Post-War Inquiries: Where's the Inquiry into the War With Hizbullah?

by Haggai Huberman, journalist and author, translated by Hillel Fendel.

In one of the parking lots in the IDF's Tzrifin compound in Rishon LeTzion is parked a line of light trucks and full-size trucks. They are painted in a variety of colors, including some in colors of camouflage. A cursory glance reveals that some of the vehicles are damaged and in bad shape. A deeper look shows their contents: missile launchers, anti-aircraft guns, and more – last used in Lebanon to fire mostly at Israeli civilian targets.

These are most of the vehicles of the Radwan special operation forces unit of Hizbullah, whose principle mission is to infiltrate Israel's Galilee. They were captured in southern Lebanon during the short time (most of Oct.-Nov. 2024) that the IDF was present there, before retreating under the France/U.S.-brokered ceasefire.

Over the past two weeks, the Israeli press has been focusing on the commissions of inquiry into the events of Simchat Torah 5754 (Oct. 7, 2023) along Israel's border with Gaza and points further east. But we have not heard of any similar inquiries into what happened on the northern front, in the battles that took place, or that didn't take place, with Hizbullah.

The reason for this, apparently, is that the ruthless Nukhba forces of Hamas struck us a very painful blow, inconceivable even now, while the Radwan units sufficed with firing rockets from a distance. This caused damage to thousands of homes, to be sure, but they did not invade Israel in their thousands, did not murder over 1,000 Israelis, and did not kidnap hundreds of Jews.

If Hizbullah had dispatched their forces to do so simultaneously with the Hamas attack, precisely according to the original Iranian plan and as Sinwar hoped, how successful would they have been? We can only imagine it with dread. Would we have known about it in advance? Probably not – but we cannot be sure, because as far as is known, no analysis or inquiry into the northern arena is being carried out.  

Let us also recall that tens of Jewish communities and towns on Israel's northern border were evacuated for their own safety, just as on our border with Gaza. The difference is that in the south, most of the residents have returned home, while in the north, most have not.

I visited last week the exhibit of the weapons we captured from Hizbullah. We saw the Toyotas and Hyundais - the notorious pickup-trucks of the type used in the Hamas attack - equipped with 80mm and 107mm rocket launchers, the very ones that Hizbillah fired massively at Galilee communities over the past year. They were captured not far from northern Israel, in the narrow strip that the IDF occupied for eight weeks. Most of the vehicles that were confiscated were brought to Israel, and the rest were apparently destroyed.

Looking at the Hizbullah weapons and stocks in Tzrifin, and knowing that much more are stored elsewhere in Israel, one is shocked by the thought of what could have happened if Radwan had infiltrated as and when Hizbullah did.

The explanations regarding what I was seeing were given by Lt.-Col. Idan Sharon Kantar, the deputy commander of the Loot Clearance Unit. This is a General Staff unit that travels around the area and collects the equipment and other weapons that the enemy leaves behind, so that it can be investigated and studied.

Officer Kantar explains that the main differences between Hamas and Hizbullah primarily concern the way they each maintain their weapons. Both terrorist forces prolifically use Kalashnikov rifles, for instance, known as AK-47's. "The Kalash is the basic, daily weapon of Hamas," Lt.-Col. Kantar explains, "and the ones that we captured were in various stages of overuse. But in Hizbullah, they are well-kept, and we found them as new as if they had just come from the factory. Most of the Kalash's that we found were made in China, and looked brand new."

"But in Hamas, it's a different story," he said. "They don't have rifles that they're saving for war time; the guns are always in use. But with Hizbullah, some of them were still in their original packing. Most of them had the name of the user, and where he was serving, etc. – very organized."

"Another interesting thing we saw was the uniformity. In Hamas, you can see how every battalion has its own equipment – different than the other battalions. But in Hizbullah, there is a planning body that defines the same formats for all the forces. The same stickers were on all the rifles, no matter where we found them, and we also saw that there was a certain uniform ratio of weapons, cartridges and bullets to each terrorist. The level of planning in Hizbullah was much higher than with Hamas.

