by Dr. Ron Breiman, former Chairman of Professors for a Strong Israel, translated by Hillel Fendel.
What must not be done with Gaza after the war…
The phrase "the day after" is often bandied about these days, generally in criticism of Prime Minister Netanyahu for not laying out a specific program outlining the desired situation following the current war in Gaza.
It should be known, however, that this phrase is really a code word meaning "return to the conceptzia" – which itself refers to the mistaken mindset of our military and political leadership ("Hamas doesn't want to fight us," "Hamas [and/or Hizbullah] is deterred," etc.) that brought us to the difficult situation in which Israel now finds itself. Most specifically, the idea of a two-state "solution" is false and dangerous, as is similar arrangement in Gaza.
Even given the very complex situation into which we were forced this past Simchat Torah, the following must be patently clear:
** On the day after, under no circumstances may Hamas rule in Gaza, militarily or administratively. To this end, the IDF must defeat it.
** On the day after, under no circumstances may the terrorist-sponsoring Palestinian Authority rule in Gaza – even if the United States says that it has improved and upgraded itself. The PA does not even have the wherewithal to rule in Gaza, if not with the help of the IDF. But the IDF, under all circumstances, may not serve as a silver platter to help the "good" terrorists of the PLO rule over the "bad" terrorists of Hamas. (Don't forget that PLO stands for Palestinian Liberation Organization – in its entirety, from the river to the sea!) The goals of both the PLO and Hamas are the same.
** We must not let the IDF facilitate the formation of a Palestinian Arab state. There would be nothing less ethical than this use of our soldiers' sacrifices.
** On the day after, the State of Israel must not run the civilian lives of the residents of the Gaza Strip via a military administration [as exists in Judea and Samaria – but see below].
By the same token, it must be understood clearly that we will brook no more deceptive talk regarding a "small and smart IDF" that will defend Israel. Israel requires a large and effective army [including the hareidim], whose officers are no longer captive to the Oslo view that "two states" will provide a solution to our problems.
If so, we are asked, "What then? There must be a diplomatic approach and strategy that will enable us to leave Gaza."
Yes, it's true: There is currently no choice other than an Israeli military administration in Gaza for as short a period as possible, up to the point that Hamas is totally defeated. And if we don't get to that point of the defeat of Hamas, we'll never get to "the day after!"
Only after Israel's total victory can there arise in the Gaza Strip a local leadership that will be able to run the lives of the local residents.
This new leadership, if and when it arises, will have to accept the fact that Israel will retain security control over the area. It will also have to engage with various nations with the goal of building a new reality in Gaza – one that will have costs for these other countries as well:
Egypt, which shares a border with southern Gaza, will have to contribute its fair share towards a regional solution by enabling several hundred thousand Gazans to rebuild their lives in the Sinai Peninsula.
The United Arab Emirates will have to contribute by sponsoring the rebuilding of Gaza and the resettlement of Gazans in Sinai.
Saudi Arabia is invited as well to take part in funding these efforts, and also to give up on its demand for a Palestinian state, which is nothing more than a recipe for the destruction of the Jewish State.
The European countries, often known as the "international community," are asked to be kind enough to absorb Gazans, each country in accordance with its size. There should be 200,000 in each of the large European countries, and proportionately less in the other ones. This will relieve the problem of population density in Gaza.
Finally, the United States will have to lead a type of Marshall Plan – a post-WW2 program to aid in the economic recovery of Western European countries. Israel will be able to reduce its security involvement in Gaza as this plan progresses.
There are no magic solutions, or even easy ones. The complex reality obligates us to understand that the three other alternatives mentioned above are much worse than the above. We must not grant them the slightest legitimacy.