Monday, August 7, 2023

Did You Sit Back When They Tried to Destroy the State?

 by Emanuel Shilo, Editor of Besheva, translated & by Hillel Fendel



Where are our pilots, hi-tech workers, doctors and professors? Why aren't they calling out the politicization of our precious institutions? If not now, when?

1. The parties of the coalition government – the nationalist/right-wing/religious/hareidi coalition – cannot really afford to give up seeking to reform the judicial system. Despite the temptation to say, as some of us are saying, "We tried, it didn't work, oh well; let's turn to other challenges," the fact is that this is untenable. If the current situation continues, our very large camp, the camp of the majority, will be stricken again and again, as will the values it holds holy and precious. 

If the composition of the High Court, and consequently its attitude and spirit, do not change – the ongoing erosion of any national or religious issue will simply continue, and the judicial system's intolerable takeover of the powers of the Knesset and the government will only intensify. If the legal establishment comes out of this confrontation with a resounding victory, its leaders will continue to trample us, knowing that any threat from the political system to restrain them no longer exists. 


2.  As of now, the justices of the Supreme Court, both past and present, show no signs of willingness to soften their stance. As if they have no responsibility for what is happening! As if it were not they who caused the entire problem by adopting such a forceful and trampling activist approach. All indications show that there is a broad public consensus that changes are needed in the judicial system, and that the question is just how much. But our Chief Justice, Esther Chayut, Attorney General Gali Bahrav-Miara, and their colleagues are totally apathetic, and show no signs of willingness to compromise.

The Knesset and government and at least half the nation are groaning under their heavy yoke, but their response is like that of the Biblical King Rehavam: "Former Chief Justice Aharon Barak flogged you with whips, and we will flog you with scorpions. Barak claimed that he is authorized to abolish laws that he believes stand in opposition to Basic Laws, but we will take the authority to nullify Basic Laws themselves!"

And then when we complain that they are selectively enforcing the law, dealing with the left-wing protestors infinitely more leniently than they treated the Gush Katif protestors 18 years ago, they roll their eyes and say they don’t know what we're talking about. When we compare the kid gloves of today and the draconian measures against the "orange" protestors then, they either lie and deny; explain with impressive pilpul why the two can't be compared; or ask self-righteously, "Two wrongs don't make a right! Should we repeat today the injustices of yesteryear?!"

As if there are only two options! As if we must either extend "until the end of the proceedings" the custody of masses of teenage protestors for having tried to block a road somewhere for a few minutes, or totally ignore the adults who block the main highway in Tel Aviv for hours at a time, with police officers marching in their ranks! Did they never consider that the correct approach might run somewhere in the middle? How about arresting the leaders of the protest and the adult road-blockers for 2-3 days and handing down serious indictments against them? 


3.  It's true that given the paltry gains we have made so far, and given the tremendous damage the unrestrained, anarchistic, criminal, fight-picking protestors have caused the State, it is definitely worthwhile to ask whether our stubborn insistence on improving the judicial system is actually worth it. But the damage that can be expected from a long-term suspension of our efforts in this area – as opposed to a limited, tactical suspension – will be no less grave. 

It must also be remembered that the other side likes to exaggerate, and this must not intimidate us. Just as they constantly overstate the number of demonstrators in Tel Aviv, so too do they embellish the threats to the country's security and economy, and constantly warn of civil war. This psychological warfare has served them well until now, so why shouldn't they continue? In actuality, however, the economy is holding up, and the IDF's readiness has not declined as much as they would have us believe.


4.  Why is there a sense of helplessness in the right-wing public and in the government? It is because we seem to believe we are facing forces that are much stronger than us. Yes, they have extensive resources and much money, including significant amounts from abroad. And just like in Gush Katif 18 years ago, there are those who seek to have us "make peace" with our failure, and to take comfort in the fact that our influence and numbers are growing and that very soon in the future we will be more successful. 

But is it really true that we are so weak? Are we truly not yet sufficiently represented in the various power centers of the country for us to have practical influence today? 

