How Far Back Must the War Investigation Go?

by Haggai Huberman, journalist and author, translated by Hillel Fendel.

Ariel Sharon announced his intention to "disengage" from Gush Katif and all of Gaza 20 years before the Simchat Torah massacre. The commission of inquiry must investigate how this led to the current war.

Most of the citizenry of Israel, it appears from a cursory glance at the daily headlines, favor a public commission of inquiry to determine what led up to the horrific massacre of Simchat Torah `23. The Israeli public does not like the clumsy attempts of the government and the Prime Minister, via various tricks and excuses, to avoid having to answer to such a commission.

However, it is not clear from what date this commission should start its research.

I would recommend that the government agree to a public commission of inquiry. After all, the government will be the body that sets the subjects of inquiry and their limits. Netanyahu's government therefore has the opportunity and the right to tell the commission to focus on government policy not only of the few years, but of the last two decades. Why that long?

It will be recalled that almost exactly 20 years before the massacre, in Dec. 2023, then-Prime Minister Ariel Sharon announced his intention – contrary to everything he had promised in the election campaign less than a year earlier – to withdraw unilaterally from Gaza. That is, all of our armed forces, and the 22 Jewish communities in Gaza (mostly in Gush Katif, were to be physically removed. This was known as the Disengagement Plan.

What is the connection between this Disengagement and the horrors of Oct. 7^th? Finding the answer to that question is exactly what I am proposing as a central topic for the inquiry. To pinpoint the connection, the following questions may not be avoided, and they must be directly answered:

·        To what extent did Israel's withdrawal from the Gaza Strip enable Hamas to build up its humongous military force, in terms of both personnel (the Nukhba units) and its rocket arsenals?

·        How is that Hamas succeeded [in 2007] in defeating Fatah and taking over Gaza militarily from the PA, but did not succeed in doing so in Judea and Samaria?

·        How is it that the Arabs of Judea and Samaria did not perpetrate an invasion and massacre similar to the what the Arabs of Gaza executed?

·        To what extent did the withdrawal detract from the intelligence capabilities of the IDF and the Shabak? No one disputes that critical information regarding Hamas intentions that morning of Oct. 7^th did not reach Israeli intelligence bodies in time.

Regarding that last point, we know that the Shabak conducted an internal inquiry, of which only small portions have been publicized. The report states that "there was relatively little intelligence, as a result (inter alia) of restrictions on our freedom of action [in Gaza] and increasing difficulties in the Shabak's independent ability to complete intelligence/operational processes there."

These words are precisely what the commission must investigate: Why were there such "restrictions" that led to "relatively little intelligence" specifically in Gaza, and not in Judea and Samaria? [It is axiomatic that intelligence is very hard to obtain without physical presence in the area being scouted. - HF]

Without detracting from the responsibility of the current political and military leaderships for the events of Oct. 7^th, the very demand to investigate also the government of 20 years ago can serve as a litmus test for the commission of inquiry that is to arise:

If it is willing to begin its investigation 20 years back, regarding events that (many feel) marked the beginning of the process that ended with the Hamas invasion/slaughter of nearly 18 months ago, then it can be said to be objective and public-minded. But if it seeks all sorts of tricks to avoid having to investigate the Sharon era and place some of the responsibility on him, this automatically places a large question mark on the reliability and trustworthiness of the commission and its conclusions.

In addition, if a measure of blame is accorded to Sharon and the Disengagement, it will have ramifications for any future consideration of similar unilateral or other withdrawals.

Netanyahu's Share of Responsibility

A public commission of inquiry must also investigate the failure of the Netanyahu governments' policies over the years that led to this war. However, while the left-wing seeks to indicate that Netanyahu's failure lies in his "managing the conflict" instead of trying to reach a diplomatic solution, I believe the opposite: "Managing the conflict" was a correct approach, but it was applied only in Judea and Samaria – from where no Oct. 7^th emanated!

Let's assume for a moment that there had been a "diplomatic process" with the PA which had actually led to some sort of a peace agreement; highly improbable, I know. The only result would have been terrorists roaring through Jewish towns along the Green Line such as Modiin, Kfar Saba and Raanana on motorcycles and Toyotas, as happened in Jewish towns near Gaza on Oct. 7^th.

Other say that we shouldn't have separated between Yesha and Gaza. But again, I believe that that actually worked in our favor, serving as an additional factor why the Arabs in Judea and Samaria did not follow their cousins in Gaza and attempt their own slaughter of Israelis.

