40 Years Since the Jibril Exchange

by Haggai Huberman, Israeli journalist and author, translated by Hillel Fendel.

The return of the corpse of Tzvi Feldman, of the 1982 Battle of Sultan Yaaqub, reminds us of the 1982 Peace for Galilee War – and the fateful decisions that followed it (1150 Freed Terrorists Led Directly to the First Intifada, the Founding of Hamas, and Untold Numbers of Deaths), and the critical importance of Jewish settlement.

The happy news of the return of the remains of IDF soldier Tzvi Feldman, captured alive during a horrific 1982 battle with Syria that felled 33 soldiers, occurs very close to two important and historic anniversaries: Israel's withdrawal from Lebanon in May 2000, and the Jibril Deal in May 1985, in which 1,150 terrorists were released in exchange for three captured Israeli soldiers.

Feldman was killed, apparently, shortly after his capture during the First Lebanon War, also known as the Peace for Galilee War. This was a war that began with fairly broad national consensus, in response to ongoing Lebanon-based PLO attacks against Israel, including rocket fire, bombings, and infiltrations. However, as the war dragged on and its strategic goals became vaguer, Israel's government and military began to lose public confidence – and in fact, within a year-plus, both then-Prime Minister Menachem Begin and then-Defense Minister Ariel Sharon were out of their jobs.

This war was the first face-to-face clash between Israel and the PLO. One of the indirect objectives of Operation Peace for Galilee was to mortally strike the PLO, headed by Yasser Arafat, so as to strengthen Israel's hold in Judea and Samaria, where the PLO sought Arab Palestinian sovereignty.

According to one school of thought, Sharon believed in an even more far-reaching scenario: After a friendly Christian Maronite government would be formed in Lebanon, headed by Bashir Jumayel, the Maronites would get the Arab Palestinians in southern Lebanon to leave for Jordan – and this would hopefully lead to a Palestinian state in Jordan. This would neutralize the primary objection to Israel's presence in Judea and Samaria, which was that the Palestinians had become a "people without a state."

In the early stages of the war, this plan seemed to be on the way to working out. The PLO was expelled to far-off Tunisia, and Israel's friend Jumayel was elected President of Lebanon. But then two things happened that changed the course of history.

In September 1982, before Jumayel could even take office, he was murdered by Syrian elements, thus throwing the entire plan off-course. Ten days earlier, something even more significant happened, the grave consequences of which no one could foresee: Eight Nachal Brigade soldiers were captured in southern Lebanon. Six of them were released in November, in a relatively minor exchange (mostly for prisoners held in a Lebanese jail).

But then came one of the State of Israel's worst decisions ever: the agreement to release 1,150 terrorists in exchange for the two remaining captive soldiers and one other, who were all being held by Ahmed Jibril's PFLP terrorist organization. The third captive soldier was Chezi Shai, who had been captured during the Sultan Yaaqub battle; three soldiers were declared missing from that battle, including Zechariah Baumel, whose corpse was brought to Israel for burial in 2019, Tzvi Feldman, mentioned above, and Yehuda Katz, not yet located and still awaiting burial in Israel. May G-d avenge their blood.

I still remember the festivities in Gaza when the terrorists were freed. I lived then in Netzarim – which was evacuated in the 2005 Disengagement Plan – and the celebrations could be heard in our home. They certainly had what to celebrate about, not only in terms of the quantity of terrorists, but also their "quality." The freed murderers included such names as Kozo Okamoto (a Japanese Red Army member involved in the 1972 Lod Airport Massacre in which 26 people were murdered); Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, released after two years of a 13-year sentence, who later founded and became the spiritual leader of Hamas; Jibril Rajoub (not to be confused with Ahmed Jibril), sentenced to life imprisonment; and numerous others, including many of those who later instigated and led the First Intifada beginning in December 1987.

The front page of the next day's edition of Yediot Acharonot featured a large photo of the ultimate Palestinian terrorist victory scene: released murderers Suleiman al-Zaki and Ziyad abu-Ayn holding up their hands showing V-for-victory. It is another such photo like this, giving great motivation to the PA in its bid to destroy Israel, that we seek to avoid today.

Let us note another sad anniversary: This week marks 45 years since the grave Palestinian terrorist murder of six young Jewish men near Beit Hadassah in Hevron, on the first Sabbath night of May 1980. One of the murderers is now serving as the mayor of Hebron, having been released in the notorious Jibril Deal.

