by Emanuel Shilo, Editor of Besheva Weekly, translated by Hillel Fendel.
The resignation of Lt.-Gen. Hertzi HaLevi as IDF Chief
of Staff was sad but necessary, and must lead to a major change in the very
conception of how the IDF is to fight our enemies.
HaLevi's resignation was regrettable because he is a
good man, with admirable values, who dedicated his life to Israel's security. Even
in the current multi-front war he exhibited great tactical abilities, brought
us great achievements, and was party to some very impressive successes.
It was necessary, however – not only because HaLevi led
the list of those who were responsible for the worst calamity ever experienced
by the State of Israel, but also, and more critically, because he failed to
achieve the war objectives in Gaza.
Despite the clear blame that he has now accepted upon
himself for Oct. 7th, he was given another chance, as well as nearly
unlimited resources to fight the war against Hamas and win it decisively. His
strategy, however, did not lead to the achievement of either of the two main
objectives set by the government: destroying Hamas, and freeing the hostages.
Yes, after 15 months of warfare under Lt.-Gen. HaLevi
the IDF struck a strong blow at Hamas' military capabilities, liquidated its
leaders, dismantled its divisions and brigades, killed tens of thousands of
terrorists, and destroyed a tremendous amount of arms, fortifications, and
tunnels. But the bottom line is that the failed strategy led by HaLevi enabled
Hamas to survive and even recover and partially rebuild itself.
Two main factors enabled Hamas to continue to rule in
Gaza. The first was the humanitarian aid to Gaza that was forced upon us by the
Biden Administration. Unforgivably, however, we did not prevent Hamas from
taking corrupt control of its distribution, thus enabling the terrorists to
retain a form of governmental authority as well as great financial resources.
The second factor was the lack of an alternative to Hamas. With no one to
compete with, even a weakened Hamas was able to remain in power.
These two factors should have been neutralized, via the
formation of an Israeli military administration – as governed the Galilee for
many years after 1948, and as still governs Judea and Samaria – which would
administer/govern the Gaza population, distribute supplies, and prevent the
area from falling under Hamas rule. But the Netanyahu government's orders to
the IDF to prepare for this was met by foot-dragging by Gen. HaLevy, backed by
former Defense Minister Yoav Galant. Despite the uncompromising fighting spirit
of the troops and officers in the field, the top security brass did not believe
in its ability to overthrow Hamas, opposed a full conquest of the Gaza Strip,
and aspired to end the war and secure the hostages' freedom via a humiliating
and disastrous deal of surrender.
Another strategic error of HaLevy that cost us many
soldiers and wasted much time was his method of repeated incursions. Under this
system, we conquered cities and areas in Gaza, destroyed buildings and tunnels,
and killed or banished terrorists, and then quickly withdrew – thus allowing
the terrorists to regroup and re-arm themselves, causing us to go in yet again
and lose soldiers as we conquered them again, etc., etc.
Though this approach had some initial successes, such
as in the Shifa Hospital terrorist complex, it quickly proved to be a failure
in general – and yet HaLevy's General Staff refused to recognize its mistake. The
root of the problem appears to be that the army under Gen. HaLevy is unable to
consider actually conquering and controlling Gaza, even for a limited time. If
we ever want to renew the fighting and achieve full victory, it can happen only
after we stop fearing this idea.
On the political front, the religious-Zionist public
can be pleased with the manner in which its two Knesset parties operated during
the current hostage-deal crisis. Ben-Gvir's Jewish Strength party resigned from
the government, but announced that it would not bring it down and would even
leave the door open to return if the warfare is renewed. Smotrich's
Religious-Zionism party voted against releasing thousands of terrorists and
temporarily ending the war in return for some of the hostages – but took upon itself
the complex task of fighting from within to try to ensure that after the first,
six-week stage of the deal, the war to destroy Hamas will be renewed.
These two approaches complement each other. If both
parties had quit the government, Netanyahu would have had to find partners from
the left-center, who would have dictated intolerable terms. And if neither had
left the government, Netanyahu would have understood that all is fine and he
can go on caving to American pressure. This way, Ben-Gvir wields a stick over
the Prime Minister while Smotrich offers him a carrot. Perhaps this integrated
approach will produce the desired results.
Prospects Don't Look Good
In truth, of course, at present the prospects for a renewal of the war against murderous and fortified Hamas following the first stage of this deal do not look promising. It will not be easy to overcome the protests of the well-funded Kaplanists who will insist that not even one hostage corpse be left behind. And in general, it will be hard for the nation, and particularly the troops, to resume fighting after so many months of warfare and so many fallen soldiers, and seek to regain what we just recently gave away.
What is needed to overcome these challenges are three
things: Strong will on the part of Netanyahu, support from the Trump
Administration, and total enlistment, determination and commitment on the part
of the right-wing public. We must be willing to take to the streets en-masse and
demand that the catastrophe of Oct. 7th finally receive its proper response:
the total annihilation of Hamas. We must not allow ourselves to be distracted
by other considerations, such as a need to prove that we too want the hostages
home or the demand that hareidim enlist in droves. We must be focused on the
immediate goals, with confidence that the hostages can be freed by winning the
war and that the hareidi/IDF problem will be solved in time. For now, we must
concentrate on winning the war and nothing else.
The coming weeks will be very fateful, and will
hopefully bring about a revolutionary change in the way the top IDF brass
thinks and plans the coming battles. There must be a total switch, with new,
younger leadership that strives for victory, not for containment. We pray that
we will be able to rise to the greatness of the occasion and pass the tests
that stand before us.