Thinking Big: Seven-Fold Growth in the Shomron by 2050

based on an article by Haggai Huberman, Israeli journalist and author (written for the religious zionist periodical - Matzav Haruach), translated by Hillel Fendel.

Generally we report here on the establishment - or the announcement of the establishment - of new communities, housing starts, neighborhoods, or outposts in the hills of Judea and Samaria. This time, however, given that such reports have happily become commonplace of late, the real news is this: The public response to the news of the 18 new communities about to be built in the northern Shomron has been of unprecedented proportions!

The Shomron Regional Council's campaign, together with the Amanah Settlement Movement, to recruit families to join in building these pioneer communities has seen more than 3,000 families request to join up!

The current program involves the reestablishment – which has already begun – of the four northern Shomron communities that were destroyed in the Disengagement of 2005: Ganim, Kadim, Sa-nur, and Chomesh. The other 14 will be built, beginning in the coming weeks and months, in strategic locations throughout the northern Shomron. For information's sake, current well-known communities in the northern Shomron include Elon Moreh, Shavei Shomron, Kedumim, Maskiyot, and more.

The released statistics show that nearly 30% of the interested parties consider themselves secular or traditional, while the rest self-define as national-religious. Half of them already live in Judea and Samaria, another 15-20% are from central Israel, and slightly less than that hail from Jerusalem. There have also been 12 requests from families currently living abroad, including from Miami and Cincinnati in the U.S., Cyprus, Great Britain, Canada, and Switzerland. New immigrants from France and Ukraine have also filed applications.

Half of the families who are considering taking part in the challenge of Making the Shomron Great Again are young couples in their 20's, and some 20% are over age 60. The applicants from a diverse range of occupations: About 40% of them work in education and therapy, 25% in engineering, high-tech, and liberal professions, and the rest in construction, agriculture, and manual labor.

The emerging picture shows that the nuclear pioneer groups for the "Big Four" - Kadim, Homesh, Sa-Nur, and Ganim – as well as for the new town of Noa are already full, with only a few spots remaining. The first pioneers of Har Eval moved to the new site just this very week, alongside a branch of the Elon Moreh Yeshiva that is already operating at the site.

The new-old community of Ganim will be initially established by families of graduates from the Eli Yeshiva, just north of Shilo; families of graduates from Tel Aviv's Yeshivat Maaleh Eliyahu are set to kick off Kadim; and in Emek Dotan, a branch of the Bruchin Yeshiva will be established with families from Tiberias, Lod, and Bruchin.

Other communities in the formation stages are Shalem (near Itamar), Maayanot, and Merom Gilboa, all expected to move with their already-full core groups right after the High Holidays.

The establishment of the 18 towns – a program that has been termed the Connection Plan, in contrast to the Disengagement that destroyed Gush Katif in Gaza and the above four Shomron towns 21 years ago – is a fulfillment of a Cabinet decision led by Finance Minister Betzalel Smotrich and Defense Minister Yisrael Katz.

It is also part of a broader plan to increase the Shomron's Jewish population to more than one million (!) by the year 2050. Though this population currently stands at approximately 150,000, this brainchild program of Shomron Council head Yossi Dagan has been developed based on natural growth, high-rise construction, and more. Geographic engineers and a broad team of professionals in various disciplines worked, and are working, together on the program.

The program, of course, does not even include the new community of Zibda that was announced just this week – because this will be established in the Yesha area south of Shomron, not far from Modiin. Its goal is to help strengthen the seam-line area of western Binyamin. The new families are in the process of preparing their ascent to the land.

Other plans for the Shomron include a new city, currently known as East Rosh HaAyin, designed to house over 130,000 residents on what is currently agricultural land in the western Samaria highlands. Rosh HaAyin itself has a population nearing 81,000. The new city is being promoted as a security belt and strategic buffer for central Israel. In addition, the western Shomron community of Karnei Shomron, with a population over 11,200, is slated to triple in size with the addition of 6,000 new homes.

At the same time, a community "envelope" is being planned, including a branch of the Bnei David pre-military Yeshiva academy (main branch in Eli), and other and yeshiva and pre-military institutions as well.

Shomron Council head Dagan – who himself, with his family, was expelled from Sa-nur during the Disengagement, moved to Shavei Shomron, and now lives once again in the "new" Sa-nur – says: "The numbers warm our hearts and speak for themselves. They prove that the People of Israel has not forgotten its roots. The Connection Plan aims to reconnect our People with itself, its values, its roots – and with the fundamental values of the State of Israel."

The Massive Egyptian Threat in Sinai: A Scary Reminder of the Six Day War Exactly 59 Years Ago

by Haggai Huberman, Israeli journalist and author, translated by Hillel Fendel.

We are commemorating this very week 59 years since the Six Day War of 1967 – a miraculous and decisive victory in which we thankfully liberated the areas of Judea, Samaria and Binyamin; the Jordan Valley; the Golan Heights; the Sinai and Gaza Strip – and of course, most historically, the Old City of Jerusalem and the site of the two Holy Temples, the Temple Mount (Har HaBayit).

Six decades is a long time, and we might have forgotten how it all started. It began when Egypt violated the terms of the agreements reached with Israel and the United Nations following the Sinai Campaign of 1956. The Sinai, a part of Egypt, became largely demilitarized, with the UN's Emergency Force (UNEF) stationed there to keep the peace. However, after just ten years, on Israel Independence Day in 1967 (the 5th of Iyar, May 15), Egypt's President Gamal Abdul Nasser streamed his country's army into the Sinai Peninsula. 

The front page of Israel's daily Maariv newspaper blared the alarming development the next day, but added this sub-headline: "Washington is advising Israel not to take the Egyptian show of force seriously.” Three weeks later, it became quite clear how strongly advisable it would have been to take that show of force quite seriously.

Our sweeping victory in the Six Day War obscured the fact that there had actually been an intelligence failure here no less significant than that of the Yom Kippur War. That is, our intelligence leaders evaluated in the months preceding the war that, in the words of one of them, "1967 will not be a year of war." The difference is that then, Egypt's activities were so above-board, and the calls across the entire Arab world for Israel's destruction were so loud, that Israel had no choice but to launch a preemptive counterattack to save the state – but on Yom Kippur we all but ignored the abundance of evidence showing that Egypt and Syria were planning a surprise attack against us, and we did nothing. 

I recall this in light of the reports of the very significant Egyptian violations of our agreements with them going on right now. As reported on Channel 14 a few days ago, the Egyptians have no fewer than 60,000 troops (possibly now up to 70,000), as well as nearly 1,000 tanks and hundreds of artillery units in the Sinai. Very close to our border in the Negev, just 100 meters from Israel, the Egyptians are carrying out training exercises, and have also deployed air defenses.