An internal Shabak investigation found that close to two-thirds of the Jibril Deal-released terrorists (as well as the 435 who were freed in the 2004 Tenenbaum deal) returned to active terrorism. The release of three Israeli soldiers thus ultimately led to the loss of hundreds of Israeli lives.

The Compounded Mistake

At the time of the Jibril Deal, it was proposed to then-Defense Minister Yitzchak Rabin to at least expel the released terrorists. But Rabin felt that keeping them in Yesha (Judea and Samaria, as well as Gaza in those days) would enable Israel to keep a tighter watch over them. However, within 27 months, he was proven deathly wrong, when many of these very terrorists helped instigate the Intifada. And it was that which led to the ill-fated Oslo accords, the establishment of the Palestinian Authority, the withdrawal from most of Hebron, and hundreds of Israeli deaths.

In the words of Zev Shiff and Ehud Yaari, in their book "Intifada:"

"There is no longer any doubt that the freed terrorists of the Jibril Deal played a central role in the intifada. According to authoritative estimates, within just a year of their release, more than a third of them had renewed their subversive activity in one way or another. Most of the rest [then] went into activity almost immediately, with the outbreak of the first wave of rioting… Jibril would later take pride, justifiably [from his standpoint - HF], that this operation planted the seeds of the uprising." That is, within just over two years, the Jibril Deal was the gasoline that fueled the engine of the intifada.

The first intifada was that which created a nearly irreversible situation in Yesha: The People of Israel, in large numbers, stayed away from parts of the Land of Israel. Those who didn’t live there, just didn’t come. They became too afraid, and distanced themselves from their Biblical homeland of Judea and Samaria: the golden wheat fields of the Dotan Valley, the ruins of the biblical city of Samaria (Sebastia), the beautiful Umm Tzafa Forest in the Binyamin region, the majestic Herodion archaeological site, and the Tomb of the Patriarchs (Machpelah Cave) in Hevron.

Judea and Samaria became the "Land of the Setters," and hardly anyone other than them (certainly not delivery drivers!) came to see it.

This then led to a sense of estrangement from these areas, which paved the way for a willingness to give them away in some kind of political agreement. The result: the calamitous Oslo Accords of the 1990's, which removed large areas of Yesha from Israeli control – precisely the opposite of the original goals of the 1982 Lebanon War, as explained above.

If at least the freed terrorists of 1985 had been expelled, it is likely that the tragic consequences of these events could have been avoided.

Only one thing stopped the stains of retreat and withdrawal that spread out over the map of Yesha: the Jewish settlement enterprise.

Greener on the Other Side? Not So Sure

by Zev Kam, tour guide, journalist, and frequent commentator on Kan Public Israel Radio, translated by Hillel Fendel.

A Light, Encouraging View From the Lebanese Front

In the summer of 2021, less than four years ago, the soldiers of Battalion 221 of the IDF's Carmeli Brigade were on reserves duty, with the routine mission of holding a line on the Lebanese border. The troops were stationed at the time on the western side of the border line – precisely as they are now, during these five months since the ceasefire with Hizbullah/Lebanon. Aside from the location, there is nothing else of the two periods and the two stints of duty that are comparable.

Then, four years ago, what frustrated the soldiers no end, and what was their lot throughout their tour of service, was the fact that they could see Hizbullah terrorists just beyond the fence – and there was nothing they could do. The terrorists would stand with cameras and photograph the soldiers' faces, curse them, hold up middle fingers – and the soldiers' hands were tied; they could not respond.

The terrorists even built structures right on the border, from which they could peer directly into Israel – and our soldiers, again, were helpless. It was some kind of "decree of destiny" imposed by an army and its leaders that had simply become accustomed to having the enemy mock them, learn their actions and schedules, and even erect a tent within Israeli territory (!), full of weapons. And our soldiers were totally unable, by order, to do anything.

This time, now, everything is different. Every battalion soldier on reserves duty this time is experiencing something totally different – 180 degrees different. Their two and a half months on the border are ending these very days, and what they will tell you is that, first of all, there's no Hizbullah on the border. Not even one terrorist. The troops patrol the border, and even often enter Lebanese territory, and there's no trace of terrorists. The IDF is systematically enforcing the ceasefire agreement, and does not allow a thing to happen that violates it. In the world of psychology, they would say that this is a "corrective experience," helping to heal and counteract the effects of what happened back in past years – not only for the soldiers who served there, but for the long-suffering residents of northern Israel.

