Connecting Gush Etzion to Jerusalem – Literally

by Haggai Huberman, translated by Hillel Fendel.

It was 25 years ago, in May 1999, when I interviewed the late Shilo Gal for the now-defunct HaTzofeh newspaper of the Mizrachi movement. Gal was then completing 20 years as the first head – mayor, essentially – of the Gush Etzion Regional Council. 

I asked him what accomplishment he was most proud of during his term as the founding head of Gush Etzion. He answered firmly: "I am proudest of having formed a wall of Jewish settlements between Gush Etzion and Jerusalem, which blocks a Palestinian spread and push westward to the Green Line [as the former border between Israel and Jordan was then known]."

If that's what he thought then, when the "wall" was quite sparse, we can just imagine what he would say now!

Shilo Gal came into the world in 1948. He would have been born in pre-State Kibbutz Kfar Etzion, but the women and children had been evacuated to safety some weeks before; Shilo's father remained there and was killed when the Jordanians captured the area. This occurred the day before the State of Israel's independence was declared, when Shilo was two months old.

In September 1967, Shilo was among the group that re-established, with governmental permission, Kibbutz Kfar Etzion on its 19-year-old ruins. Chanan Porat, who led the initiative, met with then-Prime Minister Levi Eshkol to obtain his authorization. He told me years later that Eshkol hinted that the few small communities he was willing to authorize then would soon grow much bigger… "Eshkol went over to the large map on the wall and placed his hand over the entire Mt. Hevron area," Porat continued, "and said, 'Let's see, Gush Etzion is here? OK, we'll say that we just expanded Jerusalem a little…'"

That's how it was in the days when the Labor Party was more right-wing and nationalist than today's Likud party.

Nearly 57 years have passed since then, during which Gush Etzion has grown many times over and has seen four successors to Shilo Gal. Two weeks ago, the government approved official community status for five outposts in different areas of Judea and Samaria: Evyatar on the trans-Shomron highway, Sde Efrayim in western Binyamin, Adurayim in the Mt. Hevron area, Givat Assaf near Beit El, and N'vei Ori (Cheletz) in northern Gush Etzion. The location of each one of them has critical strategic importance.

IDF Gen. Yehuda Fuchs, who completed his stint this week as Commander of the Central Region, riled up not a few people, including myself, with his parting speech sharply criticizing the outpost settlers. On his way to what appears to be his new career as another left-wing former army general commentator, he seemed to identify in his speech less with the Jewish residents and more with the Arab population. 

However, it must be said that just a few hours before his uncalled-for speech, he signed a document of great value and importance for the settlement enterprise: an order that includes the area of the N'vei Ori farm in the Gush Etzion Regional Council. This paves the way for the next step in the planning process: the preparation of the taba, or "town building program." In general, the addition of five new Jewish communities in Judea and Samaria is good news for the nationalist sector and the State of Israel.

N'vei Ori was established a few months after the despicable terrorist murder in 2019 of 19-year-old Ori Ansbacher, a National Service volunteer from Tekoa. The farm is located just a few kilometers away from the site of the murder, on a ridge above the Heletz Brook. Particularly significant is the fact that it actually connects Gush Etzion to Jerusalem – a fulfillment of Levi Eshkol's joke-come-true about "expanding Jerusalem a little." 

As Gush Etzion Council head Yaron Rosental wrote last week, "The decision to recognize N'vei Ori as a new Jewish community in the Heletz area is exciting and important for two reasons: 1) Another Jewish point of settlement in Gush Etzion! And 2), it completes the link between Gush Etzion and Yerushalayim, totally and absolutely!"

Rosental illustrated this second point most concretely:

"One who walks northward from the Lone Oak Tree [a remnant of the original Gush Etzion bloc, and now a tourist site featuring a three-dimensional topographic model of the entire Gush Etzion] just outside Alon Shvut will encounter the following milestones and communities: 

• After 50 meters he will hit upon Alon Shvut.

• A half-kilometer further up he will reach the Netiv HaAvot neighborhood of Elazar.

• 800 meters (a half-mile) later – N'vei Daniel.

• One kilometer further north – Sde Boaz.

• Two kilometers from there – the new N'vei Ori farm.

• Another kilometer later, he will arrive in Har Gilo.

• Another few hundred meters and he is in Jerusalem!

