Thursday, November 5, 2026

Elections in Israel: The Majority that Became a Minority

by Avi Greentzeig, journalist and political strategist, translated by Hillel Fendel.




Clearly, last week's elections, and their results, have aroused many more questions than answers. For instance: Did Netanyahu win, in that he received the support of a majority of the Jewish electorate, or did he lose, for not being able to form a nationalist government?

Or, consider the Shas party: Aryeh Deri, founder and long-time leader of the Sephardic religious-hareidi party is considering resigning, after Shas dropped from 11 Knesset seats to 7. How did this happen, and is Deri to blame?

[The Arab parties, which received an all-time high representation in the Knesset of 19 seats – will they be able to repeat this achievement if new elections are held soon? Or will the reports of voting "irregularities" and Qatari funding obviate this result next time? Note that nearly 1,000 votes for these parties have already been disqualified.]

In my opinion, the main story is not who won, but rather who lost, and the change-of-story that has resulted.

Until now, the sector often known as "liberal secular," represented across the spectrum by Yair Golan on the left to Avigdor Lieberman on the right, has basically felt that it is the majority here. In fact, in all Israeli governments up to but not including the outgoing one, this group had representation and influence, in addition to the numerous power centers it holds, such as the judicial system, the media, academia, and large sectors of the capital market and high-tech.

In last week's election, this group mobilized the maximum possible power for its victory. It legitimized Bennett and Lieberman, both of whom were not long ago quite high on its enemies list; it flew in tens of thousands of voters from abroad; it organized itself for Election Day efficiently so as not to waste a single vote; and it invested heavily in an aggressive campaign to lure many voters who otherwise would not have been expected to support it.

Above all, it enjoyed impressive starting conditions – primarily in relation to the hot issues on the table, such as the military draft issue and the Oct. 7th commission of inquiry or lack thereof. In addition, there were not insignificant levels of right-wing disappointment and frustration with the Netanyahu government. Haredi voters were not enthusiastic about going out to vote, the Noam party made a conscious decision to burn religious-Zionist votes, and several other groups in that sector decided to switch sides for various reasons.

But all that didn't help – and for the first time in Israel's history, this group is beginning to grasp that it is actually a minority. Pre-election polls gave it close to a majority in the Knesset, or at least in the neighborhood of 56, when in fact it reached only 48. It has only three choices for a political alliance if it wants to return to power: the Arabs, the hareidi public, or the religious-Zionist public. Each of these sectors on its own would give Eisencott-Bennett-Lapid-Lieberman a working majority of the Knesset. Are any of them realistic scenarios?

Regarding the Arabs: Given that support for terrorism and a Palestinian state is a very large if not absolutely major part of their platforms, and that this not expected to change in the coming decades, no Zionist party that seeks to survive another election campaign will agree to such a partnership.

The religious-Zionist public should potentially be a good choice. This camp shares with the "Just-not-Bibi!" camp cultural closeness, as well as Zionism and nationalism in general, and even the "covenant of those who serve" [in the army]. However, the obstacle is that the Smotrich-Ben Gvir camp is not willing to settle for minor roles in the government. The days have long gone when it agreed to have control only over of the Ministry of Religious Affairs. It is simply not likely that Yair Golan will agree to Smotrich's construction and housing plans in Judea and Samaria, that Lapid will agree to gender-segregation in the army, and that Bennett will return again to the conservative views he held when he headed the Yesha Council. All this will not happen.

The least-unlikely option, then, is that the secular-liberal camp will join up with the haredim – a sector that has few demands beyond its own autonomous issues. The problem, of course, is that even this narrow space was one of the core issues of the campaign. Is it in any way possible that a coalition agreement can be drawn up that would enable the haredi sector to avoid full-scale recruitment into the IDF? This, after all, is precisely what Bennett and partners have been screaming about for months and years.

And yet, a scenario of this type appears very rational at this point. Yes, there has been talk of a national unity government, but this is not likely to happen without Eisencott first trying to form a narrow coalition.

If none of the above materialize – and keep in mind that neither the Arabs, nor the hareidim, nor the religious-Zionists have expressed particular interest in joining Eisencott and crew – new elections are likely. If this happens, my prediction is that the liberal secular camp will lose even more decisively – and will lead to even more of a "revolution" than the 1977 elections were [when the Likud first came to power]. You heard it here first!

Monday, November 2, 2026

Naftali Bennett: For Israel's Sake – Time to Renege on Your Campaign Promise not to Join a Netanyahu Gov't

by Dr. Amir Kitron, Director-General of Isbei Kedem, translated by Hillel Fendel.




