by Din Milo, former Political Advisor and current Strategic and Economic advisor, translated by Hillel Fendel.
No one disputes that the governments of Israel over the years
could have done things differently to prevent the events that led up to Oct. 7th.
What people do dispute is how and what exactly the governments should have done
differently.
As in most of our other national disputes, this one is chiefly
waged between the right- and left-wing camps. Most of the latter feels that the
government did not take Hamas seriously enough over the years. They say that
the governments led by Netanyahu, and primarily Netanyahu himself [who has
served as Prime Minister for 18 years, beginning in 1996], armed and supported
Hamas for years, while at the same time overlooking and sidelining the
Palestinian Authority.
On the other hand, many on the right-wing side of the aisle look
at Netanyahu's governments' military campaigns against Hamas, of which there
were many, and say that they simply were not strong enough. None of the rounds
of fighting – Operation Protective Edge, Operation Days of Penitence, Operation
Summer Rains, etc. – produced a sound defeat of Hamas; they rather enabled the
terrorists to regroup, rearm, and resume their attacks months or short years
afterwards. They also maintain that Oct. 7th was a direct outgrowth
of Ariel Sharon's 2005 Disengagement plan – Israel's unilateral pullout from
Gaza, including the dismantling of 22 Jewish communities and the
"relocation" of their nearly 10,000 Jewish residents. They see the
freeing of over 1,000 Palestinian terrorists, including Yichye Sinwar and other
budding Hamas leaders, in exchange for Gilad Shalit in 2011 as having
contributed as well.
To resolve this dispute, we must understand why our governments
refrained from acting against Hamas as they should have. The reason is simple:
the Oslo Accords of 1993 and 1995. These agreements stipulated that Israel would
withdraw its forces from most of Gaza and Jericho, and would later further
withdraw from many areas in Judea and Samaria.
The Oslo agreements led to a number of things, among them:
1. When Israel pulled back its forces from Gaza
in 1994, it left the Jewish residents there without proper protection, and the
security forces without sufficient intelligence. It enabled the enemy to
establish terrorist infrastructures and strengthen itself militarily, which led
over the next few years to increased terrorism and the murder of many Israelis.
2. The creation of the
Palestinian Authority granted the terrorists the international legitimacy it
had long sought. The PA police forces received professional training by
American experts, as well as massive funding and weapons from around the world.
Oslo paved the way for the establishment of an Arab state in the heart of our
homeland.
In 2001, when Ariel Sharon took over as Prime Minister, he faced a
major crossroads: Should he order the IDF to reoccupy the terror nests that had
sprouted in Gaza over the preceding years? Or should he rather order the
evacuation of the Jews living there, and thus finalize Israel's detachment from
Gaza? He took with him to the grave his true considerations in choosing the
latter. However, inter alia, it can be assumed that he concluded that it was
not really possible to abolish the Oslo Accords and return to Gaza – because it
would have involved too many IDF casualties, and also because the Western world
would never have let such a decision pass without emplacing painful sanctions
upon Israel that could have dealt us a death blow.
We thus see that without Oslo, the Disengagement would likely not
have happened. The Oslo Accords of the early 90's led to Israel's total
withdrawal from Gaza and Gush Katif in 2005.
As is now well-known, soon afterwards, Hamas easily took over the
entire Gaza Strip, including by throwing some of its Fatah opponents from
roofs. Still, as a nation we did not actively recognize the danger that Hamas
represented.
When Gilad Shalit was taken captive by Hamas, masses of Israelis
took to the streets – but what did they demand? Not that we return to Gaza, and
not even an Israeli military operation to free him. Rather, they demanded that
Israel come to an "agreement" with Hamas regarding the release of
imprisoned terrorists in exchange for Shalit's freedom. As is well-known, the
public pressure succeeded, and Shalit came home - as did 1,0270 terrorists,
several of whom went on to murder a dozen Israelis, and one of whom went on to
mastermind the Oct. 7th massacre.
In the years since then, despite many battles, Israel never won a
single resounding victory over Hamas – because we never really considered executing
the one thing that would do the trick: a total take-over of Gaza. Only after
Oct. 7th has the Israeli public begun reconsidering this.
The only thing we can hope for now, after having allowed the
Simchat Torah massacre to happen, is to do everything to make sure that it does
not recur. To this end, we must investigate in depth the operational and
political failures that enabled the travesty. The main lesson that must
be learned is therefore this: "Yes, peace is made with enemies – but only with
those enemies who want to make peace."
The Oslo catastrophe happened because we tried to negotiate peace
with an enemy who didn't want peace, and this simply enabled him to fortify
himself in our own backyard.
In conclusion, I believe that in order to make sure that the Oslo
travesty does not repeat itself, we should stop talking so much about specific
personages, whether they be politicians, top IDF officers, or anyone else of
authority. We should instead be concentrating on the terrible policies that led
us to where we are today – namely, the Oslo Accords and its ramifications in
the form of Oct. 7th and more. The current leaders of our country
dare not make the same mistakes as their predecessors.