Not much is left of the Begin-Sadat (Camp David) peace agreement of 1979, but it did have one clear advantage: the demilitarizing of the Sinai Peninsula of all Egyptian forces, except for small forces enumerated in the agreement. Even this advantage, however, has been nearly totally erased in recent years.

The "Netziv" internet site, based on open-source intelligence, reports that elite Egyptian units, advanced weapon stores, infantry and tanks have been detected between El-Arish and the Israeli border 45 kilometers (28 miles) away. Only light-weapons are allowed there, according to the agreements. Underground bunkers have been built in mountain sides, for control and missile storage, Netziv reports, and even the Sinai's airport runways in Rafid and Um-Hashiba have been widened, enabling combat aircraft activity.

The Biggest Threat: Apathy 

Israel appears to be relating to these threatening violations with apathy. The main lesson of the Six Day War, and even more so, of the Yom Kippur War and the Simchat Torah massacre (Oct. 7th), is that the enemy must be evaluated not according to his intentions, but according to his capacities and abilities. And the Egyptian abilities are quite worrisome.

Even assuming that Israel does not wish to enter into war with Egypt at present, Israel must deal with these threats and violations publicly, noisily, and internationally.

First of all, Israel must advance its own armored forces very openly to its border with Egypt. It must also insist publicly that the United States, which is a guarantor to the Camp David Agreements, demand that Egypt remove the forces that violate the accords. Israel must even threaten, in a headlines-grabbing manner, a military response to the violations. 

At present, even more worrisome than the strong Egyptian military presence in the Sinai is Israel's current passive approach.

Northern Shomron – Finally, After 60 Years!

by Haggai Huberman, Israeli journalist and author, translated by Hillel Fendel.

There has been much excitement around the rebuilding and resettling of the communities Sa-Nur and Homesh in recent weeks – two of the four Shomron sites that were evacuated and destroyed during the Disengagement withdrawal/expulsion from Gush Katif in 1995. But in truth, the governmental decision to renew the other two communities as well – Ganim and Kadim – is actually even more meaningful in many ways.

This is because their rebuilding is not only an erasure of the disgrace of the expulsion and destruction, but also marks a genuine and unprecedented revolution in the Yesha settlement enterprise.

The reason is that over Ganim and Kadim always hovered a large question mark regarding their viability as full-fledged communities. This was mainly because of the relative isolation from other Jewish areas. This is in stark contrast to Homesh and Sa-Nur, which were located on a route connecting Shavei Shomron and Kedumim to Mevo Dotan and other Jewish towns. The nearest city to Ganim and Kadim was Afula - not a quality municipality on which to base peripheral settlement. Compare this to the settlements in Binyamin and Gush Etzion, whose base city is Jerusalem, and those in western Shomron, which relied on cities such as Petah Tikva and Kfar Saba.

Overall, the assumption even before the Disengagement, given the above as well as their weak social fabric, was that there was little or no chance that Ganim and Kadim could survive.

Lost History?
In general, until just recently, the relatively sparse Jewish presence in northern Shomron belied its glorious history as the launching point for significant Jewish settlement in modern-day Yesha. For instance, the entire liberation of Judea and Samaria in the Six Day War began precisely in the Jenin area, near the Dotan Valley battle, and then moved southward. In addition, the historic agreement between the Israeli government and the Gush Emunim movement for the establishment of Elon Moreh took place in Sebastia, near today's Shavei Shomron.

Yet, throughout recent decades, the Shomron has proven to be a particularly “hard nut to crack” in terms of Jewish presence and control. Barely ten settlements were established there, and they were widely spaced from one another, and struggled to establish themselves.

In 1979, when Ariel Sharon, serving as chairman of the Ministerial Committee for Settlement Affairs, prepared his “Annual Plan for Settlement in Yesha and the Golan Heights” (the first, and last, time a government body prepared a comprehensive settlement plan for the liberated areas), he planned two small settlement blocs in northern Samaria: the Shavei Shomron bloc, which ended up with three communities, and the Shaked bloc, including some six settlements, as well as the city of Harish in recent years.

Ganim and Kadim were planned much later, in the framework of another Sharon plan, this time when he was Defense Minister. (This was all before he instigated the Disengagement, of course.) Still, while the Menachem Begin governments did good work in building massively in Binyamin, southern and central Shomron, and the Har Hevron area, the northern Shomron still waited in the shadows.

Prime Minister Yitzchak Shamir, even more unabashedly nationalistic in the top job than his former mentor and predecessor Begin, committed to establish more Yesha settlements and expand the existing ones. However, he did only the latter, because of American intervention and other political pressures following the Madrid Conference in late 1991 – and the northern Shomron once again remained desolate of major Jewish presence.

The Prophetic Warning of Avraham Shvut

Years before the Disengagement, in October 1991, Mr. Avraham Shvut, serving as head of the Planning and Construction Department in the Shomron Regional Council, prepared a comprehensive settlement plan for the northern Shomron. In his accompanying letter to the plan, Shvut wrote words that were truly prophetic:

"Northern Shomron takes up approximately a quarter of all of Judea and Samaria. Its topography is very advantageous, and it is a connecting link both between the Galilee and southern Israel and between the Coastal Plane and the Jordan Valley. Yet, despite its great settlement potential, its Jewish presence, especially in north-eastern Shomron, is most sparse. If there is any place left where an Arab political entity could possibly arise without Jewish presence, it is the northern Shomron, centered around Sh'chem [Nablus]."

"It is clear," concluded Shvut, "that this situation cannot be allowed to continue, and we must rectify it immediately."

This warning was ultimately very much realized, in that the Oslo Agreements of the early 1990's placed most of northern Shomron - the triangle between the cities of Tulkarm, Nablus, and Jenin - under Palestinian Authority control, except for thin transportation corridors between the isolated settlements.

Over a decade later, when Sharon decided to include four Jewish communities from the Shomron in his Disengagement/destruction plan, he chose the most isolated settlements he could find, in order to enable exactly the PA continuity that Shvut had warned about.

In fact, Shvut’s warning about enabling the formation of the “core of a Palestinian state” in northern Shomron was fulfilled almost entirely.

Better Late Than Never

Now, however, the government of Israel is working to rectify this critical mistake. This month, a day after the official ceremony marking the rebuilding of Sa-Nur, a high-level meeting took place not far from there, in the Shavei Shomron home of Shomron head Yossi Dagan.

In attendance were Defense Minister Yisrael Katz, Minister Betzalel Smotrich, Housing Minister Chaim Katz, and Amanah Settlement Organization head Ze'ev Hever. We can sum up the meeting by saying that if everything they discussed comes to fruition, much of the northern Shomron will come to life, with new communities, infrastructures, roads and more.