It's not that the enemy or its weapons no longer exist. But they are scared and they're hiding – far away from our border. Instead of mocking our soldiers, they worry now only that they will be killed. And the numbers support their fears: Ever since the ceasefire came into effect last November, the IDF has killed 140 terrorists who were about to violate the truce, violently or otherwise.

This is also not to say that Hizbullah is not trying to rebuild itself, as close to Israel as possible. They can't build real buildings, so they bring in mobile structures – caravans, or mobile homes without wheels, to try to revive the former terrorist stronghold villages. But when they do so, an Israeli drone promptly comes along and bombs it. In the town of A-Nakura, for instance, there has been barely a week when the new caravans they brought in were not destroyed. And the story was the same elsewhere as well, until finally, Hizbullah stopped bringing in caravans.

One of the more memorable aspects of the warfare with Hizbullah is the story of the "nature reserves." They're not quite reserves, but they have enough shrubbery and overgrowth that the terrorists used to be able to take cover there and even fire at the IDF forces. One day, at the beginning of the current war, some Israeli reservists actually built a Roman-style catapult and fired over some fire-torches to burn large swathes of the greenery. Of late, the IDF has continued to deal successfully with this problem, clearing very large areas in Lebanon, particularly in the areas within hundreds of meters from the Israeli border, to prevent the enemy from coming near us under the cover of green.

But of course nature continues to run its course, and the growth does what it knows how to do best: it grows. The forces tried spraying various growth-retardant chemicals, but these too were insufficient. So the soldiers of Battalion 221 became gardeners: They set out for Lebanon to trim or cut down trees, cut off branches, and basically clear entire areas practically by hand. They marched through the wadis of southern Lebanon, equipped with state-of-the-art gardening tools – thus proving that it is actually not true that the grass is always greener on the other side…  

And here's another thing that is worthwhile to know: In all the Lebanese terrorist-stronghold villages along Israel's borders that the IDF destroyed in last year's war, not one of them has begun to be rebuilt. Not one. They are simply not settled; desolate. Here and there people are seen coming to collect some of their belongings or metals for one purpose or another – but no one lives there.

In Israel, on the other hand, the residents of almost every single northern village have returned home.

No one is saying that everything is hunky-dory or that there's nothing to fear. In the town of Shlomi, for instance – a beautiful Israeli village in the northwestern Galilee, population 8,000 – they built a new school about two years ago. But then the war broke out, the town came under Hizbullah fire, and people left. Now that they have returned, the question was raised: "What do we do with the new school? After all, it's even closer to the border than the old school was!" Some parents, and teachers, were quite jittery at the prospect of holding classes there.

The security officer of Shlomi quickly called the commander of Battalion 221, Brig.-Gen. Binyamin Tropper, and asked him to explain the situation to the concerned residents. Tropper came, explained to them how the situation had been reversed, told them how many soldiers are holding the area, and provided encouraging details regarding the new circumstances.

Almost everyone was reassured – except for one teacher, who asked, "Why is the soccer field in town still not lit up? And the same for the streetlights in that neighborhood. Doesn't that mean that we're still afraid that Hizbullah will fire rockets at us?"

The mayor, who was also present, was puzzled, and asked that the matter be checked. Within minutes, it turned out that no one had turned off the lights at all. Rather, a Hizbullah rocket a while back had knocked out part of the electricity in the neighborhood – and no one paid much attention to it - probably because no one was living there for a while, having all been evacuated to "southern" Israel. The matter was quickly resolved.

This story shows that there are still fears, and no one should make light of them. But the new school in Shlomi is now open.

And for a final incident, this one a bit more amusing: Overlooking Shlomi is an IDF outpost named Magen Yehuda (Shield of Judah), the largest of five such points inside Lebanon. Though they are well-protected, they are not only for the purposes of defense. Not a day goes by that the IDF does not send forces relatively deep into Lebanese territory to search for weapons and the like left behind by Hizbullah, and in general to safeguard the area.

Every move that the Lebanese Army, or the UN forces adjacent to the border, wants to make must be closely coordinated with the IDF – and in fact this is the case most of the time. On the other hand, the IDF doesn't coordinate with anyone when it wants or needs to enter Lebanon. Whenever the security needs of the residents of the north require it, even indirectly, the troops enter Lebanon and do what has to be done. This led to an interesting ping-pong exchange with the Lebanese Army recently.