In Gush Katif, we were told that we should not even try to win – for if a group of protestors would defeat the government and army of Israel, that would be the end of our democracy, not to mention the end of the IDF's deterrence power against our enemies! Yet, that is exactly what is happening today, except even more so: We ourselves are the government! We ourselves are the majority! And still we're being told that we are too weak – while at the same time, the left-wing is doing exactly what we were told we should not do! If the left's protest is successful, would that not be the end of our democracy?!


5.  I would like, with all modesty, to propose here a new approach. We are simply not doing enough. The other side is totally enlisted for the struggle, and each one does what he can to make a difference. But us? Every two months we come out to a giant demonstration, and then go home. This is not the way to win a public struggle.

The fact is this: The religious-nationalist public is already sufficiently integrated into the various sectors of the State – academia, the army, the economy, public service, and even the media – but yet, simply does not dare to stand up for its rights and to struggle for what it believes!

It's not that each of us has to be an avid supporter of every aspect of the judicial reform package. All that is needed is to strongly oppose the politicization of institutions that are supposed to be apolitical! Why should the many right-wingers in hi-tech not stand up and oppose the hijacking of some of their companies for clearly political purposes? The poor excuses provided for the companies' political stances clearly do not camouflage their obvious political motives. The same is true for academia, the media, and the army – where is everyone?!

Of course, it's easier to leave the hard work to the government. After all, we voted for them precisely so that they can work for us. This is true in normal time, but behold – we clearly see that the government cannot do the work by itself! It needs a home-front backbone for the civilian struggle. The other side is enlisted totally and disproportionately – and we must respond in kind. Are we too busy with "meetings of the minds" and looking for dialogue? Not that these aren't important; I've been to some of those get-togethers myself. But when the other side has no restraints and is not willing to budge even a millimeter, we have to be willing to fight as well.  

The anti-reform campaign has a giant budget and over 100 (!) organizations and associations devoted to toppling the government and perpetuating the continued control of the elites over the democratic majority. Even if we don't have the hundreds of millions that they have, we most certainly do have manpower and the spirit of volunteerism. We are lacking in leadership, initiative, and organization. It is easier to sit on the fence – but will we think the same after we lose the battle??

What will we answer in a few years when we ask ourselves, or our children ask us, "Where were you when they destroyed the State? What were you doing when they disintegrated the IDF? Did you lift a finger when the attempt to restore to the democratic majority the authorities that were stolen from them scored a decisive defeat at the hands of an anarchistic, irresponsible, unrestrained minority?" 

Where are our pilots? Why do I know only one IDF pilot – Shai Kelach is his name – who runs from studio to studio to protest against his refusenik colleagues, those who are willing to abandon their critical roles in our military for political purposes? I am working hard to restrain myself from mentioning the names of senior and admired pilots in our circles, whose silence is enabling the refusals in the Israel Air Force to become a threat to the security of the State of Israel. Why are our senior army officers in the reserves, from the rank of Lt.-Col. and up, – aside from isolated individuals, such as Gen. Yaakov Amidror – not making the effort to sound their voices heard and organize themselves into a contra force opposing those who are willing to dangerously politicize our precious army? They don't even have to publicly support the judicial reform; all they have to do is fight against the phenomenon of desertion in the IDF. Do we not have sufficient courage to express this elementary message? 

And where are our doctors? Why aren't they demanding the resignation of the Chairman of the Israeli Medical Association, who took full, shameful advantage of his position to call a wildcat strike and thus abandon the patients for whom he and they are responsible? 

Here are two exceptions: Veteran journalist and broadcaster Kalman Liebskind announced today that he is suspending his purchases of Strauss products, after Strauss announced that it was boycotting the right-wing Channel 14.  "I am ending my monthly subscription for Tami-4 water [produced by Strauss]," Liebskind tweeted. "We want to drink water, not politics." 

 In this week's edition of Besheva, you can read an interview with a young and promising doctoral candidate who is endangering her future advancement in order to call out Haifa University's entry into politics. 

If the examples of these two would be replicated a hundred-fold or more, the chances are overwhelming that sanity will return to our country, and the State will be run by the Knesset and government that were democratically elected precisely for that purpose. 