For example, consider that in 1987, when Yesha and Gaza were not officially separate, the first intifada broke out in northern Gaza and then quickly spread to Judea and Samaria. The second intifada started simultaneously in Gaza and Yesha (and even among Arab-Israelis), in September 2000. But in clear contrast, the Simchat Torah war never expanded to Yesha, despite the hopes of then-Hamas leader Yihye Sinwar for a "joining of the fronts."

Where, then, is the real failure of Netanyahu? It lies in his formulation and implementation of the motto, "Quiet will be met with quiet." That is, if Hamas remains quiet, Israel will view this as if Hamas is "deterred" – even if, as it turned out, it was simply biding its time while preparing for war – and we won't initiate an offensive.

How could the Likud have forgotten the famous line of its ideological founder, Zev Jabotinsky, who wrote in one of his poems, "Quiet is filth." He meant of course that to remain passive in the face of major challenges can lead to tragedy. The suitcases of dollars that our government transferred to Hamas was not meant to strengthen Hamas at the expense of the Palestinian Authority, as opponents of the government claim. It rather stemmed from a fear of war, and from the foolish belief that an improvement in Gaza's economic situation will weaken Sinwar's passion to murder Jews.

It wasn't only Netanyahu, of course, who believed this. This belief started back in the days of Shimon Peres, and encompassed also Galant, Gantz, outgoing Shabak head Ronen Bar, former IDF Chief of Staff Hertzy HaLevy, Yair Lapid, Naftali Bennett, and others whom I have forgotten; my apologies to them and to the readers. Each of them is equally responsible, but the Prime Minister – who has been in office for many years – has a bit more responsibility than all the rest. The sad result was that Hamas was permitted to build its monstrous strength over the course of years.

Our conclusions concern not only whom to blame in the past, but mainly how we are to act in the future. The State of Israel must achieve the release of all the living hostages (yes, living; contrary to popular opinion, it's OK if we wait until the next war to receive the corpses), and this is possible only if we negotiate and pay heavy prices. After they have all been released, then we can go on to implement another line in Jabotinsky's poem: "Carry the fire to ignite."

Note: This was written just before the IDF resumed the war in Gaza this week.

Do Not Forget!

by Emmanuel Shiloh, editor of B'sheva magazine, translated by Hillel Fendel. (written just days before the IDF renewed its all-out war against Hamas this week)

We have a mandate to obliterate Amalek – and certainly not to leave the job in the middle and thus forget what he did to us. We're holding a good set of cards; let's be strong and do it!

1.      We met up with Purim 5785 at a crossroads period, as we paused to see what awaited us on the horizon: War, the release of our hostages, or neither. It was clear that the longer this period lasted, the more we were in danger of violating the Torah command "never to forget" – in this case, never to forget what the Amalekite Hamas did to us. The memories of the slaughter and worse were already beginning to blur a bit… 

2.       Stage One of the hostage release deal ended in early March. We received with great happiness 30 live hostages, as well as the bodies of eight who were cruelly murdered on or since Simchat Torah 2023. In exchange, Israel released 1,904 terrorist prisoners, mostly to Gaza. Sixty-one of them were released to eastern Jerusalem and another 352 to Judea and Samaria; no fewer than 547 of them had been involved in the murder of Israelis. Another 225 were banished abroad, after having murdered Jews, dispatched murderers, or manufactured weapons for the murder of Jews.

During this period, we saw, aside from the joyous Arab receptions accorded the worst of our enemies upon their release, also hundreds of thousands of Gazans returning to what was left of their homes in northern Gaza, without any effective security checks. [They are now being redirected southward again, to western Gaza City. – HF] Similarly we know that the Hamas used this two-month ceasefire period to reorganize and rearm, to plant bombs, and to recruit hundreds more terrorists to join the estimated 30,000 already waiting to attack Israel.

3.       A list of nearly 700 Israelis who were murdered by terrorists included in the current round's mass release from jail was publicized last week in Maariv by radio and print  commentator Kalman Liebskind. This unusual item only illustrated the extent to which the Israeli media, most of which is completely mobilized in favor of the deal, tries to make us forget its heavy costs, both defense-wise and morally. For let us not forget: The families of the future victims of these murderers, Heaven forbid, will surely grieve as painfully as those of past victims; the only difference is that we don't yet know who they are.