What happened was that the IDF brass decided that the buffer zone around Magen Yehuda needed to be expanded, so as to ensure that the terrorists do not try to come close. And so, one night the Israeli troops went out with metal posts, known as baznatim, and stuck them in the ground some distance away from Magen Yehuda, in order to show the locals that there was a new "border." The next morning, the Israeli cameras showed a lot of confusion. The Lebanese locals seemed to not understand what had happened while they were sleeping. Still, however, after a few days, they decided to show some muscle, and went to remove the baznatim.

For the Israelis, this was not the end of the story, but rather only the beginning. They sent another force in that very night to replace the baznatim. But the Lebanese, too, didn't give up – and thus began a ritual of them removing, and our side replacing.

Until finally one time, when the Lebanese soldiers came to uproot the baznatim, they found themselves with hands full of oil and grease – which the Israelis had spread over the posts before leaving them in the ground. This time the cameras caught the Lebanese gesticulating in frustration at the tremendous mess they had made of themselves, and at the prospect of the long showers they would have to take – if there were any in their outposts.

Yet another time, when the Lebanese tried to uproot the metal posts, all of a sudden, miraculously, light bombs exploded from within – totally harmless, but frightening just the same. Their cries of shock could be heard all the way to the new school in Shlomi - where the pupils are safely attending classes.

He Who Hesitates Can Easily Lose

by Emmanuel Shiloh, Editor of B'Sheva Newspaper, translated by Hillel Fendel.

Pressure from Cabinet ministers Smotrich and Strook are the best chance Netanyahu has to be saved from his traditional hesitation so that he can actually strive for victory in Gaza. 

The slogan "He who dares, wins" is well known in our country as the leading motto of the IDF's elite Sayeret Matkal unit. But actually, it’s not an original Israeli brainchild, but rather a translation of the maxim of the famed WW2 British commando unit, the Special Air Service (SAS).

The traits of daring and brazenness are certainly important components of victory, although British history itself proves that he who dares does not always win. In fact, two of Britain's most dangerous historic enemies were actually quite daring, yet were ultimately defeated by Britain and her allies. Sometimes, the over-brazen end up taking miscalculated risks, or setting impossible strategic goals, leading to defeat.

In politics, too, it's not always the daring who emerges victorious. Take Naftali Bennett, for instance. A former Sayeret Matkal fighter, he set himself grandiose goals – and as a result, was forced to depart the political scene twice in the past year. (It's true that he is currently doing well in the polls, so we won't pass final judgement on him just yet.)

More to the point is Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu, who I believe was the first Sayeret Matkal member to enter politics. Unfortunately, his path as a statesman and politician has not quite been characterized by boldness, but rather by hesitation and caution. 

Netanyahu rarely takes risks. He prefers to take measured steps and avoid sharp turns; when he reaches a crossroads that involves both risks and opportunities, he usually chooses neither. This tendency has often saved him from fateful mistakes and is part of the secret of his political survival, but has also led to bad mistakes. As a prime example, we remember his decision not to return to politics in 2001, losing the easy chance to regain leadership of the Likud party when Ariel Sharon seized the premiership almost by default.

Often, he waits so long to decide that reality finally comes along and leaves him no choice. We saw this very recently in the war against Hizbullah. Netanyahu adopted a hesitant, defensive policy for nearly a year, while leaving tens of thousands of Galilee residents in an intolerable state of exile from their homes for fear of Hizbullah rockets. Apparently, the only thing that got him to move was the once-in-a-lifetime chance to carry out the famous Beepers operation. It had become clear that Hizbullah could discover the booby-trapped Beepers at any minute, and Netanyahu finally understood that he had no choice but to decide, then or never. To his credit, he bucked the opinions of some of the top security officials and decided to give the OK. No one in Hizbullah knew what hit them when thousands of beepers exploded in their hands. This then led to the offensive against Hizbullah that all but wiped out their leadership and many - not all - of their offensive capabilities.

Most problematically, Netanyahu's hesitancy and procrastination are quite evident these days on the Gaza front. All the ingredients for a strong offensive are here: a much calmer northern front, a loyal defense minister, a new IDF chief of staff and Southern Command head, and a supportive and accommodating U.S. administration that is supplying us with arms and not pressuring us to deliver "humanitarian aid" to the enemy. Hamas is beaten down and the population is in despair.