The historic northern Shomron news we heard this week - that 21 years after they were uprooted in the Disengagement, Ganim and Kadim are expected to be rebuilt this coming summer - is an important stage in the overall plan. When it happens, it will thwart the danger of the establishment of a Palestinian state in its largest potential area: northern Samaria. This will happen because of the creation, for the first time in history, a substantial Jewish presence there – beginning in and around the nearly-forsaken communities of Kadim and Ganim.

The Miracle of Olmert's Convergence Plan

by Haggai Huberman, Israeli journalist and author (written for the religious zionist periodical - Matzav Haruach), translated by Hillel Fendel.

It has not received much press, but the government made history this month when it made a series of decisions with historic significance for Judea and Samaria. Leading the way was Minister of Finance Betzalel Smotrich (Religious Zionism party), who also serves as Minster in the Ministry of Defense. Israel's mini-security Cabinet voted to fundamentally change how lands in Yesha are bought and administered, greatly fortifying the settlement enterprise.

The new changes include:

·         The removal of confidentiality requirements regarding land registry records in Yesha, thus increasing transparency and facilitating Jewish redemption of land

·         The repeal of the Jordanian law prohibiting the sale of real estate to Jews. [Nearly six decades after liberating Yesha, Israel has still never annexed the area, thus leaving some Jordanian laws in effect by default.] This allows Jews to purchase land in Judea and Samaria just as they do in Tel Aviv or Jerusalem.

·         An upgrade to the holy Tomb of Rachel site in a Bethlehem enclave, which will now have its own municipal administration, providing basic services.

·         Hebron: Building permits in the Jewish community and the Cave of the Patriarchs are now under the auspices of Israel's Civil Administration, instead of the Arab Hebron Municipality. Full municipal powers have now been granted to the Jewish Hebron Administration, which is now able to address residents' needs without having to depend on not-necessarily cooperative PA mechanisms.

At the same time, Israel has up-shifted gears in its war for the overall preservation of the Land of Israel throughout Judea and Samaria. Supervisory and enforcement activity will be applied in Areas A and B (under full and partial PA control, respectively) regarding pollution, water, and archaeological-sites infractions. 

The reason these decisions are so dramatic is because they erase, once and for all, the "vision" that reigned here precisely 20 years ago, when it appeared that the Jewish presence in Yesha was to be curtailed, condensed, and cut down to unsustainable proportions.  

Gloom in 2006

What happened 20 years ago was that Ehud Olmert was elected Prime Minister, shortly after – and on the coattails of – Ariel Sharon's ill-fated Disengagement plan. Just as Sharon withdrew unilaterally from all of Gaza, ultimately leading to several short wars and the Oct. 7^th massacre, Olmert was ready to do nearly the same in Judea and Samaria.

He called his plan the "Convergence," according to which Israel was to dismantle and withdraw from at least 60 Jewish communities, and retain no more than some 7% of Yesha. Like the Disengagement, this plan was also to be implemented unilaterally if agreement with the PA was not reached.

Following the elections of March 2006, the left-wing camp became (seemingly) firmly ensconced in power. The government was led by Olmert's Kadima party (originally founded by Sharon after the Likud largely withdrew its support for the Disengagement), and included Labor, Shas, and the seven seats - a fluke achievement - of the Pensioners' party Gil. The Gaza border was quiet, and the Disengagement was perceived at the time as a wise and safe move.

On May 4^th of that year, Olmert presented to the Knesset his new government, with guidelines stating clearly that "the area of Israel with new borders to be determined by the government, will require the reduction of Israeli settlement areas in Judea and Samaria." That is, the democratically elected prime minister of Israel promised to destroy dozens of Jewish communities, with or without an Arab partner for the move.

On June 14^th, Olmert – a former and long-time Likudnik – announced in Paris after meeting with President Chirac: "The Convergence plan is inevitable. I am determined to continue my path of separating permanently from the Palestinians, to attain safe borders that will be recognized by the international community."

The atmosphere in Yesha at the time was dismal, and many residents feared the worst. Some even began making secret inquiries and preparations regarding the compensation that they assumed would soon be offered them in exchange for their homes.

This was indeed Olmert's plan – but apparently, the Creator of the world had other idea. Just 11 days after his Paris declaration, events took their first sharp turn in a very different direction: Gilad Shalit was abducted from his tank on the Gaza border – and all of a sudden, the Disengagement didn't look like such a bright idea anymore.

Still, Olmert didn't back down, and vowed yet again to continue along his Convergence path. However, just two days later, on July 12, two reserves soldiers – Ehud Goldwasser and Eldad Regev – were kidnapped and ultimately found to have been murdered by Hizbullah terrorists while patrolling Israel's border with Lebanon. At least five other soldiers were killed in that operation. With this, the logic of the unilateral withdrawal from Lebanon of six years earlier – the brainchild of then-PM Ehud Barak – was also called into question.

Quite abruptly, Israel now found itself fighting two wars: the Second Lebanon War, and Operation Summer Rains following the kidnapping of Shalit. Withdrawals from Israeli-held territory, especially without an agreement with the enemy, no longer appeared very wise. On September 4, Olmert was forced to concede, telling the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee:

"Convergence No Longer on the Table"

"What I thought a few months ago regarding the Palestinians, is not correct at present. Our order of priorities, including what to do about the Palestinian problem, is different than it was in the past. At this point, the Convergence is not one of our priorities, as it was two months ago."

A year later, Olmert and the PA's Mahmoud Abbas, hosted by then-President George W. Bush, began trying to negotiate some kind of withdrawal from Yesha in Annapolis, Maryland. Olmert actually offered the PA some 94% of Judea and Samaria – but thankfully, Abbas rejected even this, and the conference ended with no agreement. The diplomats and negotiators packed up and went home, the plans for the abandonment of the Jewish homeland became a form of science fiction, and the Jews of Yesha – and many other Israelis whose lives would have been endangered had the PA been handed control – breathed a loud sigh of relief.

Back in Time

I ask the reader to go back in time to the month of Adar 5766/February 2006, when families in Yesha were quietly consulting with lawyers about receiving compensation. Now, imagine that someone told you then that 20 years hence, the government would not only obviate the need for compensation for the demolition of communities and homes, but would also enable the private purchase of land for the purpose of building communities. How would we have regarded such a “prophet”?

Thankfully, in this month of Adar, once again, things have happily turned upside down. Happy Purim!

The Same Headlines, 47 Years Later

by Haggai Huberman, Israeli journalist and author (written for the religious zionist periodical - Matzav Haruach), translated by Hillel Fendel.

