Don't Reward Hamas!

by Nadav Rath, Strategic Business and Personal Decisions Consultant , translated by Hillel Fendel.

Some in Israel's nationalist camp are falling into the same trap that Hamas successfully set for Israel's left-wing sector over the past year. We must be careful not to identify with the victory messages of Hamas, but rather continue to broadcast strength and might.

Over the past year, every time Hamas sent us a video [not shown in Israel, thankfully] of poor hostages forced to parrot words fed them by the terrorists demanding that Israel's government agree to a deal for their release, we of the right-wing camp all wondered: Could it possibly be that those clamoring for a deal no matter what, don't realize that their messages totally jibe with those of Hamas?

Both Hamas and the hostage-families/supporters screamed out together: "At any price!" "Now!" "The government of Israel are murderers!" They also rammed down our throats that the IDF offensives are killing or maiming the hostages. Many of us understood from the beginning that they were seeking to manipulate us with psychological warfare, and we didn't fall for their tricks. Official Israel did not agree to disseminate the videos. But many others didn't seem to notice.

After a few months, it became extra clear that this was a well-planned strategy of the enemy, with the goal of sowing chaos and discord within the Israeli public. Once this happened, we were able to continue with the war with extra energies, knowing that the enemy was strong and determined to deceive us – and that we must not fall into their propaganda trap. War always demands strength and determination, and certainly not lowliness and solidarity with the enemy's goals.

But this morning, I was very sad to find that many of us have apparently begun to suffer from a type of temporary blindness. Maybe it was the publication of the names of the arch-terrorists and murderers who are about to be released, or maybe it was the celebrations in Gaza that so confused us. All I know is that even some of my good friends began to share Hamas propaganda – videos of happy terrorists roaming the streets of Gaza, waving their hands in the joy of victory.

What is the purpose of spreading these scenes on our phones? We all knew and internalized that the purpose of the videos of the hostages were designed to harm us and our unity, our strength, our faith, our determination. Has anything changed now? In what way is the dissemination of videos of what Hamas considers victory (despite the ruins and the stench of death all around them) a good idea? These scenes were released by Hamas for precisely one purpose: to harm us and our morale, to strike at us psychologically and spiritually, to seek to ensure that we will not want to renew the war in six weeks' time. What they want is for us to fight amongst ourselves again as to who was at fault, and to leave them in "peace."

We are going through difficult days as it is, without the need to disseminate Hamas propaganda amongst ourselves. Yes, we must object to this terrible ceasefire and wholesale terrorist release, and the noble protests by some families of hostages and of fallen soldiers were of inestimable importance; it is inconceivable that such a decision would go unprotested. Now, however, we must resolve that our role is to continue to strengthen our nation in the justness of its path and struggle – and not to weaken ourselves, lower our spirits, or act as if all our efforts until now were in vain.

I have made a simple decision: I won't share any Hamas propaganda such as photos of their celebrations. I will rather focus on the tremendous destruction we have rained down on the Hamas terrorist infrastructure in Gaza, including the flattening of much of Gaza, the killing of tens of thousands of Hamas supporters, and the elimination of most of Hamas's leaders. I will continue to work to bolster our national spirit and ensure that we renew the war. Yes, we made a tactical blunder by agreeing to this deal – but we will not let it affect the entire war, of which we are still in the midst. "Let us be strong," we read in Samuel II, "for the sake of our nation and the cities of our G-d."

The Hostage Deal is Very Bad – But Could Become the Lever for Victory

by Moshe Gutman, Fellow at the Misgav Institute for National Security, translated by Hillel Fendel.

In October 1973, during the Yom Kippur War, IDF Chief of Staff Lt.-Gen. David (Dado) Elazar made a difficult decision: He ordered an end to the thankless and grinding efforts to try to save the all-but-doomed fortified positions along the Suez Canal. Instead, the positions were surrendered, and the IDF was then then able to focus on stabilizing an effective line of defense and preparing a counter-attack that would totally reverse the situation.

This painful decision later turned out to be a critical stage in Israel's ultimate victory. In an impressive display of military insight, Dado knew that he had to lose that particular battle in order to win the overall campaign.

The current deal that saw the release of three women from Hamas captivity on Sunday is done. There's no turning back, as of now. The agreement calls for the release of another 30 hostages – most of them alive, apparently – in exchange for six weeks of a ceasefire and the freeing of nearly 2,000 imprisoned terrorists, including over 700 who murdered dozens of Israelis. This terrible deal for Israel is a dangerous concession to Hamas, which will encourage and motivate our enemies, and weaken our deterrence power.

