based on an analysis by Dr. Aaron Lerner, IMRA.
Israel must be immediately prepared for the cataclysmic change that a new democratic Iran – something that could happen with little warning – will present for the entire Middle East. So writes analyst Dr. Aaron Lerner of IMRA.
"A potential regime change in Iran would be one of the most consequential strategic moments Israel has faced since the end of the Cold War," Lerner writes. "For decades, Iran has been the ideological engine and operational backbone of the regional confrontation against Israel. A genuine political rupture in Tehran would dismantle that framework almost overnight."
With many of his readers in the top echelons of both the U.S. and Israeli governments, Lerner emphasizes: "History shows that such openings do not wait to be debated at leisure; they are either seized early or shaped by others."
For one thing, Iran must normalize relations with Israel completely and immediately:
"If a post-regime-change Iran seeks international legitimacy, there is no clearer signal than full diplomatic normalization with Israel. Such a move would demonstrate to Washington, Europe, and the region that Iran has exited the revolutionary framework that has defined Middle Eastern politics for a generation."
Lerner asserts that Iran must not wait for "perfect stability or full internal consolidation," which would invite third parties to manage Iran’s reintegration themselves. Rather, there must be mutual embassies in Jerusalem and in Tehran, with public declarations and formal recognition.
But that's only the beginning. Israel must then recognize and deal with the next danger: Turkey. Israeli nemesis Erdogan runs a country that is very liable to replace Iran as our central challenge. This is because once Iran exits the confrontation framework, the regional balance reconfigures – with Turkey "uniquely positioned to move first." All Turkey has to do is to become "the easiest and most influential land-based interface for Iran’s access to Europe and NATO-adjacent systems. Economic default status can later be translated - quietly but effectively - into political and strategic leverage."
"If Israel does not act early, Iran’s strategic break risks becoming Ankara’s strategic gain," Lerner warns.
"Preventing Turkish gatekeeping does not require confrontation," he writes. "It requires credible additional options that markets are willing to use. As Iran reintegrates, the goal should be to ensure that its trade and energy links are spread across multiple viable routes… an approach that Saudi Arabia is uniquely positioned to help enable." Israel can and must, quietly and behind the scenes, be involved in shaping these arrangements, especially Persian Gulf-based rail, port, and energy connections.
In sum, according to Lerner: "Speed itself is the strategy… What Israel cannot afford is hesitation that allows others to lock in structural advantages during the transition window. Iran’s potential transformation would open a historic door for Israel. Failure to act swiftly cedes initiative to Turkey."
As an example, Dr. Lerner writes in a separate post that Israel must move to ensure that the 2.5 million barrels of oil that Iran can be expected to export to the West after sanctions are lifted must be shipped via Iran, not Egypt.
Israel's southern port of Eilat "is a considerably cheaper way for Iranian crude to reach Europe than through the Suez Canal, with the added advantage that the supertankers too big for the Suez Canal can easily dock in Eilat."
"And by becoming a route for post-sanction Iranian crude to Europe," Lerner concludes, "Israel won't find itself in the back seat when Turkey offers Iran considerably more expensive access to European markets."