The Refusers Must be Totally Renounced – Especially by the Left!

by Emmanuel Shiloh, editor of B'sheva magazine, translated by Hillel Fendel.

1.

This column will focus mainly on piercing criticism of those who refuse, for political reasons, to serve in the IDF during wartime and thus sabotage the war effort.
On the extreme fringes of our left-wing camp, refusal to serve in the IDF has once again raised its ugly head. Last time it was because of the attempts to institute some judicial reforms – and this time, too, the refusers are complaining that the "end of Israeli democracy" is near. Why? Because the government wishes to fire Shabak chief Ronen Bar as well as the Legal Counsel to the Government, Gali Bahrav-Miara. Bar functioned miserably on October 7^th, having failed to inform his superiors of indications of the Hamas plans as late as 4 AM that terrible morning.

But we begin it with praise and prayer for our combat soldiers and their success, and for the new IDF leadership that has brought a fresh spirit to the ranks. We also pray for our government, whose task this time is to be even stronger and firmer than it has been until now, and to fight until victory. There must be no agreement with Hamas, other than one for its total surrender. We must conquer all of Gaza, impose a military government there, dismantle Hamas, and locate and free our captive brothers.

Our beloved soldiers: Rise up and succeed; smite and defeat the enemy; and may the G-d of Israel come to your aid.

2.

Bahrav-Miara, too, seeks to thwart the government's plans at every opportunity. Even Minister Gideon Saar, who appointed her to the post under the Bennett-Lapid government, now regrets his choice. "You promised to be a counsel who enables [things to get done]," he told her. "What happened to that?" The answer is that she was indeed an enabler – but only for the Bennett-Lapid government. She found no legal grounds to prevent it from giving away sovereign off-shore territory without a popular referendum, as required by law; she found no problem when the transitional government appointed a Chief of Staff just days before national elections, nor when it sought to appoint the chairman of the committee that vets senior appointments at the same time (the Supreme Court later disqualified this move). She was also very enabling of the anti-reform protestors, claiming that "a protest cannot be effective if it does not disturb the public order." As if there is some legal principle that obligates the state, and the poor drivers stuck for hours in protest-blocked traffic, to make sure that a protest is "effective." 

On the other hand, regarding the Netanyahu government, she manages to find "legal impediments" to its policies wherever she looks. She did not allow Netanyahu to appoint Deri as a minister, nor to appoint Ben-Gvir for a second time (though he has been appointed despite her objections), nor to appoint a temporary (!) chairperson of the Second Channel Authority. And of course, she is blocking the government from firing the head of the Shabak – despite the law that permits exactly that. In no fewer than 25 cases, she has refused to represent the government position. Nevertheless, in spite of all this, the wild protests continue in Tel Aviv, and some of the more zealous leaders even announced their refusal to serve in the IDF. 

Another excuse that apparently justifies their "conscientious objections" is the government's stance on the painful, complex issue of the hostages. Netanyahu wants very much to see them home, and in fact succeeded in getting Hamas to agree to release 30 of them, plus another eight corpses. For this we paid a terrible price of the freeing of hundreds of dangerous terrorist murderers, "humanitarian" aid to Hamas that fills its coffers and strengthens its regime, and even three months of ceasefire, enabling it to rearm, regroup, and replant explosives and booby traps. We can only hope and pray that by some miracle, our soldiers won't pay for all this with their lives.

Netanyahu is also willing to continue along these lines – but one thing he is not willing to do, and that is to agree to end the war while Hamas is still armed and in power. The government of Israel is willing to go a long way to receive the hostages – but will not agree to commit suicide.

Parts of the left-wing camp not only do not accept this position, but accuse Netanyahu of actively preferring his own interests over those of the hostages and the country. Some of them then go even further and refuse to serve in the army – in wartime, yet!

This time, though, as opposed to the refusals during the anti-reform protests, when reactions were fairly apathetic, the public is not having it. Even the IDF has learned its lesson, and new Chief of Staff Lt.-Gen. Eyal Zamir has already permanently removed from service two soldiers, including a combat navigator, who said they would not serve.