But under the circumstances, given that those responsible for the negotiations led us into a dead end from which there has long been no turning back, it is no longer relevant to discuss how terrible it is. The only question we must concentrate on is how we can turn this failure into an opportunity.

Perhaps this deal provides us with the chance to correct some of the military campaign's failures thus far. It's been some weeks now that our military efforts in Gaza have not been producing significant results, yet have been costing us increasing number of soldiers' lives. This reveals that the army's approach continues to be based on a problematic military "conception." What the Chief of Staff terms "the incursions system" – conquering and cleansing an area, then retreating, with predictable consequences – is actually an expression of indecision and the absence of a victory plan, and it is not in line with the war goals defined by the government. Instead of a head-on strategy that will defeat Hamas, the IDF is settling for a "one-step-forward, two-steps-backwards" approach that merely lengthens the combat, wears down our forces, and plays in to the hands of Hamas. For Hamas loves the idea of a war of attrition, celebrates the death of every individual soldier, and is interested in the scorched earth it leaves behind less than last year's snow. All of this, Israel still has not internalized.

On the other hand, if we employ the principles of judo – where each side uses the momentum employed by the other in order to overcome him – we can turn the current lemon into lemonade. Instead of using this deal simply to bring about a ceasefire, it can cease something else: Israel's treading in place. Chapter Two of this war must mark the beginning of a new era in the campaign for a quick and uncompromising dash towards victory. It has to be swift, determined, and lethal.

With this understanding, we might also be able to explain the puzzling support of President Trump for the deal. After all, Trump is an undying critic of weakness and concessions in negotiations, and yet he has taken credit for the terms of the deal as designed by his bitter rival, outgoing president Joe Biden. Why? 

The answer can perhaps be found in Trump's Art of the Deal philosophy. He holds that if you have reached an impasse in negotiations, the best way out is to get up from the table, walk out, and start again. That's the "reset" approach, as anyone who has ever had a problem with a computer knows.

In the case at hand, Trump, who has always admired strength and quick achievements, is apparently losing patience with Israel's water-treading approach in Gaza. Acting as if you're doing something but actually getting nowhere is for weaklings, he holds, and he now wants to stop the whole story and turn over a new page.

From his standpoint, if Israel is not able to win a quick victory under the current circumstances, he would like to see a reset – a ceasefire that would allow a reorganization, a return to a strategy of firmness, and an operative plan that is decisive. This is how we can best explain and understand the gap between his statements and the more belligerent positions taken by his top officials.

The key to turning bitter into sweet in this conflict lies in the conditions and guarantees regarding Chapter Two of the Gaza war. Just as Dado did not abandon the outposts in 1973 without a clear plan for victory, so too today: This terrible deal that has been forced upon us must be fenced with clear and irreversible obligations to renew the war until victory is achieved. Mechanisms must be put in place to ensure that the truce is only temporary and that the main Israeli achievements are preserved; if they are not, the ceasefire will truly be our defeat.

The main question, therefore, is whether the current leadership has the courage and the vision to turn the failure of Oct. 7^th into an opportunity. Will it know how to use the ceasefire forced upon it to reorganize correctly, with a new strategy for a decisive victory? Or will it succumb to the temptation to allow it to become permanent? Without firm determination in this area, even Trump's support will be of little use, and the bad deal will remain that, marking a historic surrender that will haunt us for generations.

The members of our government – and especially Finance Minister Smotrich, who has said that he will resign if the war is not resumed, and who therefore plays a kingpin role – bear a heavy responsibility. They must ensure that there are mechanisms in place to assure that the war is renewed, and that this terrible deal actually becomes the basis for a tremendous reversal that will take us from darkness to light.

Turning Words into Action

by Ze'ev Kam, Public "Kan" Radio Commentator and BeSheva Contributor, translated by Hillel Fendel.

Between Declaring Support for Yesha – and Eternalizing it in Israel's Code of Law

This past July, we were witness to an unusual occurrence in the Israeli Knesset: No fewer than 68 MKs united around one cause and voted as one in favor of a declaration opposing a Palestinian state. And this does not mean that "only" 68 MKs feel that way; many of the other 52 are quite opposed to a Palestinian state, but for political reasons had to absent themselves for the vote.

Prime Minister Netanyahu has cited this vote since then many times, in announcements that he distributed to the media and also in his speeches. "The Knesset united as one with a great majority," he declared, "against the attempt to dictate to us the establishment of a Palestinian state" – something that would endanger the very existence of the Jewish state.