"Hizbullah was much more modern. Even if they manufactured their own explosives, they didn't do it in an underground lab, like in Gaza. They had organized laboratories, with bona-fide chemists and engineers working there. Hizbullah was a very organized army. Most of what we found there was not improvised, but rather originated in industrial plants, with clear instructions for use."

Lt.-Col. Kantar continued contrasting Hizbullah with Hamas: "Most of the RPG rockets of Hamas are made in Gaza, or put together in Gaza. Sometimes they take pieces from existing rockets to make or improve new ones; most of the rockets are not new. They have many that were dismantled and rebuilt by them themselves. Hizbullah, however, has money for whatever it needs; they buy new weapons, without having to put them together. In addition, there is a highway from Damascus to Tehran, and a seaport in Lebanon, and an airport of course. They were able to get whatever they needed."

OK, so now we have a much clearer picture – one that tells us how little we knew on that infamous Simchat Torah about what was actually going on beyond our northern border fence. What is now understood is that if Hizbullah had acted in tandem with Hamas that day, it's hard to even imagine the horrors we would have been tortured with.

The current inquiries are important, and help us draw the correct lessons, both operationally and intelligence-wise. But we must conduct in-depth investigations not only regarding the southern arena, but just as much – and perhaps more – concerning the north as well.

Brig.-Gen. (res.) Hezi Nehama: "Prepare for War. There Won't be a Stage II, for Three Reasons"

by Rivky Goldfinger, Besheva contributor, translated by Hillel Fendel.

Israel is at a crossroads: The ceasefire with Hamas is officially over, yet 21 live hostages (including two foreign workers) remain in Gaza, and talks are continuing. What will Israel's strategy be?

Hamas has refused Israel's offer to extend Stage I of the ceasefire-hostage-release deal. It also does not accept U.S. envoy Steve Witkoff's proposal for the release of additional hostages, in two groups, in exchange for seven weeks of ceasefire.

Israel has announced its consent to Witkoff's plan, but has made it clear that it has no plans at present to retreat from the Philadelphi route separating Egypt from Gaza. As part of its pressure on Hamas, Israel has stopped all humanitarian aid – of which several months' worth of supplies are still available in Gaza – and has also cut off electricity to Gaza. To be sure, Israel has not supplied much electricity to Gaza for nearly a year and a half, ever since the war started, but has now cut off the final supply, which powers desalination facilities there.

Israel has also made it very clear that it is preparing to resume its military campaign, and this time with the declared intention of conquering the entire Strip. Various officials have made statements to this effect, and military preparations are underway in full force, under the aggressive leadership of new IDF Chief of Staff Lt.-Gen. Eyal Zamir.

The coming days are critical to see which path Israel is to take: that of a temporary ceasefire, the freeing of some hostages, and the leaving behind of others – or war.

Brig.-Gen. (res.) Hezi Nehama, one of the leaders of the "Reserves Commanders and Fighters Forum," spoke with us just before Israel announced its absolute cut-off of electricity to Gaza. He said that what Israel is doing now is intended to exhaust the efforts to release as many hostages as possible for now, while keeping open the option of resumed warfare. "Israel is striving to achieve the two main goals of the war – both the defeat of Hamas and the completion of the return of the hostages."

Q. Even though these are basically contradictory goals?

A. "Practically speaking, the way in which Prime Minister Netanyahu has been operating over the past year and a half under all the tremendous pressures exerted upon him have led to a situation where he has both not stopped the war and also succeeded in returning most of the hostages... What is happening now is our trying to see if we can milk Stage I a little bit more, to achieve the release of as many hostages as possible."

Q. Stopping the humanitarian aid – did that even have any effect? After all, Hamas has stored up huge amounts of food, and other supplies.

A. "It's true that they have supplies for 4-5 months, at least. But when you stop the supplies for a large population, it first of all starts to cause unrest among the people and fears about what the future holds. The prices of food and goods of course will go up, and that itself creates panic among the Gazans.

"But at the same time, we certainly must stop, very soon, all water to places where we don't want Gazans to be. Water can't be stored up in Gaza. They have water in two ways: either via pipelines from Israel to Gaza, or by desalination facilities that require electricity. Israel's next move must therefore be to cut off electricity and water to Gaza."