This response is the correct one: "You don't want to fight alongside your comrades for the protection of your country and for the release of the hostages? Everyone else should fight except for you? Fine, don't do us any favors. The courageous, patriotic soldiers who understand the importance of this holy mission will do the job without you, and you, when you wake up to what you have done, will have to live forever with the disgrace of having run away from the battlefield."

Another grave aspect of these refusals is that they seem to be decided upon with barely any deliberation. After all, it is now clear that regarding the judicial reform, the Supreme Court did the job in at least once instance by nullifying one of the relevant laws [the one that would have greatly restricted the use of "not reasonable" as a reason to nullify a Knesset law]. So what was the purpose in refusing to fight for your country?

Even more grating are the current protests against the government's firing of Shabak chief Ronen Bar – at the same time that the matter has been taken to the Supreme Court! Make up your minds: If the Court accepts your position, your refusals will have been totally unnecessary. And if the Court allows the firing, then you will of course have to accept it. So where do you get off trying once again to shake up and divide the IDF, this time in the middle of a war, after seeing the terrible price we paid last time? Does the goal of toppling Netanyahu dwarf every other consideration??

And so, this is the moment of truth for the sensible and responsible left: You must totally renounce and condemn the refusers, and give full backing to the IDF in its iron fist against them. This is the minimum that anyone who considers himself a true Israeli patriot must do.

The Trump Spirit Upon Netanyahu

by Dr. Tzvi Moses, clinical psychologist, translated by Hillel Fendel.

Let Netanyahu work – and at the same time, let's tone down the internal dispute, rise up together, and let the special history of the Jewish Nation a chance to speak its part.

On the backdrop of Israel's renewed offensive in Gaza, the questions have again arisen as to what Netanyahu's ultimate strategy really is. The commentators offer up all sorts of ideas and scenarios, while his many detractors always like to link anything he does or doesn't do to a need of his to strengthen his coalition and survive politically as Prime Minister.

It could be, however, that this time, they are simply wrong. Netanyahu is taking inspiration and strength from Donald Trump, and he is actually very involved in what is best for the State of Israel. In fact, his achievements thus far seemed just a year ago to be nothing more than dream-like.

It is a given that with Trump in office, we stand before a seemingly one-time historic opportunity to fortify the State of Israel as a country that can stand alone on its own two feet in defending itself and its citizens.

Despite Israel's current strong dependency upon the United States, our goal is to accumulate sufficient strength so that we will be able to withstand a change of administrations in the U.S. and a new international balance of power among the superpowers.

Our recent hostage exchange deal with Hamas - in which we released some 1,700 prisoners, including 620 bona-fide terrorists and murderers - has left Israel in a very vulnerable position. The dangerous weakness that we have revealed leaves us open to unacceptable and impossible Hamas demands in exchange for all the remaining hostages, in a manner that endangers the existence of the State of Israel. Hamas is basically demanding a total end to the war, with American and United Nations guarantees that will stop Israel from completing the job of liquidating Hamas.

This is the real meaning of the proclamations made by the "Free the hostages at any price!" campaign and the protestors in Tel Aviv. A surrender of this sort would form, almost immediately, a regional chain reaction among all of our enemies. They would learn clearly that they no longer need nuclear weapons to destroy us. All they have to do is assemble a bunch of kidnapping cells in order to dismantle Israeli society from within and thus destroy our country.

The populistic chants of "First the hostages, then smash Hamas" have no validity or truth. If we try this approach, we will stand weakened and helpless against our enemies. We are all well aware that the plight of the hostages' families, and of course the hostages themselves, is indescribably horrific, and it is incumbent upon us all to add prayers that the relevant authorities break their heads to think out of the box and figure out how to free them. But the deal currently on the table is a terrible one, and we may not allow ourselves to agree to it as now formulated.

