of the local family clans [hamulot] will reign. This will prevent the development of a central government in Gaza that will be able to translate its economic power into military force. The Gazan regional "governments," with their authority dependent upon Israel, will be obligated to prevent incitement and terrorism. It will be up to us to ensure that the destruction that Hamas brought upon the Arabs of Gaza always be remembered by those who will rule and live there from now on. And after this canton system proves itself in Gaza, and after Abu Mazen leaves the scene, we can replicate it in Judea and Samaria as well.

Return to Gush Katif?

In truth, we can and should strive for even more. After Gaza City becomes uninhabitable, maybe we can convince the international community that, instead of chipping in to rebuild it once again, a more correct solution would be to spread the population of the Arab terror capital among various countries of the world. When Rehavam Ze'evi raised the idea of an agreed-upon transfer as a solution to the Palestinian problem, he was ostracized and denounced as a racist extremist. But now, after the horrific pogrom committed by the Gazans, a "transfer" of some sort doesn't seem as outlandish as it did. Even in the left-wing kibbutzim just east of Gaza, people are saying that they won't return home until Gaza is erased and they can see the Mediterranean from their homes. So why should Gaza remain desolate? Let's make sure that what the kibbutz members see from their homes will be good Jews, including soldiers who fought to liberate Gaza, living in beautiful new Jewish neighborhoods built on the beachfront of Israeli Gaza. Amen!