Q. How should the next round of fighting look, from Israel's standpoint?

A. "It has to be done very differently. We will have to detach the general populace from the terrorists, and supply water only to places that Israel approves. Water must be supplied to the humanitarian camps, but not to any place where we don't want civilians. This will cause them to evacuate and enable us to fight the enemy, which will be weakened from lack of food and water.

Q. What about Israel's insistence on remaining in the Philadelphi Route?

A. We must not leave Philadelphi! If we do, Hamas will transfer hostages, live and dead, to Iran and elsewhere. Iran will put hostages at their nuclear facilities with warnings that if we attack their sites, the hostages will die. And then what – the public cries will resume that the hostages must be freed at any price and we can't bomb Iran? No, Philadelphi cannot be opened in any way whatsoever. Netanyahu insisted throughout the war on these two critical principles: the war cannot stop, and we cannot leave Philadelphi. These are of critical strategic importance, and his insistence is very correct."

Q. What do you think about the Witkoff proposal? Does it serve Israel's interests?

A. "Israel must adopt his plan and thus, first of all, to receive half of the remaining hostages. It's exactly like the question we faced regarding Stage I because of the great challenges we would face in Stage II; right now, we have to get what we can. After we do that, we can talk more about what's next. As long as we can get some hostages home, we must exhaust this option – on condition that we don't totally stop the war and don't leave Philadelphi."

Q. Is there a chance for Stage II?

A. "No, for three main reasons. One, Hamas does not have all the hostages –meaning that it literally does not know where some of the corpses are buried. Two, Hamas will never give up its insurance policy: the hostages. The terrorists will always make sure to keep some of them, dead and alive, so that it can continue playing its game and trying to remain alive. This will go on for as long as we have not totally defeated Hamas. And three, Hamas is currently not willing to cede its control in Gaza, while Israel, for its part, is not willing to allow it to have control in Gaza. This gap cannot be bridged in any form. It could be that Stage I will be extended in some way or another, but there will be no permanent agreement to end the fighting. I therefore believe that within a month, Israel will return to very strong warfare with the goal of destroying Hamas.

"We will see things in the coming battle that we should have seen before, but did not. We will see the activation of large numbers of forces at the same time – at least four divisions [each with several thousands of soldiers] – and a massive evacuation of the Gazan populace. We did see a large evacuation before, but it was not complete. There will then be a full siege on the areas in which Hamas remains, with no civilians there – and this will lead to its surrender."

The Sharp Strategic U-Turn in Our Consciousness

by Kobi Eliraz, former advisor on settlement affairs to four Defense Ministers, translated by Hillel Fendel.

Israel's current war, not only in Gaza, is not the result of a particular or individual failure. It was not just an isolated military mistake that brought about Oct. 7th, nor a temporary or even long-term intelligence failure.

It was rather brought upon us by a failed understanding – the notorious "misconception" that everyone talks about – that became entrenched in the popular thinking of many in power, and not in power, in the State of Israel. It was the dangerous illusion that concessions, appeasement, and restraint would bring about quiet and stability.

This terrible failure that brought us to where we are does not belong to just one particular government, or to one Chief of Staff or another. It is a very deeply ensconced misunderstanding of Middle East reality that developed over the course of decades of naively mistaken policy.

It was manifest in a long series of false slogans that were disseminated and became principles of our public policy. For instance:

·         "The new Middle East" popularized by Shimon Peres [and echoed, in the context of an anticipated peace deal with Saudi Arabia, by Prime Minister Netanyahu in the United Nations just two weeks (!) before Oct. 7^th]

·         "Peace is made with enemies" – forgetting that this does not include enemies who will use the "peace" to find new ways to destroy you; and

·         "There is no military solution" – leading to a situation in which the enemy continually fortifies himself, in the knowledge that our response will be limited.

Instead of reading the reality as it truly is, we became addicted to the illusion that concessions will lead to calm. At the same time, the enemy took advantage of our weakness to build himself up with a powerful military apparatus and prepare for his next offensive.