On the other hand, Israel is currently operating relatively intensively against Hamas, and is practicing a much more active and aggressive security policy in Lebanon, Syria, to be followed by the same against the Houthis and Iran. Trump's backing in the meantime is amazing, surpassing anything our great strategic commentators ever envisioned.

These anti-Netanyahu journalists are occasionally bewildered by his success, though they steadfastly refuse to eat their hats and admit their mistakes. They certainly would never actually praise him for what has been his cautious and correct managing of everything that is going on. They rather keep finding additional claims to file against Netanyahu and his nationalist government. Yes, they do have one justified point, which is that while most of those responsible for the colossal catastrophe of Oct. 7^th have either quit or been fired, only Netanyahu himself – where the buck of responsibility is supposed to stop – remains deeply entrenched in his political seat. But in the end – so what?

Though they and many others on the left claim that justice is the epitome of what is fair and good, they refuse to acknowledge that most of the charges against Netanyahu are fabricated for political reasons. The trial against him will go down in infamy for the State Prosecution and the left-wing camp. Apparently, for them, justice is relative. In any event, Mr. Netanyahu is currently the Prime Minister, and he happens to be running several particularly successful moves and processes. Israel's political and military situation is in a very different place than it was, and even our still-limping economy is showing positive signs of recovery.

At this point in time, Netanyahu is the most suitable man in the country to lead us for at least the first two years of Trump's term in office. After that there will be elections for the U.S. Congress, and then here as well, and the voters will choose whom they wish.

The Trump spirit that has inspired and enveloped Netanyahu has granted him a great measure of self-confidence – sometimes a bit too much – in his drive to actualize the right-wing dream of cleaning out the leftist stables. Not only in the U.S., but here in Israel too, over-leftistism has taken up occupancy, sometimes openly and sometimes undercover, in all areas: security, academia, and especially in the judiciary. To balance this out is in no way a revolution or insurgency, as the protestors like to scream. It is rather a necessary approach to balance out the leftism that has accompanied the Jewish presence in the Land of Israel since even before the establishment of the State.

In any event, what is required of both sides now is to enlist our strengths to tone down the internal dispute, rise above the situation together, and allow the special history of the Jewish Nation a chance to speak its part. Let us remind ourselves that the great Jewish spirit pulsates within Israel from Dan to Eilat.

How Far Back Must the War Investigation Go?

by Haggai Huberman, journalist and author, translated by Hillel Fendel.

Ariel Sharon announced his intention to "disengage" from Gush Katif and all of Gaza 20 years before the Simchat Torah massacre. The commission of inquiry must investigate how this led to the current war.

Most of the citizenry of Israel, it appears from a cursory glance at the daily headlines, favor a public commission of inquiry to determine what led up to the horrific massacre of Simchat Torah `23. The Israeli public does not like the clumsy attempts of the government and the Prime Minister, via various tricks and excuses, to avoid having to answer to such a commission.

However, it is not clear from what date this commission should start its research.

I would recommend that the government agree to a public commission of inquiry. After all, the government will be the body that sets the subjects of inquiry and their limits. Netanyahu's government therefore has the opportunity and the right to tell the commission to focus on government policy not only of the few years, but of the last two decades. Why that long?

It will be recalled that almost exactly 20 years before the massacre, in Dec. 2023, then-Prime Minister Ariel Sharon announced his intention – contrary to everything he had promised in the election campaign less than a year earlier – to withdraw unilaterally from Gaza. That is, all of our armed forces, and the 22 Jewish communities in Gaza (mostly in Gush Katif, were to be physically removed. This was known as the Disengagement Plan.

What is the connection between this Disengagement and the horrors of Oct. 7^th? Finding the answer to that question is exactly what I am proposing as a central topic for the inquiry. To pinpoint the connection, the following questions may not be avoided, and they must be directly answered:

·        To what extent did Israel's withdrawal from the Gaza Strip enable Hamas to build up its humongous military force, in terms of both personnel (the Nukhba units) and its rocket arsenals?