4.       A shallow and superficial debate has been going on here for a while regarding the pros and cons of giving in to Hamas demands in order to secure the release of the hostages. During the course of what might also be called a propaganda campaign, we have seen ignoramuses who may never have opened a book of Halakhah [Jewish Law] in their lives rush to quote Maimonides on the overriding importance of "redeeming captives." Unfortunately, they forget to note the Rambam's qualification that captives are not to be redeemed for more than "they are worth," in order not to encourage future hostage-grabbings. Those who quote him also overlook the simple fact that we are not currently dealing with the redemption of captives, but with the laws of war. 

In addition, the Israeli law code stipulates clearly what we may offer in terms of imprisoned terrorists in a hostage-release deal – and the current agreement stands in gross violation of the specified terms. Is there no limit to our willingness to be blackmailed? If one day someone kidnaps innocent citizens and threatens to kill them if Yigal Amir is not freed from prison, would he be released? And if the terrorists demanded that we give them all the territory west of the now-infamous Route 232, including Kibbutzim Kfar Aza, Be'eri, Nir Oz, and more – would we agree? How is it that not all of us see that whenever we cave in to them, they are encouraged to kidnap more and more Israelis?

And if the next time, they demand that we uproot a few Yesha communities, or give up the Temple Mount, or demolish our nuclear plant in Dimona – would we agree, in keeping with the approach that "saving the hostages" takes priority over everything else? Is there any limit at all?!

And from another angle: Do we have the moral right to eschew our responsibility to bring the murderers of hundreds of Israelis to justice?

5.       For those who truly wish to analyze this issue with Halakhic eyes, let us note that there is also a Torah commandment not to "take ransom for the life of a murderer subject to the death penalty, as he must be put to death" (Numbers 35,31). And if we currently lack the moral clarity to execute those who murder us, as the Torah mandates, and imprison them for life instead – then at least let us not take ransom to release them from prison. For the Torah continues there (verse 33): "When blood is shed in the land, it cannot be atoned for except through the blood of he who shed it." The murder of innocents that goes unpunished is, very simply, a contamination and pollution of the land.

6.       It is likely that we will have no choice but to set out for war once again against Hamas/Amalek. It cannot be denied that this will not be easy after this long hiatus. We have all benefited from a routine of relative serenity, without sirens, reserves call-ups, and military funerals. Many reservists have shed their uniforms and returned to their families and jobs. But this quiet is simply misleading. If we don't finish the job against Hamas once and for all, we will be like King Saul who started to fulfill the command to wipe out Amalek but then allowed King Agag to live. Saul did not finish the job – and thus his kingship was seized from him and "given to his colleague who was better than him," David.

Israel's unsteady security situation is the result of decades of addiction to "quiet," and refusing to pay the price of warring against evil. At least now, we dare not allow ourselves to pass these dangers down to our children and grandchildren – not the dangers of Iran, not those of Gaza, and not those of Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen – and certainly not those emanating from Judea and Samaria. For even if we would wish to avoid the big battles, we simply won't be able to. If we do not obliterate Hamas now, then within just a few years, the story of Simchat Torah '23 will repeat itself. We will not have quiet if we don't finish the job.

As of now, we are holding a good hand of cards: There is no additional front in the north, Hamas has been weakened greatly, the United States is not only not hindering but is actually helpful, and our military leadership has been refreshed. All that's left for us is to strengthen our spirit for another round, with the faith and knowledge and strategy that this time we will absolutely win. Let us, as the Torah commands, annihilate the memory of Amalek from beneath the heavens.

Post-War Inquiries: Where's the Inquiry into the War With Hizbullah?

by Haggai Huberman, journalist and author, translated by Hillel Fendel.

In one of the parking lots in the IDF's Tzrifin compound in Rishon LeTzion is parked a line of light trucks and full-size trucks. They are painted in a variety of colors, including some in colors of camouflage. A cursory glance reveals that some of the vehicles are damaged and in bad shape. A deeper look shows their contents: missile launchers, anti-aircraft guns, and more – last used in Lebanon to fire mostly at Israeli civilian targets.

These are most of the vehicles of the Radwan special operation forces unit of Hizbullah, whose principle mission is to infiltrate Israel's Galilee. They were captured in southern Lebanon during the short time (most of Oct.-Nov. 2024) that the IDF was present there, before retreating under the France/U.S.-brokered ceasefire.

Over the past two weeks, the Israeli press has been focusing on the commissions of inquiry into the events of Simchat Torah 5754 (Oct. 7, 2023) along Israel's border with Gaza and points further east. But we have not heard of any similar inquiries into what happened on the northern front, in the battles that took place, or that didn't take place, with Hizbullah.

