by Dr. Chaim Asa and Gen. (res.) Gershon HaCohen, translated by Hillel Fendel
The focus in Israeli society on the Iranian nuclear threat, as heard often and loudly in leaders' declarations and public discourse, seems to have reached a peak over the past two weeks.
It is certainly true that the Iranian government is threatening the State of Israel. And it is definitely appropriate for the IDF to build a suitable, multi-capability force to deal with this unprecedented, complex Iranian challenge.
However, we would be well-advised to consider not only the potential threat itself, but also the place that this threat occupies in our national agenda, and its effect on the State of Israel's sense of identity. We should perhaps even go further and note the extent to which the trauma based on the immediate association of "nuclear Iran" with "destruction" has developed and taken dominant hold in Israeli society. Israeli leaders have hammered this into us, and recently, even ostensible security experts are singing the same tune. Why does no one stand up to them to suggest that perhaps their view of the situation is all wrong?
It would be a good idea to examine what it is about the Iranian nuclear threat that penetrates so deeply the psyche and culture of Jews in the State of Israel. Let this be an invitation to Israeli society to reflect on its unresolved tensions, rooted in the conscious and subconscious of the basis of its identity.
The War of Independence has been ingrained in the Israeli awareness as a war of existential necessity. The wars that followed did not receive the same consensus – and herein lies the tempting power of the Iranian nuclear threat, presented as inherently existential in order to rally the sought-after unity. The threat is also not based on any "fault" of ours, such as the "occupation," and therefore leaves Israel as the quintessential, blameless victim. We perceive this threat as one of annihilation, familiar to us from Auschwitz, and one that indiscriminately endangers every Israeli and therefore unites us.
Israel has not yet faced a situation of MAD (mutually assured destruction), one that comprises a built-in mutual deterrent to the use of nuclear power. In a year or two, or maybe five, Israel and Iran might find themselves in such a relationship, or perhaps this is already the case. We must know that recent history has shown that MAD actually works! Ever since atomic bombs were dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki 78 years ago, no nuclear war has erupted, nor has any war broken out between two hostile nuclear states.
But while the world has fundamentally changed in strategic terms, Israel remains the same. Israel is a superpower on the functional level – but not yet on the strategic level, even regionally. It must adopt a new way of thinking, not only militarily, but also politically. This transition has greater existential importance than even the Iranian threat itself.
Another transition is also needed: Israeli experts continue to speak of the need for operational military actions to prevent Iran from obtaining military nuclear capabilities. The time has come for Israel to transition to a strategy of deterrence, rather than active prevention. Israel has the ability to create deterrence even vis-à-vis a nuclear Iran, and thus form a stable and permanent balance of power in the region. By constantly harping on the need to do away with the "existential threat," Israel's leaders are making a dangerous mistake – one that might deteriorate to a military clash that could both exact very heavy prices from Israel and also not prevent Iran from gaining nuclear capabilities. Our leaders will then roll their eyes heavenward and say, "It was a war of no-choice, of an existential danger."
But is that really true? The late great Rav Yosef Dov Soloveitchik wrote that historic Jewish identity was braided with both the Covenant of Destiny (brit yiud) and the Covenant of Fate (brit goral). Thus inspired, Jewish thinkers in the modern period, following the Holocaust and the establishment of the State of Israel, sought to develop a Jewish identity on the basis of a common destiny and not just a common catastrophic fate. But this has not yet taken root in Israel, whose leaders over the years have chosen to concentrate on the uniting abilities of a common existential fear. Thus was born the political need for the threat and fear of a nuclear Iran.
A professional study of Iran's nuclear threat shows how non-absolute are its dangers. Even if the Iranians are able to reach their goal of building a bomb, they will have considerable reasons why they should not actually use it. And even if, Heaven forbid, they do fire it at Israel, this will not mean the end of Israel. Countries do not disappear or collapse after one strike, even if it is nuclear. Nations have gone through terrible times and yet continue to exist; witness Syria of recent years. And even if we were to be attacked, we have room to hope that our situation will not deteriorate to that of Syria. [Translator's note: Quite minimal consolation...] We can even expect that we will not only not collapse, but will emerge victorious from the resulting war with Iran.
Israel's leaders must make every effort to ensure that the Iranian threats do not materialize, and to develop capabilities for the necessary response. But it is also in our best interest to reduce our existential fears – which depend largely on the story we tell ourselves regarding the reasons why we rebuilt our nationhood here in the Land of our Forefathers.
From its very inception, the story of modern Zionism has wavered between two ultimate goals: on the one hand, the ancient objective of Israel's Redemption, and on the other, the minimalist goal of providing a safe haven for the persecuted Jewish People, as the First Zionist Congress formulated it in 1897. Over two decades ago, Gen. Benny Peled well expressed his desire to see the second goal simply evaporate: "If I were able, I would love to see the 'safe haven' goal be erased from our lexicon and from our consciousness… I would like this definition restricting a Jewish entity in recognized borders secured by external providers of funding and shelter to be deleted. I would like in its stead to see a definition that echoes the idea of the State of the Jews as formulated by Herzl, namely, 'a country of Jews in the Land of Israel, founded by Jews who grew tired of Exile and of second-class status and who are willing to give their lives for it.'"
For those who strive for nothing more than a safe haven, the Iranian threat must certainly be quite frustrating. If after all our efforts of the past century, Zionism has succeeded only in replacing the existential threats of Kishinev-style pogroms and persecution with a different type of existential threat in the form of Iranian nuclear bombs, there is no choice but to ask: "Have not the Jews in Brooklyn found a more effective solution?" The answer of course is negative, but only if we understand the true nature and purpose of the State of Israel.
This is precisely where we must conduct the essential discussion regarding the security of the State of Israel, and not solely on the basis of risk and threat calculations. It must take a penetrating look at our founding objective and vision, as Ben-Gurion made sure to emphasize: "It is not security that is our main goal, but rather the redemption of Israel, the ingathering of exiles, and our national rising-up."
As Israelis have drifted away from awareness of our objective of Redemption, the Iranian threat has become a way for Israeli society and leadership to ignore the real challenges of our national awakening. Despite Iran's persistence in pursuing a nuclear bomb, we need to reassess whether this threat must be placed at the top of Israel's national agenda. Over the years, this placement has detracted from our efforts on other fronts, including domestically. We have all but lost our sovereignty in parts of the Negev and Galilee, which is a long-term threat on the State of Israel no less than the Iranian threat.
By focusing its political efforts on the Iranian threat, our government has enabled the U.S. to condition, even if not overtly, its support for our Iran-related demands upon our fulfilling its own demands relating to Judea/Samaria and the Palestinian Authority. This dependency has led, inter alia, to the ongoing reticence of Israeli governments to build in key areas in Jerusalem, such as Atarot.
While we have been so busy with the Iranian perils, new threats have sprouted up around us. Most dangerously, their potential to endanger us is much greater than the Iranian menace. It is time to reassess our all-encompassing concern for what Iran might have and do.