·        How is that Hamas succeeded [in 2007] in defeating Fatah and taking over Gaza militarily from the PA, but did not succeed in doing so in Judea and Samaria?

·        How is it that the Arabs of Judea and Samaria did not perpetrate an invasion and massacre similar to the what the Arabs of Gaza executed?

·        To what extent did the withdrawal detract from the intelligence capabilities of the IDF and the Shabak? No one disputes that critical information regarding Hamas intentions that morning of Oct. 7^th did not reach Israeli intelligence bodies in time.

Regarding that last point, we know that the Shabak conducted an internal inquiry, of which only small portions have been publicized. The report states that "there was relatively little intelligence, as a result (inter alia) of restrictions on our freedom of action [in Gaza] and increasing difficulties in the Shabak's independent ability to complete intelligence/operational processes there."

These words are precisely what the commission must investigate: Why were there such "restrictions" that led to "relatively little intelligence" specifically in Gaza, and not in Judea and Samaria? [It is axiomatic that intelligence is very hard to obtain without physical presence in the area being scouted. - HF]

Without detracting from the responsibility of the current political and military leaderships for the events of Oct. 7^th, the very demand to investigate also the government of 20 years ago can serve as a litmus test for the commission of inquiry that is to arise:

If it is willing to begin its investigation 20 years back, regarding events that (many feel) marked the beginning of the process that ended with the Hamas invasion/slaughter of nearly 18 months ago, then it can be said to be objective and public-minded. But if it seeks all sorts of tricks to avoid having to investigate the Sharon era and place some of the responsibility on him, this automatically places a large question mark on the reliability and trustworthiness of the commission and its conclusions.

In addition, if a measure of blame is accorded to Sharon and the Disengagement, it will have ramifications for any future consideration of similar unilateral or other withdrawals.

Netanyahu's Share of Responsibility

A public commission of inquiry must also investigate the failure of the Netanyahu governments' policies over the years that led to this war. However, while the left-wing seeks to indicate that Netanyahu's failure lies in his "managing the conflict" instead of trying to reach a diplomatic solution, I believe the opposite: "Managing the conflict" was a correct approach, but it was applied only in Judea and Samaria – from where no Oct. 7^th emanated!

Let's assume for a moment that there had been a "diplomatic process" with the PA which had actually led to some sort of a peace agreement; highly improbable, I know. The only result would have been terrorists roaring through Jewish towns along the Green Line such as Modiin, Kfar Saba and Raanana on motorcycles and Toyotas, as happened in Jewish towns near Gaza on Oct. 7^th.

Other say that we shouldn't have separated between Yesha and Gaza. But again, I believe that that actually worked in our favor, serving as an additional factor why the Arabs in Judea and Samaria did not follow their cousins in Gaza and attempt their own slaughter of Israelis.

For example, consider that in 1987, when Yesha and Gaza were not officially separate, the first intifada broke out in northern Gaza and then quickly spread to Judea and Samaria. The second intifada started simultaneously in Gaza and Yesha (and even among Arab-Israelis), in September 2000. But in clear contrast, the Simchat Torah war never expanded to Yesha, despite the hopes of then-Hamas leader Yihye Sinwar for a "joining of the fronts."

Where, then, is the real failure of Netanyahu? It lies in his formulation and implementation of the motto, "Quiet will be met with quiet." That is, if Hamas remains quiet, Israel will view this as if Hamas is "deterred" – even if, as it turned out, it was simply biding its time while preparing for war – and we won't initiate an offensive.

How could the Likud have forgotten the famous line of its ideological founder, Zev Jabotinsky, who wrote in one of his poems, "Quiet is filth." He meant of course that to remain passive in the face of major challenges can lead to tragedy. The suitcases of dollars that our government transferred to Hamas was not meant to strengthen Hamas at the expense of the Palestinian Authority, as opponents of the government claim. It rather stemmed from a fear of war, and from the foolish belief that an improvement in Gaza's economic situation will weaken Sinwar's passion to murder Jews.

