[Article originally appeared in Besheva (Hebrew) and translated by Hillel Fendel]
by Assaf Mishnayot
B'sheva, Nov. 15, '18
Deterrence vis-à-vis Hamas
has not been achieved, and the present quiet is simply a lull, with no
guarantee that it will last for any length of time. The intensive Hamas rocket
barrage inflicted last week on Israel's northern Negev areas, all the way up to
Ashkelon, proved that the country's political and military echelons have no
real plan or program as to how to deal with Hamas. It is doubtful whether we will
be able to attain true quiet along Israel's Gaza border for a significant
period.
The ceasefire declared on Tuesday of
last week, immediately following a 24-hour bombardment of more than 450 Hamas
rockets on Israeli towns and cities, was met with fury in the Israeli public.
This was true particularly in the south, where it is known and felt that the
next round of hostilities is just around the corner. Though the Israel Air
Force made some impressive strikes against terror infrastructures in Gaza, it
was Hamas and not Israel that smelled the fragrance of victory. The basic sense
is that the IDF simply is not providing military solutions to the Gaza problem
– and this has been borne out even by statements of the Security Cabinet
members.
"Something incredible occurred
during the Security Cabinet meetings [during the barrage]," says Col.
(ret.) Dr. Eran Lerman, Vice President of the Jerusalem Institute for Strategic
Studies. "The entire professional echelon there agreed that the battle in
Gaza must not be allowed to be upgraded to anything approaching real war. I
would have expected that other opinions would be heard – but this did not
happen. The sense is that what happens in Gaza must be removed from its local
context, and must be seen only in terms of the entire region – and especially
Iran. Everything revolves around Iran."
Lerman concludes that there is truly
no genuine solution to the Gaza problem: "The illusion that there might be
a solution is liable to take us to very dangerous places – either a war like
the First Lebanon War, or to an agreement such as Oslo; both of these were
catastrophes for us. We have to simply try to manage the situation, and to
manage it well."
Asked whether the toppling of
significant buildings in Gaza by Israeli bombs did not achieve a measure of
deterrence that might delay the next Hamas attacks, Lerman expresses his
doubts: "What Israel did was a step in the right direction, but it did not
bring about real deterrence. Unlike the northern front, where Israel has been
relatively successful in achieving deterrence, the situation in Gaza is much
more complex."
Not everyone agrees with Lerman.
"The main problem is that the Israeli government has no clear strategic
plan regarding what it wants in Gaza," says Col. (ret.) MK Moti Yogev of
the Jewish Home party, who serves as a member of the Knesset's Foreign Affairs
and Security Committee. "We have a good plan in the north, and in Judea
and Samaria as well. But in Gaza we just settle for quiet and safety, without a
real program as to how to achieve this. What is needed is deterrence, which can
be achieved only if we resume our strategy of pinpointing Hamas leaders and
taking them out."
"Knocking down their buildings
has not stopped them from firing rockets at us," Yogev emphasizes, "nor
has our strategy of 'gestures.' Hamas understands only real power, and we have
to hit their leaders hard. One day they will choose a leader who doesn't want
to get killed, or a civil government unlinked with the terrorist
organizations."
Hard to Maintain High
Standards
Absurdly, this last round of combat
– the most intense since the seven-week Tzuk Eitan (Protective Edge) Campaign
in the summer of 2014 – took place just when it appeared that a hasdarah,
a long-range arrangement in Gaza, was being agreed upon. On Sunday evening,
Prime Minister Netanyahu held a press conference in Paris and said that such a
development of this nature was not out of the question. "Will it succeed?
It's too early to tell," he said.
Within a few hours, it was no longer
too early to see that it definitely would not succeed. Reports began filtering
in of massive Israeli airstrikes in the Rafah area, and Israeli residents in
the south added their own testimonies of increasing numbers of heavy military
equipment making their way towards Gaza. Hamas began reporting that members of its
Izz ad-Din al-Kassam Brigades had been killed, including Nur Barakeh, the
commander of the Brigades' eastern regiment.
The IDF Spokesman's Office, for its
part, released no information as to what was going on, leading to country-wide
rumors that a soldier had been taken captive – one of Israel's worst
nightmares. These were finally put to rest only after hours of nail-bitingly
frustrating concern and guessing.
The incident that apparently ignited
the situation happened on Sunday. As the Israeli public gradually learned over
the course of the days since then, an elite IDF force made its way deep into
Gaza on a secret mission, and inadvertently found itself near the home of
senior Hamas leader Nur Barakeh. At a certain point, the force was exposed and
discovered; as it sought to make its way back home, shots were exchanged, and
Col. M. (his name has not been released because of the high-level secret
operations in which he was involved) was killed; another officer was seriously
wounded, while seven terrorist members of Hamas and Islamic Jihad were killed.
The IDF carried out the rescue of
the trapped Israeli force in what it called "one of the most impressive
operations in recent years." The Air Force took part, both in bombing the
area and in flying the warriors back to Israel. Not one Israeli suffered a
scratch during the course of the rescue.