The headlines of the past few days about Iran reminded me that we read the same ones exactly 47 years ago, in Tevet 5739, January 1979. The newspapers then blared repeatedly "Riots Throughout Iran Threaten the Regime." At the end of December 1978, the front page of Maariv blared out, "Total Paralysis in Iran's Economy, Observers: 'Regime Change is Just a Matter of Days.'" Ten days later, Davar announced, "Chaos in Teheran, Violent Protests in Tabriz, Shortages of Gas and Oil Paralyze the Country."

It's as if the headline writers took a page from the future headlines from 2026 – with one small difference: In 1979, the riots toppled the Shah of Iran, and brought to power Ayatollah Khomeini. This time, it could very well be the exact opposite, albeit with a change of names.

It was reported a few days ago that the current leader, dictator Ali Khamenei, had prepared an escape plan to Moscow in the event that his regime falls. The plan reportedly includes a quick exit for him and his family in case the riots continue and the army withdraws its support for him. With thousands of protestors dead so far at the hands of the government, according to various sources, the situation in Iran is clearly very explosive – with positive ramifications for the Middle East and the entire world. 

U.S. President Donald Trump, fresh off his (so far) successful game-changing coup in Venezuela, now has the chance to influence, yet again, the entire balance of power in the Middle East. This will be an opportunity to rectify the blunder made, for "politically correct" reasons, by Jimmy Carter. 

Nuclear Iran, Hizbullah, Hamas, the Houthis, the Shiites in Iraq – all of these plagues are the result of Carter's total lack of understanding that led him not to intervene in Iran in late 1978. By so doing, he enabled the ascent of Khomeini and all the evil he brought with him. 

What happened, simply, was that this Democratic, near-sighted, liberal president felt that "human rights" in Iran were more important than his own country's strength. Carter could have prevented the Shah's fall and exile, if he would have given him full backing when the anti-government riots started. But he refused to do this because he suspected the Shah of being soft on "civil rights." He explained that he had no intention of intervening in "Iran's internal political affairs," but rather that he was primarily interested in stability and preventing violence. He added for the record that the U.S. would prefer that the Shah continue to "play a central role in the government," but that that was for the Iranian nation to decide… 

In short, the President of the United States abandoned his long-time ally, the Shah of Iran, and tacitly allowed the rise of Khomeinism. 

Allow me to quote from "Debacle: The American Failure in Iran" (New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1981), in which authors William Lewis and Michael Ledeen write [translated from the Hebrew translation]: "The fundamental problem throughout the crisis was the absence of the President. Carter never took an active role in the discussions, never gave any clue as to what solution he preferred, and never placed the Iran question in its overall context..." 

They also wrote: "The lack of American support for [the Shah's] regime caused trembling among the pro-West rulers in the Middle East." The U.S. even refused to offer its long-time ally safe refuge if and when he would need it. "The abandonment of the Shah after he left Iran proved to the world that no friend of the U.S. could rely on American help if his situation would be shaken." [Upon fleeing Iran in January 1979, the Shah traveled to Egypt, Morocco, The Bahamas, and Mexico before entering the U.S. in October for medical treatment of lymphatic cancer. He was later granted asylum in Egypt, where he died in 1980.]

Back to January 2026: Pres. Trump has issued all the right warnings, showing support for the protestors and providing a backwind for their efforts to topple the Ayatollahs' regime. It remains for us just to wait and see if the blustery announcements will be followed by actions.  

Revolution Against Hamas?

Hope for change might not depend entirely on the U.S., however. MEMRI reports that Egyptian journalist Ahmad Abd Al-Wahhab - deputy editor of the Egyptian government daily Akhbar Al-Yawm and columnist for a Saudi news site - has written that Hamas has brought devastation upon Gaza and caused a deep crisis of trust between Hamas and the local population. He argues that the Gazans now realize that Hamas is responsible for their disaster, and therefore no longer believe its “resistance” slogans that blame Israel for their misery. He warns, according to MEMRI's summation, that a deepening of the humanitarian crisis in Gaza could lead to a public explosion against Hamas.

If so, we may assume that given the downfall of the Assad regime in Syria a year ago, which came about in the wake of Hizbullah's collapse in Lebanon and the blows delivered to Iran, it is not unlikely that a collapse of the current Iranian regime – a very long-time prime supporter of Hamas – will encourage the Gazan public to rise up and topple Hamas. Perhaps this is not very realistic at present, but history is replete with surprises, as we all know. The most illogical things are often those that most influenced world history. 

[Translator's note: However, Ynet reported this week, in more than one article, that Israel (!) is continuing to provide economic support to Hamas. No explanation was provided.]

40 Years Since the Jibril Exchange

by Haggai Huberman, Israeli journalist and author, translated by Hillel Fendel.

The return of the corpse of Tzvi Feldman, of the 1982 Battle of Sultan Yaaqub, reminds us of the 1982 Peace for Galilee War – and the fateful decisions that followed it (1150 Freed Terrorists Led Directly to the First Intifada, the Founding of Hamas, and Untold Numbers of Deaths), and the critical importance of Jewish settlement.

The happy news of the return of the remains of IDF soldier Tzvi Feldman, captured alive during a horrific 1982 battle with Syria that felled 33 soldiers, occurs very close to two important and historic anniversaries: Israel's withdrawal from Lebanon in May 2000, and the Jibril Deal in May 1985, in which 1,150 terrorists were released in exchange for three captured Israeli soldiers.

Feldman was killed, apparently, shortly after his capture during the First Lebanon War, also known as the Peace for Galilee War. This was a war that began with fairly broad national consensus, in response to ongoing Lebanon-based PLO attacks against Israel, including rocket fire, bombings, and infiltrations. However, as the war dragged on and its strategic goals became vaguer, Israel's government and military began to lose public confidence – and in fact, within a year-plus, both then-Prime Minister Menachem Begin and then-Defense Minister Ariel Sharon were out of their jobs.

This war was the first face-to-face clash between Israel and the PLO. One of the indirect objectives of Operation Peace for Galilee was to mortally strike the PLO, headed by Yasser Arafat, so as to strengthen Israel's hold in Judea and Samaria, where the PLO sought Arab Palestinian sovereignty.

According to one school of thought, Sharon believed in an even more far-reaching scenario: After a friendly Christian Maronite government would be formed in Lebanon, headed by Bashir Jumayel, the Maronites would get the Arab Palestinians in southern Lebanon to leave for Jordan – and this would hopefully lead to a Palestinian state in Jordan. This would neutralize the primary objection to Israel's presence in Judea and Samaria, which was that the Palestinians had become a "people without a state."

In the early stages of the war, this plan seemed to be on the way to working out. The PLO was expelled to far-off Tunisia, and Israel's friend Jumayel was elected President of Lebanon. But then two things happened that changed the course of history.