It wasn't only Netanyahu, of course, who believed this. This belief started back in the days of Shimon Peres, and encompassed also Galant, Gantz, outgoing Shabak head Ronen Bar, former IDF Chief of Staff Hertzy HaLevy, Yair Lapid, Naftali Bennett, and others whom I have forgotten; my apologies to them and to the readers. Each of them is equally responsible, but the Prime Minister – who has been in office for many years – has a bit more responsibility than all the rest. The sad result was that Hamas was permitted to build its monstrous strength over the course of years.

Our conclusions concern not only whom to blame in the past, but mainly how we are to act in the future. The State of Israel must achieve the release of all the living hostages (yes, living; contrary to popular opinion, it's OK if we wait until the next war to receive the corpses), and this is possible only if we negotiate and pay heavy prices. After they have all been released, then we can go on to implement another line in Jabotinsky's poem: "Carry the fire to ignite."

Note: This was written just before the IDF resumed the war in Gaza this week.

Do Not Forget!

by Emmanuel Shiloh, editor of B'sheva magazine, translated by Hillel Fendel. (written just days before the IDF renewed its all-out war against Hamas this week)

We have a mandate to obliterate Amalek – and certainly not to leave the job in the middle and thus forget what he did to us. We're holding a good set of cards; let's be strong and do it!

1.      We met up with Purim 5785 at a crossroads period, as we paused to see what awaited us on the horizon: War, the release of our hostages, or neither. It was clear that the longer this period lasted, the more we were in danger of violating the Torah command "never to forget" – in this case, never to forget what the Amalekite Hamas did to us. The memories of the slaughter and worse were already beginning to blur a bit… 

2.       Stage One of the hostage release deal ended in early March. We received with great happiness 30 live hostages, as well as the bodies of eight who were cruelly murdered on or since Simchat Torah 2023. In exchange, Israel released 1,904 terrorist prisoners, mostly to Gaza. Sixty-one of them were released to eastern Jerusalem and another 352 to Judea and Samaria; no fewer than 547 of them had been involved in the murder of Israelis. Another 225 were banished abroad, after having murdered Jews, dispatched murderers, or manufactured weapons for the murder of Jews.

During this period, we saw, aside from the joyous Arab receptions accorded the worst of our enemies upon their release, also hundreds of thousands of Gazans returning to what was left of their homes in northern Gaza, without any effective security checks. [They are now being redirected southward again, to western Gaza City. – HF] Similarly we know that the Hamas used this two-month ceasefire period to reorganize and rearm, to plant bombs, and to recruit hundreds more terrorists to join the estimated 30,000 already waiting to attack Israel.

3.       A list of nearly 700 Israelis who were murdered by terrorists included in the current round's mass release from jail was publicized last week in Maariv by radio and print  commentator Kalman Liebskind. This unusual item only illustrated the extent to which the Israeli media, most of which is completely mobilized in favor of the deal, tries to make us forget its heavy costs, both defense-wise and morally. For let us not forget: The families of the future victims of these murderers, Heaven forbid, will surely grieve as painfully as those of past victims; the only difference is that we don't yet know who they are.

4.       A shallow and superficial debate has been going on here for a while regarding the pros and cons of giving in to Hamas demands in order to secure the release of the hostages. During the course of what might also be called a propaganda campaign, we have seen ignoramuses who may never have opened a book of Halakhah [Jewish Law] in their lives rush to quote Maimonides on the overriding importance of "redeeming captives." Unfortunately, they forget to note the Rambam's qualification that captives are not to be redeemed for more than "they are worth," in order not to encourage future hostage-grabbings. Those who quote him also overlook the simple fact that we are not currently dealing with the redemption of captives, but with the laws of war. 

In addition, the Israeli law code stipulates clearly what we may offer in terms of imprisoned terrorists in a hostage-release deal – and the current agreement stands in gross violation of the specified terms. Is there no limit to our willingness to be blackmailed? If one day someone kidnaps innocent citizens and threatens to kill them if Yigal Amir is not freed from prison, would he be released? And if the terrorists demanded that we give them all the territory west of the now-infamous Route 232, including Kibbutzim Kfar Aza, Be'eri, Nir Oz, and more – would we agree? How is it that not all of us see that whenever we cave in to them, they are encouraged to kidnap more and more Israelis?