Yet instead of taking advantage of all this in order to initiate an all-out attack that will enable us to take over all of Gaza and finally win this war decisively, Netanyahu is once again treading water. Even the recent offensive in the Morag Route area was not for the purpose of destroying the enemy, but only to pressure him to agree to another round of hostage releases in which we free hundreds of terrorists and renew the supplies to Hamas. As of now, after beginning to consider a partial release of hostages, Hamas predictably reconsidered, in the hope that Israel would fold. 

In fact, the abominable Hamas murderers have several good reasons for thinking that this would happen, including:

• The political and public pressure regarding the recruitment of hareidim, which threatens to dismantle the coalition government;
• threats of refusal to serve in the IDF; 
• the Netanyahu trial, which takes up so much of the prime minister’s critical time that it constitutes a national security threat;
• the courts' and the left-wing's refusal to accept the government's firing of Shabak chief Ronen Bar, leading to tremendous political and social unrest; 
• and above all, the incessant pressure by the Kaplanist groups demanding the hostages' release "at any price," based on the same talking points parroted by Hamas.

Why does Netanyahu continue to act so hesitantly now? His detractors – a nice way of saying his enemies – say it's because he doesn't want the war to end, because that's what's keeping him in office. His supporters say he wants to continue to search for every possible chance to secure the release of hostages, as long as it does not mean ending the war with Hamas still in power.

But it's possible that the reason is much more mundane: He simply has trouble, as usual, being decisive. He prefers to take little steps rather than to make a dramatic and daring decision to end the war with a massive offensive. Though this option sounds frightening, it does not have to cost us as many sacrifices as in previous rounds. With the help of air power, we succeeded in overcoming Hizbullah with relatively few sacrifices – and we can do the same in Gaza. Netanyahu has no choice but to understand that the time is now; we can no longer afford the economic costs, nor the costs to family life of the reservists, nor the drop in motivation in the IDF, that his delay is causing us. 

Another worrisome sign is that the top military brass actually submitted a proposal to the Cabinet this past week regarding the renewal of "humanitarian aid" to Gaza. It's as if we haven't learned a thing! The plan means that the IDF fights Hamas with one hand, and strengthens the enemy and supplies it with the other! How could such a plan be considered without even offering a solution to the problem of Hamas taking over and using the supplies for its own needs and coffers?

Religious Zionism party chief Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich, who also has authorities in the Defense Ministry, sharply opposed this destructive plan. His unwavering commitment to victory in the war, together with his colleague Minister Orit Strook, stands out above all their fellow ministers. But actually they were not alone this time. Many ministers expressed opposition to the plan, and the Cabinet sent the senior IDF officials to do their homework and present an alternative in which supplies are not distributed by Hamas. 

One can only hope that the new Chief of Staff, Zamir, will finally realize – as we thought he did already – that victory will be achieved only via a complete conquest of the Gaza Strip, the establishment of an Israeli military government, and the destruction of Hamas as either an armed or governing organization.

Seek Peace for the Border Town of Shlomit

by Yossi Achimeir, Israeli journalist, former politician, and director-general of the Jabotinsky Institute.

What is the significance of the military maneuvers in the Sinai Peninsula, seemingly in violation of the Israel-Egypt peace agreement? And what explains the growing hostility toward Israel in the Egyptian media?

We left Egypt, celebrated our formation as a nation during 40 years of wandering in the Sinai, and recounted the ten plagues that God inflicted upon our oppressive taskmasters. Yet, Egypt does not seem to leave us.

While we focus on Iran, Gaza, Lebanon, Syria, Turkey, and, of course, internal disputes that consume much of our energy, we pay less attention to the war drums echoing from Cairo.

What is the meaning behind the military exercises in the Sinai Peninsula, apparently contrary to the peace agreement? And what explains the increasing hostility toward Israel in the Egyptian media?

Recently, I visited a settlement that is almost unknown to the public—not by name, Shlomit, nor by its very existence. Shlomit means "peace." It is one of three religious community settlements established after the evacuation of Yamit, in the Peace Bloc. One must be a true pioneer, a devoted Zionist, a believer in peace, to build a home and family in such a "remote" settlement, close to the Egyptian border.

