How Far Back Must the War Investigation Go?

by Haggai Huberman, journalist and author, translated by Hillel Fendel.

Ariel Sharon announced his intention to "disengage" from Gush Katif and all of Gaza 20 years before the Simchat Torah massacre. The commission of inquiry must investigate how this led to the current war.

Most of the citizenry of Israel, it appears from a cursory glance at the daily headlines, favor a public commission of inquiry to determine what led up to the horrific massacre of Simchat Torah `23. The Israeli public does not like the clumsy attempts of the government and the Prime Minister, via various tricks and excuses, to avoid having to answer to such a commission.

However, it is not clear from what date this commission should start its research.

I would recommend that the government agree to a public commission of inquiry. After all, the government will be the body that sets the subjects of inquiry and their limits. Netanyahu's government therefore has the opportunity and the right to tell the commission to focus on government policy not only of the few years, but of the last two decades. Why that long?

It will be recalled that almost exactly 20 years before the massacre, in Dec. 2023, then-Prime Minister Ariel Sharon announced his intention – contrary to everything he had promised in the election campaign less than a year earlier – to withdraw unilaterally from Gaza. That is, all of our armed forces, and the 22 Jewish communities in Gaza (mostly in Gush Katif, were to be physically removed. This was known as the Disengagement Plan.

What is the connection between this Disengagement and the horrors of Oct. 7^th? Finding the answer to that question is exactly what I am proposing as a central topic for the inquiry. To pinpoint the connection, the following questions may not be avoided, and they must be directly answered:

·        To what extent did Israel's withdrawal from the Gaza Strip enable Hamas to build up its humongous military force, in terms of both personnel (the Nukhba units) and its rocket arsenals?

·        How is that Hamas succeeded [in 2007] in defeating Fatah and taking over Gaza militarily from the PA, but did not succeed in doing so in Judea and Samaria?

·        How is it that the Arabs of Judea and Samaria did not perpetrate an invasion and massacre similar to the what the Arabs of Gaza executed?

·        To what extent did the withdrawal detract from the intelligence capabilities of the IDF and the Shabak? No one disputes that critical information regarding Hamas intentions that morning of Oct. 7^th did not reach Israeli intelligence bodies in time.

Regarding that last point, we know that the Shabak conducted an internal inquiry, of which only small portions have been publicized. The report states that "there was relatively little intelligence, as a result (inter alia) of restrictions on our freedom of action [in Gaza] and increasing difficulties in the Shabak's independent ability to complete intelligence/operational processes there."

These words are precisely what the commission must investigate: Why were there such "restrictions" that led to "relatively little intelligence" specifically in Gaza, and not in Judea and Samaria? [It is axiomatic that intelligence is very hard to obtain without physical presence in the area being scouted. - HF]

Without detracting from the responsibility of the current political and military leaderships for the events of Oct. 7^th, the very demand to investigate also the government of 20 years ago can serve as a litmus test for the commission of inquiry that is to arise:

If it is willing to begin its investigation 20 years back, regarding events that (many feel) marked the beginning of the process that ended with the Hamas invasion/slaughter of nearly 18 months ago, then it can be said to be objective and public-minded. But if it seeks all sorts of tricks to avoid having to investigate the Sharon era and place some of the responsibility on him, this automatically places a large question mark on the reliability and trustworthiness of the commission and its conclusions.

In addition, if a measure of blame is accorded to Sharon and the Disengagement, it will have ramifications for any future consideration of similar unilateral or other withdrawals.

Netanyahu's Share of Responsibility

A public commission of inquiry must also investigate the failure of the Netanyahu governments' policies over the years that led to this war. However, while the left-wing seeks to indicate that Netanyahu's failure lies in his "managing the conflict" instead of trying to reach a diplomatic solution, I believe the opposite: "Managing the conflict" was a correct approach, but it was applied only in Judea and Samaria – from where no Oct. 7^th emanated!

Let's assume for a moment that there had been a "diplomatic process" with the PA which had actually led to some sort of a peace agreement; highly improbable, I know. The only result would have been terrorists roaring through Jewish towns along the Green Line such as Modiin, Kfar Saba and Raanana on motorcycles and Toyotas, as happened in Jewish towns near Gaza on Oct. 7^th.

