by Moshe Gutman, Fellow at the Misgav Institute for National Security, translated by Hillel Fendel.
In October 1973, during the Yom Kippur War, IDF Chief of Staff Lt.-Gen.
David (Dado) Elazar made a difficult decision: He ordered an end to the
thankless and grinding efforts to try to save the all-but-doomed fortified
positions along the Suez Canal. Instead, the positions were surrendered, and
the IDF was then then able to focus on stabilizing an effective line of defense
and preparing a counter-attack that would totally reverse the situation.
This painful decision later turned out to be a critical stage in
Israel's ultimate victory. In an impressive display of military insight, Dado knew
that he had to lose that particular battle in order to win the overall
campaign.
The current deal that saw the release of three women from Hamas
captivity on Sunday is done. There's no turning back, as of now. The agreement calls
for the release of another 30 hostages – most of them alive, apparently – in
exchange for six weeks of a ceasefire and the freeing of nearly 2,000 imprisoned
terrorists, including over 700 who murdered dozens of Israelis. This terrible
deal for Israel is a dangerous concession to Hamas, which will encourage and motivate
our enemies, and weaken our deterrence power.
But under the circumstances, given that those responsible for the
negotiations led us into a dead end from which there has long been no turning
back, it is no longer relevant to discuss how terrible it is. The only question
we must concentrate on is how we can turn this failure into an opportunity.
Perhaps this deal provides us with the chance to correct some of the
military campaign's failures thus far. It's been some weeks now that our
military efforts in Gaza have not been producing significant results, yet have
been costing us increasing number of soldiers' lives. This reveals that the
army's approach continues to be based on a problematic military "conception."
What the Chief of Staff terms "the incursions system" – conquering
and cleansing an area, then retreating, with predictable consequences – is
actually an expression of indecision and the absence of a victory plan, and it is
not in line with the war goals defined by the government. Instead of a head-on
strategy that will defeat Hamas, the IDF is settling for a "one-step-forward,
two-steps-backwards" approach that merely lengthens the combat, wears down
our forces, and plays in to the hands of Hamas. For Hamas loves the idea of a
war of attrition, celebrates the death of every individual soldier, and is
interested in the scorched earth it leaves behind less than last year's snow.
All of this, Israel still has not internalized.
On the other hand, if we employ the principles of judo – where each side
uses the momentum employed by the other in order to overcome him – we can turn the
current lemon into lemonade. Instead of using this deal simply to bring about a
ceasefire, it can cease something else: Israel's treading in place. Chapter Two
of this war must mark the beginning of a new era in the campaign for a quick
and uncompromising dash towards victory. It has to be swift, determined, and
lethal.
With this understanding, we might also be able to explain the puzzling
support of President Trump for the deal. After all, Trump is an undying critic
of weakness and concessions in negotiations, and yet he has taken credit for
the terms of the deal as designed by his bitter rival, outgoing president Joe
Biden. Why?
The answer can perhaps be found in Trump's Art of the Deal philosophy.
He holds that if you have reached an impasse in negotiations, the best way out
is to get up from the table, walk out, and start again. That's the
"reset" approach, as anyone who has ever had a problem with a
computer knows.
In the case at hand, Trump, who has always admired strength and quick
achievements, is apparently losing patience with Israel's water-treading
approach in Gaza. Acting as if you're doing something but actually getting
nowhere is for weaklings, he holds, and he now wants to stop the whole story
and turn over a new page.
From his standpoint, if Israel is not able to win a quick victory under
the current circumstances, he would like to see a reset – a ceasefire that
would allow a reorganization, a return to a strategy of firmness, and an
operative plan that is decisive. This is how we can best explain and understand
the gap between his statements and the more belligerent positions taken by his
top officials.
The key to turning bitter into sweet in this conflict lies in the
conditions and guarantees regarding Chapter Two of the Gaza war. Just as Dado
did not abandon the outposts in 1973 without a clear plan for victory, so too
today: This terrible deal that has been forced upon us must be fenced with
clear and irreversible obligations to renew the war until victory is achieved. Mechanisms
must be put in place to ensure that the truce is only temporary and that the
main Israeli achievements are preserved; if they are not, the ceasefire will truly
be our defeat.
The main question, therefore, is whether the current
leadership has the courage and the vision to turn the failure of Oct. 7th
into an opportunity. Will it know how to use the ceasefire forced upon it to
reorganize correctly, with a new strategy for a decisive victory? Or will it succumb
to the temptation to allow it to become permanent? Without firm determination
in this area, even Trump's support will be of little use, and the bad deal will
remain that, marking a historic surrender that will haunt us for generations.
The members of our government –
and especially Finance Minister Smotrich, who has said that he will resign if
the war is not resumed, and who therefore plays a kingpin role – bear a heavy
responsibility. They must ensure that there are mechanisms in place to assure
that the war is renewed, and that this terrible deal actually becomes the basis
for a tremendous reversal that will take us from darkness to light.