And if the next time, they demand that we uproot a few Yesha communities, or give up the Temple Mount, or demolish our nuclear plant in Dimona – would we agree, in keeping with the approach that "saving the hostages" takes priority over everything else? Is there any limit at all?!

And from another angle: Do we have the moral right to eschew our responsibility to bring the murderers of hundreds of Israelis to justice?

5.       For those who truly wish to analyze this issue with Halakhic eyes, let us note that there is also a Torah commandment not to "take ransom for the life of a murderer subject to the death penalty, as he must be put to death" (Numbers 35,31). And if we currently lack the moral clarity to execute those who murder us, as the Torah mandates, and imprison them for life instead – then at least let us not take ransom to release them from prison. For the Torah continues there (verse 33): "When blood is shed in the land, it cannot be atoned for except through the blood of he who shed it." The murder of innocents that goes unpunished is, very simply, a contamination and pollution of the land.

6.       It is likely that we will have no choice but to set out for war once again against Hamas/Amalek. It cannot be denied that this will not be easy after this long hiatus. We have all benefited from a routine of relative serenity, without sirens, reserves call-ups, and military funerals. Many reservists have shed their uniforms and returned to their families and jobs. But this quiet is simply misleading. If we don't finish the job against Hamas once and for all, we will be like King Saul who started to fulfill the command to wipe out Amalek but then allowed King Agag to live. Saul did not finish the job – and thus his kingship was seized from him and "given to his colleague who was better than him," David.

Israel's unsteady security situation is the result of decades of addiction to "quiet," and refusing to pay the price of warring against evil. At least now, we dare not allow ourselves to pass these dangers down to our children and grandchildren – not the dangers of Iran, not those of Gaza, and not those of Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen – and certainly not those emanating from Judea and Samaria. For even if we would wish to avoid the big battles, we simply won't be able to. If we do not obliterate Hamas now, then within just a few years, the story of Simchat Torah '23 will repeat itself. We will not have quiet if we don't finish the job.

As of now, we are holding a good hand of cards: There is no additional front in the north, Hamas has been weakened greatly, the United States is not only not hindering but is actually helpful, and our military leadership has been refreshed. All that's left for us is to strengthen our spirit for another round, with the faith and knowledge and strategy that this time we will absolutely win. Let us, as the Torah commands, annihilate the memory of Amalek from beneath the heavens.

Post-War Inquiries: Where's the Inquiry into the War With Hizbullah?

by Haggai Huberman, journalist and author, translated by Hillel Fendel.

In one of the parking lots in the IDF's Tzrifin compound in Rishon LeTzion is parked a line of light trucks and full-size trucks. They are painted in a variety of colors, including some in colors of camouflage. A cursory glance reveals that some of the vehicles are damaged and in bad shape. A deeper look shows their contents: missile launchers, anti-aircraft guns, and more – last used in Lebanon to fire mostly at Israeli civilian targets.

These are most of the vehicles of the Radwan special operation forces unit of Hizbullah, whose principle mission is to infiltrate Israel's Galilee. They were captured in southern Lebanon during the short time (most of Oct.-Nov. 2024) that the IDF was present there, before retreating under the France/U.S.-brokered ceasefire.

Over the past two weeks, the Israeli press has been focusing on the commissions of inquiry into the events of Simchat Torah 5754 (Oct. 7, 2023) along Israel's border with Gaza and points further east. But we have not heard of any similar inquiries into what happened on the northern front, in the battles that took place, or that didn't take place, with Hizbullah.

The reason for this, apparently, is that the ruthless Nukhba forces of Hamas struck us a very painful blow, inconceivable even now, while the Radwan units sufficed with firing rockets from a distance. This caused damage to thousands of homes, to be sure, but they did not invade Israel in their thousands, did not murder over 1,000 Israelis, and did not kidnap hundreds of Jews.