As long as we have not tried this method, it is still way too early to declare defeat. 

Thursday, July 27, 2023

Photo Essay: Signs at the Pro-Judicial Reform Demonstration

Pro-government protesters came out 300,000 strong Sunday night in Tel Aviv’s Kaplan Square to express support for changing Israel’s judicial system to be comparable to those of normative Western countries like the USA. Bet El Institutions’ Baruch Gordon captured the slogans on the signs which are an indicator of the crowd’s sentiments. Translations to English are below each image.

Wednesday, July 26, 2023

Our Unconditional Pledge of Allegiance to Defend Israel

 by Rabbi Eliezer Shenvald, translated & by Hillel Fendel




Pilots and Officers have, tragically, threatened not to show up for the privilege of defending our country, in the mistaken thought that their pledge to serve was taken conditionally.

One of the most exciting and emotional moments in the process of young cadets joining the IDF is the hashbaah, the swearing-in ceremony. 

When the Israel Defense Forces was established (Order of the Day, 22 Iyar 5708/May 31, 1948), the General Staff instituted that every new soldier take an oath of loyalty (or simply "declare," if he is religious, which generally precludes taking an oath) as he receives his first IDF rifle and Bible. 

Israel's first prime minister, David Ben-Gurion, understood the special importance of this occasion in a democratic state. It guarantees that the soldiers are totally subordinate to the "recognized authorities" of the State of Israel, without reservations or conditions. 

Before the establishment of the State in 1948, the Jewish entity in the Holy Land was engaged in years of struggle with the ruling British – not as part of one army, but rather in separate ideological groups, such as the Palmach (part of the Haganah), Irgun, and Lechi. Such an arrangement is unthinkable in a democratic state, for there must be one single, popularly-elected, authoritative body. As Ben-Gurion himself wrote in his book Uniqueness and Destiny: "An army that is not absolutely subservient to the democratic regime of the people, ultimately takes control over the nation and leads to military anarchy."

This is why he dismantled the Palmach as an independent military organization, and ordered its integration within the IDF. This decision was strongly opposed, especially among members of the left-wing Mapam party, which felt that the Palmach should continue under the auspices of the Histadrut. Most fortunately, Ben Gurion remained firm.

It was also Ben-Gurion who very precisely formulated the oath of allegiance "to the State, to its laws, and to its authorized governing bodies." Specifically, it states: "I hereby swear and commit myself by my word of honor to maintain loyalty to the State of Israel, to its laws, and to its authorized authorities; to accept unconditionally and without reservation the yoke of the discipline of the Israel Defense Forces; to obey all orders and instructions given by the authorized commanders; and to devote all my strengths and even sacrifice my life to the defense of the homeland and the freedom of Israel."

Not for naught did Ben-Gurion specify that every soldier accept this oath upon himself "unconditionally and without reservation" – for he understood that this was not a "conditional contract" of a give-and-take nature. Rather, each soldier was to give of himself during his time in uniform to the "recognized authorities" of the State, without preconditions.

In the thick of the military campaign for Israel's independence, when the country's fate and the lives of its residents faced mortal danger, this understanding was sharpened: The soldier, a citizen of the state, enlists in a "people's army" – a "compulsory army" and not a "mercenary army," and certainly not a "volunteer army," for the protection of the State and the lives of its residents and his own family.

The soldier and the State are one body, not separate entities; an army of the people that protects and defends the lives of your neighbors, families, and even yourself. The trust it places in us, and the commitments we take upon ourselves for it, are therefore absolute. As such, there is no difference between obligatory service and volunteerism [as some opponents of the judicial reform legislation tried to claim these past weeks in maintaining that though they would not avoid obligatory service, their political stance permitted them to stop volunteering for the army]. Nor is our military service stipulated by a mutually-signed contract, with restrictions and conditions. Only mercenary soldiers sign a contract with their employers! In our case, we are obligated as soldiers of the IDF to serve, with no give-and-take and with no ifs, ands, or buts.  