In September 1982, before Jumayel could even take office, he was murdered by Syrian elements, thus throwing the entire plan off-course. Ten days earlier, something even more significant happened, the grave consequences of which no one could foresee: Eight Nachal Brigade soldiers were captured in southern Lebanon. Six of them were released in November, in a relatively minor exchange (mostly for prisoners held in a Lebanese jail).

But then came one of the State of Israel's worst decisions ever: the agreement to release 1,150 terrorists in exchange for the two remaining captive soldiers and one other, who were all being held by Ahmed Jibril's PFLP terrorist organization. The third captive soldier was Chezi Shai, who had been captured during the Sultan Yaaqub battle; three soldiers were declared missing from that battle, including Zechariah Baumel, whose corpse was brought to Israel for burial in 2019, Tzvi Feldman, mentioned above, and Yehuda Katz, not yet located and still awaiting burial in Israel. May G-d avenge their blood.

I still remember the festivities in Gaza when the terrorists were freed. I lived then in Netzarim – which was evacuated in the 2005 Disengagement Plan – and the celebrations could be heard in our home. They certainly had what to celebrate about, not only in terms of the quantity of terrorists, but also their "quality." The freed murderers included such names as Kozo Okamoto (a Japanese Red Army member involved in the 1972 Lod Airport Massacre in which 26 people were murdered); Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, released after two years of a 13-year sentence, who later founded and became the spiritual leader of Hamas; Jibril Rajoub (not to be confused with Ahmed Jibril), sentenced to life imprisonment; and numerous others, including many of those who later instigated and led the First Intifada beginning in December 1987.

The front page of the next day's edition of Yediot Acharonot featured a large photo of the ultimate Palestinian terrorist victory scene: released murderers Suleiman al-Zaki and Ziyad abu-Ayn holding up their hands showing V-for-victory. It is another such photo like this, giving great motivation to the PA in its bid to destroy Israel, that we seek to avoid today.

Let us note another sad anniversary: This week marks 45 years since the grave Palestinian terrorist murder of six young Jewish men near Beit Hadassah in Hevron, on the first Sabbath night of May 1980. One of the murderers is now serving as the mayor of Hebron, having been released in the notorious Jibril Deal.

An internal Shabak investigation found that close to two-thirds of the Jibril Deal-released terrorists (as well as the 435 who were freed in the 2004 Tenenbaum deal) returned to active terrorism. The release of three Israeli soldiers thus ultimately led to the loss of hundreds of Israeli lives.

The Compounded Mistake

At the time of the Jibril Deal, it was proposed to then-Defense Minister Yitzchak Rabin to at least expel the released terrorists. But Rabin felt that keeping them in Yesha (Judea and Samaria, as well as Gaza in those days) would enable Israel to keep a tighter watch over them. However, within 27 months, he was proven deathly wrong, when many of these very terrorists helped instigate the Intifada. And it was that which led to the ill-fated Oslo accords, the establishment of the Palestinian Authority, the withdrawal from most of Hebron, and hundreds of Israeli deaths.

In the words of Zev Shiff and Ehud Yaari, in their book "Intifada:"

"There is no longer any doubt that the freed terrorists of the Jibril Deal played a central role in the intifada. According to authoritative estimates, within just a year of their release, more than a third of them had renewed their subversive activity in one way or another. Most of the rest [then] went into activity almost immediately, with the outbreak of the first wave of rioting… Jibril would later take pride, justifiably [from his standpoint - HF], that this operation planted the seeds of the uprising." That is, within just over two years, the Jibril Deal was the gasoline that fueled the engine of the intifada.

The first intifada was that which created a nearly irreversible situation in Yesha: The People of Israel, in large numbers, stayed away from parts of the Land of Israel. Those who didn’t live there, just didn’t come. They became too afraid, and distanced themselves from their Biblical homeland of Judea and Samaria: the golden wheat fields of the Dotan Valley, the ruins of the biblical city of Samaria (Sebastia), the beautiful Umm Tzafa Forest in the Binyamin region, the majestic Herodion archaeological site, and the Tomb of the Patriarchs (Machpelah Cave) in Hevron.

Judea and Samaria became the "Land of the Setters," and hardly anyone other than them (certainly not delivery drivers!) came to see it.

This then led to a sense of estrangement from these areas, which paved the way for a willingness to give them away in some kind of political agreement. The result: the calamitous Oslo Accords of the 1990's, which removed large areas of Yesha from Israeli control – precisely the opposite of the original goals of the 1982 Lebanon War, as explained above.

If at least the freed terrorists of 1985 had been expelled, it is likely that the tragic consequences of these events could have been avoided.

Only one thing stopped the stains of retreat and withdrawal that spread out over the map of Yesha: the Jewish settlement enterprise.

How Far Back Must the War Investigation Go?

by Haggai Huberman, journalist and author, translated by Hillel Fendel.

Ariel Sharon announced his intention to "disengage" from Gush Katif and all of Gaza 20 years before the Simchat Torah massacre. The commission of inquiry must investigate how this led to the current war.

Most of the citizenry of Israel, it appears from a cursory glance at the daily headlines, favor a public commission of inquiry to determine what led up to the horrific massacre of Simchat Torah `23. The Israeli public does not like the clumsy attempts of the government and the Prime Minister, via various tricks and excuses, to avoid having to answer to such a commission.

However, it is not clear from what date this commission should start its research.

I would recommend that the government agree to a public commission of inquiry. After all, the government will be the body that sets the subjects of inquiry and their limits. Netanyahu's government therefore has the opportunity and the right to tell the commission to focus on government policy not only of the few years, but of the last two decades. Why that long?

It will be recalled that almost exactly 20 years before the massacre, in Dec. 2023, then-Prime Minister Ariel Sharon announced his intention – contrary to everything he had promised in the election campaign less than a year earlier – to withdraw unilaterally from Gaza. That is, all of our armed forces, and the 22 Jewish communities in Gaza (mostly in Gush Katif, were to be physically removed. This was known as the Disengagement Plan.

What is the connection between this Disengagement and the horrors of Oct. 7^th? Finding the answer to that question is exactly what I am proposing as a central topic for the inquiry. To pinpoint the connection, the following questions may not be avoided, and they must be directly answered:

·        To what extent did Israel's withdrawal from the Gaza Strip enable Hamas to build up its humongous military force, in terms of both personnel (the Nukhba units) and its rocket arsenals?

·        How is that Hamas succeeded [in 2007] in defeating Fatah and taking over Gaza militarily from the PA, but did not succeed in doing so in Judea and Samaria?

·        How is it that the Arabs of Judea and Samaria did not perpetrate an invasion and massacre similar to the what the Arabs of Gaza executed?