Former IAF Commander Gen. Eitan
Ben-Eliyahu acknowledged, in a talk with B'Sheva, that the operation was not
faultless: "Mistakes can happen, especially when similar operations repeat
themselves often. Caution decreases a bit, the other side begins to learn your
moves, and the risks increase. We paid a heavy price this time."
The IDF imposed a veil of secrecy
over the details of the operation, though it denied the Hamas claims that the objective
was the capture of a top Hamas leader. Hamas itself wasn't sure whether Israel
had targeted Barakeh or Marwan Issa, who heads the Hamas military apparatus.
The IDF stated only that the operation was routine and was carried out
successfully.
460 Rockets
By the next day, no shred of a hasdarah
was left. Beginning shortly after 4 PM, Hamas began firing rockets throughout
southern Israel, reaching a total of 460 – nearly one every three minutes over
the course of 24 hours – and hitting as far north as Ashkelon (population
150,000). The Iron Dome defense system, which up til now has been quite
effective in intercepting Kassam rockets, did not perform as well as had been
hoped. It did deflect 100 rockets, but several others hit buildings or
populated neighborhoods in Sderot, Netivot, Ashkelon, the Ashkelon coast,
Ofakim, and elsewhere. Only one person was killed – an Arab man from the Hevron
area; his uncle planned the infamous Bus #300 terrorist attack in 1984.
Israel hit back hard against the
rocket barrage, hitting a number of key targets. Among them were the Hamas
television offices, the Al-Rachma building that served as the Hamas TV
channel's previous headquarters, Hamas Internal Security headquarters, Hamas
Intelligence offices, and others. The homes of leading Hamas terrorist and
officials were destroyed, as was the Palestine Academy. The IDF made clear that
its successes were even greater than during Protective Edge.
Military achievements
notwithstanding, many Israelis feel that Israel lost in the all-important
political arena. "We simply did not achieve the deterrence effect that we
need," MK Yogev said. "The bottom line is that Hamas feels that it is
a stronger threat against us than was the case a week earlier. What this means,
very simply, is that the next round is very close."
It may be hard to recall, but
Israeli attempts to reach quiet on the Gaza front just before the recent
violence included the transfer of suitcases with $15 million from Qatar to
Gaza. Netanyahu came under strong domestic criticism for allowing the move, and
many Gazans did not like it either; #TheySoldUsOut became a common Twitter refrain
in many areas of the Gaza Strip. Still, Israel's military echelons are nearly
unanimously in favor of the money transfer. Yogev explained why:
"For one thing, it emphasizes
and enforces the disconnection between [PA chairman] Abu Mazen and Gaza. With
this funding from Qatar, we finally free ourselves of the terrible conception
advanced by the left that we can impose PA rule on Gaza. We have to realize
that the PA was never a factor in Gaza, and never will be. The left simply
hopes that the PA can take over in Gaza, and include Judea and Samaria at the
same time – all under one united PA regime. We now see that this won't work.
Secondly, even as we try to take out the top Hamas and Islamic Jihad leaders,
we have to take responsibility for the humanitarian situation in Gaza – for no
one else will do it. If not, it could explode in our face one day."
Gen. Ben-Eliyahu doesn't agree:
"Whoever thinks that allowing the transfer of these $15 million will get
the Gazans to stop their violence is simply fooling himself. We might think
that this is a major move, but for them it's very little compared to their
ultimate objective – nothing less than the total removal of any form of any closure
upon Gaza. That is, the road to a genuine hasdarah is a long one,
involving a very fragile security situation, the Gazans' demand for thousands
of work permits in Israel, and more. Money alone can't bring the desired quiet
– though the flames can be put on hold for given periods of time."
Q. You're saying that all Hamas
really wants is hasdarah and the ability to bring goods in freely – but
it doesn’t look that way on the ground. They keep violating every ceasefire. To
which Hamas should we pay attention: the one that talks, or the one that fires
at us?
A. "Part of their strategy to
reach hasdarah is via their periodic rounds of violence, which they see
as a legitimate approach. Don't forget that if it hadn't been for the original
undercover incident [on Sunday], we wouldn't have been talking about rockets,
but only about the weekly protests near the fence. Everyone knew, and we saw it
in the Gaza reactions, that the Gazans did not want war."
Not everyone agrees with this view,
either. For one thing, the recent round of violence could easily have
deteriorated into full-fledged war had the Sderot gas deposit that was hit by a
Kassam rocket actually exploded.
In addition, as Col. Lerman
explained, "Many of us were quite surprised at the extent of the Hamas
display of force, and this is true of many in the IDF as well. They utilized
many of the means at their disposal, probably under pressure from the Gaza
public. Many Gazans felt that the Hamas leaders sold out the public and its
interests for $15 million."
Lerman feels that the undercover
incident was used to justify their attacks, "but they could have sufficed
with the few rockets they fired on Sunday night. Instead, they preferred to
keep firing for many hours, knowing that it could lead to full-scale war at any
moment."