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Wednesday, July 31, 2024

How the Biden Administration's Policies Have Led to the Gravest Escalation in the Middle East in Decades.

by Nitzan David Fuchs, geopolitical analyst, Makor Rishon columnist, and "The Great Game" podcast host, translated by Hillel Fendel.




If anyone was surprised at the Biden Administration's restrained response to the murderous Hizbullah rocket attack on the Israeli-Druze city of Majdal Shams that killed 12 teenagers, he has not been paying attention very well for the past nine months. Note, too, that this a response also includes the expectation that Israel should show similar restraint.

The Biden-Harris government has committed itself to the concept of "de-escalation," even in light of blatant Iranian provocations. The primary question for Israel is how to navigate its moves so that it can properly protect its citizens under such circumstances. 

De-escalation has become a mantra in the strategic discourse of the Administration. National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan tends to use it very often in various contexts, from Gaza to Ukraine. In an article in November 2023, Sullivan wrote proudly of the Administration's success in de-escalating the Gaza-Israel situation – without analyzing whether the mega-event of the month before had been a result of that policy. 

What exactly is de-escalation? The nub of the Biden-Harris strategy and order of priorities is this: China is the primary challenge, and everything else, including Iran, is secondary. De-escalation therefore dictates a policy of reducing tensions with Iran, including giving preference to diplomatic channels over a military conflict, all for the goal of freeing up resources for a clash with China.

This strategy has produced mixed results. While the resuscitation of the nuclear agreement with Iran has failed, understandings have been reached to ease sanctions against Iran in return for Iranian restraint in its race to achieve nuclear bomb capabilities. On the ground, Tehran continued to enrich uranium, though at a slower rate, and stepped up its support for Russia, while improving its international standing. The Biden-Harris regime chose to ignore these developments, in return for relative quiet.  

The murderous Hamas onslaught of Oct. 7th shook up regional stability, but did not change the American strategy. The Administration continued to stick with de-escalation, in an attempt to contain the warfare in Gaza and to prevent a broad regional escalation. Even in the face of attacks on American forces in Syria and Iraq, the US response remained restrained, allowing for a strong but still restrained military response only after American lives were lost. 

The Houthi threat on maritime freedom in the Red Sea – a historic and vital American interest – also elicited a lukewarm US response. The American rejoinder focused on thwarting future attacks, and was nowhere near a comprehensive offensive against the Houthis. 

The climax of the de-escalation policy came in reaction to the unprecedented Iranian attack against Israel this past April. Israel successfully repelled the more than 300 Iranian drones and missiles fired at Israel, and the Americans viewed this as a great victory for the regional air defenses. Others, such as Iran, Hizbullah, Hamas and the like saw it very differently. They have likely chalked it up in their book as proof of Iran's ability to target Israel, or possibly any American ally, with impunity and barely any US response. The United States is allowing Iran to behave with increasing aggressiveness – which ironically is itself what will increase the chances of a crisis that will force it to retaliate militarily.

The policy of de-escalation is expected to continue under a future Harris presidency, if the American electorate so decides. Israel will have to get used to the fact that American support for its military initiatives will be limited, even if this strengthens Iran and its proxies. If Donald Trump is elected, he can perhaps be expected to take a more aggressive approach vis-à-vis Iran, but it is still doubtful whether he will want or tolerate a regional war. 

The conclusion is straightforward: No one in the world can act for Israel's security except for Israel.