The reason for this, apparently, is that the ruthless Nukhba forces of Hamas struck us a very painful blow, inconceivable even now, while the Radwan units sufficed with firing rockets from a distance. This caused damage to thousands of homes, to be sure, but they did not invade Israel in their thousands, did not murder over 1,000 Israelis, and did not kidnap hundreds of Jews.

If Hizbullah had dispatched their forces to do so simultaneously with the Hamas attack, precisely according to the original Iranian plan and as Sinwar hoped, how successful would they have been? We can only imagine it with dread. Would we have known about it in advance? Probably not – but we cannot be sure, because as far as is known, no analysis or inquiry into the northern arena is being carried out.  

Let us also recall that tens of Jewish communities and towns on Israel's northern border were evacuated for their own safety, just as on our border with Gaza. The difference is that in the south, most of the residents have returned home, while in the north, most have not.

I visited last week the exhibit of the weapons we captured from Hizbullah. We saw the Toyotas and Hyundais - the notorious pickup-trucks of the type used in the Hamas attack - equipped with 80mm and 107mm rocket launchers, the very ones that Hizbillah fired massively at Galilee communities over the past year. They were captured not far from northern Israel, in the narrow strip that the IDF occupied for eight weeks. Most of the vehicles that were confiscated were brought to Israel, and the rest were apparently destroyed.

Looking at the Hizbullah weapons and stocks in Tzrifin, and knowing that much more are stored elsewhere in Israel, one is shocked by the thought of what could have happened if Radwan had infiltrated as and when Hizbullah did.

The explanations regarding what I was seeing were given by Lt.-Col. Idan Sharon Kantar, the deputy commander of the Loot Clearance Unit. This is a General Staff unit that travels around the area and collects the equipment and other weapons that the enemy leaves behind, so that it can be investigated and studied.

Officer Kantar explains that the main differences between Hamas and Hizbullah primarily concern the way they each maintain their weapons. Both terrorist forces prolifically use Kalashnikov rifles, for instance, known as AK-47's. "The Kalash is the basic, daily weapon of Hamas," Lt.-Col. Kantar explains, "and the ones that we captured were in various stages of overuse. But in Hizbullah, they are well-kept, and we found them as new as if they had just come from the factory. Most of the Kalash's that we found were made in China, and looked brand new."

"But in Hamas, it's a different story," he said. "They don't have rifles that they're saving for war time; the guns are always in use. But with Hizbullah, some of them were still in their original packing. Most of them had the name of the user, and where he was serving, etc. – very organized."

"Another interesting thing we saw was the uniformity. In Hamas, you can see how every battalion has its own equipment – different than the other battalions. But in Hizbullah, there is a planning body that defines the same formats for all the forces. The same stickers were on all the rifles, no matter where we found them, and we also saw that there was a certain uniform ratio of weapons, cartridges and bullets to each terrorist. The level of planning in Hizbullah was much higher than with Hamas.

"Hizbullah was much more modern. Even if they manufactured their own explosives, they didn't do it in an underground lab, like in Gaza. They had organized laboratories, with bona-fide chemists and engineers working there. Hizbullah was a very organized army. Most of what we found there was not improvised, but rather originated in industrial plants, with clear instructions for use."

Lt.-Col. Kantar continued contrasting Hizbullah with Hamas: "Most of the RPG rockets of Hamas are made in Gaza, or put together in Gaza. Sometimes they take pieces from existing rockets to make or improve new ones; most of the rockets are not new. They have many that were dismantled and rebuilt by them themselves. Hizbullah, however, has money for whatever it needs; they buy new weapons, without having to put them together. In addition, there is a highway from Damascus to Tehran, and a seaport in Lebanon, and an airport of course. They were able to get whatever they needed."

OK, so now we have a much clearer picture – one that tells us how little we knew on that infamous Simchat Torah about what was actually going on beyond our northern border fence. What is now understood is that if Hizbullah had acted in tandem with Hamas that day, it's hard to even imagine the horrors we would have been tortured with.

The current inquiries are important, and help us draw the correct lessons, both operationally and intelligence-wise. But we must conduct in-depth investigations not only regarding the southern arena, but just as much – and perhaps more – concerning the north as well.

Brig.-Gen. (res.) Hezi Nehama: "Prepare for War. There Won't be a Stage II, for Three Reasons"

by Rivky Goldfinger, Besheva contributor, translated by Hillel Fendel.