"In the 70's [Rosental continued], after the founding of the first communities in Gush Etzion, no one believed that we could actually be connected to Jerusalem. This is why [in accordance with Moshe Dayan's original plan], Route 367 was "broken through" towards the Elah Valley in the west, so as to connect the Gush with western Israel and not Jerusalem.

"I recall that when I finished the army, I used to walk from Har Gilo to Kfar Etzion on Fridays. The first part of the hike was simply beautiful, but the truth is that it was a bit unpleasant, because there was no Jewish presence all the way up until N'vei Daniel. But now – we have done it! Jewish communities fill the land all the way up to Yerushalayim!

"I write these words with tears of excitement and emotion in my eyes at the privilege granted me to take part in this process. I believe with all my heart that the defenders of the Gush in 1948 are looking down at us now from above and singing the traditional pioneers' song, 'Shuru, habitu, ur'u – look around and take note how great is this day!'"

Rosental then thanked Prime Minister Netanyahu, Minister Smotrich, former Gush Regional Council Head Shlomo Ne'eman, and the Tal family who have lived in the farm for several years. 

When the first Kfar Etzion pioneers moved in, they were 15 young men and women, and though hundreds of people joined in the initial ground-breaking celebration, by nightfall they barely had a minyan [ten men]. Today, however, the 22 (!) communities of Gush Etzion number 28,000 residents (!) – not including the 68,000 in the hareidi city of Beitar Illit or the 12,000 in Efrat. That comes out to well over 100,000 residents between Gush Etzion and Jerusalem. May they increase again and again!

Messianic Hopes of Different Kinds

by Dr. Geulah Paran, Professors for a Strong Israel, translated by Hillel Fendel.

"Messianics, zealots, delusionals" – these have become the derogatory nicknames of choice to term the members of the Religious Zionist party and, sometimes, the camp in general. Journalists, politicians, former military officers of the "conception" mindset that proved to be so catastrophic – all of them have taken to accept as a given that "extremist right-wing Messianism" is one of the main dangers facing the State of Israel. 

The left has lost its way. It used to have a Golden Calf before which it bowed down, in the form of imaginary "peace in the Middle East." However, it came crashing down with a great thud on the 7th of October, and the left now has no place to hang its sorrow and disappointment. Nothing remains of its weltanschauung, and in its bitterness and anger (at itself?), it has turned on those who were actually correct. As Finance Minister Betzalel Smotrich said this week, "Isn't it time you listened to us, given that we have been right for 30 years now?" 

The nationalist/religious/right in Israel has been proven correct in its warnings against the Oslo agreements, and when it cried out, "Don't give them guns!" It was similarly on the mark when it objected to leaving Lebanon and turning our backs on the soldiers of the Southern Lebanese Army, and most certainly when we begged the government not to disengage and quit Gush Katif (Gaza) and the northern Shomron.

Truth be told, it is not easy to admit a mistake, and especially when its consequences were so grave. The integrity needed to acknowledge an error is a rare commodity within the progressive-liberal left camp. Instead, they often replace it with something known as "projection." This is a defense mechanism that protects those who use it from dealing with emotional matters that are simply unbearable. The process is to take the "threatening content" and "project it" upon, or attribute it to, the other side. Thus, the offending party – the left, in this case – avoids confronting the issue and can relate to it as something of total irrelevance.

Some of those in the so-called "peace camp" have actually taken stock of their views and have admitted the error of their ways. Some of them have even gone so far as to say they now recognize there is no one on the other side with whom to make peace.

However, much too many of them, in their bitterness, direct their arrows to those who were right in the first place. They "project" their Messianism – their unshakeable belief in "peace in our time" – on those who believe that the State of Israel is truly destined for greatness. Many, as stated, do not suffice with calling them Messianists, and add in "extremist" and "delusional' to boot.

My heart goes out to them. It is hard to live in the State of Israel without faith and belief. In every dispute between right and left, the latter will always chime in with a challenging, "What, shall we have war forever?!" The answer from the believer is invariably, "We have no choice in the matter, but we have faith in the Eternity of Israel and in the coming of the Messiah." In response the left would smirk and scoff, taking their own "Messianism" back to their imaginary, longed-for "peace." But now, to where can they take it? The left-wingers can only lash out at those whose faith continues to strengthen them. 

For some, the breaking of their faith weakens them on all fronts, and they can't even fight their enemies, while those whose faith is renewed daily are able to continue fighting for the sublime cause, knowing that they can, must, and will continue until victory.

