by Kobi Eliraz, former advisor on settlement affairs to four Defense Ministers, translated by Hillel Fendel.
Israel's current war, not only in Gaza, is not the result of a particular or individual failure. It was not just an isolated military mistake that brought about Oct. 7th, nor a temporary or even long-term intelligence failure.
It was rather brought upon us by a failed understanding – the notorious
"misconception" that everyone talks about – that became entrenched in
the popular thinking of many in power, and not in power, in the State of
Israel. It was the dangerous illusion that concessions, appeasement, and
restraint would bring about quiet and stability.
This terrible failure that brought us to where we are does not belong to
just one particular government, or to one Chief of Staff or another. It is a
very deeply ensconced misunderstanding of Middle East reality that developed
over the course of decades of naively mistaken policy.
It was manifest in a long series of false slogans that were disseminated
and became principles of our public policy. For instance:
·
"The new Middle
East" popularized by Shimon Peres [and echoed, in the context of an
anticipated peace deal with Saudi Arabia, by Prime Minister Netanyahu in the
United Nations just two weeks (!) before Oct. 7th]
·
"Peace is made with
enemies" – forgetting that this does not include enemies who will use the
"peace" to find new ways to destroy you; and
·
"There is no military
solution" – leading to a situation in which the enemy continually
fortifies himself, in the knowledge that our response will be limited.
Instead of reading the reality as it truly is, we became addicted to the
illusion that concessions will lead to calm. At the same time, the enemy took
advantage of our weakness to build himself up with a powerful military
apparatus and prepare for his next offensive.
Between the Oslo Accords of 1993-95 and the Disengagement/expulsion of
2005, Israel repeatedly retreated, while the terrorists kept on growing
stronger. The thought that our withdrawals would decrease Palestinian violence was
proven to be downright wrong: Our departure from Gush Katif and Gaza did not
turn it into the "Singapore of the Middle East," but rather into the
capital of international terrorism.
Every round of fighting in Gaza
over the past three decades ended with an "arrangement" – but not
with a decisive defeat of Hamas. This in itself strengthened Hamas, giving it not
only confidence, but also the ability to rearm, regroup, and rebuild. Our
restraint in the face of Hamas rockets, tunnel-building, and terrorist attacks sent
Hamas a clear message: "Israel will not fight you forcefully and you have
little to lose by continuing to attack us."
This ongoing mistake of
believing that we can simply "manage" the dispute instead of
"winning" it has nothing to do with the lack of intelligence at any
given time. It does, however, explain why whatever intelligence was received
was woefully misinterpreted.
When commissions of inquiry are
ultimately established to investigate what happened on and before Oct. 7th,
they must not be allowed to suffice with attempts to figure out who is most to
blame for the military and intelligence blunders. The critical question that
must be answered is rather: How did Israel allow this situation to develop in
the first place?
The officers who went to sleep
early Simchat Torah morning in the belief that the signs of an imminent attack
were not substantial made a local mistake. Those who waved off the warnings of
the female lookout soldiers made a worse mistake. They must all pay for them.
But most culpable of all are those who led the State of Israel into deceptive
"peace" agreements and who tried to sell the public false dreams of
"peace for land" and insisted that there "is no military
solution." These include many in academia, the media, the security
establishment, and in the broad public. They helped form a reality in which
Israel was perceived as weak – which invited our enemies to act against us in
every way they could.
The current war must lead not
only to a change in our military, but to a change in how we think. We can no
longer strategize in terms of how to manage the conflict, but rather how to win
and end it; no more ceasefire, but only total destruction of the enemy's
military capabilities; no more unilateral concessions, but only steps that
strengthen our grasp on the Land and our deterrence capabilities.
For Israel to return to
strategic security, there must be a total change in our thinking, and on the
ground. We must not return to the same cycle of weakness, false illusions, and
baseless hopes. The time has come, once and for all, to stop hoping that everything
will work out on its own – and to start shaping it the way we want with force,
strength, and strategic clarity.