An open letter to former PM and former Yesha Council leader Naftali Bennett, whose party won 11-12 seats in this week's election and is counted in the anti-Bibi camp. The letter is long and therefore here condensed.

Dear Naftali, 

I voted for you every time you ran, except for this most recent election. I believe you that you are guided by what you believe would benefit the State of Israel. Even when you decided to establish a government with [the Arab party] Ra'am, I understood that you felt that the alternative was yet another election campaign, following four previous ones in less than two years, with no end in sight to the political paralysis and the lack of a national budget.

I wasn't happy when you were attacked in the Knesset, when you were called a traitor, liar, and crook. It's clear that in politics, sometimes, for the sake of the country, one has to break election promises. Binyamin Netanyahu, too, broke promises in the past, and sometimes he had justified reasons. 

I have no doubt that you were very hurt by the protests outside your home, by the personal attacks against you, and by the way in which your coalition government fell apart [with the resignation, under outside pressure, of MKs from your party].

But politics often involves competition, power struggles, and disappointments. Leaders sometimes fight against those who seek to inherit them. This was the case even with King Saul against David, among others. History teaches that alliances change, rivals become partners, and sometimes the path to getting things done requires cooperation with surprising associates. 

This is what happened with you, in 2020. You made a political alliance with Yair Lapid and a sector that was not previously part of your "base," and later you adopted some of its messages; you even coined the term "covenant of those who serve" [as opposed to those who avoid army service].

Your success in connecting with a sector that is wary of hareidim, settlers, and Likud supporters is valuable. That sector, too, is a precious part of Am Yisrael, and you were never detached from it: You met them during your army service, in the hi-tech world, and in your personal life. Now after you have once again acquired political capital, you are in a unique position. You bear the confidence of a public that previously did not see you as its representative, and have strong familiarity with the nationalist camp in which you grew up. This gives you the chance that not every political leader receives: to renew ties between camps that have grown apart.

Naftali, Israel faces many external dangers, including Iran, Lebanon, and terrorism within Judea and Samaria. But internally, as well, there is what to be concerned about regarding the rise of those who negate critical fundamentals of Israel's identity as a Jewish state. There are those who support the "return" of hundreds of thousands of Arabs who lived here before 1948, who wish to change Israel's national character, and who legitimize those who massacre our citizens. This is especially concerning when we see that these positions are held by leaders of political movements [such as the Arab parties in the Knesset].

Without placing historic responsibility upon an entire public, we know that we cannot be complacent. We must face head-on the dangers of ideological incitement and hostility. We must treat with the utmost severity expressions of support for terrorists, commemorations of murderers, and education to incitement. Such phenomena cannot be tolerated, especially when they are backed by public officials.

At the same time, there are some other grave problems [in the Arab sector] that cannot be overlooked: Rampant illegal construction, organized crime, hoards of illegal weapons, and lack of governance with parts of the country, especially the Negev. These problems require firm action on the part of the government. A Jewish, democratic Israel must be able to protect its identity, its sovereignty, and its citizens' security, without ceding the rule of law and the rights of all its citizens.

Naftali, your parents went out to protest against the Oslo Accords with great self-sacrifice, and they taught you love of the Land and commitment to the future of the State. I believe that these values still guide you, even if your political path has changed. Standing before you now is the opportunity to prove that it is possible to rise above the grievances of the past. Do you have within you the strength to break yet another political promise - the promise to boycott Netanyahu – but this time for the sake of national Zionist unity?

I know how difficult this mission is. I know that the wounds of the past have not yet healed, and that the lack of trust between the camps is very great. But if you were able to cross the political lines in the past and form a government with partners you never dreamed of, why shouldn't you be able to do this again – but this time, in order to unite the broad Zionist camp?

Use your experience and capabilities to form alliances. Recruit your current partners, and together find a way to a genuine Zionist outline for unity. What we need is unity not "against" Bibi, but "for" Likud voters, centrist voters, religious-Zionist and hareidi voters, as well as liberal and secular voters. 

We need unity that will recognize that national service is not expressed only in the military, but also in Zaka, in Ezer MiZion, Chabad in Israel and around the world. All of these are part of the mosaic of the Jewish People. The "covenant of those who serve" that you speak of can be expanded to all spheres of national responsibility and mutual commitment.

Argue – But Work Together

This does not mean that there will not be disagreements. You can still argue about policy, leadership, the judicial network, and the future of Yesha, and you can even continue to criticize Netanyahu. But these disputes must not prevent us from cooperating vis-à-vis our common challenges.

All I ask, Naftali, is to utilize the political daring you showed in the past – and this time, for the sake of bringing our political camps closer. You have shown that you can surprise the political establishment and do what others thought was impossible. Has the time not come to do it again? Who knows if this is not your destiny!