by Michael Sparber, member of the Judea & Samaria forum, translated by Hillel Fendel.
===Translator's
note:
While the world, and particularly American public opinion, focuses on – and
exaggerates unrestrainedly – supposed "settler violence," Israel
continues to suffer from equally unrestrained murderous terrorism. Our
newsletters have featured articles on the truth of the myth of "settler
violence" – which we hope our readers disseminate widely – and we plan to
continue to do so. In the meantime, please note that on Yom Kippur eve, a
Jewish father of six and resident of the Shomrom community of N'vei Aliza was
brutally gunned down by a Palestinian terrorist. The victim, in his last
moments of life, was able to warn his 16-year-old son and thus save his life.
This article deals with the manner in which Israel must wage the ongoing war
against terrorism.
The
question as to whether Kadri Samara, may his name be blotted out – the
Palestinian terrorist who murdered Netanel Shukrun – should be executed (according
to a new law passed in the Knesset mandating a death sentence in such cases) is
an important one. But it once again puts the spotlight on our reaction to
terrorism, instead of on the security and governmental faults that enabled the
murder in the first place.
We would
be advised not to ask only what to do with the murderer, but what do to prevent
another one.
Here is
the recent news item that so sadly and perfectly illustrates this failure: an
announcement and warning by our Defense Minister, Yisrael Katz. He revealed
that Israel has "information" on the possibility that Hamas will try
to kidnap an Israeli soldier or citizen. Minister Katz then issued a threat:
"If this happens, all of Gaza City will be evacuated and will be dealt
with just as we dealt with [the terrorist-headquarter cities of] Rafah and Biet
Hanoun."
Note the order: The intelligence exists, but our actions will happen only after the intelligence proves to be true: "If they abduct an Israeli, then we will take the strongest action. If they murder someone, we will execute. If they attack us, we will exact a heavy price."
There is nothing wrong with deterrence, or with threatening. The problem is how and when. Deterrence must happen before, not only after. We find ourselves having turned our threats into policy: The enemy takes the initiative, and we respond; he determines the attack, and we then set the punishment.
This is
not the way to win. It's a way of managing the conflict, but it leaves no room
for ending it.
Almost
sixty years after the Six-Day War, the State of Israel has still not defined
the situation it seeks to create in the face of Palestinian terrorism.
Israel possesses a strong army, intelligence, the Shin Bet, and elite units. It
knows how to arrest wanted persons, thwart terror cells, demolish houses, and
find and kill or arrest terrorists almost anywhere and at any hour.
But
these are tools. They are not policy.
Over
the course of years, we have become accustomed to measuring success by the
number of attacks thwarted, instead of by whether we are changing the reality
that necessitates our preemptive actions. Another wanted terrorist is arrested,
one more cell is thwarted, additional weapons are seized. A terrorist attack is
committed, followed by a military operation, followed by some relative quiet –
followed at some point or another by another attack. The cycle continues. And
the responsibility to break it is not of the IDF or the Shin Bet. It is the
responsibility of the political leadership.
And
here we must point our finger directly at our current government, headed by
Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu. After Oct. 7 (Simchat Torah 2023), it no
longer has the privilege of simply "managing" this conflict and its
threats. The massacre of three years ago was the worst exemplification of the
price to be paid for a policy that seeks to deter the enemy, to thwart him, and
to exact prices from him – but to leave the threat that he represents still intact.
We
can argue about the methods: about the PA, about sovereignty, security control,
or whatever. What can't be done is to not decide. Because inaction and
indecision is in itself a decision – to continue the same policies that have
failed us in the past.
And
this is precisely what is happening when the government continues to threaten
what it will do "if" and "after" – after the enemy murders
and kidnaps and attacks. Our reactions are taking the place of ensuring that
the enemy cannot continue its attacks.
If
there is intelligence about a planned or intended kidnapping, then the first
issue that must be dealt with is how to counter the enemy's ability to do so
[which is, hopefully and presumably, precisely what our security organs were
doing even as Minister Katz issued his threat - HF]. The infrastructures that
produce terrorism must be dismantled before, not after, the next attack.
And
if it is not only an infrastructure that must be taken down, but the entire
reality that is enabling the terrorists to attack again and again, then the
government and all its branches must deal strategically with how this reality
is totally changed.
Containment
is not a policy, but merely a way of gaining time between calamities.
Similarly, capital punishment for a given terrorist is not the heart of the
matter; it simply distracts us from actually changing the situation - and
winning.
After October
7, we can no longer say that we don't know the potential cost of containment. A government that knows, understands, warns,
and threatens – yet still continues to manage the same enemy threats, instead
of deciding what to do with them, cannot be surprised when it repeatedly
receives the same bitter, painful results.
Defeating
terrorism begins where containment ends.