Between the Oslo Accords of 1993-95 and the Disengagement/expulsion of 2005, Israel repeatedly retreated, while the terrorists kept on growing stronger. The thought that our withdrawals would decrease Palestinian violence was proven to be downright wrong: Our departure from Gush Katif and Gaza did not turn it into the "Singapore of the Middle East," but rather into the capital of international terrorism.

Every round of fighting in Gaza over the past three decades ended with an "arrangement" – but not with a decisive defeat of Hamas. This in itself strengthened Hamas, giving it not only confidence, but also the ability to rearm, regroup, and rebuild. Our restraint in the face of Hamas rockets, tunnel-building, and terrorist attacks sent Hamas a clear message: "Israel will not fight you forcefully and you have little to lose by continuing to attack us."

This ongoing mistake of believing that we can simply "manage" the dispute instead of "winning" it has nothing to do with the lack of intelligence at any given time. It does, however, explain why whatever intelligence was received was woefully misinterpreted.

When commissions of inquiry are ultimately established to investigate what happened on and before Oct. 7^th, they must not be allowed to suffice with attempts to figure out who is most to blame for the military and intelligence blunders. The critical question that must be answered is rather: How did Israel allow this situation to develop in the first place?

The officers who went to sleep early Simchat Torah morning in the belief that the signs of an imminent attack were not substantial made a local mistake. Those who waved off the warnings of the female lookout soldiers made a worse mistake. They must all pay for them. But most culpable of all are those who led the State of Israel into deceptive "peace" agreements and who tried to sell the public false dreams of "peace for land" and insisted that there "is no military solution." These include many in academia, the media, the security establishment, and in the broad public. They helped form a reality in which Israel was perceived as weak – which invited our enemies to act against us in every way they could.

The current war must lead not only to a change in our military, but to a change in how we think. We can no longer strategize in terms of how to manage the conflict, but rather how to win and end it; no more ceasefire, but only total destruction of the enemy's military capabilities; no more unilateral concessions, but only steps that strengthen our grasp on the Land and our deterrence capabilities.

For Israel to return to strategic security, there must be a total change in our thinking, and on the ground. We must not return to the same cycle of weakness, false illusions, and baseless hopes. The time has come, once and for all, to stop hoping that everything will work out on its own – and to start shaping it the way we want with force, strength, and strategic clarity.

The Mistakes of Oct. 7th Go Back Not Five Years, but 32

by Din Milo, former Political Advisor and current Strategic and Economic advisor, translated by Hillel Fendel.

No one disputes that the governments of Israel over the years could have done things differently to prevent the events that led up to Oct. 7^th. What people do dispute is how and what exactly the governments should have done differently.

As in most of our other national disputes, this one is chiefly waged between the right- and left-wing camps. Most of the latter feels that the government did not take Hamas seriously enough over the years. They say that the governments led by Netanyahu, and primarily Netanyahu himself [who has served as Prime Minister for 18 years, beginning in 1996], armed and supported Hamas for years, while at the same time overlooking and sidelining the Palestinian Authority.

On the other hand, many on the right-wing side of the aisle look at Netanyahu's governments' military campaigns against Hamas, of which there were many, and say that they simply were not strong enough. None of the rounds of fighting – Operation Protective Edge, Operation Days of Penitence, Operation Summer Rains, etc. – produced a sound defeat of Hamas; they rather enabled the terrorists to regroup, rearm, and resume their attacks months or short years afterwards. They also maintain that Oct. 7^th was a direct outgrowth of Ariel Sharon's 2005 Disengagement plan – Israel's unilateral pullout from Gaza, including the dismantling of 22 Jewish communities and the "relocation" of their nearly 10,000 Jewish residents. They see the freeing of over 1,000 Palestinian terrorists, including Yichye Sinwar and other budding Hamas leaders, in exchange for Gilad Shalit in 2011 as having contributed as well.

To resolve this dispute, we must understand why our governments refrained from acting against Hamas as they should have. The reason is simple: the Oslo Accords of 1993 and 1995. These agreements stipulated that Israel would withdraw its forces from most of Gaza and Jericho, and would later further withdraw from many areas in Judea and Samaria.

