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| Child in an anti-Disengagement t-shirt watching the expulsion |
We recall that Hamas came to power in Gaza following the withdrawal/expulsion – the 2005 Disengagement from northern Shomron and Gaza, architected by Ariel Sharon. "The Disengagement process was the basis for one of the most difficult internal disputes that Israel has ever faced," Roman writes. "Supporters felt that it would create long-term security quiet, would 'release' Israel from the yoke of Gaza, and would grant Israel the right to respond very strongly to even the smallest lone missile fired at it from Gaza."
However, he says, the withdrawal's deficiencies were built-in and unavoidable: "Aside from the fundamental principle that we must not cede territory, and beyond the terrible suffering imposed upon the residents of Gush Katif and northern Shomron, one of its intrinsic problems was that no demands were placed upon the other side. Israel withdrew, asked for nothing in return, and received nothing in return."
"This weakness displayed by the Government of Israel was simply another link in the chain of similar actions in the years leading up to it. It began with the rushed nighttime retreat from Lebanon under Prime Minister Ehud Barak in May 2000. It continued with the Second Intifada that claimed the lives of thousands of Israeli civilians and soldiers, and that ended only after Sharon finally ordered Operation Defensive Shield. Then came the Disengagement, which brought nothing other than a strengthened Hamas and its terror activities, followed by the Second Lebanon War, which all but crushed home front security…"
Roman says that all these placed Israel in the light of the beaten and weakened from years of Palestinian violence, murder, terrorists, exploding buses, and shooting attacks. "Israel was weak; it had forgotten what it was like to win."
And ever since then, Roman concludes, "we have been engaged in round after round of fighting. While Netanyahu justifiably concentrates on preventing a nuclear Iran, Hamas can do what it wants – for there has been no Israeli decision to defeat it once and for all. Precisely now when there is international legitimacy to destroy terrorist organizations, Israel restrains itself from responding appropriately to rockets fired at it 'by mistake,' or, more embarrassingly, fires a single shell at a makeshift wood-and-canvas Hamas outpost."
Who is to blame for Israel's seeming lack of motivation to win? There is no lack of candidates, writes Roman: "Domestic organizations that strive for Israeli concessions; other bodies that activate the motherly instincts not to send young soldiers to the frontlines; international leaders that pressure Israel not to win; even opposition politicians at home who challenge the political dialogue with vacuous statements. But in the end, the leadership must make the hard decisions, without fear."
Confidence and belief in the justness of their cause was certainly not lacking amongst the residents of Gush Katif when their government decided to uproot them. They insisted on remaining in their homes, in the land promised us in the Torah and in which the modern-day State of Israel is developing into a world leader in many ways. Sadly, the government, with the support of outside elements who did not have Israel's best interests in mind, and influenced as well by other external considerations, claimed that the withdrawal would strengthen Israel. Events have shown otherwise.
As such, it is time to once again bring "victory talk" back to the table. Israel must not fear defeating Hamas once and for all, Roman writes. "Hamas must come to the point where it lays down its weapons and says, 'It's no longer worth it for us.' Hopefully, they will also be convinced that they must do so for the sake of their own future. Wouldn't any father choose for his son a future that includes a high school diploma and a university degree, rather than one that involves guns and grenades in hand? Doesn't every mother hope her daughter will grow up to be a doctor rather than one dressed in an explosives vest?"
By allowing the status quo to continue without a decision, "we are actually causing the situation to deteriorate. The Palestinians are led to think that we don't know exactly what we want, and that perhaps there might be a chance after all to return to the May 1967 borders. In that case, they say to themselves, 'let's continue to apply pressure – shootings, kidnappings, etc. – and we might just get them to give in.' Israel must make it perfectly clear that terrorism will be countered with disproportionate aggression."
"In any event, the alternatives are clear: Continued rounds of terrorism, escalation, and 'errant' missiles as a matter of routine – or decisive victory. Israel must bring about a situation in which its existence here is absolutely unchallengeable. Following the upcoming elections, this must be the objective of the next government in Israel."