The settlement, located south of the Gaza envelope, was spared from the October 7 attack. Shlomit is experiencing a construction boom. The demand to live there is rising. Quality of life, tranquility, a relaxed atmosphere, and tradition are likely the reasons. But as I concluded my brief visit to this beautiful place, I couldn't help but think about its border location, about a kilometer from the international peace border, behind which war schemes are currently brewing.

Egypt and Qatar are competing with each other over the management—so-called—of negotiations for the release of the hostages. Wealthy Qatar is a declared enemy state, funding Hamas and extending its influence throughout the Middle East and the world, even reaching the Prime Minister's Office in Jerusalem.

In the official daily 'Al-Sharq' and other Qatari media outlets, antisemitic articles are published, praising Hamas's October 7 attack and portraying Jews as "enemies of Allah, schemers, traitors, murderers of prophets, and bloodsuckers." Editor Jaber Al-Harami wrote: "We are confident that Judgment Day will not come until we fight the Jews and kill them. Among us, there is no despair or loss of hope, despite all the pain, wounds, and blood."

Poor Egypt, still a peace state, depends on generous financial grants from Qatar. Antisemitism is even more rampant there. The daily 'Al-Youm Al-Sabea' recently published a harsh anti-Israel article stating that "Israel is the number one enemy of the Arabs, seeking to kill them to expand its territory."

According to the article, Israel is "an occupying entity that commits massacres against Palestinians in Gaza, tries to conquer parts of Syria and Lebanon, and imposes a new reality in the region. Additionally, it aims to empty the Gaza Strip of its Palestinian residents under the pretext of eliminating Hamas."

This article is just a sample of the harsh anti-Israel tone flooding the Egyptian media. Many articles accuse Israel of provoking Egypt by violating the peace agreement and committing crimes against Palestinians in collaboration with the U.S. They vehemently reject Israel's claims that Egypt is violating the peace agreement by reinforcing its military presence in Sinai. "Egypt has the right to defend its borders," they assert.

This propaganda method is typical of Egypt, which, as one Israeli Middle East expert put it, is not a state with an army but an army with a state. Not only is it concentrating military forces east of the Suez Canal, not far from Israel's border, but it justifies this with the absurd need to "defend its borders."

Who believes this? Who threatens it from the east? Who is interested in breaking the peace agreement, for which Israel gave up the vast territory of Sinai? Egypt has another excuse: the fear—according to reports—of a "plan to expel Gaza Strip residents to Sinai, which exposes Egypt's national security to real danger."

Does the concentration of forces in Sinai, accompanied by a wave of anti-Israel articles, indicate Egypt's intention to violate the peace agreement and create another war front against Israel? Is there a looming threat to the peace of the pioneering settlement of Shlomit? Time will tell. And we must acknowledge, painfully: salvation for our 59 hostages is unlikely to come from these two hostile mediators, Qatar and Egypt.

Ketzaleh: Beleaguered Hilltop Pioneers Deserve Israel Prize

 by Hillel Fendel, editor, author and translator.

The contrast is acute: While the newest generation of hilltop "settlers" has gained a bad name because of media reports of alleged violence against Bedouin shepherds, they are in fact saving the Land of Israel for the State of Israel.

Not only do recent reports by left-leaning media outlets omit the Arab violence of which the young Jewish pioneers have been the victims, but they do not showcase the tremendous contribution they are making on behalf of the Jewish People's hold on vast areas of our Biblical homeland and strategic security expanses of Judea and Samaria.

A long article in Haaretz last week, for instance, makes essentially one point: Extremist Jewish settlers are harassing Bedouin farmers, sometimes violently, and the latter are either forced to leave their homes, or have no place to leave to. In fact, however, these tear-jerking stories are the tiny exception to the rule – which is that Jewish pioneers are frequently violently attacked, and then are often arrested to boot.

A year ago, 14-year-old Binyamin Achimeir was found murdered after taking a flock of sheep out to graze from Malachei HaShalom, an outpost in the Binyamin region. PM Netanyahu called Achimeir's death a "heinous murder."

But let us focus on the positive. Elisha Yered, 25, formerly of Disengagement-destroyed Sa-Nur and now of Ramat Migron between Beit El and Psagot, explained the concept of the new farms and hilltops:

"Simply speaking, we're saving the Land of Israel for the Jewish People. Even those who don't buy into the Divine promise of the Land and the like, certainly comprehend that, security-wise and politically speaking, we have a very simple axiom: It's either them – the Arabs – or us."