It could be that even more former peaceniks than we think have allowed the events to affect their thinking and have made a careful accounting of their convictions. But a small and very vocal minority is still holed up in its anger and disappointment, and is seeking – successfully, to an extent – to revive the protest movement that took over our country until last October 6th. They have a different excuse each time: "The government must be toppled! The hareidim must be drafted! The captives must be freed at any price! We will never cooperate with the dangerous Messianists!"

And who are these Messianits that they are referring to? Parents and families of fallen soldiers, true heroes who went out on Oct. 7th to save Jews with practically their bare hands, and who continue to fight – and die – in battle today to protect those who scorn them.

The recent funeral of fallen IDF soldier Elon Veiss, a 49-year-old reservist commander who insisted on serving in combat even at his advanced age, was a lesson for all sides. After the singing of Hatikvah, the participants continued soulfully with the words of Maimonides: "Ani Maamin – I believe with perfect faith in the coming of the Messiah, and even if he tarries, I will still await his arrival every day." 

Ani Maamin much is more than just a song. It was originally composed during the Holocaust, and provided the Jews with a glimmer of hope in a devastated world that appeared to be all but Jew-free. These words were a spark of Jewish faith – faith in the justness of our path, in the eternity of the Jewish People, and in a blessed future for Am Yisrael in its Land. And in many other funerals, as well, this song was borne on the lips of the mourners – strengthening, comforting, and uniting.

With the strength of this faith, the Nation of Israel fights its enemies until their total defeat, settles the entire Land of Israel with a sense of historic and national mission, and believes that the price it is paying is not in vain. And even when they continue to be mocked as Messianists, they need only remember Menachem Begin's classic words. Addressing himself to those who protested Israel's right to protect itself and bomb the Iraqi reactor, he said: "If there are some bleeding-hearts who want to turn up their noses at our actions – they can remain with crooked noses!"

Hostage Deal Endangers not Netanyahu's Government, but the State of Israel

by Haggai Huberman, translated by Hillel Fendel.

The deal currently being negotiated, according to reports, would turn Israel into a washrag state – acutely endangering our standing in the Middle East.

Former Education Minister and long-time Likud member Limor Livnat, in an interview a few days ago, officially joined the ranks of those who attack Netanyahu for not reaching a deal to free the hostages held by Hamas. She said that his motives for nixing a deal are simply to ensure his government's survival.

Let's ignore, for now, the fact that so far the one nixing the deal has been Hamas. I also don't feel any great need to defend Netanyahu in general, for I really don't know what his motivations are for many of his positions. I can, however, express my opinion on the deal being negotiated, based on the details currently available. And so, my humble opinion is this: 

A deal with Hamas wherein we enable Hamas to continue to rule over Gaza and we withdraw our forces and agree to cease our fire – endangers not only the survival of the current coalition government, but is liable to endanger the survival of the State of Israel altogether. This is not an exaggeration. 

The "photo of the year" that would crown such a deal will include Sinwar walking confidently and heroically among the adulating crowds of Gazans, smiling and flashing V signs in all directions. It will be a constant reminder to the international community, our foes and friends alike, that the powerful Israel was defeated soundly by a terrorist group. Why would this be a defeat? Because not one of the objectives Israel set for itself will have been achieved – not the release of all the hostages (for the current deal stipulates only that some of them will be freed for now), and not the destruction or replacement of Hamas.

The photos of Israeli hostages being welcomed happily by their families will simply not have the power of the shots of Sinwar and his thousands of cheering terrorists and supporters greeting him throughout Gaza. If anything, they will further symbolize the beating that Israel suffered.

If it is thus solidified throughout the world that Israel was vanquished by Hamas, Israel will become a washrag state, which no country in the world will respect or relate to seriously. This would be a fatal blow precisely to our peace treaties with Egypt and Jordan, and of course to the Abraham Accords with the UAE and Bahrain – those which the Israeli left so highly regards.

Both Egypt and Jordan agreed to make peace with Israel only after their leaders became convinced that the State of Israel was the most stable and powerful force in the Middle East, and that it would be worth their while to be on its good side.

Egyptian President Sadat reached this conclusion after his country's military failure in the Yom Kippur War of 1973. That war, as the current one, saw Egypt achieve total surprise against Israel and conquer territories – yet it ended with the IDF threatening to enter both Cairo and Damascus. For Jordan, the understanding came even earlier; after it lost critical territories in the Six Day War, it refused to join the attack against Israel in the Yom Kippur War. 