When is a contract necessary? When one side refuses to recognize his obligations. This is what appeared to happen with the Tribes of Reuven and Gad when the Israelites were about to enter the Promised Land. These tribes said they wanted to settle the eastern banks of the Jordan River, and Moshe Rabbeinu feared that they wished to separate from the nation and not take part with their brethren in fighting for and settling the western side of the Promised Land. 

Moshe therefore formulated a "contract" with them that would unambiguously define their obligations to take part in the war for the Land, and never to part ways with the rest of the nation: 

"Moshe said to them: If you do the following, and go out before G-d to war, and cross the Jordan before G-d [and fight] until He drives out His enemies before Him, and [until] the land is conquered before G-d – then you may return [to the eastern bank of the Jordan River]…" (Bamidbar 32,20-30)

Moshe made it quite clear in his lengthy speech to Gad and Reuven, and to part of the Tribe of Menashe who joined them, what would be the consequences if they would not fulfill their side of the bargain. Moshe made what is known as a "double condition," spelling out both what would happen if they fulfilled the condition, and what would happen if they did not. This "contract" became the archetype of Jewish business contracts, which must include the "conditions of Gad and Reuven," to avoid any possibility of a misunderstanding, and to preclude either side from saying, "The contract says only what must happen, but not what will be if it does not happen."

Moshe, in his wisdom, understood the need for a contract with clear obligations. When it comes time to fulfill commitments, there is an inclination among those for whom those commitments are not convenient at that given time to try to reinterpret and explain the contract in an imaginary way that jibes with their desires. 

In the end, Gad, Reuven and Menashe fulfilled all their obligations in the contract, and received their inheritance in the lands of Gilad, Bashan, and environs, east of the Jordan. However, the geographic separation caused more than one incident of tensions between the 2.5 tribes and the rest of Israel; see Joshua 25, for instance. 

During these days preceding Tisha B'Av – the ninth day of the month of Av, the anniversary of the destruction of both Holy Temples and other calamities in Jewish history – we mourn not only the tragedies, but the sins that led up to them. We must be particularly mindful of causeless hatred and lack of unity, and must certainly not allow the readiness and strength of the IDF to deteriorate. As the Rambam wrote some 850 years ago about the events of our defeat by the Romans: 

"And it is for this that we lost our kingdom, and our Holy Temple was destroyed, and our Exile has lengthened until now – because our forefathers sinned and are no longer, for they found many books about astrology, etc., and did not engage in military studies and conquests, but rather thought that those things [astrology, etc.] would help them." (from the Rambam's letter to sages in southern France)

Our generation has the great privilege of being able to enlist in our "national army," to protect our very own State. Let us not forfeit our unconditional allegiance for contractual agreements that allow for all sorts of loopholes and belie our natural bonds with our people. 

Tuesday, July 11, 2023

The Siege Around Megiddo: A Dangerous Taste of the Future?

by Yossi Achimeir – journalist, former MK, translated & adapted by Hillel Fendel




Every Friday, Arab gangs from the Galilee demonstrate and protest with signs and angry chants, demanding that Israel "return the fields of Megiddo to their original owners." Will this be allowed to continue?

The Land of Israel between the Mediterranean Sea and the Jordan River is populated, as is well-known, by three different Arab minorities: 

Within Israel itself, there is an Arab minority of full-fledged citizens of the state. In Judea and Samaria, the Arab majority is under the aegis of the Palestinian Authority (Areas A and B), and in Gaza, they are a political entity unto themselves. Thus, Gaza is totally Arab; Yesha has an Arab majority and a Jewish minority of over a half-million Jews; and Israel has a 20-21% minority of Arabs. 

The Arab minority in Israel is very different than minorities in other countries around the world. Most minorities are homogeneous groups, basically unrelated to other communities outside the borders of their home countries. The Jews in America are an exception to this rule, as they are full-fledged US citizens but with a clear attachment, sentimentally and in other ways, to the Jewish State, which is of course thousands of miles distant from them.

In Israel, the two-million strong Arab population, some 9% of which are Christian Arabs, is a minority in Israel – but a part of the overwhelming Arab majority that surrounds Israel. They see themselves as "Palestinian citizens of Israel," yet an intrinsic part of Jewish-Israeli society, which itself is a minority in the Middle East.