Behind the scenes, what's fascinating about this is that the vote has absolutely no legal or practical ramifications. The declaration against a PLO state is not an official decision by the State of Israel, and has only symbolic significance. Still, however, it will not be long before Netanyahu and many others in the coalition government, as well as those from the opposition who voted for the declaration, will be tested as to how seriously they meant what they voted for.

Many of are mistakenly inclined believe that if one day, the State of Israel decides to cede parts of Judea and Samaria (Yesha) and give them to an Arab entity, unilaterally or by mutual agreement, the government will be obligated to hold a popular referendum to ascertain if this is the will of the people. After all, it is Israeli law that a referendum must be held in the event that the government wishes to cede territory.

But those many of us are mistaken. This is because the existing law does not pertain at all to Judea and Samaria, but only to areas that are under total Israeli sovereignty. Judea and Samaria – as opposed to Jerusalem and the Golan Heights – are still under IDF administrative control, and have not yet been upgraded to full Israeli status. It's true that in the past, the assumption was that any agreement having to do with Yesha would involve an exchange of territory, meaning that actual parts of Israel would be given up in exchange for the areas of the Yesha settlement blocs, and that this would then obligate a referendum.

But there is yet another caveat. As PM Netanyahu explained in 2013 when the Cabinet approved the draft bill, "Any agreement, if it is achieved in negotiations, will be brought as a referendum. It is important that every citizen directly vote on fateful decisions like these." That is, unilateral withdrawals, such as occurred in 2005 from Gush Katif, need not be brought for a referendum.

Who can guarantee that we won't see a future intiatiative to withdraw unilaterally from some part or other of Yesha? In such a case, no referendum will be needed! Not to mention areas that are already under some sort of Palestinian Authority control; ceding them, despite the tremendous security and other ramifications that will result, will require no popular vote!

Precisely for that reason, the three co-chairmen of the Land of Israel lobby in the Knesset – MKs Yuli Edelstein, Simcha Rotman, and Limor Sohn Har-Melekh – have decided to advance a bill requiring a referendum in the events listed above. And in order to speed the process along, they decided not to take the regular, long, winding legislative route of a "private bill" sponsored by individual MKs. Rather, they arranged for the the Knesset Law Committee to sponsor it. As such, the Ministerial Committee for Legislation will not have to review the bill and determine whether the Government supports it or not, and it can be submitted to the Knesset immediately for its first reading.

For it is clear that a bill of this nature will attract unwanted international pressures, just as the bill to outlaw UNRWA – a full participant in the atrocities of Oct. 7^th – recently did. Although the UNRWA bill passed and is about to be implemented in full, who's to say that the Yesha referendum bill will have the same success? Speed is therefore of the essence.

In one of the preparatory Law Committee sessions for this bill, one of the supportive MKs, Yulia Malinovsky (Yisrael Beiteinu), said with a sting, "I just hope that the coalition will vote for this bill, given the people involved. I also hope that the Prime Minister won't block it, but if he does, he should at least do so in his voice and not via some emissary." A short time after this session, a senior member of the coalition announced that certain hareidi party leaders were demanding that the topic be discussed at the next coalition meeting. This was not the first time that hareidi representatives take the old Diaspora approach of, "What will the goyim say?"

But the three Land of Israel heads – Edelstein, Rotman, and Sohn Har-Melekh – say that they're going ahead with the bill until someone actively tries to stop them. It's actually a form of a dare, to see the Prime Minister, or the leader of any coalition party, would be brazen enough to say that "now is not the time for this bill." This was actually the very real fear when the above-mentioned declaration against a PLO state was voted on. Up to the very last hours before the vote, everyone involved was anxious about some foreign intervention that might suddenly happen in the form of a phone call from abroad, or that someone from the Prime Minister's office, or the Prime Minister himself, would abruptly appear saying that because of Biden, or a feared arms embargo, or the UN Security Council, or whatever, the vote has to be pushed off.

Of course, in the end, the declaration passed by a large majority, including even several opposition MKs.

The idea now is to turn that very declaration into practical law, with real teeth – something that will truly make history.

The Trump Opportunity: Let's Not Bungle It

by Emanuel Shilo, editor of the weekly BeSheva newspaper, translated by Hillel Fendel.

Although reports are that a deal for the exchange of some of the hostages now, and possibly the rest at a later date, is close to finalization, "it's not over until it's over" - and this is one of the reasons why the following article by the editor of the weekly BeSheva newspaper is still very relevant.