The Abraham Accords with the Gulf states also stemmed from latter's realization that the State of Israel must be reckoned with, not fought against. And Saudi Arabia's desire to be included in the treaty is based on its growing concern at the domination that Iran and its proxies are exercising in the region. The Saudis understand that they must join forces with the primary regional power – the State of Israel – in fighting off the Iranian danger.

But now, if Israel is defeated by a stateless terrorist organization, everything will change. All the above countries will certainly sit down to recalculate their steps and decide if Israel is still on the winning side – or one of the losers.

The State of Israel, with its new washrag image, will receive no sympathy or assistance from anyone. Already today we are under attack by non-countries, such as Hamas, Hizbullah, the Houthis, and other terrorists – and if we release hundreds of terrorists and withdraw from Gaza, this will only increase. When wolves smell weakness, they don't hesitate to pounce.

The bottom line is that if this deal goes through, in exchange for the lives of a few Israelis now and then some more over the course of the next few months of negotiations - and we don't know how many of the 120 hostages are alive; estimates are around 50 - the price we will be forced to pay in the future will be hundreds of other Israeli lives, in a very difficult war, without international aid.

This does not mean that we may not agree to any hostage deal at all. There could possibly be an arrangement whose details might be acceptable. When "freeing the captives" was set as an objective of the war, the intention was not that the IDF would physically rescue each of them from their captivity, which is all but impossible. Rather, it was to create military and other pressures upon Hamas, so that they would agree to release the hostages on terms acceptable to Israel – terms that would not frame Israel as a vanquished country.

This cannot be achieved by periodic forays into Gaza, such as this week's raid on a UNRWA headquarters used as a terrorist base, and not even by air strikes. It certainly cannot happen if we stop the war. We can only achieve the captives' release by taking over more and more Gaza territory, such that Sinwar will truly shake in fear at the sound of Israeli tanks rumbling above his head in his tunnel hideout – as Defense Minister Yoav Gallant boasted at the beginning of the war, though he never attempted to actually execute it. 

If and when the State of Israel begins to use these pressure tactics, when it truly rules over most of the Gaza Strip, when the IDF resumes systematically destroying each and every Hamas tunnel and all the rocket launchers and the rocket manufacturing lines – then and only then will we be able to negotiate the terms of a deal for the captives' release from a position of strength.

Anyone who claims that there is another way not only lives in illusions, but is also deceiving the public.

Can We Still Win the War?

by Emanuel Shilo, Editor of Besheva, translated by Hillel Fendel.

There is no way to achieve the declared goals of destroying Hamas and freeing the hostages without occupying the entire Gaza Strip and establishing a military government. The Israeli public that sacrificed so much should demand from the weakened military and political leadership the victory they promised.

1. It appears, from the interview Prime Minister Netanyahu granted Israel's Channel 14 last week – his first public interview in months – that it will not be more than a few weeks at most before the IDF announces that it has all but completed its mission in Gaza. Our forces will then remain on the Philadelphi route in Rafah and in other strategic locations in Gaza, from where it will occasionally set out to attack specific Hamas targets.

If this is in fact the case, most unfortunately, the war will have essentially ended without the achievement of its goals. Hamas will not have been destroyed; it is already on its way to rejuvenation, at least partially. If Hamas continues to rule in Gaza, it is doubtful whether the exiled Jews of the Gaza Envelope will agree to return to their kibbutzim and communities, even if they are physically rebuilt.

In addition, the hostages – those who are alive – will continue to suffer in captivity, if they survive. Though the IDF might be able to rescue a few more of them here and there, we can assume that Hamas will not agree to any comprehensive release deal, because the hostages serve an important purpose for Hamas: They protect, physically and otherwise, the Hamas leaders from Israeli strikes. The only way Hamas will agree to release them is if Israel withdraws all its forces from Gaza, with international guarantees that the IDF will not attack again. This would be a pure victory for Yahye Sinwar and Hamas, dealing a death blow to Israel's deterrence capabilities vis-à-vis Hizbullah and others. The present government will not agree to such a scenario – but it is not presenting an alternative strategy leading to victory.

2. The alternative that even some on the left-wing agree to is simply this: We must conquer the entire Gaza Strip, pursue every single terrorist, confiscate every weapon and piece of ammunition, and destroy every tunnel and weapons-manufacturing plant. We must not conquer and leave and conquer and leave, but conquer and remain.