An Israeli-Arab generally doesn't have to get on a plane to visit an Arab country or entity. He can rather take his car to go shopping in Jenin or one of the Arab villages in what he calls the West Bank, and can even easily cross the border into the Jordanian Kingdom, and feel at home there. As an Israeli-Arab, he enjoys the benefits of both worlds: He lives in the most advanced country in the region, with a standard of living higher than his fellow Arabs in other countries (except for the United Arab Emirates, of course), and is able to hop over with ease to an Arab-run society. When he visits in Egypt or Jordan, he does not hide his Israeli identity, and is even proud of it.

The Arab minority society is an important part of Israeli life. Its members are among the builders of the land, having paved roads, built intersections, skyscrapers, and even private homes, both Jewish and Arab. They are also pharmacists, nurses, doctors, lawyers, soccer players, and more. Ask an Arab Israeli if he would like to be a citizen of the "Palestinian state," and he will either laugh at you or become horrified at the mere idea of it.

During Israel's 75 years of existence, there were not many cases of Arab insurrection and riots interfering with the co-existence. Of course, the riots of May 2021 [chiefly in Jerusalem, Lod and Acre] and October 2000 were among the exceptions. Fanatic religious clerics in Um el-Fahm and elsewhere did not hide their hatred for the Jewish Nation, and incited and called for strong-arm protests and road-blockings, until they were arrested.

In truth, Islamic fanaticism was always a thorn in the side of co-existence in Israel, and this trend continues to intensify. Arab memories of 1948 are very much alive of their former homes and villages that they abandoned, never to return. Less remembered is that their Arab leaders called on them to leave their homes, so that the fledgling State of Israel could be more easily overrun and wiped out. What they call the Nakba [the "catastrophe" of their defeat in Israel's War of Independence] is constantly brought up, and is taking up more and more of the young generation's awareness and consciousness. Israeli-Arabs increasingly wave PLO flags, in solidarity with their brothers in the "West Bank" and as a signal of defiance and insolence against their home country. Not a few terrorist murderers have sprung up from their midst, using their status in Israel to their full benefit.

And in fact, the Islamist incitement in Israel has begun to bear more fruit of late. Incidents of challenges to Israeli sovereignty and its rule of law are increasing in Israeli-Arab society. No longer a matter just of frustrated individuals, entire groups now seek to instigate and provoke, taking full advantage of Israeli democracy.

And here's the most alarming phenomenon to occur, and it bodes ill, or worse, for future Jewish–Arab relations in Israel: Every Friday over the past few months, dozens of Arabs of the lower Galilee essentially besiege the southern exit to Kibbutz Megiddo in the Jezreel Valley, demanding that the kibbutz "return" them some of the Kibbutz lands. They are acting partially at the behest of the Northern Branch of the Islamic Movement, which was outlawed by Israel because of its ties with Hamas and the Islamic Brotherhood. They overrun and damage kibbutz fields, hold prayer services there, chant slogans, wave PLO flags, and threaten the residents with their presence. "If you want us to stop, return the lands," they say.

At first glance, they seem to have a point. Megiddo is in fact situated, at least partially, on the site of the abandoned Arab village Lajun. The fact that the residents of pre-1948 left voluntarily when riled up by their own leaders and told that their choice was either to be "massacred" by Jewish forces, or to help, at least in spirit, five Arab nations destroy Israel so that they could then return victoriously to their homes – all this does not, in their eyes, mar their case.

The case of Megiddo cannot be allowed to turn back history. The boundaries of Israel were recognized by the United Nations and by the nations that attacked Israel and lost. The Arabs of the Galilee have no right to besiege a Kibbutz with Mafia-style demands to "give us lands or else." What will be next? Will Arabs arrive en-masse in northern Tel Aviv and issue an ultimatum that the land on which is built Tel Aviv University – with its reputation for pro-Palestinian positions – be evacuated so that the village of Sheikh Munis can be rebuilt there? And what about Jaffa, where abandoned villas now house bleeding-heart liberal Israelis who call for "justice for Palestinians"? 