·        To what extent did the withdrawal detract from the intelligence capabilities of the IDF and the Shabak? No one disputes that critical information regarding Hamas intentions that morning of Oct. 7^th did not reach Israeli intelligence bodies in time.

Regarding that last point, we know that the Shabak conducted an internal inquiry, of which only small portions have been publicized. The report states that "there was relatively little intelligence, as a result (inter alia) of restrictions on our freedom of action [in Gaza] and increasing difficulties in the Shabak's independent ability to complete intelligence/operational processes there."

These words are precisely what the commission must investigate: Why were there such "restrictions" that led to "relatively little intelligence" specifically in Gaza, and not in Judea and Samaria? [It is axiomatic that intelligence is very hard to obtain without physical presence in the area being scouted. - HF]

Without detracting from the responsibility of the current political and military leaderships for the events of Oct. 7^th, the very demand to investigate also the government of 20 years ago can serve as a litmus test for the commission of inquiry that is to arise:

If it is willing to begin its investigation 20 years back, regarding events that (many feel) marked the beginning of the process that ended with the Hamas invasion/slaughter of nearly 18 months ago, then it can be said to be objective and public-minded. But if it seeks all sorts of tricks to avoid having to investigate the Sharon era and place some of the responsibility on him, this automatically places a large question mark on the reliability and trustworthiness of the commission and its conclusions.

In addition, if a measure of blame is accorded to Sharon and the Disengagement, it will have ramifications for any future consideration of similar unilateral or other withdrawals.

Netanyahu's Share of Responsibility

A public commission of inquiry must also investigate the failure of the Netanyahu governments' policies over the years that led to this war. However, while the left-wing seeks to indicate that Netanyahu's failure lies in his "managing the conflict" instead of trying to reach a diplomatic solution, I believe the opposite: "Managing the conflict" was a correct approach, but it was applied only in Judea and Samaria – from where no Oct. 7^th emanated!

Let's assume for a moment that there had been a "diplomatic process" with the PA which had actually led to some sort of a peace agreement; highly improbable, I know. The only result would have been terrorists roaring through Jewish towns along the Green Line such as Modiin, Kfar Saba and Raanana on motorcycles and Toyotas, as happened in Jewish towns near Gaza on Oct. 7^th.

Other say that we shouldn't have separated between Yesha and Gaza. But again, I believe that that actually worked in our favor, serving as an additional factor why the Arabs in Judea and Samaria did not follow their cousins in Gaza and attempt their own slaughter of Israelis.

For example, consider that in 1987, when Yesha and Gaza were not officially separate, the first intifada broke out in northern Gaza and then quickly spread to Judea and Samaria. The second intifada started simultaneously in Gaza and Yesha (and even among Arab-Israelis), in September 2000. But in clear contrast, the Simchat Torah war never expanded to Yesha, despite the hopes of then-Hamas leader Yihye Sinwar for a "joining of the fronts."

Where, then, is the real failure of Netanyahu? It lies in his formulation and implementation of the motto, "Quiet will be met with quiet." That is, if Hamas remains quiet, Israel will view this as if Hamas is "deterred" – even if, as it turned out, it was simply biding its time while preparing for war – and we won't initiate an offensive.

How could the Likud have forgotten the famous line of its ideological founder, Zev Jabotinsky, who wrote in one of his poems, "Quiet is filth." He meant of course that to remain passive in the face of major challenges can lead to tragedy. The suitcases of dollars that our government transferred to Hamas was not meant to strengthen Hamas at the expense of the Palestinian Authority, as opponents of the government claim. It rather stemmed from a fear of war, and from the foolish belief that an improvement in Gaza's economic situation will weaken Sinwar's passion to murder Jews.

It wasn't only Netanyahu, of course, who believed this. This belief started back in the days of Shimon Peres, and encompassed also Galant, Gantz, outgoing Shabak head Ronen Bar, former IDF Chief of Staff Hertzy HaLevy, Yair Lapid, Naftali Bennett, and others whom I have forgotten; my apologies to them and to the readers. Each of them is equally responsible, but the Prime Minister – who has been in office for many years – has a bit more responsibility than all the rest. The sad result was that Hamas was permitted to build its monstrous strength over the course of years.

Our conclusions concern not only whom to blame in the past, but mainly how we are to act in the future. The State of Israel must achieve the release of all the living hostages (yes, living; contrary to popular opinion, it's OK if we wait until the next war to receive the corpses), and this is possible only if we negotiate and pay heavy prices. After they have all been released, then we can go on to implement another line in Jabotinsky's poem: "Carry the fire to ignite."

Note: This was written just before the IDF resumed the war in Gaza this week.

Post-War Inquiries: Where's the Inquiry into the War With Hizbullah?

by Haggai Huberman, journalist and author, translated by Hillel Fendel.

In one of the parking lots in the IDF's Tzrifin compound in Rishon LeTzion is parked a line of light trucks and full-size trucks. They are painted in a variety of colors, including some in colors of camouflage. A cursory glance reveals that some of the vehicles are damaged and in bad shape. A deeper look shows their contents: missile launchers, anti-aircraft guns, and more – last used in Lebanon to fire mostly at Israeli civilian targets.

These are most of the vehicles of the Radwan special operation forces unit of Hizbullah, whose principle mission is to infiltrate Israel's Galilee. They were captured in southern Lebanon during the short time (most of Oct.-Nov. 2024) that the IDF was present there, before retreating under the France/U.S.-brokered ceasefire.

Over the past two weeks, the Israeli press has been focusing on the commissions of inquiry into the events of Simchat Torah 5754 (Oct. 7, 2023) along Israel's border with Gaza and points further east. But we have not heard of any similar inquiries into what happened on the northern front, in the battles that took place, or that didn't take place, with Hizbullah.

The reason for this, apparently, is that the ruthless Nukhba forces of Hamas struck us a very painful blow, inconceivable even now, while the Radwan units sufficed with firing rockets from a distance. This caused damage to thousands of homes, to be sure, but they did not invade Israel in their thousands, did not murder over 1,000 Israelis, and did not kidnap hundreds of Jews.

If Hizbullah had dispatched their forces to do so simultaneously with the Hamas attack, precisely according to the original Iranian plan and as Sinwar hoped, how successful would they have been? We can only imagine it with dread. Would we have known about it in advance? Probably not – but we cannot be sure, because as far as is known, no analysis or inquiry into the northern arena is being carried out.  

Let us also recall that tens of Jewish communities and towns on Israel's northern border were evacuated for their own safety, just as on our border with Gaza. The difference is that in the south, most of the residents have returned home, while in the north, most have not.