Other say that we shouldn't have separated between Yesha and Gaza. But again, I believe that that actually worked in our favor, serving as an additional factor why the Arabs in Judea and Samaria did not follow their cousins in Gaza and attempt their own slaughter of Israelis.

For example, consider that in 1987, when Yesha and Gaza were not officially separate, the first intifada broke out in northern Gaza and then quickly spread to Judea and Samaria. The second intifada started simultaneously in Gaza and Yesha (and even among Arab-Israelis), in September 2000. But in clear contrast, the Simchat Torah war never expanded to Yesha, despite the hopes of then-Hamas leader Yihye Sinwar for a "joining of the fronts."

Where, then, is the real failure of Netanyahu? It lies in his formulation and implementation of the motto, "Quiet will be met with quiet." That is, if Hamas remains quiet, Israel will view this as if Hamas is "deterred" – even if, as it turned out, it was simply biding its time while preparing for war – and we won't initiate an offensive.

How could the Likud have forgotten the famous line of its ideological founder, Zev Jabotinsky, who wrote in one of his poems, "Quiet is filth." He meant of course that to remain passive in the face of major challenges can lead to tragedy. The suitcases of dollars that our government transferred to Hamas was not meant to strengthen Hamas at the expense of the Palestinian Authority, as opponents of the government claim. It rather stemmed from a fear of war, and from the foolish belief that an improvement in Gaza's economic situation will weaken Sinwar's passion to murder Jews.

It wasn't only Netanyahu, of course, who believed this. This belief started back in the days of Shimon Peres, and encompassed also Galant, Gantz, outgoing Shabak head Ronen Bar, former IDF Chief of Staff Hertzy HaLevy, Yair Lapid, Naftali Bennett, and others whom I have forgotten; my apologies to them and to the readers. Each of them is equally responsible, but the Prime Minister – who has been in office for many years – has a bit more responsibility than all the rest. The sad result was that Hamas was permitted to build its monstrous strength over the course of years.

Our conclusions concern not only whom to blame in the past, but mainly how we are to act in the future. The State of Israel must achieve the release of all the living hostages (yes, living; contrary to popular opinion, it's OK if we wait until the next war to receive the corpses), and this is possible only if we negotiate and pay heavy prices. After they have all been released, then we can go on to implement another line in Jabotinsky's poem: "Carry the fire to ignite."

Note: This was written just before the IDF resumed the war in Gaza this week.

Do Not Forget!

by Emmanuel Shiloh, editor of B'sheva magazine, translated by Hillel Fendel. (written just days before the IDF renewed its all-out war against Hamas this week)

We have a mandate to obliterate Amalek – and certainly not to leave the job in the middle and thus forget what he did to us. We're holding a good set of cards; let's be strong and do it!

1.      We met up with Purim 5785 at a crossroads period, as we paused to see what awaited us on the horizon: War, the release of our hostages, or neither. It was clear that the longer this period lasted, the more we were in danger of violating the Torah command "never to forget" – in this case, never to forget what the Amalekite Hamas did to us. The memories of the slaughter and worse were already beginning to blur a bit… 

2.       Stage One of the hostage release deal ended in early March. We received with great happiness 30 live hostages, as well as the bodies of eight who were cruelly murdered on or since Simchat Torah 2023. In exchange, Israel released 1,904 terrorist prisoners, mostly to Gaza. Sixty-one of them were released to eastern Jerusalem and another 352 to Judea and Samaria; no fewer than 547 of them had been involved in the murder of Israelis. Another 225 were banished abroad, after having murdered Jews, dispatched murderers, or manufactured weapons for the murder of Jews.

During this period, we saw, aside from the joyous Arab receptions accorded the worst of our enemies upon their release, also hundreds of thousands of Gazans returning to what was left of their homes in northern Gaza, without any effective security checks. [They are now being redirected southward again, to western Gaza City. – HF] Similarly we know that the Hamas used this two-month ceasefire period to reorganize and rearm, to plant bombs, and to recruit hundreds more terrorists to join the estimated 30,000 already waiting to attack Israel.