1. In only six days from now, a good friend of Israel, Donald J. Trump, will again become the President of the United States. In the two years that remain until the end of the current Netanyahu government, Trump will enjoy a majority (albeit narrow) in both the Senate and the House, as well as a supporting backwind from the Supreme Court and its clear conservative majority. Hopefully we are smart enough to utilize this special window of opportunity, by presenting the incoming Administration our clear goals and plans of action for the Middle East, and making clear our requests and expectations from our best friends. If so, these two years could be dreamlike, extricating us from the current quagmire and guaranteeing a better long-term future for Israel.

2. Pres.-elect Trump has already promised to totally remove all vestiges of the arms embargo that the Biden Administration partially imposed on Israel. The IDF can expect to receive from his administration generous helpings of weapons, and can even hope for the top-quality bunker busters that we so sorely need in order to attack the Iranian nuclear project. Trump's people are already exerting pressure on the International Criminal Court at The Hague so as to thwart future moves against Israel, and even to water down or retract previous anti-Israel decisions – beginning with the arrest warrants (!) issued against Prime Minister Netanyahu and former Defense Minister Galant.

Our requests from the U.S. in the near future are expected to fall on open ears and hearts. We must correctly prioritize our objectives and prove to the new Administration that we will know how to use whatever aid we receive to fulfill them. If we continue to wallow in the mire and drag out the war, our impatient friend in the White House is liable to lose interest in us.

3. Our two most important goals for which we must strive at this time are to, at long last, end the war in Gaza and fulfill its goals – the destruction of Hamas and the release of our captives – and also to uproot and destroy the Iranian nuclear threat.

Trump is clearly committed to the release of the hostages, having stated that if Hamas does not release them by the time he takes office, "all hell will break out." We must see this as a promise from the United States to Israel and its hostages. No longer should we look towards the brutal, murderous leaders of Hamas and hope that they will sign some kind of disastrous deal with us. Instead, we must get ready to "help" along the new policy by opening the incinerators of hellfire and waging an absolutely major assault on Gaza: three or four divisions that will completely occupy the Strip, rescue as many hostages as possible, and destroy Hamas. We can absolutely not accept Hamas administrative control of the population, and we must arrest or eliminate Hamas officials involved in this. Even more importantly, we must stop the "humanitarian aid" that always ends up in Hamas hands and essentially perpetuates the war by keeping Hamas alive.

The entire concept that has driven the war so far must be eradicated. We can no longer implement the wasteful and failed approach led by Chief of Staff HaLevy by which we conquer cities in Gaza such as Jebalya and Beit Hanoun, then withdraw and allow the terrorists to regroup and re-arm themselves, then go and lose soldiers as we conquer them again, and again, etc. Every area that we conquer must be totally cleansed of terrorists and then must remain in our hands! To some of these places, a carefully-screened civilian population can be allowed to return and live under an IDF military administration. The gates of Gaza must also be opened for mass emigration for whoever wants, such as refugees who want a better future for their families. This will also help alleviate the crowded conditions – which are certainly one of the reasons why Gaza became such a dangerous hotbed of terrorism.

At the same time, the IDF must initiate more military operations to release captives! It has been seven months since the famous Operation Arnon, in which four hostages were heroically freed by our forces. But since then – nothing. We can simply not accept this intelligence and operational failure of the first order. Renewing such operations must be part of the general war effort, causing the Gazan population and Hamas terrorists in particular to realize that their end is near, and that the most they can hope for is a safe escape route in exchange for the release of the hostages.

All this must be done within a short time, because the incoming President is not known for his forbearance and patience. Yes, he wants us to win the war, but he also wants to see the war end – quickly.

4. Is Lt.-Gen. Hertzy HaLevi the right man to lead the IDF to this critical and quick battle and decisive victory? Doubtful. He has many merits, including having led Israel's war on seven different fronts simultaneously (!) – but it is quite clear that the responsibility for what happened on Oct. 7^th is mainly his. He is the one who received the intelligence just hours before the attack and decided, with his senior colleagues in a late-night consultation, to take a chance and do nothing, without even taking the trouble to inform his bosses in the government. Despite this, he was not removed from his position, and instead received humongous resources in every form to wage war against Hamas – which, despite some impressive successes, simply did not succeed.

His troubled relations with the government – which was forced to accept his appointment scandalously dictated to it by the Lapid-Gantz-Bennett transitional government – add to the question marks regarding his ability to seize the golden opportunity and achieve the war's goals: the release of the hostages and the decisive defeat of Hamas.

5. And back to the golden opportunity that begins next week: No one truly knows why Israel did not take advantage of its successful airstrikes in Iran to finally rid the world of Iran's nuclear abilities and aspirations. It was likely because of the Biden administration, and also perhaps because of Netanyahu's characteristic hesitancy. But it can now be hoped that with Trump's taking up residence in the White House, there will be no more excuses.