I visited last week the exhibit of the weapons we captured from Hizbullah. We saw the Toyotas and Hyundais - the notorious pickup-trucks of the type used in the Hamas attack - equipped with 80mm and 107mm rocket launchers, the very ones that Hizbillah fired massively at Galilee communities over the past year. They were captured not far from northern Israel, in the narrow strip that the IDF occupied for eight weeks. Most of the vehicles that were confiscated were brought to Israel, and the rest were apparently destroyed.

Looking at the Hizbullah weapons and stocks in Tzrifin, and knowing that much more are stored elsewhere in Israel, one is shocked by the thought of what could have happened if Radwan had infiltrated as and when Hizbullah did.

The explanations regarding what I was seeing were given by Lt.-Col. Idan Sharon Kantar, the deputy commander of the Loot Clearance Unit. This is a General Staff unit that travels around the area and collects the equipment and other weapons that the enemy leaves behind, so that it can be investigated and studied.

Officer Kantar explains that the main differences between Hamas and Hizbullah primarily concern the way they each maintain their weapons. Both terrorist forces prolifically use Kalashnikov rifles, for instance, known as AK-47's. "The Kalash is the basic, daily weapon of Hamas," Lt.-Col. Kantar explains, "and the ones that we captured were in various stages of overuse. But in Hizbullah, they are well-kept, and we found them as new as if they had just come from the factory. Most of the Kalash's that we found were made in China, and looked brand new."

"But in Hamas, it's a different story," he said. "They don't have rifles that they're saving for war time; the guns are always in use. But with Hizbullah, some of them were still in their original packing. Most of them had the name of the user, and where he was serving, etc. – very organized."

"Another interesting thing we saw was the uniformity. In Hamas, you can see how every battalion has its own equipment – different than the other battalions. But in Hizbullah, there is a planning body that defines the same formats for all the forces. The same stickers were on all the rifles, no matter where we found them, and we also saw that there was a certain uniform ratio of weapons, cartridges and bullets to each terrorist. The level of planning in Hizbullah was much higher than with Hamas.

"Hizbullah was much more modern. Even if they manufactured their own explosives, they didn't do it in an underground lab, like in Gaza. They had organized laboratories, with bona-fide chemists and engineers working there. Hizbullah was a very organized army. Most of what we found there was not improvised, but rather originated in industrial plants, with clear instructions for use."

Lt.-Col. Kantar continued contrasting Hizbullah with Hamas: "Most of the RPG rockets of Hamas are made in Gaza, or put together in Gaza. Sometimes they take pieces from existing rockets to make or improve new ones; most of the rockets are not new. They have many that were dismantled and rebuilt by them themselves. Hizbullah, however, has money for whatever it needs; they buy new weapons, without having to put them together. In addition, there is a highway from Damascus to Tehran, and a seaport in Lebanon, and an airport of course. They were able to get whatever they needed."

OK, so now we have a much clearer picture – one that tells us how little we knew on that infamous Simchat Torah about what was actually going on beyond our northern border fence. What is now understood is that if Hizbullah had acted in tandem with Hamas that day, it's hard to even imagine the horrors we would have been tortured with.

The current inquiries are important, and help us draw the correct lessons, both operationally and intelligence-wise. But we must conduct in-depth investigations not only regarding the southern arena, but just as much – and perhaps more – concerning the north as well.

From Interrogation to Target

by Haggai Huberman , journalist and author, translated by Hillel Fendel.

The latest annual Shabak report reveals new anti-terrorist and anti-espionage methods and impressive successes.

The Shabak (Israel's General Security Service, also known as Shin Bet, corresponding to the American FBI) released its annual summary report this past week, entitled, "The Shabak in a Multi-Front War." It contains some interesting facts and insights regarding the war in Gaza, the anti-terrorism war in Judea and Samaria, the Arabs of Israel, and increased Iranian attempts to recruit spies in Israel.

The most significant change in 2024 was the fact that most intelligence from Gaza is now gathered physically from within Gaza. Under the current war conditions, Shabak agents entered the area, together with IDF forces, in order to recruit and activate agents "on the spot." This is the first time since the Disengagement withdrawal, nearly 20 years ago, that this is happening – and not at all by coincidence. The withdrawal engineered by then-Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, a Yom Kippur war hero, was the beginning of the process that ended on Simchat Torah of 2023 with the unforeseen slaughter of 1,200 Israelis and the kidnapping of 250 more. This occurred at least partly because barely any valuable intelligence information was obtainable from Gaza for nearly two decades.

This is of course further proof that no technological means, no matter how up-to-date, can ever replace the "personal contact" between the Shin Bet and its agents – spies – on the ground. Signals intelligence (SIGINT) cannot exclusively take the place of human intelligence (HUMINT), and the Shabak learned, and implemented, this over the past year.

In 2024, the joint Shabak-IDF activity resulted in over 1,350 arrestees, including some 40 senior operatives and commanders, 165 close associates of senior officials, 45 involved in the Oct. 7 slaughter, and 100 who apparently have information regarding the hostages.

Saving Lives in Real Time

The main question facing the Shabak over the years was how to make the best, and fastest, use of the information garnered during interrogations. For it is clear that much of the intelligence gathered in this way has no value at all if not utilized as quickly as possible. For this purpose, a new unit was established in the Shin Bet entitled "From Interrogation to Target," which, as its name implies, aims to formulate targets as immediately as possible. The current report reveals that during the war, hundreds of targets in Gaza have been attacked whose information came directly from Shabak investigations. As a result, over 30 (!) top Hamas terrorists in Gaza have been liquidated, as well as hundreds of others on slightly lower levels.

In addition, the investigations led to life-saving information that was passed on to IDF forces on the ground, including warnings about booby-trapped houses, and more.

Not only that, seven hostages were freed by Israeli forces in three different operations, planned and led by the Shabak. Valuable information was also obtained that led to the finding of nine bodies of hostages that were rescued from Gaza and brought to burial in Israel.

Another mission that the Shabak took on was to "pay back" those who took part in the Simchat Torah slaughter. A special command office was set up for this purpose, and succeeded in killing dozens of those known as Nukhba terrorists.

As far as Lebanon and the northern front is concerned, the Shabak significantly stepped up its work there this past year, especially in light of increased Hamas activity in Lebanon. The Shabak increased its intelligence gathering and thwarting of terrorist actions in the Land of the Cedars.

Yesha: Over 1,000 Attacks Thwarted

The report features some amazing stats related to the Yesha (Judea and Samaria) front, where the Shabak thwarted 1,040 significant attacks this year. These included 689 attempted shootings, 326 bomb attacks, 13 stabbings, 9 attempted car-rammings, two suicide attacks, and even an attempted kidnapping. Dozens of special IDF-Shabak operations were carried out in Yesha, including 13 airstrikes.