Not Paying Attention

The weekly events around the socialist Kibbutz Megiddo are not being accorded sufficient public attention. Many of those who should be taking note are too busy with judicial reform and the Netanyahu trial. But in truth, we can simply not afford to view what is happening with Megiddo as anything less than a loud warning signal as to what could happen in the future elsewhere in the country.

If the Arabs of Israel wish to continue to co-exist with us in a mutually beneficial manner, they must lay down once and for all the idea of their supposed "right of return," which basically stems from hostile Ramallah and the Palestinian Authority. If they wish to help the Palestinians establish another Arab state and also to facilitate the end of the State of Israel, they must be put in their place – and quickly.

Megiddo is an example for the entire State of Israel. If the Arab nationalist current is not halted in Megiddo, the Arab majority that surrounds us as a minority country in the Middle East will become emboldened – endangering both Jews and Arabs.

Tuesday, June 27, 2023

Taking a New, Sober Look at the Iranian Threat

 by Dr. Chaim Asa and Gen. (res.) Gershon HaCohen, translated by Hillel Fendel




The focus in Israeli society on the Iranian nuclear threat, as heard often and loudly in leaders' declarations and public discourse, seems to have reached a peak over the past two weeks. 

It is certainly true that the Iranian government is threatening the State of Israel. And it is definitely appropriate for the IDF to build a suitable, multi-capability force to deal with this unprecedented, complex Iranian challenge.

However, we would be well-advised to consider not only the potential threat itself, but also the place that this threat occupies in our national agenda, and its effect on the State of Israel's sense of identity. We should perhaps even go further and note the extent to which the trauma based on the immediate association of "nuclear Iran" with "destruction" has developed and taken dominant hold in Israeli society. Israeli leaders have hammered this into us, and recently, even ostensible security experts are singing the same tune. Why does no one stand up to them to suggest that perhaps their view of the situation is all wrong?

It would be a good idea to examine what it is about the Iranian nuclear threat that penetrates so deeply the psyche and culture of Jews in the State of Israel. Let this be an invitation to Israeli society to reflect on its unresolved tensions, rooted in the conscious and subconscious of the basis of its identity.

The War of Independence has been ingrained in the Israeli awareness as a war of existential necessity. The wars that followed did not receive the same consensus – and herein lies the tempting power of the Iranian nuclear threat, presented as inherently existential in order to rally the sought-after unity. The threat is also not based on any "fault" of ours, such as the "occupation," and therefore leaves Israel as the quintessential, blameless victim. We perceive this threat as one of annihilation, familiar to us from Auschwitz, and one that indiscriminately endangers every Israeli and therefore unites us.

Israel has not yet faced a situation of MAD (mutually assured destruction), one that comprises a built-in mutual deterrent to the use of nuclear power.  In a year or two, or maybe five, Israel and Iran might find themselves in such a relationship, or perhaps this is already the case. We must know that recent history has shown that MAD actually works! Ever since atomic bombs were dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki 78 years ago, no nuclear war has erupted, nor has any war broken out between two hostile nuclear states. 

But while the world has fundamentally changed in strategic terms, Israel remains the same. Israel is a superpower on the functional level – but not yet on the strategic level, even regionally. It must adopt a new way of thinking, not only militarily, but also politically. This transition has greater existential importance than even the Iranian threat itself.  

Another transition is also needed: Israeli experts continue to speak of the need for operational military actions to prevent Iran from obtaining military nuclear capabilities. The time has come for Israel to transition to a strategy of deterrence, rather than active prevention. Israel has the ability to create deterrence even vis-à-vis a nuclear Iran, and thus form a stable and permanent balance of power in the region. By constantly harping on the need to do away with the "existential threat," Israel's leaders are making a dangerous mistake – one that might deteriorate to a military clash that could both exact very heavy prices from Israel and also not prevent Iran from gaining nuclear capabilities. Our leaders will then roll their eyes heavenward and say, "It was a war of no-choice, of an existential danger."