Netanyahu must know that this is most likely his last term as Prime Minister, and if he wants to leave with a good taste in our mouths, he would be advised to carry out what he has long defined as his major goal: the destruction of the Iranian nuclear threat. (The same is also essentially true for the liquidation of Hamas and the freeing of the hostages.) If not now, with the help of the friendliest American administration we can conceive of, then when?

Not Good: Turkey Closing in on Syria

by Nitzan Kedar, journalist and author, translated by Hillel Fendel.

The fall of the Assad regime in Syria means that Syria no longer exists as the country we once knew – and that we have yet to see who will be our new neighbor to the northeast. If we worried that it would be the Islamist terrorists known as the "rebels," it now appears that our old adversary from Turkey – President Recep Tayyip Erdogan (pronounced Erdwan) – will be in charge. This is not especially cheerful news.

Erdogan's relations with Israel have known chiefly downs as far as Israel is concerned. We know that he has long conspired to revive and expand the Ottoman Turkish Empire (which fell apart over a century ago), and Syria now seems to have fallen into his hands like ripe fruit. If he succeeds in forming a Sunni axis together with Qatar, following his successes in taking advantage of current Russian and Israeli weaknesses in light of their respective wars, and of Iran's loss of regional influence, this is liable to mark the beginning of "Turkish Syria."

Erdogan hold another card as well, namely, support from the "rebels," led by the new Syrian leader, Ahmed al-Sharaa. Formerly known as Abu Mohammad al-Jolani, he will apparently grant Erdogan the rights to build Turkish military bases in Syria and to redraw the maritime borders between Syria and Turkey.

The Turkish president's plan is to take over oil-rich northeastern Syria, while declaring war on the Kurds, his nemesis who currently control the region. What is stopping him is only the fear that the United States will intervene in favor of the Kurds. It's true that President-elect Trump, in his previous term, essentially abandoned the Kurds, and has even said that "the United States has nothing to look for in Syria." However, this is not the approach of the Pentagon, and some Republican senators have already said that they are working with Trump to change his mind. The situation remains murky, but Erdogan is planning to do all he can to ensure maximum Turkish presence in Syria.

Turkish foreign-affairs expert Dr. Chai Eitan Cohen Yanarocak says that even back in 2011, after the civil war broke out in Syria, "Erdogan took a hostile approach to Assad… The Turks view Syria as historically Sunni, not Alawi, and saw the Arab Spring as a type of opportunity to return the crown to its former glory. And if the Turks can't return to Syria themselves, they'll settle for having Turkish loyalists in power there. They also wanted to throw the Iranians out of Turkey's back door – and now they see their chance to do all this."

"The Turks say to themselves," Yanarocak continues, "'If we invested so much here, including lives of our soldiers, the time has now come to reap the profits.' So they will deepen their hold in Syria via a host of projects in construction and infrastructures such as building airports, radar installations, highways, new military bases, electricity, and searching for oil and gas. These are all a way of telling the Syrians, 'we're here to stay.'"

Asked whether Erdogan is seeking to replace Russia, which was heavily involved in Syria in recent years, Yanarocak responded: "The situation with Russia is still unclear. A significant portion of the Russian forces have left Syria, but they still remain strong in two regions. No one knows now what will be with the army bases there. Clearly the Russians will try to banish the Turks, but the latter are very anxious to replace the Russians and will do all they can for that purpose."

Erdogan also would love to abolish the Kurdish autonomy in Syria, although, as stated the Americans represent a threat to these plans. Asked about Foreign Minister Gideon Saar's recent declaration that Israel will support the Kurds, Yanarocak said that such statements "cause great harm to the State of Israel, because they increase Turkish hostility towards us. In my opinion, because the Kurds have no access to the sea and because they are absolutely dependent upon Turkey and the rebels' new regime, they will not be able to supply us, Israel, with any advantage."

Yanarocak is not optimistic about the American role in the future Syria: "Without the Turks, the U.S. will have no word with the new Syria. We know Trump as a businessman, and he will want to maximize American interests in the region. I don't think he cares that much about the Kurdish nation. A few years ago, when the Turks demanded that the U.S. withdraw from the area, Trump did so. The Americans folded and the Turks entered. Afterwards, when the Pentagon exerted pressure, Trump stopped the Turks. Perhaps now, however, Trump will view the situation differently, because so many things have changed there."

"In short," Yanarocak concluded, "there is no doubt that the relations between Israel and Turkey will be even more tense than they are now."