* Let the reader imagine that these numbers did not measure "thwarted attacks," but rather attacks that were actually carried out. The State of Israel would have been in a very different place during this past year-plus of war…

And what about the Israeli-Arabs? We tend to think that they have sat quietly during this past year, but this is true only for the general populace, which did not riot as it did throughout Israel during the "Guardians of the Wall." But in terms of individuals, some 20 Israeli-Arab terrorist gangs were uncovered as they planned attacks against their fellow citizens, including five rings that planned car-bombs and other bombings. Again, it is not hard to guess the catastrophic effects if five car-bombs had exploded in Israel during the course of the war.

During the course of 2024, some 80 cases involving Israeli-Arabs were investigated, including 26 in which the suspects swore allegiance to or planned to carry out terrorist activity inspired by global jihad and the Islamic State (ISIS) within Israel.

Administrative Detention for Arms Dealing

This year also saw, for the first time, administrative detention for arms dealers, as part of the war against criminal activity that spills over into terrorist activity.

The Shabak report reveals much about Iran's increased attempts – and successes – to recruit spies within Israel. During the course of 2024, 13 grave espionage cases involving Israelis working on behalf of Iran were uncovered. No fewer than 37 Israelis were investigated, and 27 have been charged with very serious crimes with possible life imprisonment sentences. These represent an approximate 400% rise over the year 2023. The discovery of these spy rings, or individuals, led to the thwarting of attacks of terrorism, espionage, and even assassination.

It is estimated that dozens of Israelis were in touch with Iranian intelligence agents during these past 15 months of war, and that hundreds of others were contacted by them. The publication of these stories has led to increased public awareness of the seriousness of the Iranian intentions, and therefore the nipping in the bud of other potential Iranian spies among Israelis.

The Irresponsible, Miraculous Maccabean Revolt – Then and Now

by Haggai Huberman , journalist and author, translated by Hillel Fendel.

Judah Maccabee's war against the Syrian Greeks was not logical or realistic, and basically had no chance of succeeding. But then came the miracles… Things didn't work then by logic – and the same is true today.

If someone in the year 167 BEC had made a cold calculation of the balance of power between the Hasmonean rebels and the Greek kingdom in the Holy Land, he would not have recommended that the Jews start a war against the latter. In fact, there was truly no realistic chance for them to win. They started off with only 3,000 soldiers (or possibly 6,000, according to Maccabees II), while the Greeks had anywhere between 20,000 and 100,000 troops. Things did not look rosy for the good guys.

Even worse was the quality of the respective forces. The Seleucids were well-trained, well-organized, and well-armed, and could boast of infantry, heavy and light cavalry, elephant units, and catapult units for hurling large rocks. In contrast, Judah Maccabee's small army used primitive farming tools and home-made weapons. What chance did he have?

And yet, the Jews won, after a very long war. They utilized a unique combination of Judah's battle tactics: guerilla warfare integrated with unpredictable miracles. The first Chanukah miracle was not the famous "flask of oil" incident, but rather a seemingly "natural" battle development. It happened during the fourth of the eight battles between the Hasmoneans and the Greeks, which took place in Beit Tzur, south of today's Gush Etzion bloc. [One of the modern Jewish communities there is known as Carmei Tzur, in commemoration of the town.] Practically in mid-battle, Greek commander Lysias suddenly left for home to try to inherit the apparently-deceased Antiochus – and Judah rushed in with his forces to fill the void. Announcing, "The Temple Mount is in our hands!" a bunch of centuries before anyone ever dreamt of Al-Aqsa, they purified the Holy Temple, found a lone flask of ritually pure oil, and lit the Menorah for eight days until additional pure oil could be produced.

The fifth battle also took place in Gush Etzion, one of whose communities is named Elazar – after the brother of Judah Maccabee who was killed at this time while bravely stabbing a Seleucid elephant from beneath.

After this defeat, another Chanukah miracle took place. Lysias had retaken Jerusalem, and was about to pursue Judah's army to the north. However, he received word of a rebellion in the eastern part of the kingdom, and again he abruptly and surprisingly left the scene, though not before offering Judah a ceasefire of sorts. Judah the Maccabee utilized the situation for good advantage, and retook the entire area of Judea. This did not mean the onset of a Jewish State, however, as Judah was killed in the next battle: the Battle of Elasa, not far from today's Beit El.

For the next seven years, the Jewish forces were led by Mattathias' youngest son (Judah's youngest brother) Yonatan. He spent this time building up a larger and better-trained army, and in the year 152, he and his forces again liberated Jerusalem and purified the Temple. This time, the Jewish autonomy and Temple dedication lasted for over 200 years, until the Romans sacked the Holy City in 68-70. Yonatan also achieved the nullification of the anti-religious decrees.

Paradoxically, then, it was precisely the Greek decrees aimed at separating the Jews from their Judaism that caused them to rebel and ultimately oust the Greeks and their culture from the Holy Land.  

Miracles are of course not a good work plan. But it's also true that Ben-Gurion - who declared the founding of the State of Israel in 1948 even though it was militarily expected not to last more than a week - famously said: "In Israel, whoever doesn't believe in miracles is not a realist."

We can also now give new meaning to the words of our prayers, "He Who wrought miracles to our forefathers in those days – at this time" - for in our times, too, we are living through a period of an ongoing miracle. It will take years before we truly comprehend what an amazing Heavenly miracle these entire last few months have been, and internalize that nothing that happened here could have been forecast by any realistic observer.

Could anyone have believed on Simchat Torah of 15 months ago, with thousands of Hamas terrorists overrunning our southern border, capturing communities and kibbutzim, slaughtering over 1,200 Jews – that a year later, Hamas leader Sinwar would be turned to dust, most of the Gaza Strip would be turned into piles of ruins, and .Iran would abruptly lose much of its military power in the Middle East and would be closer than ever to economic collapse? Could it have been foreseen that within this time period, Hizbullah would lose not only most of its military strength, but also its legendary leader Hassan Nasrallah in an Israeli attack? Would anyone have believed that a long strip of villages in southern Lebanon would be razed and Hizbullah would be pushed back from the Israeli border? How about that Assad would be in exile in Russia, Syria would be left without an army, and the highest peak of Mt. Hermon, as well as other parts of Syria, would be under Israeli control without even a battle?

Yes, miracles cannot be the main feature of a national battle strategy. And even for a miracle to take place, we must work hard – or at least, fight hard. Without the initiatives that the IDF took, to what would the miracles have adhered or applied? On the other hand, no matter how much we do, without Heavenly providence, our success, especially in these wars, is very far from guaranteed. Both of these have always been true, throughout our history, and including of course that of the State of Israel.

Very soon, we all pray and hope, we will merit to experience possibly the happiest miracle of all: The safe return of dozens of Israeli captives to their families and country, Amen.