Hamas will continue to rule in Gaza unless it is totally dismantled, and this cannot happen if we encourage local militias to take its place. The only body that can neutralize Hamas from the very foundations is an Israeli military government. It will also help Israel in terms of our intelligence gathering. We will be able to receive information from the local populace that will help us locate Hamas leaders, as well as the hostages. When Sinwar realizes that our forces are closing in on him and that his organization is on the verge of total eradication, it is more likely that he will finally agree to release our hostages in a deal that Israel can live with – just as he did in November, when more than 100 hostages were freed.

3. This approach certainly has its shortcomings. However, it is the only way to achieve our war objectives and the victory we so sorely need to rehabilitate our deterrence capabilities. Sadly, there are those amongst us who have despaired of achieving this victory. For instance, the IDF Spokesman actually told the world, in an apparent reflection of the opinion of the Chief of Staff and other top military figures, that Hamas is an "idea that cannot be defeated." Even if it is true that an idea cannot be defeated, certainly the number of its believers can be reduced and its implementation can be prevented. Communism and Nazism might still exist as ideas, but are nowhere near a position to bring about the terrible calamities they did in the past. It is very regrettable that the impression left by the Spokesman's remark is that our General Staff, which is responsible for the Oct. 7th travesty, has simply given up in despair.

4. This defeatist spirit must be opposed on and from all levels, and the movement of opposition must begin at the bottom: The soldiers and their families, those who have been paying the highest price of this war in every sphere, must publicly demand the victory that the government and army promised us, and for which we sacrificed so very much. In the face of the despair and helplessness, the voice demanding victory and the full achievement of our objectives must be heard strongly - from the political echelons, from the public, from the media, and from the battalions, brigades and divisions. 

The government leaders must then demand this from themselves and from the IDF, and internalize that the only path available to us is the complete occupation of the Gaza Strip and the establishment of a military government there.

After all, what is the point of the survival of this government if it doesn't lead us to victory? True, every other possible governmental constellation – other than a unity government – would be much worse. This does not mean, however, that we can accept a right-wing, nationalist government that cannot win the war! If Defense Minister Gallant continues to dream of local Gazan forces that will replace Hamas, he must either be re-educated, or replaced. Binyamin Netanyahu, Yisrael Katz, Yariv Levine, Betzalel Smotrich, Itamar Ben-Gvir, Orit Strook, Yuli Edelstein – it's up to you!!

And it's also up to Avigdor Lieberman and Gideon Saar – two opposition party leaders who understand the importance of fighting the war to it successful conclusion. Instead of providing fuel to the fires of the protestors who continue to demand, at almost literally all costs, the toppling of the present government – which will almost certainly lead to a premature end to the war – they must show responsibility and join the government. 

A unity government is the call of the hour, and will show our enemies that we are still united and still believe in "Together We Will Win."

Netanyahu and the Submarines: A View From His Side

by Yoni Rotenberg, Besheva, translated by Hillel Fendel.

Every once in a while, ever since it first burst into the public consciousness in 2017, the story of the "purchase of the German submarines" returns to the headlines. The general impression appears to be that, though important security figures always have what to say about it on the news programs – just enough to fill the allotted air-time – the public doesn't really know what all the fuss is about, or what it has to do with our everyday lives. 

But this time, when the rumors and suspicions abruptly became official "warning letters" to Prime Minister Netanyahu and others, it appears that the drapes of apathy have been drawn open. The feeling is that there must be fire under the smoke. 

Let us therefore disperse some of the smoke so that we can see how our leaders, some of whom are still in positions of major influence, behaved regarding the security of the State of Israel. 

The commission of inquiry that sent the letters was decided upon by the short-lived Bennett-Lapid government. Its mandate was to look exclusively into how the decision to purchase the submarines was made; the accusations of bribery against Netanyahu have long been debunked. The most interesting of the five recipients of the warnings are by far Netanyahu and his then-Defense Minister, and now his bitter rival, Moshe Bugi Yaalon. 

If the average citizen of Israel, one who knows even just a bit about the news, would read the warning letter to the Prime Minister and the clauses of which he is "accused," he would probably respond with four words: "Of course, that's Netanyahu!" That is, Netanyahu is described in the letter as acting in his classic style, just as he has throughout his political career, for better or for worse. He is described as having "made decisions bearing great ramifications in a non-regulated manner," as having "come to conclusions… while bypassing the government," and even having "turned the National Security Committee into an executive committee of the Prime Minister." These are all classic Netanyahu! The are just like the "War Cabinet" that he invented during the current war, by which he surrounds himself with those he trusts and keeps others out of the decision-making process. Nothing new here. 