If Hizbullah had dispatched their forces to do so simultaneously with the Hamas attack, precisely according to the original Iranian plan and as Sinwar hoped, how successful would they have been? We can only imagine it with dread. Would we have known about it in advance? Probably not – but we cannot be sure, because as far as is known, no analysis or inquiry into the northern arena is being carried out.  

Let us also recall that tens of Jewish communities and towns on Israel's northern border were evacuated for their own safety, just as on our border with Gaza. The difference is that in the south, most of the residents have returned home, while in the north, most have not.

I visited last week the exhibit of the weapons we captured from Hizbullah. We saw the Toyotas and Hyundais - the notorious pickup-trucks of the type used in the Hamas attack - equipped with 80mm and 107mm rocket launchers, the very ones that Hizbillah fired massively at Galilee communities over the past year. They were captured not far from northern Israel, in the narrow strip that the IDF occupied for eight weeks. Most of the vehicles that were confiscated were brought to Israel, and the rest were apparently destroyed.

Looking at the Hizbullah weapons and stocks in Tzrifin, and knowing that much more are stored elsewhere in Israel, one is shocked by the thought of what could have happened if Radwan had infiltrated as and when Hizbullah did.

The explanations regarding what I was seeing were given by Lt.-Col. Idan Sharon Kantar, the deputy commander of the Loot Clearance Unit. This is a General Staff unit that travels around the area and collects the equipment and other weapons that the enemy leaves behind, so that it can be investigated and studied.

Officer Kantar explains that the main differences between Hamas and Hizbullah primarily concern the way they each maintain their weapons. Both terrorist forces prolifically use Kalashnikov rifles, for instance, known as AK-47's. "The Kalash is the basic, daily weapon of Hamas," Lt.-Col. Kantar explains, "and the ones that we captured were in various stages of overuse. But in Hizbullah, they are well-kept, and we found them as new as if they had just come from the factory. Most of the Kalash's that we found were made in China, and looked brand new."

"But in Hamas, it's a different story," he said. "They don't have rifles that they're saving for war time; the guns are always in use. But with Hizbullah, some of them were still in their original packing. Most of them had the name of the user, and where he was serving, etc. – very organized."

"Another interesting thing we saw was the uniformity. In Hamas, you can see how every battalion has its own equipment – different than the other battalions. But in Hizbullah, there is a planning body that defines the same formats for all the forces. The same stickers were on all the rifles, no matter where we found them, and we also saw that there was a certain uniform ratio of weapons, cartridges and bullets to each terrorist. The level of planning in Hizbullah was much higher than with Hamas.

"Hizbullah was much more modern. Even if they manufactured their own explosives, they didn't do it in an underground lab, like in Gaza. They had organized laboratories, with bona-fide chemists and engineers working there. Hizbullah was a very organized army. Most of what we found there was not improvised, but rather originated in industrial plants, with clear instructions for use."

Lt.-Col. Kantar continued contrasting Hizbullah with Hamas: "Most of the RPG rockets of Hamas are made in Gaza, or put together in Gaza. Sometimes they take pieces from existing rockets to make or improve new ones; most of the rockets are not new. They have many that were dismantled and rebuilt by them themselves. Hizbullah, however, has money for whatever it needs; they buy new weapons, without having to put them together. In addition, there is a highway from Damascus to Tehran, and a seaport in Lebanon, and an airport of course. They were able to get whatever they needed."

OK, so now we have a much clearer picture – one that tells us how little we knew on that infamous Simchat Torah about what was actually going on beyond our northern border fence. What is now understood is that if Hizbullah had acted in tandem with Hamas that day, it's hard to even imagine the horrors we would have been tortured with.

The current inquiries are important, and help us draw the correct lessons, both operationally and intelligence-wise. But we must conduct in-depth investigations not only regarding the southern arena, but just as much – and perhaps more – concerning the north as well.