The Oslo agreements led to a number of things, among them:

1.      When Israel pulled back its forces from Gaza in 1994, it left the Jewish residents there without proper protection, and the security forces without sufficient intelligence. It enabled the enemy to establish terrorist infrastructures and strengthen itself militarily, which led over the next few years to increased terrorism and the murder of many Israelis.

2.     The creation of the Palestinian Authority granted the terrorists the international legitimacy it had long sought. The PA police forces received professional training by American experts, as well as massive funding and weapons from around the world. Oslo paved the way for the establishment of an Arab state in the heart of our homeland.

In 2001, when Ariel Sharon took over as Prime Minister, he faced a major crossroads: Should he order the IDF to reoccupy the terror nests that had sprouted in Gaza over the preceding years? Or should he rather order the evacuation of the Jews living there, and thus finalize Israel's detachment from Gaza? He took with him to the grave his true considerations in choosing the latter. However, inter alia, it can be assumed that he concluded that it was not really possible to abolish the Oslo Accords and return to Gaza – because it would have involved too many IDF casualties, and also because the Western world would never have let such a decision pass without emplacing painful sanctions upon Israel that could have dealt us a death blow.

We thus see that without Oslo, the Disengagement would likely not have happened. The Oslo Accords of the early 90's led to Israel's total withdrawal from Gaza and Gush Katif in 2005.

As is now well-known, soon afterwards, Hamas easily took over the entire Gaza Strip, including by throwing some of its Fatah opponents from roofs. Still, as a nation we did not actively recognize the danger that Hamas represented.

When Gilad Shalit was taken captive by Hamas, masses of Israelis took to the streets – but what did they demand? Not that we return to Gaza, and not even an Israeli military operation to free him. Rather, they demanded that Israel come to an "agreement" with Hamas regarding the release of imprisoned terrorists in exchange for Shalit's freedom. As is well-known, the public pressure succeeded, and Shalit came home - as did 1,0270 terrorists, several of whom went on to murder a dozen Israelis, and one of whom went on to mastermind the Oct. 7^th massacre.

In the years since then, despite many battles, Israel never won a single resounding victory over Hamas – because we never really considered executing the one thing that would do the trick: a total take-over of Gaza. Only after Oct. 7^th has the Israeli public begun reconsidering this.

The only thing we can hope for now, after having allowed the Simchat Torah massacre to happen, is to do everything to make sure that it does not recur. To this end, we must investigate in depth the operational and political failures that enabled the travesty. The main lesson that must be learned is therefore this: "Yes, peace is made with enemies – but only with those enemies who want to make peace."

The Oslo catastrophe happened because we tried to negotiate peace with an enemy who didn't want peace, and this simply enabled him to fortify himself in our own backyard.

In conclusion, I believe that in order to make sure that the Oslo travesty does not repeat itself, we should stop talking so much about specific personages, whether they be politicians, top IDF officers, or anyone else of authority. We should instead be concentrating on the terrible policies that led us to where we are today – namely, the Oslo Accords and its ramifications in the form of Oct. 7^th and more. The current leaders of our country dare not make the same mistakes as their predecessors.

Last Week's Hamas Attacks that Mean Just One Thing: All-Out War

by Prof. Elisha Hass, member of Professors for a Strong Israel, translated by Hillel Fendel.

Last week, a most amazing miracle in Israel was widely overlooked when Islamo-Nazis placed mis-timed bombs on at least five public buses, and five other Islamo-Nazis attempted and failed to blow up themselves and their fellow passengers on the light-rail nearby. The proper approach to these events is of course to give thanks to G-d – and also to go out to war against the terrorist infrastructures in Yesha from which the attacks originated precisely as if 200 Israelis had in fact been murdered that Friday morning.

In terms of the military response, there must be no difference between 200 funerals and zero funerals. The threat is the same threat, the significance of the attempted attacks is the same, and the conclusion must be identical as well: We are in an existential war, there is no ceasefire, and war is no fun: One must storm the enemy wherever possible.