Though we have gotten used to it, it is of course unacceptable. The opinions of Cabinet ministers must be sought and seriously considered, as must be those of professionals in the field. Netanyahu is not justified in believing that only he can be trusted with the security of the State of Israel. However, even though the criticism of his modus-operandi is justified, it must come with an asterisk: When we talk of the "professionals" whom Netanyahu bypassed when he decided to purchase the submarines, we are referring to none other than Israel's security establishment, and primarily the IDF – and there's the rub.

As we have known for many years, and as was empirically proven over the past nine months, the security establishment suffers from dogmatic and narrow thinking, a sense of self-importance, complacency, and too many intrigues and ego-considerations. It is expected of Netanyahu, as the Prime minister, to use his own personal judgement when dealing with this network. (This should also be kept in mind by the anti-Netanyahu protestors who on the one hand marched with giant balloon submarines to protest his independent thinking, yet now demand that he take responsibility for all the mistakes made by the army and security apparatus before and after October 7th!)

It is very hard to disagree with the security establishment. These are not easygoing people, they see their opinions as absolute truth, and have little interest in bowing before the elected leadership. This is evident today as well. This is why Netanyahu built himself the National Security Council – a body that existed before him, but without great influence – as a professional security body that will provide recommendations that do not necessarily conform with those of the army and defense establishment and that are more in line with his own conceptions. Yes, this deviates from the accepted practice of how decisions are made, but it could be that in some cases it is necessary. 

The Two Sides

Let us boil down the dispute between Netanyahu and the establishment so that we can understand what it is about, and not simply reject one side or the other out of hand. In a nutshell, Netanyahu wants to enhance our naval power even if it costs more, and the security establishment feels that this is wasteful and unnecessary. The Prime Minister's position is not surprising at all. He is in general an alarmist-type, and specifically regarding Iran and what he feels is the existential threat it presents for the State of Israel. This, and the need to guarantee Israel's gas reserves, are the two main issues for Netanyahu, and it is only natural that he wishes to ensure that they are budgeted generously. 

The security establishment also recognizes the Iranian threat, of course. It acknowledges that Israel must have submarines that can carry nuclear bombs (according to foreign reports) for second-strike capabilities that form deterrence and a balance of power. However, they feel that a fleet of five such ships, so that one can be on constant alert at any given moment, is sufficient. Netanyahu, however, sees the worst-calamity scenario in which Iran takes out two of the subs and heaves an atomic bomb on Israel. He therefore says, "Let's go not for the minimum, but for the maximum." 

Faced with the official objections, Netanyahu has no choice but to make decisions in a less-than-acceptable manner, and "turn the National Security Council into his own executive branch."

*** Translator's note: The author notes that though there is much more to write regarding this complex issue, he can only elaborate on a few points. Let us sum them up:

1. The operative assumption of the commission is that the security establishment is the epitome of professionalism, and that Netanyahu's deviation from its recommendations actually "harms national security." However, this is not necessarily true, as can be seen from the small example of Netanyahu's desire to privatize the job of maintaining Israel's existing submarines. The idea was scrapped so that there should not appear to be a conflict of interest, but even the "professional" IDF itself did not succeed in carrying out its own plan to privatize the maintenance, and was criticized by the State Comptroller for this back in 2022.
2. Then-Defense Minister Yaalon's version of the events seeks to portray Netanyahu as having been motivated by personal considerations. Keep in mind that ever since Yaalon was fired by Netanyahu in 2016, he has barely missed a chance to bitterly criticize Netanyahu. But in fact, in several ways, his version actually bolsters Netanyahu's case.
3. Netanyahu felt that it was important at the time to augment the navy's submarine fleet, and wished to take advantage of Germany's offer to sell advanced submarines even if they would not be ready for years. Let's consider: If Israel, in the current state of international affairs in which it finds itself, would now try to make the same deal with Germany from scratch, would Germany agree? And if so, what would Biden have said? And even if the deal would pass, what about in a year or two from now, given a possible major war with Lebanon and clashes with Iran – would the West also then be interested in our acquisition of submarines that could aid us in an apparently-nearing nuclear war? When looked at from this angle, Netanyahu's efforts to spend money for German submarines take on a very different color.