"If we allow them to build here and spread out over the plains and mountains, a Palestinian state can actually be established here – and then the cities and towns in next-door Israel will be directly endangered, just as we saw in Gaza a year and a half ago."

Yered notes with enthusiasm that "there are many large areas throughout Samaria, and elsewhere, that have been illegally commandeered by Arabs, or are in danger of being so taken over. What we do is locate a hilltop, send a family or some youths, or both, to live there, with a flock of sheep or the like – and thus we can control thousands of dunams [quarter-acres] at a time. This prevents Bedouins and other Arabs from taking over this land. Little by little, the outpost becomes a 'young neighborhood,'" and can be on its way, even if it takes years, to becoming a full-fledged community."

There has been great success over the past two years. Traveling along the north-south Alon Highway, east of the Judean/Shomron Mountains, one can see, with sharp eyes, the major change that has come over the area. No fewer than 30 new young farms and hilltops form Jewish territorial contiguity all the way from Shaar Binyamin (on the well-traveled Route 60 between Beit El and Jerusalem), to the northern Jordan Valley.

This has been the below-the-radar Jewish response to the PA's Fayad Plan to isolate Jewish communities in Yesha by surrounding them with Arab farms and structures. In total, some 290,000 new dunams are in Jewish hands.

I mention to Yered that there is a truly huge area outside the new Jewish hilltop named A'ira Shachar [I Will Awaken the Dawn] that appears to be empty of Bedouin. Yered laughs: "Hah! Now there are over 20 families in A'ira Shachar, but when I got there about eight years ago, we went through tough times with the Bedouin there. They used to come up and attack us, while we grazed our sheep in the expanse and caused them, little by little, to leave. That's why it looks like the whole area is empty!"

Another of the new outposts is Sdei Yonatan, not far from Maaleh Michmash, overlooking and safeguarding the all-important intersection of Route 60 and the Alon Highway. It was started by Oz Yehuda Rom when he was single, and he now lives there with his new wife, Tamar. "When we first came," he told the Srugim website, "there were two Arab encampments [whose residents] used to cross Route 60 on a regular basis – and they even attacked a few Jewish youths. Ever since we’re here, they realize that something has changed."

But he emphasizes: "Even if the Arabs leave, we’re staying to settle the area. It's not just a question of security. We want this area to be farmed by Jews even 200 years from now."

Oz Yehuda said that the Israeli authorities were very rough on them, "destroying what we built here and taking our stuff" no fewer than 12 times in the course of 18 months. The situation has improved somewhat, and Arabs have largely stopped attacking them with gunfire and the like - but it's still not simple: "What motivates us is the desire to settle our Land; if we don't do it, no one else will. We're here for the same reason that motivated all the generations of Jewish settlers in the Land of Israel."

Articles like the above-mentioned Haaretz piece do not report, for instance, that late last month a Jewish shepherd was grazing his sheep in the Gush Etzion area when he was attacked by Arabs with clubs and was taken to the hospital. The attackers were six Arabs from the illegal encampment Um Shabin in eastern Gush Etzion. Many other similar attacks also go largely unreported.

The Israel Prize, No Less

Yaakov Ketzaleh Katz, Chairman of the Board of Bet El Institution, who himself has taken a foremost role in helping to found Beit El and building up Judea and Samaria, specifically when he served as Deputy to the Housing Minister in the early 90's, says simply: "I love the new hilltop settlers, they are our true heroes."

He said that there are no fewer than 82 new farms and hilltops in Judea and Samaria, "all because of their fearless dedication to live there with their families, and of course with their flocks of sheep. This grants our security forces control over huge expanses of land. Even the IDF now recognizes their importance."

Ketzaleh adds: "While the anti-Semites of the European Union invest billions to encourage the Arabs to build illegally in these areas, even in Areas B [under Israeli security control] and C [Israeli civilian control], often leading to additional centers of terrorist activity – our young men and women on the hilltops are making every effort to thwart them, and are succeeding. Unlike in the past, when even our own public did not appreciate these brave pioneers, there is now a real understanding of the importance of their actions. Yesha leaders such as Yossi Dagan, Yisrael Ganz, and many other municipality heads are supporting them."

Bottom line, according to Ketzaleh: "These pioneers deserve to be awarded the Israel Prize [considered Israel's most significant cultural honor]."