One of the attackers left a note: "Regards from the Tulkarm refugee camp." Tulkarm was perhaps once a refugee camp, but today it is a full-fledged Arab city in Samaria, very close to Kfar Saba and Raanana. Either way, it must be erased from the earth via massive air-raid bombings, without delay. Those who dream only of the release of the remaining hostages and who are prepared to absorb, to that end, additional hundreds of murdered Jews; those who don't understand that Hamas rules not only in Gaza, but also in Judea and Samaria; those who don't understand that the hostages will not be freed until we stop the humanitarian aid going into Gaza, withhold water and electricity, and open the gates of hell upon the entire Gaza Strip and any "refugee camp" that initiates terrorist attack anywhere in Israel – is partner to bringing near a very much more dangerous war in the future.

We signed an insane deal, extricating only about half of the live hostages for unprecedented concessions, including the release of untold number of murderous terrorists. This was a surrender to emotional blackmail created by the powerful and ongoing propaganda machine that was nourished by the energy and resources of enemies of Israel. The agreement caused us to lose the military achievements accomplished by our soldiers, genuinely deceiving those brave and patriotic warriors. They had sacrificed their lives to eradicate the Muslim enemy, and then came along a deal that revived this very enemy. They embarked on a war that was to be decisive, and the agreement then reversed everything, and turned the fighting into a wishy-washy "war of rounds" wherein we give some, lose some, and then try again, and again, and again.

Now is the time to stop this ongoing defeat, and set out to truly destroy the enemy, once and for all, without hesitation. It is time for us to activate our maximum firepower in Gaza, with no apologetics and without advance warnings. We recall what the Allies did in Europe in World War II, especially in Dresden [and during Operation Meetinghouse in Tokyo], and this is what must be done in Gaza. After no building is left standing there, only then should our ground forces enter again into the same places that we left thanks to the hostage release deal. An enemy who does not cease his efforts to destroy us is not one to make deals with; the principle must rather be, in the spirit of Purim, "to destroy, to kill, and to erase." This is a law of nature that cannot be ignored.  

There are two ways in which the hostages can be freed: Either we wage war to destroy Hamas and they beg and plead for a short ceasefire in order to release them, or we actually destroy Hamas and then we find and free the hostages. True, the second option means that not all of them will actually be freed alive – but we must remember that when a nation finds itself in an existential war, it sends soldiers to the front lines in the clear knowledge that some or many of them will not return. Similarly, in a profoundly ethical manner, a nation knows that in order for it to exist, it will suffer individual losses for the sake of the life of the nation. The current war in Gaza and Lebanon has cost us several hundred bereaved families – and now we have to start almost all over.

The recent failed bus bombings mean that Hamas has ended the ceasefire and renewed the war.  Hamas in Judea and Samaria is same Hamas as in Gaza. Anyone in authority who takes comfort in the fact that, by the grace of G-d, the operation failed, is disgracing his position. Anyone who does not heed this battle cry of Hamas and realize that continuing the deal to its Stage 2 means destruction of the Zionist enterprise must vacate his position.

We now have the full backing of the world's one superpower to act precisely as it itself acted in World War II, without restraints, and without distinguishing between combatants and those who are "uninvolved." As the Allies fought then, we too are righting in the name of humanity to wipe out evil. We have the unique chance to save the world from radical Islam that has thrived on the weakness of the progressive elements throughout the West and in Israel. Now is not the time to make business calculations with the murderers for the sake of receiving individual hostages in drips and drabs. We must relate to the hostages in the same way we relate to our brave soldiers, who are willing to make the supreme national and universal sacrifice for the sake of something greater than themselves as individuals.

There is no time left. The massive terror attack of this past Thursday night is a stormy wake-up call: "Forward, charge!" It was lacking only the actual funerals – but it has the same thunderous message nonetheless: "Forward, charge!"

We are no longer in the ghetto, crying over calamities that befall us. We are the Nation of Israel that has been granted nationalism and sovereignty anew, and we must act accordingly. I call on the Prime Minister to issue the strongest possible "Fire!" order, immediately, and to flatten every house still standing in Gaza, and to tighten the complete food blockade, including water and electricity, right now.

History will not forgive those who hesitate today and give preference to individual lives at the expense of the future of our national existence.