But is that really true? The late great Rav Yosef Dov Soloveitchik wrote that historic Jewish identity was braided with both the Covenant of Destiny (brit yiud) and the Covenant of Fate (brit goral). Thus inspired, Jewish thinkers in the modern period, following the Holocaust  and the establishment of the State of Israel, sought to develop a Jewish identity on the basis of a common destiny and not just a common catastrophic fate. But this has not yet taken root in Israel, whose leaders over the years have chosen to concentrate on the uniting abilities of a common existential fear. Thus was born the political need for the threat and fear of a nuclear Iran.

A professional study of Iran's nuclear threat shows how non-absolute are its dangers. Even if the Iranians are able to reach their goal of building a bomb, they will have considerable reasons why they should not actually use it. And even if, Heaven forbid, they do fire it at Israel, this will not mean the end of Israel. Countries do not disappear or collapse after one strike, even if it is nuclear. Nations have gone through terrible times and yet continue to exist; witness Syria of recent years. And even if we were to be attacked, we have room to hope that our situation will not deteriorate to that of Syria. [Translator's note: Quite minimal consolation...] We can even expect that we will not only not collapse, but will emerge victorious from the resulting war with Iran.

Israel's leaders must make every effort to ensure that the Iranian threats do not materialize, and to develop capabilities for the necessary response. But it is also in our best interest to reduce our existential fears – which depend largely on the story we tell ourselves regarding the reasons why we rebuilt our nationhood here in the Land of our Forefathers.

From its very inception, the story of modern Zionism has wavered between two ultimate goals: on the one hand, the ancient objective of Israel's Redemption, and on the other, the minimalist goal of providing a safe haven for the persecuted Jewish People, as the First Zionist Congress formulated it in 1897. Over two decades ago, Gen. Benny Peled well expressed his desire to see the second goal simply evaporate: "If I were able, I would love to see the 'safe haven' goal be erased from our lexicon and from our consciousness… I would like this definition restricting a Jewish entity in recognized borders secured by external providers of funding and shelter to be deleted. I would like in its stead to see a definition that echoes the idea of the State of the Jews as formulated by Herzl, namely, 'a country of Jews in the Land of Israel, founded by Jews who grew tired of Exile and of second-class status and who are willing to give their lives for it.'"

For those who strive for nothing more than a safe haven, the Iranian threat must certainly be quite frustrating. If after all our efforts of the past century, Zionism has succeeded only in replacing the existential threats of Kishinev-style pogroms and persecution with a different type of existential threat in the form of Iranian nuclear bombs, there is no choice but to ask: "Have not the Jews in Brooklyn found a more effective solution?" The answer of course is negative, but only if we understand the true nature and purpose of the State of Israel. 

This is precisely where we must conduct the essential discussion regarding the security of the State of Israel, and not solely on the basis of risk and threat calculations. It must take a penetrating look at our founding objective and vision, as Ben-Gurion made sure to emphasize: "It is not security that is our main goal, but rather the redemption of Israel, the ingathering of exiles, and our national rising-up."

As Israelis have drifted away from awareness of our objective of Redemption, the Iranian threat has become a way for Israeli society and leadership to ignore the real challenges of our national awakening. Despite Iran's persistence in pursuing a nuclear bomb, we need to reassess whether this threat must be placed at the top of Israel's national agenda. Over the years, this placement has detracted from our efforts on other fronts, including domestically. We have all but lost our sovereignty in parts of the Negev and Galilee, which is a long-term threat on the State of Israel no less than the Iranian threat.

By focusing its political efforts on the Iranian threat, our government has enabled the U.S. to condition, even if not overtly, its support for our Iran-related demands upon our fulfilling its own demands relating to Judea/Samaria and the Palestinian Authority. This dependency has led, inter alia, to the ongoing reticence of Israeli governments to build in key areas in Jerusalem, such as Atarot.

While we have been so busy with the Iranian perils, new threats have sprouted up around us. Most dangerously, their potential to endanger us is much greater than the Iranian menace. It is time to reassess our all-encompassing concern for what Iran might have and do.