Israel is at a crossroads: The ceasefire with Hamas is officially over, yet 21 live hostages (including two foreign workers) remain in Gaza, and talks are continuing. What will Israel's strategy be?

Hamas has refused Israel's offer to extend Stage I of the ceasefire-hostage-release deal. It also does not accept U.S. envoy Steve Witkoff's proposal for the release of additional hostages, in two groups, in exchange for seven weeks of ceasefire.

Israel has announced its consent to Witkoff's plan, but has made it clear that it has no plans at present to retreat from the Philadelphi route separating Egypt from Gaza. As part of its pressure on Hamas, Israel has stopped all humanitarian aid – of which several months' worth of supplies are still available in Gaza – and has also cut off electricity to Gaza. To be sure, Israel has not supplied much electricity to Gaza for nearly a year and a half, ever since the war started, but has now cut off the final supply, which powers desalination facilities there.

Israel has also made it very clear that it is preparing to resume its military campaign, and this time with the declared intention of conquering the entire Strip. Various officials have made statements to this effect, and military preparations are underway in full force, under the aggressive leadership of new IDF Chief of Staff Lt.-Gen. Eyal Zamir.

The coming days are critical to see which path Israel is to take: that of a temporary ceasefire, the freeing of some hostages, and the leaving behind of others – or war.

Brig.-Gen. (res.) Hezi Nehama, one of the leaders of the "Reserves Commanders and Fighters Forum," spoke with us just before Israel announced its absolute cut-off of electricity to Gaza. He said that what Israel is doing now is intended to exhaust the efforts to release as many hostages as possible for now, while keeping open the option of resumed warfare. "Israel is striving to achieve the two main goals of the war – both the defeat of Hamas and the completion of the return of the hostages."

Q. Even though these are basically contradictory goals?

A. "Practically speaking, the way in which Prime Minister Netanyahu has been operating over the past year and a half under all the tremendous pressures exerted upon him have led to a situation where he has both not stopped the war and also succeeded in returning most of the hostages... What is happening now is our trying to see if we can milk Stage I a little bit more, to achieve the release of as many hostages as possible."

Q. Stopping the humanitarian aid – did that even have any effect? After all, Hamas has stored up huge amounts of food, and other supplies.

A. "It's true that they have supplies for 4-5 months, at least. But when you stop the supplies for a large population, it first of all starts to cause unrest among the people and fears about what the future holds. The prices of food and goods of course will go up, and that itself creates panic among the Gazans.

"But at the same time, we certainly must stop, very soon, all water to places where we don't want Gazans to be. Water can't be stored up in Gaza. They have water in two ways: either via pipelines from Israel to Gaza, or by desalination facilities that require electricity. Israel's next move must therefore be to cut off electricity and water to Gaza."

Q. How should the next round of fighting look, from Israel's standpoint?

A. "It has to be done very differently. We will have to detach the general populace from the terrorists, and supply water only to places that Israel approves. Water must be supplied to the humanitarian camps, but not to any place where we don't want civilians. This will cause them to evacuate and enable us to fight the enemy, which will be weakened from lack of food and water.

Q. What about Israel's insistence on remaining in the Philadelphi Route?

A. We must not leave Philadelphi! If we do, Hamas will transfer hostages, live and dead, to Iran and elsewhere. Iran will put hostages at their nuclear facilities with warnings that if we attack their sites, the hostages will die. And then what – the public cries will resume that the hostages must be freed at any price and we can't bomb Iran? No, Philadelphi cannot be opened in any way whatsoever. Netanyahu insisted throughout the war on these two critical principles: the war cannot stop, and we cannot leave Philadelphi. These are of critical strategic importance, and his insistence is very correct."

Q. What do you think about the Witkoff proposal? Does it serve Israel's interests?

A. "Israel must adopt his plan and thus, first of all, to receive half of the remaining hostages. It's exactly like the question we faced regarding Stage I because of the great challenges we would face in Stage II; right now, we have to get what we can. After we do that, we can talk more about what's next. As long as we can get some hostages home, we must exhaust this option – on condition that we don't totally stop the war and don't leave Philadelphi."

Q. Is there a chance for Stage II?

A. "No, for three main reasons. One, Hamas does not have all the hostages –meaning that it literally does not know where some of the corpses are buried. Two, Hamas will never give up its insurance policy: the hostages. The terrorists will always make sure to keep some of them, dead and alive, so that it can continue playing its game and trying to remain alive. This will go on for as long as we have not totally defeated Hamas. And three, Hamas is currently not willing to cede its control in Gaza, while Israel, for its part, is not willing to allow it to have control in Gaza. This gap cannot be bridged in any form. It could be that Stage I will be extended in some way or another, but there will be no permanent agreement to end the fighting. I therefore believe that within a month, Israel will return to very strong warfare with the goal of destroying Hamas.