3.       A list of nearly 700 Israelis who were murdered by terrorists included in the current round's mass release from jail was publicized last week in Maariv by radio and print  commentator Kalman Liebskind. This unusual item only illustrated the extent to which the Israeli media, most of which is completely mobilized in favor of the deal, tries to make us forget its heavy costs, both defense-wise and morally. For let us not forget: The families of the future victims of these murderers, Heaven forbid, will surely grieve as painfully as those of past victims; the only difference is that we don't yet know who they are.

4.       A shallow and superficial debate has been going on here for a while regarding the pros and cons of giving in to Hamas demands in order to secure the release of the hostages. During the course of what might also be called a propaganda campaign, we have seen ignoramuses who may never have opened a book of Halakhah [Jewish Law] in their lives rush to quote Maimonides on the overriding importance of "redeeming captives." Unfortunately, they forget to note the Rambam's qualification that captives are not to be redeemed for more than "they are worth," in order not to encourage future hostage-grabbings. Those who quote him also overlook the simple fact that we are not currently dealing with the redemption of captives, but with the laws of war. 

In addition, the Israeli law code stipulates clearly what we may offer in terms of imprisoned terrorists in a hostage-release deal – and the current agreement stands in gross violation of the specified terms. Is there no limit to our willingness to be blackmailed? If one day someone kidnaps innocent citizens and threatens to kill them if Yigal Amir is not freed from prison, would he be released? And if the terrorists demanded that we give them all the territory west of the now-infamous Route 232, including Kibbutzim Kfar Aza, Be'eri, Nir Oz, and more – would we agree? How is it that not all of us see that whenever we cave in to them, they are encouraged to kidnap more and more Israelis?

And if the next time, they demand that we uproot a few Yesha communities, or give up the Temple Mount, or demolish our nuclear plant in Dimona – would we agree, in keeping with the approach that "saving the hostages" takes priority over everything else? Is there any limit at all?!

And from another angle: Do we have the moral right to eschew our responsibility to bring the murderers of hundreds of Israelis to justice?

5.       For those who truly wish to analyze this issue with Halakhic eyes, let us note that there is also a Torah commandment not to "take ransom for the life of a murderer subject to the death penalty, as he must be put to death" (Numbers 35,31). And if we currently lack the moral clarity to execute those who murder us, as the Torah mandates, and imprison them for life instead – then at least let us not take ransom to release them from prison. For the Torah continues there (verse 33): "When blood is shed in the land, it cannot be atoned for except through the blood of he who shed it." The murder of innocents that goes unpunished is, very simply, a contamination and pollution of the land.

6.       It is likely that we will have no choice but to set out for war once again against Hamas/Amalek. It cannot be denied that this will not be easy after this long hiatus. We have all benefited from a routine of relative serenity, without sirens, reserves call-ups, and military funerals. Many reservists have shed their uniforms and returned to their families and jobs. But this quiet is simply misleading. If we don't finish the job against Hamas once and for all, we will be like King Saul who started to fulfill the command to wipe out Amalek but then allowed King Agag to live. Saul did not finish the job – and thus his kingship was seized from him and "given to his colleague who was better than him," David.

Israel's unsteady security situation is the result of decades of addiction to "quiet," and refusing to pay the price of warring against evil. At least now, we dare not allow ourselves to pass these dangers down to our children and grandchildren – not the dangers of Iran, not those of Gaza, and not those of Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen – and certainly not those emanating from Judea and Samaria. For even if we would wish to avoid the big battles, we simply won't be able to. If we do not obliterate Hamas now, then within just a few years, the story of Simchat Torah '23 will repeat itself. We will not have quiet if we don't finish the job.

As of now, we are holding a good hand of cards: There is no additional front in the north, Hamas has been weakened greatly, the United States is not only not hindering but is actually helpful, and our military leadership has been refreshed. All that's left for us is to strengthen our spirit for another round, with the faith and knowledge and strategy that this time we will absolutely win. Let us, as the Torah commands, annihilate the memory of Amalek from beneath the heavens.