"We will see things in the coming battle that we should have seen before, but did not. We will see the activation of large numbers of forces at the same time – at least four divisions [each with several thousands of soldiers] – and a massive evacuation of the Gazan populace. We did see a large evacuation before, but it was not complete. There will then be a full siege on the areas in which Hamas remains, with no civilians there – and this will lead to its surrender."

The Sharp Strategic U-Turn in Our Consciousness

by Kobi Eliraz, former advisor on settlement affairs to four Defense Ministers, translated by Hillel Fendel.

Israel's current war, not only in Gaza, is not the result of a particular or individual failure. It was not just an isolated military mistake that brought about Oct. 7th, nor a temporary or even long-term intelligence failure.

It was rather brought upon us by a failed understanding – the notorious "misconception" that everyone talks about – that became entrenched in the popular thinking of many in power, and not in power, in the State of Israel. It was the dangerous illusion that concessions, appeasement, and restraint would bring about quiet and stability.

This terrible failure that brought us to where we are does not belong to just one particular government, or to one Chief of Staff or another. It is a very deeply ensconced misunderstanding of Middle East reality that developed over the course of decades of naively mistaken policy.

It was manifest in a long series of false slogans that were disseminated and became principles of our public policy. For instance:

·         "The new Middle East" popularized by Shimon Peres [and echoed, in the context of an anticipated peace deal with Saudi Arabia, by Prime Minister Netanyahu in the United Nations just two weeks (!) before Oct. 7^th]

·         "Peace is made with enemies" – forgetting that this does not include enemies who will use the "peace" to find new ways to destroy you; and

·         "There is no military solution" – leading to a situation in which the enemy continually fortifies himself, in the knowledge that our response will be limited.

Instead of reading the reality as it truly is, we became addicted to the illusion that concessions will lead to calm. At the same time, the enemy took advantage of our weakness to build himself up with a powerful military apparatus and prepare for his next offensive.

Between the Oslo Accords of 1993-95 and the Disengagement/expulsion of 2005, Israel repeatedly retreated, while the terrorists kept on growing stronger. The thought that our withdrawals would decrease Palestinian violence was proven to be downright wrong: Our departure from Gush Katif and Gaza did not turn it into the "Singapore of the Middle East," but rather into the capital of international terrorism.

Every round of fighting in Gaza over the past three decades ended with an "arrangement" – but not with a decisive defeat of Hamas. This in itself strengthened Hamas, giving it not only confidence, but also the ability to rearm, regroup, and rebuild. Our restraint in the face of Hamas rockets, tunnel-building, and terrorist attacks sent Hamas a clear message: "Israel will not fight you forcefully and you have little to lose by continuing to attack us."

This ongoing mistake of believing that we can simply "manage" the dispute instead of "winning" it has nothing to do with the lack of intelligence at any given time. It does, however, explain why whatever intelligence was received was woefully misinterpreted.

When commissions of inquiry are ultimately established to investigate what happened on and before Oct. 7^th, they must not be allowed to suffice with attempts to figure out who is most to blame for the military and intelligence blunders. The critical question that must be answered is rather: How did Israel allow this situation to develop in the first place?

The officers who went to sleep early Simchat Torah morning in the belief that the signs of an imminent attack were not substantial made a local mistake. Those who waved off the warnings of the female lookout soldiers made a worse mistake. They must all pay for them. But most culpable of all are those who led the State of Israel into deceptive "peace" agreements and who tried to sell the public false dreams of "peace for land" and insisted that there "is no military solution." These include many in academia, the media, the security establishment, and in the broad public. They helped form a reality in which Israel was perceived as weak – which invited our enemies to act against us in every way they could.

The current war must lead not only to a change in our military, but to a change in how we think. We can no longer strategize in terms of how to manage the conflict, but rather how to win and end it; no more ceasefire, but only total destruction of the enemy's military capabilities; no more unilateral concessions, but only steps that strengthen our grasp on the Land and our deterrence capabilities.

For Israel to return to strategic security, there must be a total change in our thinking, and on the ground. We must not return to the same cycle of weakness, false illusions, and baseless hopes. The time has come, once and for all, to stop hoping that everything will work out on its own – and to start shaping it the way we want with force, strength, and strategic clarity.